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ABSTRACT 
The pioblem selected for study is the relation between 
nuclear proliferation and international political behaviour 
with special reference to West Asia„ The problem fits in 
that area of enquiry known as strategy and national security 
stu^ -ieso For tho international political behaviour of a given 
unit of the present international system is primarily aimed 
et manipulating the best possible vehicles of strategy and 
maintaining the degree of national security without which 
survival and national interests become vulnerable to escalat-
ion-prone threatso As the present nuclear weapon states do 
enjoy a relatively better degree of national security than 
those which have not deployed nuclear v/eapons and can act more 
freely and assuredly on the international theatre,the process 
of nuclearization is likely to remain one of proliferation 
for a foreseeable future. A vertical overview of the phenome-
non sub,]ected to study reiterates the notion that the process 
of nuclear?zation is one of proliferation;from one nuclear 
weapon state in 19^ +5 to five in 1977 and a host of states 
striving for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by, various 
means» 
As the precent international system is basically composed 
of nation-states which aspire for boosting their national 
pov/er,the decision eventually leading to manufacture and dep-
loy nuclear weapons ought be viewed as a national power deci-
(2) 
sion. In consequence,the adoption of power as a frame of ref-
erence would help promote better understanding of the present 
situation and,equally,of future prospects. 
In the case of West Asia,the possibilities of exercising 
the nuclear option are governed by the same conditions that 
govern the nuclearization phenomenon in other areas. Neverthe-
less, two factors make the frequency of such possibilities 
higher than any other area. These factors are:the sustained 
Arab-Israeli conflict which is substantially escalation-prone 
and the degree of weapon-orientation of Israel's nuclear pro-
gramme. The environment in which the conflict has been managed 
since the 1973 October War could be called sub-nuclear in the 
sense that the conventional weapon systems now deployed by 
the conflicting parties have got a fire-power equal to that 
of token nuclear forces, Hov/ever,the intensity of the conflict 
and the instant damage promised by the use of nuclear weapons 
coupled with the psychological effects of the acquisition of 
such weapons might invite actual deployment of nuclear weapons. 
This explains the thesis,now abundantly presented in American 
literature on the subject -though not methodologically examined, 
that there will be a recourse to nudlear weapons should there 
be another round of fighting in the area. 
Literature on the subject is,on the one hand,considerably 
short of that ordering device which promotes cognition,safe-
guards prediction and effectuates,eventually,checks and controls. 
(3) 
This observation could be accounted for by the fact that this 
very subject is interesting and attractive for the layman;hence 
the copiousness of pseudo-scientific literature. On the other 
hand,literature emanating from nuclear vjeapon states tends to 
preach non-proliferation and diffuse apocaljrptic visions. As 
no becoming endeavour to project a Third V/orld interpretation 
has been traced,the writer committed himself to seek for a 
Third V/orld projection of the phenomenon subjected to study. 
With strategic studies still in the cradle,a methodological 
problem cropped up. No unanimity has so far been reached on 
methodology,not to speak of definitions and concepts. Besides, 
this field of enquiry -which is largely accused of embracing 
the darkest side of human life- cannot afford that empiricism 
which other disciplines enjoy. An interdisciplinary method has 
been worked out to this effect. It was necessary to assess 
Systems Analysis in its capacity as the most publicised method 
of studying problems of choice relating to national security. 
This resulted in a critique of Systems Analysis which is,in 
itself,a major contribution of this thesis. 
The study of the relation between nuclear proliferation 
and international political behaviour was initiated by a re-
formulation of the problem. The process of rofornulation 
necessitated a comperative analysis of a number of formulations 
of different orientations. To guarantee the distinguishing 
characteristic of strategic studies,the writer approached a 
(4) 
structural-operational reformulation of the problem: the acq-
uisition of weapon-grade fissile materials (WGPMs) in the 
context of a weapon-oriented programme. Two criteria have 
been suggested to verify this formulation:the deployment of 
a suitable delivery system and the quantity of plutonium 
and/or enriched uranium stockpiled. Should it be verified 
that a given unit of the present international system has 
acquired WGFMs in the context of a weapon-oriented programme, 
we ought expect a change in the international political be-
haviour of this unit due to the impact of such acquisition 
on the strategic posture and national security doctrine of the 
unit and,consequently,on its adversary. In the case of West - ' 
Asia,it has been verified that Israel has acquired VIGFMs in 
the context of a weapon-oriented programme but has found it 
profitable to invest the output of an ambiguous declaratory 
policy. 
As the problem selected for study is not self-generating, 
the reasons underlying must be understood in their diversity 
and interaction. This is the second step in our analysis of 
the problem:search. Three perspectives have been used to work 
out the search;a prestige perspective,an economic perspective 
and a national security perspective. A relation between the 
acquisition of WGEHs in the context of a weapon-oriented pro-
gramme and prestige was traced but it could not explain the 
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(5) 
entire process of nuclearization. In the case of West Asia, 
minor allusions to prestige were detected. The relation,in 
general,stems from the observation that the image of a nuclear 
weapon state is not only that of a secure state but also of 
a permanent member of the Security Council and of a totally 
advanced society. 
In an economic perspective,there is the thesis that the 
acquisition of WGFMs in the context of a weapon-oriented pro-
gramme could load to sharp reduction of expenditure on convent-
ional weapon systems. However,the two cases of the United States 
and the Soviet Union suggest that,unless coupled with a credible 
conventional force,a strategic nuclear force loses much,if not 
all,of its primary task. But this suggestion applies only to 
those powers which have developed both global interests and 
strategic nuclear forces. A token nuclear force,accordingly, 
could suffice for a medium or small-sized power to confront a 
possible nuclear blackmail or to maintain a given regional dis-
tribution of power. In West Asia,Israeli pronouncements indicate 
a belief in the economic advantages of deploying a token nuclear 
force. As regards the use of 'clean* nuclear explosives in 
projects with economic objectives,no authentic economic return 
has so far been traced though the Soviet Union,for example,has 
utilised nuclear explosives to boost underground reservoirs 
for storing gas, American R 8G D on plowshare programmes and the 
annual allotment on such programmes signify some forthcoming 
economic advantages. 
(6) 
In a national security perspective,the deployment of nuc-
lear weapons does certainly enrich military security and pro-
vide a quantitative boost to fire-power. The need to feel 
secure against a massive conventional attack or a possible 
nuclear strike plays a direct role in inducing further acquis-
ition of WGFMs in the context of weapon-oriented programmes. 
Some units of the present international system tend to present 
a particular pattern of behaviour in this respect. These units 
equate their national security with military security and,in • 
turn,speak of two alternatives:the acquisition of a huge con-
ventional force andough their major ally or manufacturing,in-
dependently, WGPMs in the context of a weapon-oriented programmes, 
As a matter of fact,an indigenous nuclear force can boost the 
independence of the N — unit as it provides for an independent 
fire-power. The problem in this regard is that the implications 
of the acquisition of Vi/GPMs in the context of a '.'OP 
are qualitative as v/ell as quantitative. In West Asia,Israel 
tends to relate the deployment of nuclear weapons to the issues 
of survival which are fundamentally imaginary. Egypt,due to 
psycho-historical reasons,does not feel any challenge to its 
survival. However,Egjrpt conceives of an Israeli nuclear force, 
whatever token,as a real challenge to its physical survival. 
This position could be used to explain Egjrpt's declaration that 
it will not be the first to initiate nuclear weapons in the 
area. 
The interpretation process is embarked upon by suggesting 
a working criterion to test the validity of a given national 
(7) 
security doctrine and strategy. It is suggested that the degree 
of affecting the behaviour of the adversary,potential or real, 
can be employed as an efficiency criterion. Such criterion has 
got one essential advantage:it would help correct the choice of 
alternatives. As the international political behaviour of the 
nation-states is pursued in a dialectic power interaction,it was 
necessary to try determine the characteristics of the nuclear 
environment within the orbit of which that interaction takes 
place. This environment has developed its distinguishing assum-
ptions. The central assunption is that the actor or player does 
evolve some proper rationality which would underlie and modify 
his behavioural patterns;thus we need not be haunted by those 
Apocalyptic visions adumbrated in literature on nuclear prolifer-
ation. It has been noted that in the present nuclear environment 
there is a marked decline of designing behaviour in terras of 
was known as the politically possible vis-a-vis the politically 
impossible. Rather,there is a set of strategic alternatives. 
The inventory of these alternatives extends from the initial opt-
ion to acquire WGFMs in the context of a WOP to the suicidal 
nuclear exchange. 
The survival of the nation-state served well as the genesis 
of national security. The validity of this genesis stems from 
the understanding of the international strategic environment as 
one of power relations against which the nation-state perceives 
of self-preservation as substantial especially when a conflict 
situation includes a sub-conflict of value systems. A sound under-
(8) 
standing of the requirements for survival would help the units 
of the system identify their proper objectives and patterns of 
behaviour. Otherwise,a decision to acquire WGFMs in the context 
of a WOP,for example,may not correspond to the power dimensions 
of strategy and national security. Israel is a case in point. 
The survival issue,as Israelizedjis faulty at core and may,conse-
quently invite a counter-Egyptian nuclearization in which case 
Israel will have but two alternatives. The firiSt alternative is 
to give in its hurried heading for nuclearizing the strategic 
environment in the V/est Asia sub-system, Israel is not likely to 
opt for this alternative in the light of the Zionist doctrine of 
which she is an embodiment,the patternised responses of the mili-
tary establishment and the faulty structure of its oocurity doc-
trine. The other alternative is to escalate the nuclear strategic 
environment from fission ^^ ""0 in-- >. ,^ - cn-o^ ,,ijteno. Despite the 
fact that such development is highly costly for Israel,the strat-
egic objectives are conditioned by major uncertainties* The 
writer has proved that no nuclear deterrence doctrine could be 
effectuated in the area because deterrence requires a dual acqu-
isition of credible second-strike capabilities which would take 
both Israel and Egypt quite a long time to form up. Accordingly^ 
the impact of any Israeli acquisition of WGFMs in the context of 
a WOP or a declared token nuclear force will only be quantitative: 
an increase in fire-power. The sole advantage which Israel might 
score from such acquisition is psychological. Egypt,on the other 
hand,should have opted for the acquisition of WGFMs in the context 
77v7/ 
(9) 
of a WOP as the application of the perspectives referred to by 
the writer in Part II,Chapter II do favour an early Egyptian 
nuclearization. It has been pointed out that the threats to 
Egjrptian national security have,for almost seven thousand years, 
been the produce of population concentration at both banks of 
the River Nile,only ^% of thfe tqtal area of Egypt, Unless this 
pattern of concentration undergoes major alterations,which would 
necessitate huge amounts of electric power needed for the process 
of urbonis at ion, Egyptian national seciirity will be in'no position 
to abfindon the geostratogic vulnotability we identified. More-
'over,an Egyptian token nuclear force may lead to considerable 
reduction in expenditure on conventional forces, For Egypt repre-
sents a special case in the sense, that its forces are the largest 
in the entire area of the conflict and they amount to some 60^ 
of the forces of a medium-sized nuclear power such as France, 
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PRjJFACE 
At 11.35 pm, on Wednesday October 24,.1973,the United 
States of America declared a world-wide nuclear alert of 
Defence Condition Three®, follov/ing an American report 
that seven Russian landing crafts and two ships with tr-
oop helicopters on the^ ir decks were spotted in East.:. 
Mediterranean waters and that signals had been monitored 
indicating that seven Russian airborne divisions v/ere on 
standby alert,(l) 
The American move came also in the wake of tigs-iaX-Gaa--. 
Israeli reports that Russian SCUD missiles tipped with 
nuclear v/arheads were moved to Alexandria* (2) Besides, 
there has been,for fifteen years, a considerable flow of 
reports and leakages on Israel's nuclear development co-
upled with q^ "'insinuation to a possible military potential. 
Moreover,strategic studies based on the lessons dravm 
from the October 1973 politico-military developments tended 
@ Defence Condition Three means that troops are placed on 
standby and av/aiting orders. 
(1) For an account of the American version,see: Sunday Times 
Insight Team; Insight on Middle East War;(London; Vikas 
Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.,197^},pp.206 - 210. See for 
commentary on same: Heikal,M.; The Road to Ramadan; 
(London: Collins,1975),pp.243 - 256. 
(2) This bit of information was refer-recl to by: Rosen,S,; 
Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East;The 
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations;Vol.1,No,3, 
Spring 1976,p.24, Polmar hinted at a similar idea. See: 
Polmar,N.; Strategic Weapons;(London:Macdonald & Jane's 
Limited,1976;,p.77. 
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to h igh l igh t th^ popp iMl i ty of pscalpt ing the c o r f l i c t 
i n t o nuclear i/Var should there be another round of f i g h t -
ing. -^•^  Consequently', the ' nuc l ea r i s sue ' was conceived 
of as prepeing on the West Asia scene, from within pnd 
from without. 
I t WPS exactly then when th-^ need for an i n s igh t in to 
the nuc lea r iza t ion i ssue became urgent and s u b s t a n t i a l . 
When contemplated, the issu<^ gained more urgency by the 
h i s t o r i c a l observation tha t the regional conf l i c t now 
unr'erw,ay i s escalat ion-prone and t h a t i t has not been 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y accomodated despi te the lappe of some thirty-
years . 
The present t h e s i s i s an academic attempt to sa t i s fy 
a fundam3ntaL ^rea of t ha t need which has ce r t a in ly not 
been academically s a t i s f i e d . 
An i n s i g o t in to l i t e r a t u r e on the subject , however r a r e 
i f comppr'-'d to l i t e r a t u r e or r'-^lated is=!U'^s, indica top a 
p r o h i b i t i v e and f r u s t r a t i n g charac te r . For i t i s heavily 
p o l i t i c a l i z e d and considerably short of the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
devic^^ which helps impose order on the phenomenon subjected 
to study. 
I t i s hoped t h a t the cont r ibut ion t h i s work makes to 
l i t e r a t u r e on tho subject , i n methodology, analysis and 
(5) An oxaffiple of such s tudies i s ; Prauger,R. & Tahtinen, D.; 
The -^uclear Legacy of the October 1975 Middle East War; i n 
Govt, of £jiZ Proc edings of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l gymposium 
on the 1973 October tVar; Wiilitary Sector; C Cairo^.Ministx-y 
of War, P.P.A.1973)5 pp«226-245. 
(3) 
conclusions will not be vieii/ed as an end, A far more sig-
nificant contribution of this work will be made if it 
serves as a sound premise for bringing the issue into 
thoughtful focus and encouraging meaningful and function-
al scrutiny. 
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s c r i p t - several t i n e s indeed - in to a nea t ly typed form. 
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hear tedly be thanked for the homely care they extended 
t o me, without which I would not have been able to work 
as I did. 
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never-ceasing encouragement and for a l l the v^orries and 
anxiety they have lieen suffering from for four perpetual 
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my g ra t i t ude for my uncle and h i s wife, Mr. & Mrs. 
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s a c r i f i c e to get the work p r in ted , and to Mr. Shiv Dayal 
for the four year t r o u b l e s , 
Mr. Eathi Osman has suffered from my never-ceasing 
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MJOLEAR PROLIFE-RATIOIM; 
A VERTICAL OYERYIW 
The p r o c e s s of n u c l o a r i z a t i o n has beon one of p r o l i f -
e r a t i o n and i s l i k e l y t o con t inue so f o r a f o r e s e e a b l e 
f u t u r e . I n Ju ly 19^4-5, the United S t a t e s , of Amorica was t h e 
only country which Vv-fnt n u c l e a r . I t s n u c l e a r i z a t i o n caff-e i n 
t h e form of a sho>v of the a c q u i s i t i o n of a n u c l e a r f i s s i o n 
'bomb' vvhich could be dropped from an a i r c r a f t t o i n f l i c t 
d e v a ? t - t i o n on ground tarGGtSkTh<^> USSR follo'ir^d s u i t i n 19^-9 
t h u s briiiftjing t o a c l o s e a l l American a s p i r a t i o n s to main-
t a i n nuc loa r monopoly which would e v e n t u a l l y p r e s e n t t h e 
(5)(5) 
world with an OA/crwholming power. The nuc lea r i za t ion of the 
USSR, shaped a f te r the national power requirements to cope 
with uhc United S t a t e s , the co-winner of World War I I , came 
also in the form of a t e s t dec lara t ion of a nuclear 'bomb' . 
Three years l a t e r , Br i t a in conducted i t s f i r s t t e s t of a 
nuclear bombc In February I960, France had i t s nuclear bomb 
exploded and China concluded the entry in to the nuclear 
@ The wri ter i s j u s t ' s t a t i n g ' a phenomenological observation 
dra"/n frOiU i v e r t i c a l overview.Reasoning and i n t e i p r a t a t i o n 
of t h i s statement wi l l follow in due course.See P a r t I I , 
Chapter 1, 2. 
@@ There i s ample ..vidonce t h a t the United S ta t e s planned, 
for some time, to maintain nuclear monopoly.The a t t i t u d e of 
USA towards Br i tp in i n ^ t h i s respect during the few years 
which followed the Nag-^ '^ sjaki and Hiroshima inc iden t s i s a 
case in po in t . Sec F i s c i e r , G„; The Non-Prol i fera t ion of 
Iluclear Weapons^ (.London: Europa Pub l i ca t i on , 1971), p . 2 1 . 
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weapon club i n 1964. Those five cases of nuclear p r o l i f e r -
a t ion r rp r - s en t one model* nuc lea r iza t ion in the form of the 
acquis i t ion of a nuclear weapon. 
In l i t e r a t u r e on these cases , no non-mil i tary fac tor 
was traC'.d as a major motive for nuc lea r i za t ion , ^on-weapon 
purposes of the acquis i t ion of f i s s ionab le ma te r i a l s csjne 
always in a l a t e r s tage. Thus the USSH could commission the 
wor ld ' s f i r s t nuclear p l an t for the gent^'^ation of e l e c t r i c 
pc ' /er only in l^^^-, fiv'^ years wfter i t had pxploded i t s 
f i r s t nuclear weapon.^ ^ The s ixth cafe i s of a d i f fe ren t 
o r i e n t a t i o n . Ind ia i s the only case of a country goirjig 
(2) 
nuclear solely for c i v i l and developmental purposes . 
I n d i a ' s nuclear explosion of May 18, 197^ embodied t h i s or ient -
at ion as i t was conducted underground in the form of a nuclear 
implosion device to help develop programmes "in the f i^ ld 
( ^) 
of mining and earth moving opera t ions . 
(1) VoskoboinikjD.5 Nuclear Power (New Delhis Peop le ' s Eub-
l i s h i n g House, 3rd Inpress ion, 1973), P'5« 
(2) This theme has been r^^iteratpd recen t ly by Mr.Morarji 
Desai, the Prime Minis ter of I nd i a , who went to the 
extent of declar ing tha t no nuclear explosion would be 
conducted by Ind ia unless i t i s found necessary for peace-
ful purposes and tha t any such explosion would be conducted 
not in secre t but In an open manner. See»'^imes of I nd i a , 
May 17, 1977, 
(3) Indi-s'p p o s i t i o n following the May 18, 197^ nuclegr expl-
osion Was presented in an o f f i c i a l statement issued by 
the Indian 5'oreign Minis ter on May 21, 197^. See for t e x t : 
J a i n , J . 5 Nuclear India;(New Delhis -tiadiant Pub l i she r s , 
197-^), Vol .11, pp. 3 3 9 - 3 ^ . 
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Tho coursG of nuc lna r p r o l i f e r a t i o n i s a l so ono of 
ouc lc - . i r i za t ion ai^ d c o u n t e r - n u c l e a r i z a t i o n , t h e deployment 
of a Mucloar fo rce and a c o u n t e r - f o r c e . This a c t i o n - r e a c t i o n 
c o u r - v-nrcts 'vhat could b - c p l l ^ d ^h^ ^^^^^^^.^^^^^^^ o-f 
s t r e c o j i o s and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y d o c t r i n e s . E v e n the f i r s t 
n u c l o a i i z a t i o n which the p r e s e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l system came 
to laao\7 i n 1945, 'vhen t h e Unit-^d S t a t e s e x e r c i s e d i t s n u c l e a r 
wscpon p o t e n t i a l 5 had i t s genes i s i n thp s u s p i c i o n s and 
apprehens ions a r o u s e d , a d m i t t e d l y fo r v a r i o u s r e a s o n s , i n t h e 
United S t a t e s l e s t Hazi Germany should go n u c l e a r . ^ 
The USSH's n u c l e a r i z a t i o n was equa l ly a r e a c t i o n to 
the n u c l e a r i z a t i o n of the United S t a t e s which b e l i e v e d i t 
could p r e s e r v e i t s n u c l e a r monopoly fo r q u i t e sometime; hence 
i t s Baruch P l a n t h a t c a l l e d f o r q s t r i c t f^ nd compl ica ted 
c o n t r o l system,^ '-' The Atomic Energy Act of 194-6 pas sed by 
(A-) For a d e t a i l e d account of t h e s e ^ p r e h e n s i o n s and o t h e r 
m o t i v e s , sees leaker, P .Ccdo) ; The iitomic Bomb; The Great 
Dec i s ion ; (Nev York; H o l t , R i v - r h a r t and ? / ins ton,1968) , 
"P 0 • 1—2. 
(5) S c fo r t oz t sUn i t ed S t a t e s .Irms Control and Disarmament 
Agency; Documents on Pisarmaffient; 1945-1959;CWashington: 
U.S . Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1969) ,Vol. I , p p , 7 - 1 7 . 
This pi-in i s sora'-timep cqll.-^d tho B q r u c h - L i l i p n t h a l P l a n . 
!\_r. o rripirtor of f p c t , t h e P l a n p r e s e n t e d t o t h e Uni ted 
l l - ' i u n ^ Commission on Atomic l^norg;}' on Juno 1451945 was 
c r j l e d uhc Baruch P lan a f t e r t h e name of t h e then US r e p -
CGcntnt ive . This p i on was based on an earlj^ier one which 
wr - c a l l e d the Achoson-L i l ion tha l P l a n , 
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thc Unitod Sta tes jvhence I.losoow was planning for a balance 
of power baped on a balance of forcos betwepn the co-winners 
of World War I I , p a r t i c u l a r l y in Europe. 
As for Br i t a in , the decision to rc>ini t ia t° the 
nuclear programme af ter World War I I was a d i r ec t r eac t ion 
bo the atmosphere of secrecy which thp 4mericans created around 
nuclear data and irformation and the signs of d i s t r u s t t ha t 
they s t a r t ed to snow in regard to fore igners working i n America's 
nuclear i n s t a l l a t i o n , ^^  'i/hil'= Francp i s lareiply b - l i ^vpd to have 
decided to exercise the nuclear option when i t r ea l i zed during 
the Suez Cr i s i s tha t the major al ly could, i f i t de s i r e s ,w i th -
(7) The Br i t i sh d-^cision could also bp accounted for by thp 
notion t h a t Br i ta in was "the f i r s t to recognise the mi l i -
t a ry value of the atom, t h a t as ear ly as April 19-^0, "the 
Maud Cormnittee was es tabl ished in Br i ta in t o explore 
the f p a s i b i l i t y of cons t ruct ing a uranium bomb" and tha t 
the 19^7 Br i t i sh decision "was accompanied by a growing 
body of Bri t is ' r mi l i t a ry th inking tha t embracpd the 
supreme de ter ren t value of nuclear power" , .» . t h a t a 
Soviet at tack against Wegitern Europe would bp deterred 
c-^spntially by the "atomic sword'. Sees Joshua,W,& 
Hahn,^o; Nuclear Po l i t i co? ^.meric-^, France and Br i t a in ; 
(Beverly Hills,CA=, USAs Sage Publ icabions , I n c . , 1973)? 
pp»8-9. 
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draw i t s support, the S'rench nuclear programme kept an eye 
open on Soviet deployment of nuclear forces in Europe. In 
the case of China, there i s the t hes i e tha t the prog,ramme was 
contpinpl qtpd soon a f te r the American nuclear bombine: of-
Hiroshima and Nagasaki? though Chinese announcement then 
tended to show the contrary. Four years l a t e r ,Ch ina had 
the United S ta tes on top of i t s l i s t of adversa r ies . When 
the USSR withdrew i t s nuclear ass i s tance to China, there was no 
a l t e r n a t i v e to the development of an indigenous programmeoNow, 
there i s a l a rge number of l i s t s of nucle&r candidates* Notably, 
c e r t a in s t a t e s ate included in a l l such l i s t s , namely?South 
Africa, I s r a e l , Braz i l , Argentina, I r a n , Taiwan, Pakis tan 
and South Korea. 
(8) For an analys is of t h i s t h e s i s see Ghosh,S5 China' s 
Nuclear l^eapon Programme and Strategy; in ; Ghosh, S. & 
Sre^dbar ( e d s . ) , China's Nuclear and P o l i t i c a l Strategy; 
(New Del hi ^ Young i s i a Pub l i ca t i ons , 1975), p.'4-8. See 
rxlsQi Gelbert , H5 Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Strategy; 
I D D I fctr3tep:ic Digest, November 1971, pp. 89-10 7. 
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II.MJGLEAJ? PHOLIFERATION mB NATIQNJIL POWER; 
The i n t o r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l behav iour of a given u n i t 
of t h e p r e s e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l systooi i s shaped a f t e r n a t i o n a l 
power i n tho sense t h a t t h e p a t t e r n s of behaviour now mani fes t -
ed i n d i c a t e t h e r33 l dimensions of t h e nation.aL power of t h a t 
u n i t . ^^ On t h o o t h e r hand, such p a t t e r n s could a l s o s i g n i f y 
t h e a s p i r a t i o n s of n a t i o n a l power i n a f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h i s does not mean t h a t t h ^ p a t t p r n s of behav-
i o u r of a given u n i t e x e r c i s e s do always correspond t o i t s 
nat ional- power. Por h i s t o r y p r o v i d e s us wi th ample examples 
of u n i t s which p a t t e r n ! s e d t h e i r behav iour wi thout e i t h e r 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e i r n a t i o n a l power o r ' t h e 
compulsions brought about by t h e n a t i o n a l power of a given 
(D) 
a d v e r s a r y . Only i f cond i t ioned by r a t i o n a l i t y and a c l e a r 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of power, t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l behav iour 
of a g iven u n i t would tend t o correspond t o t h e r e a l n a t i o n a l 
power. 
( 9 ) Por e l a b o r a t i o n , s e c : MorgenthaUjH.5 P o l i t i c s Among 
Nations? ( Galcu t tas S c i e n t i f i c Book Agency 55th E d i t i o n , 
I n d i a n Repr in t ,1975) ,pp .103-162.McClel land ' s c r i t i q u e of 
Morgen thau ' s theory i s e q u a l l y impor t an t .See :McCle l l and ,C. 
Power and I n f l u e n c e ; i n : Hartmann, F. ( e d . ) ; World i n Gin, s i s ; 
(New York:Macmil 1 an Company,4th E d i t i o n , 1973) , p p . l 6 - ' 
(10) Por d e f i n i t i o n , s e e s S y n d e r , G . ; De te r r ence and D e f e n c e ; v 
( P r i n c e t o n ; P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 5 l 9 6 l ) ,p .25»For a 
d i s c u s s i o n of t h e problems a s s o c i a t e d with r a t i o n a l i t y , 
s e e : George,A. & Smoke,R.; De te r r ence i n American Fore ign 
P o l i c y ; T h e o r y and P r a c t i c e ; ( H p w York; Columbia U n i v e r s i t y 
P r e s s , 1974) , p p . 57-77. 
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I f vicwod in teruis ^ I ' i t s d i a l e c t i c r c l - t i c n to n-^.tion-
a l .^o\.'Gr the eocision to gc nuclocjr the ducisi-'A \.v^ulu 'oy^iioccssity 
D 0 a 
l^ i ona l power docision. This wil l help us understand the motivrs 
for nuclcaEizfeticn , the impact i t 'vi l l dpve on nat ional 
powor and, consoqacntly, on tho ' ab i l i t i e s of a given un i t of 
the i n t c r n r t i o m l -^vstem to exercise p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n s of 
bchaviour.Wh-'.b i s more im.port;ant i s t b^ t t h i s view can provide 
for the ab i l i t y of assessing futiure p r o s p e c t s . l t has been 
poin*-'d out thpt tho fiv^ 0^=00 of nucl-^ar '^•eapon s t a t e s 
reprcsoat one model; nuclear iz =ition 01 strg-cegy through the 
acquisiLion oi a nuclear force, whatever toTsen. Nuclear izat ion 
for other purposes come-^  in a more advanced s tage .This ver-
t i c a l overview impl i - s the assumption thnt the deployment 
of nuclr-ar forces has got considerable bearing on na t ional 
securi ty whose maintenaince i s the prime task of the na t ion-
s ta te .The said assumption i s based on a p a r t i c u l a r understand-
ing of the r c l r t i o n between power as an a b i l i t y to affect 
otheic -^ Jid che moans of affect ing a given adversary. Fundament-
a l l y , t h i s cT^dorstandi ng i s or,--^  of th^ quant i ty of dam a^ge 
promised by the use of nuclear weapons ond, equal ly , the 
rnt io- i - l unacceptance of th--^  s-^id damage. 
J i t h the sncrp incre-^sc in energy requirements and 
the unp-, ecedc ni:-^ d dependence on more -^ nd mor-^  advanced forms 
oi c n . r ^ ' to run c i v i l and milicary machiner ies ,nuclear power 
ha'" ':^ccmc, accordincr tn •:ilmost a l l proj-^cts, an unavoidable 
a l tGrnot ivc . This on^-rgy factor has i n t e n s i f i e d the r e l a t i o n 
between nuclv a r i za t ion and nptional po^ver. -^  
The un i r s of the present in te rna t iona l system do al'vays 
aspire for whomever a b i l i t y to act more f reely and assuredly . 
The a v a i l a b i l i t y of q nuclepr fc-rce pt th-^ dispos^il of the 
s t r a t e g i s t would ce r t a in ly add to his choices of the rungs 
of esca la t ion end would equally enrich h is bargaining p o s i t i o n 
because of the q_uuic;ity of f i r^-pcvor and damage which the 
deployment of nuclear forces promia^B,This mgjces n u c l e a t i z -
a t iop 1 formidable element of na t ional power i n the context 
of tho p resen t i n t p r n a t i o r a l sytf^m 'which i s fundamentally 
(12) 
one of n t i o n - s t a t e s . 
(11) iJallQ t h i s work was being typed, Geoffrey Kemp , Associate 
Professor of Intern'-^tioT^al P o l i t i c s , P le tcher School 
of Lew and Diplom-^cy, Tufts Universi ty ,1-^3°. , USA., 
published a paper wherein he r e l a t ed the energy f ac to r 
(\/Uich he cal led the grooving importance of scarce 
resources) to tne assossmrnt of the overa l l J^orld 
s t r a t e g i c balance.Kemp explained how the energy f ac to r -
i n i t s capacity as sn element of na t ional pcv-er - could 
o i"cc tua te a nev diffusion of power,SeesKemp,G. 5 The 
HuJ S t ra t eg ic Map; Survival Vol .XIX,No. 2 ,March/ ipr i l 
1977, pp.50-59. 
(12) For e labcra t iop of the id'-^a of the n a t i o n - s t a t e as the 
un i t of the present i n t e r n a t i o n a l system,seeiSprout , 
Ho ?i Sprount, M. 5 Foundations of I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s ; 
(Now Delhi :Aff i l ia ted East-West P res s Pv toLtd . , Ind ian 
Rep "iut,196'4-) ,pp.73-7^^ See niso; Sto^ssinp-er, J . ; The Might 
of Nations; World P o l i t i c s in Our Time; ('EQ'N York?Random 
i iouser '5 ta Hdition, 1975) » pp. 7/''^ l-'^ .The wr i t e r doer Bot agree 
with S toes s inge r ' s analysis of the case of I s r a e l a£ 
pr^-sentcd on p'igc 10. 
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I I I . FJCLEilR PROLIFERATION; THE CLASH Qg 'iRGmEMS; 
On April 27? US Pres ident Carter sent a message t o the 
Congress submitting nis I dmin i s t r a t i on ' s Nuclear I^ion-Prolif-
« 
eratioR \ct of 1977 "vbereiri he declar^>d tha t the need to hal t 
nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n i s one of mankind's most p re s s ing 
challenges and tha t his aides were engaged in i n t e rna t i ona l 
d iscuss ions to find waiys of con t ro l l i ng the spread of nuclear 
explosive capabi l i ty without depriving any nat ion of the means 
(17.) 
to sa t i s fy i t s energy needs. ^^  Equally, the USSR has 
maintained an a n t i - p r o l i f e r « t i o n ^ttitud--^ and Sovi'^t l-^-^dprs 
have rendered p e r s i s t e n t e f fo r t s to see the IiPT accepted and 
(1-4-) 
implemented. While the stance of the nuclear weapon 
, stattos-^"'^^-^-'-^y ^^® super-powers, I P bas ica l ly against 
the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuclear tDchnology which could have any 
mi l i t a ry p o t e n t i a l , a considerable number of s t a t e s are s t r i v -
ing to go nuclear and have come up with counter-arguments to 
the extent ^hat some of these s taces declare t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s 
(15) USIS, Off ic ia l I'ext of Pres ident C a r t e r ' s Messages 
submi-cting the Idmi ni s t r a t i on* s Nuclear I^on-Prolif-
erat ioD .let of 1977, New Del h i , April 28, 1977, 
(14) For a comprohcnsivo review of the USSR's p o s i t i o n on 
nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n , see; LambethsB.; Nuclear P r o l -
n 
i f o r a t i o n and Soviet Arms Control Policy,IDS.I S t r a t -
egic Digest , March 1971, e spec ia l ly his d i s t i n c t i o  
between 'mani f - s t ' and ' l a t - n t ' Soviet p o s i t i o n s , 
p . 1 9 . 
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to go independently nucle,qr in capp t h p i r app i ra t ions for 
peaceful nuclear prograianies are not s a t i s f i e d . The case of 
Brazi l i s a reveal ing example. Brazil threatened to develop 
i t s O'vn nuclear technology i f i t s agreement i/^ith West 
Germany i s blocked and t h a t i t would "uni te a l l i t s forces 
i n a nat ional ef for t to achieve t h i s same technology" in 
which case Brazil would be under no i n t e rna t i ona l control 
whereas the implementation of the agreement signed with West 
Germany implies safeguards approved by the In t e rna t i ona l 
Agency for Atomic Energy. -^ '^  ^or cont rovers ia l reasons , the 
United S ta tes embarked upon some diplomatic moves to ha l t 
the agreement by v i r t ue of which West Germany undertakes to 
provide Brazil with two to eight nuclear r e a c t o r s with a 
capaci ty of 1,300,000 k i lowa t t s each and a plutonium separ-
a t ion p l a n t . In oth^r words, the agreement provides for the 
whole cycle of nuclear power product ion, from prospec t ing 
for uranium deposi ts to the cons t ruc t ion of power p l a n t s 
qnd the ex t rac t ion of weapon-grade plutoniTjm.' While campaign-
ing for Presidency, Pres iden t Garter announced t h a t he would 
t r y to block the sale of tbe v/ost Gorman fue l - recyc le nuclear 
system to Braz i l . ^ This statement angered Braz i l i ans to 
the effect t h a t the Braz i l i an Minis te r of Planning said his 
(15) See the announcement of Brazi l ian Foreign Minis ter i n : 
P a t r i o t , February 25, 1977. 
(16) Mainichi Daily News,Nov.18,1976; quoted in-.IDSi News 
Roviow on Science and Technology; Jan.1977, p . ^ 7 . 
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country would ignore Gar t e r ' s statement on the agreement 
which he described as ' f a i t accumpli ' . "^  When the Carter 
Administration ppproach<^d the Br=tzili?in Government formally 
to suspend the agreement, the l a t t e r re jec ted the /jnerican 
rcq.uest and declared t h a t Brazil wi l l hsve nuclear r e a c t o r s 
dosigi'^Qd and b u i l t by Braz i l i ans and supplied with Braz i l i an 
(17) 
enriched uranium by 1985. '^ While the ilmericans t ry give 
the impression t h a t they i n t e r p r e t the nuclear deal - des-
cribed as the biggest deal of the century because i t amounts 
to some US$5 b i l l i o n - i n something l i k e a wrong technology 
(because of the mi l i t a ry p o t e n t i a l of the plutonium separated) 
exported to the wrong country(because Brazi l has reDcc"Cod the 
KPT) i n the wrong time (because there i s no good c i v i l i p n 
reason at the time to ex t rac t plutoni\jm from used fuels only 
/ T O N 
a m i l i t a r y reason)^ , "^  the Braz i l i ans s t a t e t h a t they have no 
i n t e n t i o n of m a^icing nuclear weapons but they have not signed 
the HPT because i t r e s t r i c t s the ful l range of nuclear tech-
(15) 
nology to f ive s t a t e s alone.^ •^^  The case of Brazi l ind ica tes* 
the re fo re , t h a t the arguments presented by the p resen t 
nuclear weapon s t a t e s - the super-powers in spec i f i c - i n 
favour of non-pro l i fe ra t ion are not accepted by the non-
nuclear s t a t e s . Equally, the nuclear we^on s t a t e s r e j e c t 
the a sp i r a t ions of the nuclear have-nots.Th^ crux of the 
(17) Tribune (Chandigarh), Feb. 16, 1977. 
(18) The Economist. March 19, 1977-
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problcu docs co r t a in ly l i e somGwhcrc between theee juxta-
posed p o s i t i o n s . 
The clash of arguments heat imposed i t s e l f on t h a t 
f i e ld of enquiry known as s t ra tegy and nat ional securi ty .The 
major reason undprlying t h i s observation i s t ha t nuc lea r i z -
at ion must h-'ve got some rel-^tion to n- ' t ional power in terms 
of enriching s t ra tegy and onh'^ncing nptionql secur i ty . 
In l i t o r a t u i e on the subject there i s n common trend 
to divide nuclear progmmmes in to peaceful and non-peaceful. 
Ho.vcver, some leading cont r ibu t ions to l i t e r a t u r e on tDe 
subject h-^vr pt-^rt^d to indic-^tp cl^-^rly thsit th.o teohno'ro'gxcal 
base j'oq.uircd for the manufacturing of nuclear we?5)ons i s 
exactly the same requi r rd for what i s ca l led the peaceful use 
(19) 
of nuclear power. Gonsequontly, the apparent increase 
in the production of f i s s i l e mater ial a l l over the world 
does promise a m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l . ( See Appendix 1^1)* 
I f going nuclear i s deoiaibed as a so lu t ion to a c r i s i s 
i n energy requirements, there i s no reason to ru l e out the 
m i l i t a i y p o t e n t i a l . 5'or energy i s the one alement of nat ional 
(19) Reference i s made here to the pub l i ca t i ons of S . I . P . R . I . 
e spec ia l ly : Nuclear P r o l i f e r a t i o n Problems; ( Stockholm^ 
Almqvist and Wiksoll , 197^). See also the In t roduc t ion 
to Chapter I of: Barnaby,P. 5 The Nucl ear Age; ( Stockholm; 
Mmqvist and Wiksell I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 197-^) » PP' l-2» 
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po<vcr which i s fundampntal for the survival of the modern 
na t io i i - s ta to whether during mi l i t a ry opera t ions or peace t ime. 
The so-cal led nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n should in conseq-
uence iDe viewed in t o t a l i t y as such inhe r i t ed and equally 
a r t i f i c i a l d iv i s ions wil l load liut to an unbecoming approach ' 
to the understanding of the problem. I t has been pointed out 
t h a t var ious forms *-*^  "'^ '^ ® nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n phenomena 
are re la ted to nat ional powr-r and pccordingly to the regional 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of power which wi l l eventually affect the global 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of power. This would p a r t l y explain the p o s i t i o n 
adopted by the super po-vers on nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n . 
The r e l a t i o n between nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n and nat ional 
secur i ty and s t ra tegy could only be accounted for , t he re fo re , 
i n a power context . Mi l i ta ry-wise , the acqu i s i t ion of a 
nuclc-'^r forco i s gonorally bolipvi-^d to be lead ing to consider-
able reduct ions in conventional forces which have become qui te 
cos t ly . Such acqu is i t ion may also i n h i b i t or de ter an adversary 
from launching an a t tack , conventional or nuclear .Energy-wise, 
thoro i s a growing awareness t h a t by the time f a s s i l e fuels wi l l 
bo in no p o s i t i o n to sa t is fy any reasonable demand for 
energy -• most prcl^ably by the end of t h i s century - nuclear 
energy wil l be the sole r e s o r t . For those count r ies which 
presen t ly face acute energy problems, the hurried nucle.-^ia^ 
ation uf t h e i r enrrgy generating suppl ie r s poses i t s e l f as an 
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unavoida"blc a l t e r n a t i v e . For those count r ies whicb have 
exhauscod t b o i r energy resources , th^ Qonstmiction of nuclear 
power g ta t ions i s equally unavoidable.By the end of 1975, 
19 countr ies h^d 168 nuclear r e a c t o r s with an i n s t a l l e d 
cspaci ty of over 73 mi l l ion Krfs. By 198O the number of such 
r eac to r s in 29 s t a t e s i s expected to increase to 345 with 
an i n s t a l l e d capacity of some 220 mi l l ion K'7s.^^^ Economic-
al ly , the promises of nuclear power i n ag r i cu l t u r e , i ndus t ry 
science and technology and, in a l a t e r sta^e in t rade and 
tocbnology do ce r t a in ly i n s t i g a t e any n a t i o n - s t a t e to go 
nuc lea r .P res t ige -wise , though the w r i t e r tends to exclude i t 
i n a study l i k e t h i s , nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n acquires some 
more impetus, The obsprvation t h a t thp p resen t pprmanpnt 
members of the United Nat ion ' s Security Council are nuclear 
weapon count r ies i s the maDor p r - s t i g e fac tor c i ted in t h i s 
r e spec t . 
(20) S . I .PR. I . ; World Armaments and Disarmaments;(Stock-
iO-mqvist and Wiksell , 1976) , p . 4 2 . See also 
(i'ippcndix ) which shows the p resen t and forthcoming 
pono t ra t ion of nuclear r e a c t o r s for the generat ion 
of e l e c t r i c power. 
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Nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n , as a phenomenon making i t s way 
i n tho p resen t i n t e rna t iona l system, i s more and more impos-
ing i t s e l f . Howpv-'-r, l i t e r a t u r e on the subject does not seem 
to have provided for a proper pe r spec t ive and understanding 
of t h i s phenomenon so as to meet the ser iousness with which 
the phenomeriGn bl-qzes its-^lf for th . 
x A H T I s RSSS/.IiCH TOOLfi, ?TCTHCJDLOGY . .NS S U 3 S T ; J I 0 E . 
P:UIT I ; o.i;j?o:EE i§ RESERCH TOOLS. 
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^ • I . I ' * THE PaQBLBTi SELECTED RJxi STUDY; 
Tbo problpra ppl-^ct^-^d fo r t h i p etudy i s t hp r e l a t i o n 
botwGon n u c l o a r p r o l i f e r a t i o n and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l 
behaviour .Tho problem f i t s i n t h a t a r ea of enqui ry kno.vn as 
stT'auOgy nnd n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y s t u d i e s * 5*or t h e i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l behav iour of a given u n i t of t h e i n t e r n p t i o n a l 
system i s p r i r a a r i l y nimed a t m a n i p u l a t i n g t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e 
Veh ic l e s of t h e s t r a t e g y designed and m a i n t a i n i n g the degree 
n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y wi thou t which n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s become 
vxilnerablo t o e s c a l a t i o n - p r o n e t h r e a t s . 
The problem s e l e c t i o n had i t s t h e o r e t i c a l p r emise i n 
t h e fnc t t h a t as tbn course of tbp nucle^ir op t ion h=)F b^eji 
one of p r o l i f e r a t i o n , t he assumption t h a t an e x e r c i s e of such 
op t ion would boos t both t h e p o t e n t i a l v e h i c l e s of s t r a t e g y 
and t h e natiuuuo. s e c u r i t y of a given u n i t has r e c e i v e d much 
more r e i t c r a t i - ^ n than examinat ion . The r e l a t i v e s e c u r i t y 
cnvjoycd by t h e n u c l e a r wo^on c o u n t r i e s , t h e i r permanent 
membership of t h e U.N. Secu r i t y Council, t h e l a r g e r a l t e r -
n a t i v e s they have fo r behaving on t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t ^ g e aBd 
bhc p romise s of t h e n u c l e a r technology p o t e n t i a l have been 
t h e mador sou rces of t h e r e i t e r a t i o n of t h e said assumption. 
On tho o t h e r hand, non-examinat ion has r e c e i v e d impetus from 
t h e widely spread n u c l e a r 'my ths ' a s s o c i a t e d with t h e energy 
p romises and tho unprecedented d e s t r u c t i v o n e s s of n u c l e a r 
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weapons. 
L i t e r a t u r e on the subjet emanating fruui near nuclear 
count r ies i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y of the ?it)Ovr—mentionpd 
t rend . On the other hand, l i t e r a t u r e cuaiing out of the 
p resen t nuclear powers i s fu l l of p seudo- sc i en t i f i c attempts 
whose danger l i e s in the fact t h a t they are s c i e n t i f i c a l l y 
wrppped-up. 
As the present i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i s one of nat ion-
s t a t e s , the nat ional dr ive s t i l l p r e s se s on st^itesmpn, and 
equally on s t r a t e g i s t s , (3uring the various s tages of decision-
mking for i n t e rna t iona l behaviour; for nationalism i s s t i l l 
believed to be the major source of social energy. iVs long as 
some of the regional c o n n i c t s t h a t have not been resolved 
and the iMorna t iona l c r i s i s - s i t u a t i o n s carry one sh^^^e or 
another of nationroLism i s s u e s , the dr ive for enhancing and 
enriching nat ional power gains urgency.In the context of the 
involvement of nat ional ism, no non-power cons idera t ions can 
be of weight and the posisi b i l l t i e s uf stepping up the ladder 
of esca la t ion t i l l the u^o of force becomes a mat ter of 
m i l i t a r y decision r a t h e r than of a 'grand s t r a t e g y ' t o o l . I t 
i s the very stage where oi l the components of the armed 
arsenal are mobilised. 
Despite ' d e t e n t e ' ?and the numerous desc r ip t ions of a 
balance of power depending upon a balance of the so-ca l led 
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s t r a t e g i c forces or second-str ike c a p a b i l i t i e s , the mere 
acquis i t ion of nuclear force, whatever tuken, implies t a c i t l y 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s deployment in b p t t l e - f i e l d , ^^itb 
the sfcructurcj quant i ty , and qua l i ty of the now ava i lab le 
nuclear forces , the spread of such iweapons ought be ser ious ly 
contciTiplated, bat not a f te r e th ica l p a t t e r n s , at l e a s t i n a 
study l i k e t h i s . The study of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , and of 
s t ra tegy and nat ional securi ty branches in spec i f i c , i f des i r -
ed to be functional and opera t iona l , must be conceived as a 
study of power and power r e l a t ions .The problem selected for 
study i s , the re fore ,o f a 'power' frame of reference . 
Previous attempts at hqndling the problem give the 
impression t h a t there i s a body of problems a l l of which are 
adhcnsively in t eg ra t ed , not ' aJ ' problem.'/Vithin t ha t body of 
problems, i t seems qui te a d i f f i c u l t task to iden t i fy the 
p r inc ipa l problem from secondary problems. In an academic 
study, s e l ec t ion , consequently, becomes a must.Not only the 
se lec t ion of the problem but also of the frame of re ference . 
In t h i s study, the wr i t e r will always s t ick to the problem 
selected as a p r i n c i p a l problem. I f any other problem appears 
or i s subjected to ana lys i s , i t wi l l eas i ly d i s t ingu i shab le 
as secondary. On the other hand, the commitment to 'power' as 
a frariic of reference a l l through shal l help maintain the 
inner unity and harmony of the ana lys i s . 
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1.1.2s SCOPE 
The scope of the problem covers an area extending bot-
WGcn power and surv iva l . In t h a t area, a major i n t e r a c t i o n 
tsICGS p lace between the need of a given un i t for phys ica l 
survival and i t s power capf^ble of or required to sa t i s fy t h i s 
spec i f ic need. I f s a t i s f i e d , physical survival p a r t l y gives in 
some of i t s urgency to whpt i s communly known as the welfare 
of the socie ty . The search for and promotion of the welfare 
of the society enriches the need for power. In t u rn , the 
society wi l l feel l e s s secure. Lnd the chain i n t e r a c t i o n 
goes on. 
The need for enhancing nat ional power, therefore rep-
r e sen t s a continuum of ac t ion- reac t ion dec is ions . At l e a s t 
country-wise, the course of nuclear development has proved 
t o be one of ac t ion- reac t ion ever since the Soviet Union 
brclce the Americ?tn nuclear monnpr^ly in 19^9* In t h i s context , 
the o r ig ins of i n s t a b i l i t y can be marked and several at tempts 
have indeed been successful i n iden t i fy ing such origins.On 
the other hand, the p resen t i n t e rna t i ona l system does 
c e r t a i n l y enQoy r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y . I t i s easy to e n l i s t 
qu i te a good number of wr i t ings on the subject which deal 
with or hint at t h i s r e l a t i v e s tabi l i ty .Some con t r ibu to r s 
have oven gone f a r t he r to speak of the world of the seven-
t i e s as more s t ab le than t h a t of the s i x t i e s . 
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fhe scope of the problem selected for study i s , there-
fore, of an interaction character. To conceive of the scope 
as Fuch would ensure a dynamic understanding which, in turn, 
will make i t re la t ively easy to predict for a foreseeable 
future. 
As for the nature of the scope of the problem selected, 
i t i s two-fold in the sens'^ that nuclear prol i fera t ion i s 
both a national posit ion in the frame of national strategy, 
and, in the seme time, i s par t of a biggpr assembly of 
phonomiona consti tuting the in te rna t ioml environment. 
To distinguish nuclear pro l i fe ra t ion , the posi t ion, 
i t i s necessary to define i t ,^s a concept, \7ithout def-
in i t ion , the an'^ilysis will be short of one of i t s subs-
tan t ia l tools ; i . e . , the concept. In the very case of nuclear 
pro l i fe ra t ion , the concept i s almost missing in a consider-
able pa r t of l i t p r a tu re on thp subjpct. This fact can be 
explained in terms of the degree of development of such 
scudieSoKow i s the time to try distinguish the phenomena 
with the help of a working concept, especially in the l igh t 
of the remarkable increase in the number of specialised 
research centres and, equally, the ver t ical increase in the 
topics and aspects dealt with^and the calibre of those 
scholars working on the subject. (In India, e .g . , five 
centres are dealing now with^the problem and associated 
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i s s u e s : a) The Indian I n s t i t u t e for Defence Studies and 
Annlypes, b) Thp Indian Council of World A-ffairs, c) The 
Schocl o£ Internat ional . Studies at J.N.U. , d) The Depart-
ment of Mil i ta ry Studies at Poona Univers i ty , and e) The 
United Services I n s t i t u t i o n which i s e s s e n t i a l l y an Armed 
jFo-Tces I n s t i t u t i o n . ) -
As p a r t of a bigger assembly of phenomena c o n s t i t u t i n g 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environm'-'nt, nuc l ra r p r o l i f p r a t i o n should 
mean a pol icy decision re l a t ed to a numoer of assumptions 
and condi t ions about the ro l e i t should p lay as a vehic le 
th 
Of s t ra tegy and the ro l e the N "  country envisages to play 
on the i n t e rna t i ona l stage.These assumptions and condi t ions 
do not spring only from the elements of power tha t a given 
un i t of the in t e rna t iona l system possesses but also from 
the elements of power possessed by an adversary and, equally 
the powcr r e l a t i o n s governing the i n t e rna t i ona l system at 
a given time» 
The scope of the problem selecced for t h i s study i s 
influenced by thp u t i l i t y fVictor.Tbp nuclr-ar option,wb'^tbpr 
i n acquir ing the basic know-how or in weapons procurement, 
i f exorcised, has a t a c i t assumption t h a t t h i s pai^t icular 
forra of power can be used - ce r t a in ly under speci f ic 
condi t ions . Although t h i s fac tor i s general ly r e l a t ed to 
the i s sue of the use of force, the ' nuc lea r ' qual i ty i s 
in no way an ordinary force ah i t s effect i s s u e s do so 
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easily t;ouch the very physical survival of nations,Regard-
l e s s of the ne^d to show a willingness to use nuclear forces, 
the strategic and national security doctrines of both the 
super-powers s t i l l show, at l eas t implici t ly , some degree 
of reluctance in directing a f i r s t - s t r i k e nuclear attack.They 
are trying to keep up the i r f i r s t - s t r i k e oapfebilitlGs, .and 
maintain a credible second-strike, but that reluctance i s 
thofe in the i r s trategic and national security doctrines as 
will be shown in due course. Another issue related to th is 
u t i l i t y factor i s the responsibil i ty issue.Whereas the present 
nuclear weapon countries have become of the habit of accusing 
non-nucloar-woapor countries of i r responsibi l i ty of in te r -
national po l i t i ca l behaviour, the l a t t e r countries have r a i s -
ed a finger back and gave evidence of the i r abi l i ty to bo 
consciously responsible and to exercise se l f - res t ra int .But 
the IFFUC i s s t i l l unsolved and has come to have bearing on 
the tra^nsfer of advanced technology, the supply of f i s s i l e 
materials and nuclear fuel needed for exclusively 'peaceful' 
prograinmes. A third issue related to the u t i l i t y factor i s 
that of wil l : the will to use nuclear weapons and, i f used, 
the will to launch a more destructive, even fatal s t r ike . 
I t should be quite clear that t h i s i s not the issue of 
whether war should be l e f t to the generals or not.The will 
issue i s much more elaborate and complicated as i t i s relate,d 
to the inner build-up of a nationj i t s psychological s t ructure, 
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t h o oboec t iveso f t h e e l i t e , t h e f a r - r e a c h i n g goa l s of t h e 
socio-oconomic systxxis and i t s p e r c e p t i o n of i t s r o l e i n 
c i v i l i . 'a t ion a t l a r g o . 
As f a r as V/ost Asia i s concerned, t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
e x o r c i s i n g tho n u c l e a r op t ion are governed by the vory 
c o n d i t i o n s governing t h e n u c l - a r p r o l i f e r a t i o n phenomenon 
i n any o t h e r r e g i o n , Jr^t, tvvo f a c t o r s seem t o make tho f r eq -
uency of sucb p o s s i b i l i t i e s h igher than t h o s e of any o t h e r 
r e g i o n , naiaelyj t h e su s t a ined A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t and t h e 
degree of w e a p o n - o r i e n t g t i o n of I s r a e l i n u c l e a r programme. 
As f a r as t h e f i r s t f a c t o r i s concerned, t he p r e s e n t and f u t u r e 
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of Egypt i n terms of the human e lement , p o p -
u l a t i o n , {pross- ' r p t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n , s t r i k e - c o n t a i n m e n t 
cap.-sity, should be given c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n . As r e g a r d s 
the second f a c t o r , t h e r e should n e i t h e r be e x a g g e r a t i o n nor 
o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n as t b ^ ' v r i t n r ' s readine" of l i t o ^ a t u r e on 
I s r a e l ' s nuclee^r developucnt has shown a major f a l l i n t o one 
of t h f s e two drawbacks. 
I . I . 5: AJ^ ALYSIS AND DAT A.-G<lT.Tn]HIIJG LIMIT <lTIONS; 
The l i m i t a t i o n s of da t •^-ga ther ing and a n a l y s i s faced 
by t h e w r i t e r ought be not'-d as they can shed l i g h t on t h e 
p o s s i b l e means of d e v e l o p i n g ' of f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h work on 
t h e Euboocts 
(1) L i t e r a t u r e on the sub j ec t i s c a t e g o r i c a l l y sho r t of 
t h o t e s t a b l i s h e d oinpir ical approach expected to have 
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p r a c t i c a l ends. Thie has ne tura l ly led to considerable con-
cen t ra t ion on theory and theor i s ing . Though the wr i t e r does 
not deplore the nor-avai l a b i l i t y of an empirical spproach, 
i n fac t no human being does, he w i^shod there could have been 
a degree of ob jec t iv i ty much more than tha t found i n l i t -
prpiturc on tbo subject . 
'Vhcn Herman Kahn -cried to enforce empiricism on his 
anaLy^i^s, the mate r i a l s of empiricism were c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y 
very few and had very l e s s to do with a l l the elements of the 
problems. On analysing c i v i l defence in the nuclear age ( A. 
Report on a Study of Non-Military Defence,RAND ReportsR-322-
RC!) , Kahn's empirical mate r ia l s were: 
a. 3 numerical statement of ' pe rmiss ib le peace-t ime 
s tandards ' for esposure to r a d i o a c t i v i t y , 
b. statements of expected e f fec t s of nuclear a t t a cks , 
c. an est imate of the e f fec ts of r a d i o a c t i v i t y on llfr^ 
shortening, 
d. an estimate of the expected incidence of bone cancer 
duo to the ±a l l -ou t of Stronium-90, and 
c. quantifiedition of selecned aspects of American 
economy during the f i f t i e s . 
I t i s c l ea r t h a t Kahn* s ma te r i a l s were not s t a t i s t i c a l 
p r e sen t a t i ons aimed at ver i fying thi^ assumption in quest ion. 
No scholar , of course, would wait t i l l a r ea l nuclear exchange 
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occurs eiiC then apply his techniques. We do not have to seek 
for u t t e r pe r fec t ion in t h i s very ste^e of the development 
of s t r a t e g i c and nat ional securi ty s tud ies . Equally, ive do 
not have to enforce ostablisbed techniques except when the 
l o g i c a l l y poss ib l e data avai lable or when such s tud ies devel-
op i n t o c redib le computations. 
(2) Sources of br3sic da"ca are hardly or ig ina l . Informat ion 
r e l a t i n g to a giver count ry ' s s t r a t e g i c pos ture i s , in a l -
most a l l cases , avnilMblr in sources re leased by i t s adver-
sary. There i s cer ta in ly no claim against uiicclci.f3ing' 
f^ripls on strateo-ic lonptur^s. But no i np lys i s cp^ ^^ ver i f ipd 
except "t^ i^  iJ-Gh- -che present pustiores. In the case of r e l a t i v e 
a v a i l a b i l i t y , as t h a t of the Unired S t a t e s , tdei?e i s al^ .1^ ays 
a need to u;,.'^^-'tc the posture data subjocted to anqlys is . 
'flh-^n the wr i t e r wp' working out tho f i m i icduCrions o^f -fchis 
rescprch, t he re c^ ime the repor t t h a t the United S ta tes moved 
in to the hard'vare phase of developing a more po'verful, more 
accurate IGBM which i s supposed to replace the Minut'^man 
mi se i l e s , for f i f t een years have been the backbone of 
American nuclear de te r ren t force. With t h i s development, the 
SilLT are cxpi-^cted to bp affected p? th^ deployment of th^ now 
generation of ICBM, repor tedly cal led Missi le X, r epresen t s 
a move toward mobile ICBM in a time when the Si\LT monitoring 
means depend upon reconnaissance s a t t e l i t e photographs of 
m i s s i l e s i l o hol'-s. A s imi lar s i t u a t i o n arose when Soviet 
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Communist Pa-ty l eade r , Leonid Brezhnev warned of the 
posFible appe^ranc'^ of a puppr-wpspon 'v^icb could !)<=> morp 
d '-s truct ive than nuclear weaponso 
(3) To maintain the p red i c t i ve power of the study, i t was 
nacessary not to allow a b i s t o r i c a l tendencies an ample 
room though in tho case of such s tud i e s , the ana lys is 
of ava i l ac le present- t ime data encouragas, to a l a rge 
extent , these tendencies as they are e a s i e r to ver i fy . 
(4) The r e l a t i v e scarci ty of o r ig ina l con t r ibu t ions to 
the f ie ld has inevi tably led to concentrat ion of the 
few or ig ina l works wr i t ten by acknowledged spec ia l -
i s t s . P h i l i p Green's The Deadly Loo:ic, though in i t s e l f 
a con t r ibu t ion , i s pr imari ly a discussion of one of the 
works of Herman Kahn - On Thermonuclear War, r a t he r than 
a work on th? th 'ory of det^rjr-nce. 
(5) The lack of organization of ava i lab le sources. 4t the 
General Library of Jawaharlal Nehru University i tems 
l i k e strategy- or National Security w r e excluded 
from the subject-A/ise ind°x t i l l a helpful ' Issis-
tatit L ibrar ian i n se i t ed some items to help the 
wr i t e r . Works on the subject are only to be t raced 
through the author-wise index si^'ce the Alphabet-wise 
index of t i t l e s i s misleading. 
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6) Hundreds of extremely va lupb lo rc-soarch p a p e r s a re 
inc luded under ' c l a s s i f i e d inferrngt ior i ' whether i n I n d i a 
or a"broad, 5ver t hose very f •^w p a p e r ? t b n t the w r i t e r 
has come to road wore not be ased as r e f e r e n c e m a t e r i a l s 
fuc to t h e i r c l a s s i f i e d ngiture.. 
7) This v^TY fi-"1^1 of stu'^Vo ir^tc^v pti'ne: ns i t i s from tho 
la5"iian's p o i n t of vie^w, has been v u l n e r a b l e to p seudo-
s c i e n t i f i c a t t e m p t s , /hen the w r i t e r cummenced on da tp 
g a t h e r i n g , i t was q u i t e a d i f f i c u l t t p sk t o d i s t i n g u i s h 
vjorth r e a d i n g works e ,?pecial ly i n case of secondary 
s o u r c e s . 
8) As f a r as tr-rminology i s concernrd , s'^veral t:erms have 
not y e t bnen d e f i n - r , and - i f def ined - t he d e f i B i t i o n 
has n e t y e t ga inrd consensus or i s used t o f i t i n t h e 
c o n t e x t j f one study on ly . Some terms axe not even 
avai labl-^ in th^ dic t ionar i -^^o 
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1.1.42 FIELD SPECTfiLISATION ENVIRQLMENT; 
A look at any sample of w r i t i n g s on the s u b j e c t would 
soon r^^vpal t h a t t h e r e i s a cpl i 'brp of escperts 'vhose c o n t r i b -
u t i o n s f a l l mainly under ' s t r a t e g i c and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y ' s t -
u d i e s . ?/ith t h e no t ion t h a t s t r a t e g y and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a re 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y concerned with means r a t h e r t han ends , r e a l i z -
a t i o n of o b j e c t i v e s r a t h e r t han dec i s ion -mak ing , i t becomes 
q u i t e c l e a r t h a t s t r a t e g i s t s and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y e x p e r t s a re of 
a rec i -u i tment d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of s ta tesmen and p o l i t i c -
i a n s . I n t h e same way, they a re not m i l i t a r y e x p e r t s , even 
when they touch m i l i t a r y a s p e c t s or they were o r i g i n a l l y army 
o f f i c e r s . Equa l ly , they are not mere academicians or s c h o l a r s 
of a d i s t i n g u i s h e d d i c t i o n . Also they, a re not economis t s 
'^ven though they might r e s o r t t o t h e c o s t - e f f e c t . r,i"jr"r,ch. 
o r t r y t o economise s e c u r i t y d o c t r i n e s and s y s t e m s . ! sample 
of l o a d i n g f igarcE i n l i t e r a t u r e on the s u b j e c t shows bhat 
Thomas S c h e l l i n g was an economis t , Henry K i s s i n g e r a 
h i s t o r i a n , Herman Kabn a p h y s i c i s t , Andre Bcaufre an army 
o f f i c e r , Leonard Beaton 3 j o u r n a l i s t , 41bprt ^ ' ' /ohlogtetter a 
ma themat ic ian , K.Subrah anyam a Chemist, Bernard Feld a 
p h y s i c i s t and John Garnet t a p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t . 
The r i s e of t h i s very g e n e r a t i o n of s t r a t e g i s t s and 
n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y e x p e r t s can be observed from t h e focus of 
t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s . I n a s e n s e , they r e p r e s e n t t h e f i r s t 
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generation of nuclear s c i e n t i s t s as they s t a r t ed con t r ibu t ing to 
the subject a f te r the i n i t i a t i o n of nuclear weapons. The 
special importance of t h i s group of nuclear s t r a t e g i s t s i s tha t 
they have l a id the foundation for , perhaps , the most in f luen-
t i a l branch of study in the post-World I I era-
liver pinco th« inH lo t ion of nucleqr weapons in 19^'^, 
decision-makers have come to the conclusion or ~ r a the r -
obliged t o , tha t th.^ planning of a ns t ion l secur i ty doctr ine 
-nd the dcbit£n of a 'gr^nd s t r a t egy ' are two t a s k s , which 
can be implcmpnted separately ne i the r by t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t -
i c i a n s nor by mi l i ta ry p ro f e s s iona l s . This development was 
b'^.sic-illy due tos 
p) thp r e a l i s ^ t i o r tha t the concept of nat ional power has 
undergone abrupt changes and t h a t i t was no longer dacided 
by mi l i ta ry power a lo re , =nd 
b) the r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t w^sr, in a nuclear context , has become 
no more a means of pol icy and tha t ther^ should be some 
other a l t f -mat ives for the use of modern woaponflry, 
especia l ly through the non-use. 
Those who s ta r ted worlcing on the subject along these 
l i n e s were mostly c i v i l i a n s , oven though some of them were of 
a mi l i t a ry background»The moment they embarked upon such 
s tud ies depending upon an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y npproach, they 
belonged to the C'^libre of c i v i l i a n exper t s . I^ he two French 
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GQTKXPIS Andre Bpgufre and Piprrp Gal lo is are good pxamples 
of thir- dovelopmont. 
Klaus Enorr , in his foreword to ON THEB^ lQ ITU CLEAR tfAR 
admits tha t the confrribution of thope c i v i l i a n export? to 
the ai'ialysis of mi l i t a ry problenis since »Vorld #ar I I has 
been ' 'unprocedcntly l a rge in volume and high in qual i ty" .^ '^  
The a l lus ion i s , b f^ ica l ly , to the con t r ibu t ion of Herman Kfehn 
'Nhosc ivork i s described by Ph i l ip Green as "the mort s ig-
n i f i can t s ingle cont r ibut ion to arms pol icy discussion during 
the nuclear era. " '^  
Kphn himself as a c i v i l i a n , was the f i r s t to s t r e s s the 
importance of c i v i l i a n s as defence po l i cy p lanners or ana lys t s , 
stra-Gogists and nat ional securi ty exper t s . His ma.jor argument 
i n t ' i s respect i s tha t "in otden t imes, when thp problems 
were simpler and events moved more slowly and the cor rec t ive 
ef fec ts of experience played a bigger r o l e , i t was poss ib l e to 
make good d-signs by a process of p o l i t i c a l compromise,' e 
( l ) Sec the Foreword wr i t ten by Klaus Knorr to Herman Khan's 
Qu Thermonuclear >i/ar ( fn. 3) , p . 7» 
(2) GeenP. ; The Dead Logic; (Ohio, USA.: Ohio State Univ-
e r s i t y P r e s s , 1966)5 p.15* 
(3) KahnjH. 5 On Thermonuclear ''/ar; (Pr ince ton: Pr inceton 
Universi ty P re s s , 1967), p .124. 
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process typica l of tho mentali ty of t r p d i t i o n a l po l i t ic ! -^ns . 
He <• vcT-i goes farthr-r to speak of the c i v i l i a n analyst as one 
"in a bo t to r 'psychologica l ' pos i t i on than the profess ional 
mi l i t a ry off icer in approaching new long range problemso "^ '^ •^  
According to Brodie, the mi l i t a ry profess iona l i s 
always stiraul atod "by the immediate no^ds of the service to 
which ho devotes his l i f e "^ ^ and thus becomes oriented 
tO'.'ards the t - chn ica l nffici^-^nc^^ pnd smooth operation 'vhpre-
as contemporary var condi t ions are changing "almost from 
month to month''o Gone are the days when, "Kelson, whoso f lag-
ship on the dg,/ oi Trafalgar was forty years old ye t in no 
way - i n f e r i o r in f igh t ing capacity to the majority of the 
ships engaged, could spend h is l i f e t i m e l ea rn ing and perf-
ec t ing the a r t of the qdmiral without fepring t h a t thp 
fundpLicntal condit ions of t h a t qrt would change under his 
feet„"^-"' . ( 
1 
Except for very tew works, the bulk of l i t e r a t u r e on 
the subject has been the producf^ of c i v i l i a n s who foresaw the 
mpotcncy of conventional nat ional secur i ty and s t r a t e g i c 
planiiii^g rifter the in-nroduction of nucl^qr weapons.Kahn has 
(4) Kahn, H & Mann, J, ; Techniques of Systems Analysis 
(U.S. Air Force Pro jec t RAj^ Ds Research Memorandum, 
R-^vised Edi t ion, June, 1957)5 P-3« 
( "5) Ib id . , p . 3 , 
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been doscribcd as the author of "the moFt s ign i f i can t s ingle 
( 2) 
contr ibut ion t3 s i a s pol icy discussion' ' ^ and Wohlstot ter 
i s , in Green's ass-ssment, ' ' the most sophis t ica ted po lemic is t 
on behalf of systoms ana lys i s . 
Sabr 'Jim jaycn admits th^ f- i^ct t h a t q npnr cptpe-ory of 
c i v i l i a n expert has, for the l a s t f i f t een yea r s , "made his 
appearance and has made s ign i f ican t cont r ibu t ion to the 
und -rebanding of problem of nat ional secur i ty . This c i v i l i a n 
expori , in Subr-hu~ny , e ' vi6w,"is informed in i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
re l^ ' t ions , and i s capabl^^ of c rea t ive and ana ly t i ca l thought ( 7) on tne subject" . Re i t e ra t ing 'vhat i s i m p l i c i t i n Brodie ' s 
outlook3.Subrah:-iany-^ji speaks of the exp-^rtis-^ of the c i v i l i a n 
analyst as "based on •=. body of knowledge broader than thosa 
of t r a d i t i o n a l profess ions and d i s c i p l i n e s and may include 
h i s to ry , p o l i t i c s , economics- sociologj^, psycbology, m i l i t a r y 
( 7) 
science, phys ics , applied mathematics and engineering". '^ •^  
.In export of such a ca l i b r e ought bas i ca l ly depend on 
methoilology - conceptual iza t ion. The d ive r s i ty of information 
bases l e a d s , scl ' -^r t i f ical ly , to no harmony or cohesion except 
whe-'^  ^ 'un i f ied approach' i s reached a t . 
In t h i s r e spec t , i t becomes f a i r tu t r y assess the 
(Q) Grren, P.? ( fn .2 ) , r . 9 1 . 
(7) ftubrahmonyam,K.; Perspec t ives in Ddfonce Flannin^-^ (]\ynrr 
Del hi 5 AD hi nav Publ i c ations,1972) ,p.l6o ' 
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analyses and contrilDutions cf diviligns in thi.s field of 
studyo 
Bidi/Voll repp^ t^od tb^ same idppt "^ 'hpn h'? stqt-^d that 
"the anthropologist, the political scientist, the 
psychologist, the weapon tnchnologist, the professional 
soldi rs oil h'i.vo something to gay and anyone of these 
aspects i s onoucrb to occupy ono i^sn for a lifetime.' Ho 
admits tliat this field of study is onc"in which accurate 
observations- and classifications havp their place, and 
(9) 
connactions can he traced between possible causes and effects." 
An entirely different^ though not opposite, view is pre-
scn-Ged by General Chaudhury who i s of the opinion that i t 
i s necessary, apart from politicians understanding the naturo 
of present national security and total war problems,"the 
executive, both civil and military, got together and, freed 
of otiicr responsibilities- for a tiiae, start'^d to understand 
each, other's problems. "It was also necessary that when 
together, they sho-ald cunsidor hypothetical national war 
plans as a team, while i t was evident that the contacts made 
in the process of learning jointly would certainly pay large 
dividends during an actual emergency". -^  Ghaudhuri i s , 
(8) Bidwell.; Mudern Warfare-.(London; Allen Lane,1975) .n . l . 
(9) Ibid., p. 3. 
(10) Chaudhur.i,Gen. J.M.; ,\rms, iims and \spects;( Bombay / Ma.nak-
tala & Sons Pvt.Ltd. , Third lmpressiun,1955-,p.l06. 
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thcrLlorc , speaking not of 3. nrv^ c a l i b r e of expert , but of 
te nn wi specia l ized menibT?. Though 'Gen, Chaudhuri did not 
juFi;iIy thr idea of s team ra the r than one -^xpert of nat ional 
secur i ty , Iv eeens tha t his idea wa,s based on the need for a n u i t i -
- t i p l e approach tc national secur i ty problems and the 
Waging of vJar'e because he, in a previous p aragraph, tackled , 
i n fact very b r i e f l y and simply, the pxioin of the non-avai l -
a b i l i t y of a t i e -up on a notional scale in modern u'arf are . Gen. 
Ghaudhury's ic'.c^ i s vulnerable bc-causc the quali ty of member-
ship in bhc propofctd team i s one of competit ion, though i t i s 
an i rbcgra ted member ship.''/e can c i t e i n t h i s respect the 
tra.ditj jnal c r i s e s am^ng the three chiefs of s taf f or among 
the CJiuniandcrs of the army. Moreover, no analyst can ever avoid 
thr> p r "cheiogical preasur'es -^ n "key o f f i c i p l s e spec ia l ly in 
time of emergency or oven \whcn a scenario i s embarked upon. 
I t ought be noted here t ha t Chadhuri must h"ve had in 
mdnd ^r i n r t i t u t i o n such as vhe Nstic n-^ J Security Council of 
the U i tod S ta tes of /ijiierica. Even with a council l i k e this", 
the reed i s s t i l l th-^fe for unio^ue experts tu cont r ibu te to 
the s t ra tegy and secur i ty of a g ivm nat ion. 
'^ ^uado, i n his introductiv^-n to " \na lys i s for Mi l i ta ry 
Decision" says:"Systematic , q u a n t i t a t i v e s tud ie s , by physical 
and social s c i e n t i s t s and engineers working in co l l abura t i en 
with t^ c m i l i t a r y , bav" b-come important with th'^ foundation 
of cefcnce po l i cy . 'Their scope ranges upward from increas ing 
tlac eff iciency of rout ine oo.-'dsrclc.l - nd iiiclUB-Lri'1 o;^)cr-
fcticns in c ni l i t r^r j ' c.;ni:e.xt. . . to advising Cocisi .n-
( l l ) 
ninXcrc on -the b r : rdc s t i s sue '^f nr. t icncl secur i ty" . ^ 
By ^;rcrjoiit in/; t h i s t lie s i s , i t i s tlic p.:h.i oi the 
vjritor t : contr ibutc j acr dc-nicr.lly, t . s":rr;Gc ,^y cnC n-t i jnp. l 
secur i ty l i tv,r , - turc - but with the eye of r. Third ',/orld 
BChol:ir p.s r.in'iSt r l l the Cjn t r ibu to rs .-re T/cstern-oricntccl 
and often sceh to ^justify the s t r a t e g i c jfiostures of t h e i r 
res;,)ectiYG countriGs rnd^ in gener '- l , of the '.Vest, 
(11) See Qurde's In t roduc t ion to s Quado,E. (cd) | i^Jiaj-ysis 
_f£r_ Mil i tary Dcci sion; {A '-stordao^g North HollrJ-id 
Publ i shin-_ Coi:r;p,ny, Third P r i n t i n g , 1967), p . 2. 
PART I ; CH/.rT^r: I I ; LJJTHODOLOCY. 
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P.UT I ; 
CHi^TER I I ; METHODOLOGY 
I . I I . I : ON METHODOLOGY 
I n no f i e l d of contemporary human knoivledge hps 
methodologica l obsscsp ion bcon so f r equen t a? i n the f i e l d 
of t h i s s tudy . The major c o n t r i b u t o r s tu the f i e l d are t'-oro 
p ro -occup ied with methodolog ica l i s s u e s than wi th t h e i r 
c o n c l u s i o n s . The i r cx - i t i c s a rc no e x c e p t i o n . -^  
This dilemma can be exp la ined i n the c o n t e x t of t h e 
n a t u r e of such studi>-^F, ''7he^"', i n t^p preliTr.in=>ry ptpge of 
i n q u i r y and r e s e a r c h work, one i s more i n t e r e s t e d i n expected 
d a t a , choice of <^l ternqt ivos and d e f i n i n g u n c e r t a i n t i e s , t h a n 
wi th c u r r e n t da ta due t o t h e l-^-ck of an e s t a b l i s h e d empi r i ca l 
apioroach t'he t o o l s of assessment l e a d i n g t o p r e d i c t i o n and 
deduc t ion become iSucb more d i s t u r b i n g than to s y n t h e s i z e t h e 
(12) Reference i s m-^ d" h.'^ r'^  t o Tfrrman K^hn ' s Technique of 
Systems Analys i s (US i i i r Force P r o j e c t R^NDs Research 
Mcmorandui:a, -thirst p u b l i s h e d on December 3? 1956,Revised 
E d i t i o n June , 1957) and On Thermonuclear Vex ( P r i n c e t o n 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , Second E d i t i o n , S i x t h P r i n t i n g , 1 9 5 ? ) . 
One can P1<='0 c o i p a r e t h e q u a n t i t y of 'Quade's works on 
methods and t e c h n i q u e s t o h i s Systems ilnqlysQ s. 
(1:3) P h i l i p Green ' s The Deadly Logic (Pn .2 ) i s a c r i t i c i s m 
of t h e methods of Herman K^hn r a t h e r than a work 
on t h e thev.ry of d e t e r r e n c e . 
- 43 -
smoll b i t s i n a conceptual fraciework, a se t of r u l e s and 
governing laws.Underlying a l l wr i t ings on methodology i n t h i s 
f i e ld of study and, equally, a l l c r i t i c i sm on those w r i t i n g s , 
i s a specif ic n^^d for an ordering device t h a t can lead to 
coherence and se l f -cor rec t ion ' lay n c n s o f the employment of an 
i n t c r d i s c r i p l i n a r y approach. l t has almost become rai rxlct: t h a t 
to ^n^lyso or p r e d i c t und^r condi t ions of uncer ta in ty in the 
nuclear ago i s tu r e s o r t to several d i sc ip l ineso These 
d i s c i p l i n e s include economics, psychology,geography, h i s t o ry , 
mi l i t a ry science e t c . .attention, consequently, ought be giv^n 
to moe.ns of working o'nt coherence among d i f f e r e n t , sometimes 
conf l i c t ing , d i s c i p l i nps r a t h e r than tu means of deciding 
which d i s c i p l i n e to endorse and which to ignore . 
An excuse can ce r ta in ly be found for both methodological 
ob^jssion and the confusion charac tor i s ing l i t e r a t u r e on the 
subject . One cscusc i s tha t s t r a t e g i c and nat ional secur i ty 
s tudios nro s t i l l in thn cradle as they, l i t e r a l l y , arc some 
twenty-five years ^^d. in -chio casG,thcy ohould not bo 
compared to thO£o s tudies which or ig ina ted hundreds of yea r s 
back.Hsthcr, tli^j- should bo encouraged t i l l they reach tha t 
stago when t h e i r quantity can give b i r t h to qual i ty s tandards , 
thus enabling such s tudies s tandardize t h e i r methods, ilnuthor 
excuse i s the rx^tnvf^ of f-o int-^rdisciplin-^ry approach now 
endorsed by w r i t e r s on the subjec t , though s>jme of them are 
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proud of i t for i t roprosem s an aclvraioed stago of 
in te l l ec tua l sopliistication. Ihe in terdisc ipl inary 
appropcli lias "been in i t i a ted iv'ith as a„lrge numLer of 
netJiods as tha.t of tnc discipl ines resorted to , A tliird 
excuse i s tlie diif icultyj if not tlie iuipo ssilDility, of 
applying the '-lethodc of physical sciences though A/riters 
on the subject sho^ .v imnicnsely an in teres t in nathoaatical 
techniques, models and qucntifica,tion of several processes 
a2id in teract ion. A fourth excuse i s that some of the 
contributions have been pol i t ica l i sed in the sense that 
they were originally neont to serve par t icular ._ politica.l 
goals as these studies v/hich usually spread in the United 
States justifying "the po l i t i e s of the Pentagon before 
the Secretary of Defence presents the budget to the Congress. 
There i s , indeed, a need for an ordering device and 
for standardisation. On the other ha„nd, the bulk of published 
materials has not yet given us aJi ajuple room that a,llows 
for such standardisation, method-wise, as the quantity 
of the bulk i s re la t ively very small. I t could also be 
observed that s trategic research centres established 
everywhere do boloni_,, method-wise, to the i n s t i t u t i on 
sponsoring theja. Some are being sponsored by minis t r ies 
of defence and exe, therefore, mi l i t a r i ly -or ien ted . Others 
are sponsored by univers i t ies and a re , bherefore, absorbed 
in sc ient i f ic jargon end developing the i r o\;n diction*Some 
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CGiit OS belong to independent bodies. Even in the c^se of 
those research cent res sponsored by u n i v e r s i t i e s , one can 
fi'id differences according to the o r i en t a t i on of the p ro fe s so r 
in charge of the college to vvhicn the cent re i s a f f i l i a t e d . 
One nothod ^vbich has widely benn used - or misus'^d - i s 
Systems Analysis.But there i s no one system analys is and 
the re i s no s ingle se t , agreed upon by schola rs , of proced-
ures . The wriTver's reading of l i t e r a t u r e on Sysibems toalysis 
has r e i t e r a t e d th- observation t h a t t he re i s a Bumber of 
procedures as the nuruber of systoas analyses .This i s one roesen 
fcr iroGcntin^; study tha t fol lows, br^fore the research 
m-'tlrod i s presented. 
I . I I . 2 1 SYSTEMS /iN^TSig 
I . I I .2 .AS Introduct ion 
L i t e r a t u r e on S-jstoms Analysis - ;^ s a methodology for 
studying choice problem and the l i k e - i s d i s t i ngu i sh ing ly 
cl -\r-ctorizcd by arguments and counter-arguments to the 
extent t l :a t i t might give no impression of a meaningful 
d isc ip l i '^o . In t h i s Chapter, an attem.pt i s r: :1c to 
oxpiTiino thoroughly the Merits and demerits of Systems 
ana lys is . 
Bo-cvcon Green's ru l ing t h a t "onp simply cannot find 
what Systems Analysis i s " '^  and Possony and Pourno l l ' s 
descr ip t ion of Systems Analysis as "the curr-^nt miracular 
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(15) s u b s t i t u t e for mi l i t a ry judgf^mpnt and e r r p t i v i t y " • 
thf. l og ic ppcp seomp hardly bridgeableo 
In between Green's severe at tack and Possony and 
P o u r n e l l ' s en thus ias t i c support, one can also find t h a t the 
subt le ty of methodological c r i t i c i s m of Schl-^singer. 
In the words of Herman Kahn, the spokesman and champion 
of ^s te rns Analysis, the said method i s ' ' th- us'^ of quan t i t -
a t ive i^nalysis where poss ib le and the s e t t i n g up of a c l ea r 
l i n e of demarcation showing where q u a n t i t a t i v e ana lys i s was 
not found re levant in whole or in part"o '' Systems Analysis 
i s , the re fore , of bas ica l ly quantifying t rend . The w^ritor 's 
reading of l i t e r a t u r e on ^s te rns Analysis r e i t e r a t e s the view 
the quan t i f i ca t ion i s conceived of by the prBponents of the method 
as a d i s t ingu i sh ing element. But Kahn's phrase "where p o s s i b l e " 
i s an ind ica t ion of condit ioning though no c l ea r - cu t condi t ions 
aio repor ted . I f viewed a b s t r a c t l y , Kahn's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
conceives Systems Analysis ^<= "th^ us^" of quanti fi ca t ion , not 
quan t i f i ca t ion i t s e l f as Schlesinger conceived i t . 
(15) Posscny, S. &Pourne l l , J; The Strategy of Technology 
(Mass., US4J University of Cambridge, 1970), p , 3 1 . 
(16) Schlesinger, J , ; Q.uantitative An-^Iysis. and National Sec. 
u r i t v g ins Kissinger , H, 5 Probl-^mg of National St ra tegy; 
New York; Frederick A. Praeger , 19^5), pp.85-107. 
(17) Kahn, H. 5 C f n . j ) , p o V i i i , 
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Tho job of th^ Systpne .inplyst i s dnfincd "by Kchn PF 
"one of design, d.-^gign to mok:'^  thr^ choice problem l e e s 
pS-''" '^^ -izing'' and adds tha t such a job i s "not to advis--^ dir-^ct-
ly on the choicr problem". 
/ /oh l s tu t t e r , who i s describod by Gre^n as " thr most 
sophis t ica ted po l imic i s t on behalf of Syst-ms Analysis" 
def in-s S^ystems Analysis as i f , the wr i t e r S^J thinlcs, i t w r e 
an off -spr ing of the Gnstalt th rory of OOCI-PI psychology -
by s t a t i n g tha t "the ^s terns Analyst must take a systems 
sppro8ch5 tha t i s he must a t t enp t to look at the problem at 
a whole". "^  Thus we are led by i//oh] s t e t t c r to use the 
terms: wholipt ic approach and systems approach in terchange-
ably and to think of Systems Analysis as a p ro j ec t iun uf some 
techniques adumbrated in the social psychology d i s c i p l i n e . T h i s 
can be just i f i '^d by tho fact t h a t th-' very f ie ld of study 
wl ere Systems ^malysis i s endorsed has? n a t u r a l l y , r esor ted 
tj the help uf various d i s c i p l i n e s - mainly due to i t s lack 
of an es tabl ished empirical approach. 
Yet ' i /ohlstet ter proceeds frcm t h i s eas i ly j u s t i f i o d 
pos i t i on to add to the confusion cha^racterizing l i t e r a t u r e 
on Systems Analysis by defining i t as "the comparison 
(18) Ib id» , p .123 . 
(19) Green, P.5 ( f n . 2 ) , p . 9 1 . 
(20) Ib id . , p . 285, 
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( 21) 
of ealargpd pyptems of i n t p r r e l a t e d elements". Though 
t h i p notion does not bas ica l ly cont radic t h is Ges ta l t - type 
outlook, i t se t s no c lear demarcation l i n e between the «bm-
p a r a t i v e approach and Systems A.nalysiso In h is view, Systems 
Analysis i s "an enquiry" - not a method or an approach - "to 
aid the decision-maker choose a course of act ion -by.^ 
systematical ly i nves t i ga t ing h is proper oboect ives , comparing 
quan t i t a t i ve ly where poss ib l e the cos t s , effectiven-^ss, (22) i f those examined are found wanting". 
Frankel dexined Systems Analysis as a method leading 
the analyst to "think systemat ical ly about the f ie ld of 
inqu i ry" . ^ But i f i t were r e a l l y so, Systems Analysis 
would not have been anything more than a ' tendency ' to make 
the thinking of an analyst f i t in the ru l e s of pure l o g i c . 
Viewed according to Frankel, Systems Analysis wi l l surely seem 
something l i k e a d r i l l session in log ic conducted to s tudents 
of Humanities. t h i s should not mean quest ioning 
the v a l i d i t y of F rnnkp l l ' s expose for he, to 
(21) I b i d . , p . 2 1 . 
(22) Ib id . , pp.19-20. 
(23) Frankel, J.? Contemporary I n t e r n a t i o n a l Theory (London? 
Oxford Universi ty P r e s s , 1973), p«33. 
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tho 'vr i tor , i s among tho v^ry fe.v ccintributorF whoFP svork? 
1 pck nt p rec i s ion . Even .vitb th^- t'-rm i t p c l f , Frankol l e f t 
nc rucm for confusiun by s t a t i n g , for examplo, t h a t "the 
conc'-pt 'system' in In t e rna t i ona l -ttolations i s -^  d i r e c t der iva-
t i c n of t h i s cncf^pt as usc=d in General Systeals Theory (GST) 
vhicfc cuns t i tu tos an e l l o r t to find a basic co^'rolati^n be t -
ween oil arroa of know] edgi-^". 
Before proceeding in the attcnipt to iden t i fy Systems 
Analysis , on^ should always keep in mind the guide l ines set by 
Herman i^jiui sinc^ no expounding of Systems Analysis can avoid 
e i the r Ta^'^n's contr ibut ion to l i t e r a t u r e on tho subject or 
h is Systems Analyses. The basic theme i s h is con t r ibu t ion to 
lite"' 'atur'^ on th'^ subject i s thpt in Systpms Analysis "words 
should br^  quant i f ied , u n c e r t a i n t i e s should be indica ted 
reisonably e x p l i c i t l y " . -^ 
Vi-^ wed in tei-ms of the pr'iblems tha t Systems Analysis 
deals with, a reading of l i t e r a t u r e en thp subject shovs quit^ 
c lear ly tha t tl'ey are choice problems under u n c e r t a i n t i e s in 
the future . Th^so u n c e r t a i n t i e s do not only deal with the tech-
nical and operat ional parameters ( f o r exauiple, the eff iciency of 
a,n under-study del ivery system or the actual v u l n e r a b i l i t y 
(24) I b i d . , p .34 . 
(25) Kahn, H. & Mann, J . ; ( f n . 4 ) , p . 8 . 
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of -in opr ly n p m i n g system) and t h o a6tiGn8 of t h e onemy/'"but 
( o(^^ 
also GoncGptual uncortainties". UncortaintiGs, as hand-
led in £i7stef-is -i^-nalysis - according to Quide, are of two 
catcg'^riGss s t ^ t i s t i c i l qnd rea l . 
S ta t i s t i ca l urcer ta in t ies gre thopo "'that thr-ir occur-
anc- probability can be calculated. They can be handled by 
natl^rintic^l tp-chriquos. "R^ql uncprtain^if^s aro thopo "th-^ t^ 
hoy 'lugicaL c^nstructiun ur cunccrned with future behaviour 
of things, which i s beyond the prac t icab i l i ty of -analysts 
to predict"/^^-^ 
The writer suggests a niore pract ica l categorization of 
uncertainties into: horizontal and ve r t i ca l . Horizontal un-
cer ta in t ies are those that deal with 'quant i ty ' in the project 
orphcnoaenon subject'^d to Systems Analysis. Vertical un-
cer ta in t ies are those that d'^ al with ' q u a l i t y ' . I f the subject 
of analysis i s , for oxa-iple, a choice of bomber for a nuclear 
delivery systeu, mdius and lo^dins: ar^ ^ vie"'^ «d as horizontal 
whereas - k i l l i n g capability i s to be viewed as vert ical 
uncertainty. 
(26) Quade, S,; Methods and Procedures;in: Quade, E (ed) ( f n . l l ) , p.170. 
- 51 -
0. SCIENTIFIC Q.UAlTTI FT CATION AND ART OF ANALYSIS; 
Desp i te t h e f a c t t h a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e bulk of l i t e r a t u r e 
' o f Syetenis Ana lys i s i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y one of quan t i f -
i c a t i o n and t h e use of mathemat ica l t e c h n i q u e s , t h o s e who 
c o n t r i b u t e d t o i t and r e i t ' ^ r a t e d t h e s c i e n t i f i c s t r u c t u r e 
of t h e method, spoke of i t as " l a r g e l y a form of a r t " . ^ ^ 
The l a c k of an agreed upon se t of r u l e s and def ined r e g u l a r -
i t i e s i s always admi t t ed , a t l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y . W o h l s t e t t p r 
j u s o i f i e d ' t h e l a c k of t h e o r y ' by t h e f a c t t h a t Systems 
A n a l y s i s " i s a new d i s c r i p l i n r " and t h a t " h i s t o r y t e a c h e s 
us t h a t good theory u s u a l l y COQ-S l a t e i n t h e development 
( ?8*) 
of any f i e l d and a f t e r f a l s e s t a r t s " . •^ The q u e s t i o n t h a t 
now b l a z e s i t s e l f f o r t h i s whe th t r vVohls te t ter - not t o 
speak of ndni rprp - -''=?? q'^ar^ of the l i T n i t a t i o n s t -^ci t i n 
t h e now l a r g e l y app l i ed Systems Analysis^ The confus ion can 
bo enforced by Quade ' s remark t h a t one of t h e Systems 
Ana lys i s l i t e r a t u r e has r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e exaggera ted 
i n s i s t e n c e on q u a n t i f i c a t i o n i s al'^vays met by a c o u n t e r -
i n s i s t e n c e on t h e f a c t t h a t q u a n t i f i c a t i o n i s not t h e 
main t h i n g . And t h i s i s t he b a s i c r--^ason u n d e r l y i n g our 
assessment t h a t confus ion p r e v a i l s ©n Systems Ana lys i s 
l i t e r a t u r e . 
(27) I b i d . , p . 1 5 3 . 
(28) I b i d . , p . 1 4 9 . 
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I f Systehis Analysis i s not bas ica l ly a process of 
quan-uification (of words as well as unco r t a in t i e s - according 
to Kahn's no t ion) , then what diff'^rence i s th'-re between i t and 
what hiay be cal led ' o b j e c t i v e ' ana lys is or ana ly t i ca l app-
roach? Another clement tha t adds to t h i s confusion i s the r e -
currence of remarks tha t make Systems Analysis some sor t of 
' q u a l i t a t i v e ' ana lys i s . And i t ^vas Quad?^  himself who said t h a t 
"a charoct^^rist ic of Systems Analysis i s t ha t so lu t ions are 
often found in a set of compromises vvhich seek to balance, and 
where p o s s i b l e , to reonci lo confl ict in '^ obo-^ctives and quest ions 
of Value. I t i s more important to choose the ' r i g h t object-
ive then i t i s to make the ' r i g h t ' choice between a l t e r -
na t ives" . de also stated c lear ly t h a t "thn ess-^nco of 
%st;ens Analysis i s not mathematical techniques or proced-
urc° . A coaxputing uachin or a technique such as l i n e a r 
pro-"'ramming nay or may not b^ useful , dp>prnding on th^ problem 
and the extent of our information.The e s sen t i a l th ing i s 
l i s t i n g of the a l t e r n a t i v e s and an examination of t h e i r 
( 50) 
impl ica t ions and costs so tha t they can be compar^^d." -^ 
The confusion between Systems Analysis and the 
co i^ara t ive method mentioned e a r l i e r i s also p reva len t in 
(29) Ib id . , p . 160 
(30) I b i d . , p .167 
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Qu-dc'.9 i d o n t i f i c p t i o p of Syptnmp Inqlypi c; "Sincp a Syetr'Vie 
inalj-riff i s a study which ax:tGiftpts to i n f l u b n c e p o l i c y , i t 
must In t h e ond p r e s e n t a convinc ing comparison of t h e 
( ^1) 
r e l e v a n t a l t e r n a t i v e s " . This i m p l i e s b a s i c a l l y t h e 
t h e u,=.c of comparat ive techniqu-^s, a f a c t which g e n e r a l l y 
c o n c r a d i c t s a s t a tement l i k e >"/ohlstet ter 'S3 " . . . . systems 
s t u d i o s i n n a t i o n a l defense should ho conceived as t h e 
q u a n t i t a t i v e method of sc ience app l i ed to t h e r e f r a c t o r y 
( 52) 
problems d e s c r i b e d ' -"^  though compara t ive t e c h n i q u e s can 
p o s s i b l y - but not n e c e s s a r i l y - be q u a n t i f i e d , vi/'e can quot^ 
Quade h imsel f t o p rove thff i d e a t h a t q u a n t i f i c a t i o n i s not 
a musts "Because ^ s t e r n s Analys i s goes beyond obj-^ctive ( 55") 
a n a l y s i s , i t r e l i e s heav i ly on cons ide red judgement" . ^^ -^  
While V 'oh l s to t t e r i d e n t i f i e s Systcm^s Ana lys i s as 
(31) I b i d . , p . 1 7 3 
(32) W o h l s t o t t - r , A.; Anal.Ysis and Design of C o n f l i c t 
Systems, i n : Quade,1). ( r d . ) ; ( f n . l l ) , p . 105 . 
(33) Quado, E, , ( f n . 2 6 ) , p . 176. 
@ I t i s noteworthy t h a t P r o f e s s o r v ' /oh les te t t e r used t h e 
te rms ^ s t e r n s xlnalysis and C o n f l i c t System Design 
i nue rchangoab ly . 
n 
Was 
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thc^'atceapt to answor quest ions of ir/rportance in choice 
policy''^-^ and t h a t Systems A.nalysis i s not "merely 
node] construction' '^ '^^ '^  Woh los t e t t c r ' s idea i s , i n f ac t , 
incoherent with Quadc's inc lus ion of model const ruct ion as 
a basic element i n the process of Slysteuis i inalysis '^  and -
equolly - \A7ith thr simil qr proc-^dum of Hitch -^ "^^  to *rhich 
James Schlcsinger a t t r i b u t e s the ' r evo lu t iona ry ' effect o 
budget-making in the U.S. Department of D e f e n c e . ^ n i t 
Hitch in his capacity as Assis tant Secretary of Defence/ 
Comptroller between 1961 and 19^5 - >vho i n i t i a t p d o f f i c i a l l y 
Syscorns Analysis to DOD.) 
I t ought "be c l a r i f i ed t h a t the very Systems 1.nqlysis 
to which Schlesinger referred i s the one conceived by Hitch 
not Wohlcste t ter - to mention only one of the p o l i m i c i s t s on 
behalf of an overwhelming Systems Analysis, ^or Hitch conceiv-
ed Systems Analysis as a method to ' economis'p' dr^f--^!^ 
(34) v;ohls te t ter , A.; ( fn .32 ) , p . lOJ . 
(35) Ib id . , p .104. 
(36) Quade,E. i JJoncher.V/.( eds-) ; Syst-ms Analysis and 
Pol icy Plqrrning; (Jf^ s/y lorkjElQvier , 1968), p . 14 . 
(37) Hitch, C. 8c McKean,R.? The Economics of DefenGO i n tbo 
3^uclear Age; ( F i r s t published by HA^ D Corp. ,1960; 
Fi f th P r i n t i n g by Harvard Universi ty Press,Cambridge, 
- 1967) , pp. 1 3 9 - 1 ^ . 
(38) Schlcsinger, J.? ( f n . l 6 ) , p . 9 0 . 
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(39) 
problci.is ^special ly when handling budgctccring. Schlos-
in£,cr was absolutely c lea r ae 'vell ae sharp in c r i t i c i s i n g 
'/Vhat the wr i t e r c a l l s ' exagg^rqt'^d Systons Analysis ' , i . e . 
exaggerating in iiaposing quan t i f i ca t ion and i l luii i inption 
with mathonatic^l t -cbnigues . In Schl'^sinffor's vip"/ i t 
might be t r u ^ t h a t "in cpr ta in problems, ' ou tpu t ' can be 
mcasurrdo In other cases , i t cannot bey for the ' o b j e c t i v e ' 
i s only a general phrase t ha t melts toge ther a number of 
d i sc ro t subgoals". Scr ics inger adopts a. s e m i - u t i l i t y 
^j)roach and declares^ "v/hat Systeius Analysis does i s to 
provide data on cos ts or p r i c e s of achicsring d i f fe ren t 
ob j r c t i ve s through th'-^  apv-rpl alt i^rnativp syst'^ms". I t 
i s oi-ily by means of t h i s h ighl ight c - s t by Schlesinger t h a t 
one can achieve an enl ightening c r i t i c i s m of Kqhn and Mann's 
p o s t u l - t e t ha t in Systems Analysis 'pe t ry to design a system 
cap-^ble of meeting contingoncios which wil l a r i se f ive to 
ton , end sometimes f i f t een years in the future and t h a t "we 
must not only design t h i s system, ve must also decide under 
what condi t ions i t wi l l be used and what we shal l want to do 
with i t " . ^ With the f i r s t p a r t of the p o s t u l a t e (des ign-
(39) Hitch, C&McKean,Ro; ( fn. 3?) , pp. 5-6. 
(40) Schlcsingor, J . , ( f n . l 6 ) , p . 8 8 , 
(41) Ib id . , p .96 
(42) Kahn,H & Manr, I . , ( f n . 4 ) , p . 4 . 
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i n g a s y s t e m . . . ) ? t h e ' i n p u t ' can be e a s i l y moasurod, but 
i t i,^ not ha.rdly doubtful t h a t he second p a r t ' s ' i m p a c t ' can 
e q u a l l y b? measured. 
D. Sy.GT'EMS .^N^XTSIS; THE METHOD; 
D . l . INTBQDUGTIQN; 
I t might be easy fo r a r e s e a r c h s c h o l a r t^, a p p r o c i a t e 
G r e e n ' s r ia l ing t h a t "one simply cannot f ind what Systems 
Ana lys i s i s " s ince t h e bulk of Green ' s t r e a t i s e i s bu t an 
a n a l y t i c a l c r i t i c i s m of Systems Analys i s as conceived by 
Kphn and Wohl s t ' ^ t t r r . But i t i s not a t a l l easy fo r any r e s e a r c h -
s c h - l a r t o a p p r e c i a t e Quade ' s s t a t e m e n t ' " i t i s not easy 
t o t e l l someone how to ca r ry out a system, a n a l y s i s , ' ' ^ 
simply b'^!cause h i s "Systems Analys is ; Methods and P r o c e d u r e s " 
i s an e s s e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n b e s i d e s t h e f a c t t h a t h i s 
systeu^s ana ly se s have been v a l u a b l e . However, t h i s s t a t emen t 
can be viewed as an e x p r e s s i o n of the c o m p l e x i t i e s sur round-
i n g the methods of Systems A n a l y s i s , t he d i v e r s i t y of t e « h -
n iqu -p r e s o r t e ' j t o and t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y p e n e t r a t i n g almost 
a l l t h e s t e p s of System A n a l y s i s . 
(43) Quade ,S . , ( f n . 2 6 ) , p . 1 4 9 -
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To iDegin w i t h , one ought p o i n t a t t h e common i n d u l g -
@ 
encc i n mathemat ica l t e c h n i q u e s r a t h e r t h a n an i n t e r e s t i n 
s e t t i n g up an ord^r ins : fi<^vlco "by v i r t u e of 'vhicb cboicp 
p rob lems , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e r e l a t i n g t o m a t t e r s of defence 
p l a n n i n g and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , can bes 
a) formulptpd on sound b a s e s , 
b) expla ined i n terms of t h p i r v a r i a b l e and 
c o n s t a n t c o n s t i t u e n t s , and c o n s t r u c t i n g a 
working model , and 
c) solved by choosing t h e r i g h t a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
D, 3 . THE I-gTCH PROCEDURES 
As a method, Hi tch s ee s no l i n e of demarca t ion between 
t h e p r o c e d u r e s of O p e r a t i o n s Rr^eearch ?nd System 4 n a l y s i s . 
To H i t c b , both h-^ve t h e same e s s e n t i a l e l emen t s : 
a) An o b o e c t i v e , or a number of o b j e c t i v e s . 
b) A l t e r n a t i v e means ( o r ' s y s t e m s ' ) by which 
rhe ob . j - c t ive may be accompanied. (Those may be' 
C9 '"^uadc, whose c o n t r i b u t i o n t o th'^ t bpo ry and p r q c t i c e i s a 
landmark i n t b ^ s tudy of t h e t ' ^chniques , admits c l e a r l y 
t h i s f a c t . 
( 4 4 ) . H i t ch , J . , toalysls f o r Air Eorco D e c i s i o n s ; i n : 
Quade, E. (ed) , ( f n . l l ) , p . 1 3 . 
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d i f f e r e n t weapon sys tems , or diffc^rent s t r a t e g i e s of us ing 
a weapon sys tem.) 
c) The c o s t s o r r e s o u r c e s r e q u i r e d by each system. 
d) A mathemat ica l or l o g i c a l model or models . 
- (45') 
e) A c r i t e r i o n fo r choosing t h e p r e f e r r e d a l t e r n a t i v e . 
D.4. THE O.UADE PH}CSDUE.Eg 
But Quade bps ano the r view of t h e p r o c e d u r e of Systems 
Analys i s as a g a i n s t Opera t ions Research.Whi le Ope ra t i ons 
Research , fo r Quade comprises t h e folilowing f i v e e lements ! 
a) Formulat ion of t bp problpm, 
b) Search , 
c) E x p l a n a t i o n , 
d) I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , (by means of a model) and 
e) V e r i f i c a t i o n , ^ 
System Ana lys i s i n v o l v e s only t he f i r s t four because 
t h e o^cpcrimentali ty r e q u i r e d fo r v e r i f i c a t i o n may not be 
a v a i l a b l e . 
D.5. HITCH VERSUS Q.UADE; 
To expound t h e p r o c e d u r e s of Systems A n a l y s i s , i t i s 
necessa ry t o embark on a comparat ive p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e 
p r o c e d u r e s as viewed by two of t h e major c o n t r i b u t o r s and 
t r y deduce t h e e lements agreed upon. (A comparison of 
^^stoms Ana lys i s and Opera t ions Research i s t o follow i n due 
c o u r s e . ) 
• ' • • ' " • " " • - • " •• ™ • • ' ' " • — • l • • ^ • • . i — i . Ill, • I II I !• I. . I — — I I • • • i » i i . . . - » ^ i i - . - i ^ T 
(45) Ibid. , pp.l>14. 
(46) Quade ,E. , ( fn. 26) , p . 158. 
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The f i r s t s top , according to Hitch, i s to decide the 
obocctive or objec t ives .But , l o g i c a l l y , no ob jec t ive , or 
ob jec t ives , can be formed except a f t e r the basic problem i s 
foimulated. Otherwise the object ive wil l turn out to be a 
hypothetical problc^m r a t h e r than a rea l one.Quado t r e a t s 
problem formulation as a f i r s t step and, ins tead of defining 
end choosing the object ive or obj-actives, he speaks of f i x -
ing ' 'the context within which those quest ions or i s sues 
involved in the problem) are to bo reso lved . " There seems 
to be no meaningful differen(^c between what Hitch terms as 
'ob j c t i vo ' and i'hat Quadr r-^ f^ eTr-'-^ d^  to . as" ' cwnt ^xt ' . Ace rCt.->gly, 
the f i r s t step for both Q,uad- and Hitch i s one and the ssPe, 
except for the terms used. 
Yet, i t i s the w r i t e r ' s view t h a t the gr-no^al framework 
within which the th inking of Hitch i s mouldi^ ^d d i f f e r s from 
Quadc's. VVhile the former 's main concern i s to 'economize' 
defence problems, i t i s obvious t ha t Quade's f i r s t i n t e r e s t 
i s to ' s o l v e ' problems r e l a t i n g to defence and s t ra tegy . 
Perhaps, i t i s due to t h i s idea t h a t Hitch i n s e r t s ' c o s t s ' 
i n his procedure and re in forces i t by a ' c r i t e r i o n ' , whereas 
Quade speaks of ' s e a r c h ' , explanation and then i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
The w r i t e r ' s evaluation can b'^ come c l e a r e r by comparing 
Hi t ch ' s de f in i t i on of the ' c o s t ' element to Quade's de f in i t i on 
(47) Ib id . , p .15b. 
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of the ' s ea rch ' olement in both procodurep.For Hith, each 
a l t ' - rna t iv means of accomplishing the objpct ivos impl ies 
the use of spec i f ic resources which cannot then be used for 
oth.-r purpososo On the other hand, Quade dcfinf^s whnt he 
c e l l s ' s e a r ch ' as a step "concerned with f inding the f a c t s , 
or evidence on which the analysis i s based."^ ^ I t i s the 
resources aJid resource problems which are given p r i o r i t y and 
f i r s t considerat ion by Hitch wh:le ' fqc t s ' - resources are 
imp l i c i t but as one element in a set of d i f fe ren t elements -
imply much more than resources . Quade, moreover, went to the 
extreme of including ' f a c t s t ha t are n^vcr known' i n the 
search step - --vrr in case of performance of future weapons 
In the same way, i t i s the a v a i l a b i l i t y of f ac t s which 
makes a so lu t ion poss ib le in Quade's procedure wher^i^s i t i s 
the cost-effectiiiszeness in f l i t ch ' s . To be f a i r enough^. Hitch 
s ta ted qui te c lear ly t ha t in his pe r spec t ive , problems of 
dcfon":e are viewed from an economic po in t of view. This 
kind of ana lys is i s , to him, a r e f l " c t i o n of the methods and 
techniques developed in (economics. Hitch speaks of na t ional 
securi ty as "one big economic problem", and of ' s t r a t e g y and 
cos t ' as "interdependent as th.- front and roar s igh t s of a 
r i f l e " . "^ "^^ ^ 
(48) I b i d . , p.164-
(49) Hitch, C. &McKean,R.; ( f n . 3 7 ) , p . 3. 
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Tb^ nnxt ptop Iri Ouad^'p proc^dur'^ i s pxpl-^npition 
y^'iich i f uiostly develop-^d by a model - by means of a s e r i e s 
of cqu-^Tjioiis, sciaetiui3S ''by siaiul-^tion or by a 'Jsr gapio*'. 
( 51") 
Sacb a nodcl i s "expl ormtory mr ' i ^ r thpr, d n s c r i p t i v " . - ^ ^ A. 
model, l o r Hitch i s "^ r '^presentation of the s i t ua t i on under 
study desiQ;r--d to p r e d i c t the cost qx>d performance of each 
( 52) 
a l t ^rnntivo". -^  Once ' c o s t and performance' are the obj'^ct 
t h a t ought be predic ted by the model, construct ion b--comes 
no d i f f i c u l t job. Yet, Quade admits t ha t r u l e s for model 
bui ld ing arc few in number and not very helpful j ^ - ^ - ^ ^ >/\/hich 
means t h a t cos ts alone -^re not the ti^irig t ^^ t courts in model 
bu i ld ing or , to be more p r e c i s e , are not the only th ing . 
Moreover, Quade speaks of the necess i ty for an analyst to have 
( 55) 
"an i n s t i n c t " ana e "sense of f urm"^- '^^ ^ to achi-^ve a 
dosircd effect for a model. Besides f ac t s and mathematical 
equat ions , an ' a r t ' i s needed, for i n s t i n c t and the sense of 
fern are b)ut a r t i s t i c t a l e n t s , '''/hilp Quade emphasiz^a thnsp 
f ' o non- sc i en t i f i c e lemmts to guarantee an e f f i c i en t analys is 
the ' " ' r i t r r does be l i rve t h a t any attempt to negate the rep-
(50) quade, B.; ( fn. 25) , p . l 6 6 , 
(51) I b id . , p.167 
(52) I b id . , p .155 
(53) I b id . , p .168 
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rcscnta t iu i i of pucb elc-mc-nts would lead to irderGpresGntfltion 
of uijc^,-rtaintics especia l ly v e r t i c a l u n c e r t a i n t i e s - Hitch : 
develop? a ' c r i t f^r ion ' '-^hich i s a ru le or t-^et by which onp 
a l t m a t i v " c^n bo chopop in pref^-rr^nce to another. Hi tch 'p 
guara"itoe i s , there fore , bas i ca l ly oconomic since i t i s 
supposed to rclfl te "the objec t ives and cos t s in seine manner, 
for example, by maximizing the achipvemont of obj '^ctives for 
some assumed or given budget". ^ ^ 
For Quade, explanation by v i r tue of an explanatory 
r a t h e r than a descr ip t ive model i s not a f ina l step t h a t 
s a t i s f i e s the anqlyst . An ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' step follo-vs soon. 
The solut ion obtained ought be in t e rp re t ed "in the l i g h t of 
cons idera t ions 'vhich mqy not have been adequpiely t r ea t ed 
e 
by the model, SIT^GO the model ivas but P s ingle r ep resen t -
( 55") 
a t ion of the rea l world chosen by the analyst",. "^ -^ ^ Quade's 
argument may, in fac t , bo the rea l reason underlying Schles-
i n g e r ' s ae^essmnnt t h a t H i t ch ' s analysi'=', vvhich should be termed 
' q u a n t i t a t i v e ' , c a n obtain successes in problems of budget-
malting and defence a l l oca t i ons ,no t i n problems of broader 
defence and nat ional secur i ty i s sups . 
(54) Hitch, J . ; ( f n . 44 ) , p .14 . 
(55) . Quade, E.; ( fn. 26) , p . 173. 
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Available and published systems analyses are obvious-
ly r i ch in mathematical techniques of varying degrees of 
complexitv. In bptw/ppn r igorous computation and thp game 
theory and/or scpnarios, the wr i t e r does share Quade's 
wonder "to sA^ hat extent they ( the mathemtical techniques) 
are r ea l l y sued in Systems Analysis". In the previous 
p o i n t s , the wri tpr has already pointed at the common indulg-
ence in mathematical techniques. In 'Things To Come' , Kahn 
Was deeply indulged in iii^DOsing mathematical techniques on 
some i s sues to which the appl ica t ion of such techniqups 
must be quest ionable. He himself was aware, i t seems so, of 
such indulgence to the extent t h a t he had - in fact d i r e c t l y 
and blunt ly - to add the adjectivp ' subject ivp* to some 
(^7) dxagramso " ' 
(56) ^uade Eo? Mathematics and Systems Analysis;in;Quade,E. 
( e d , ) ( f n . l l ) , p„247o / 
(57) Kahn, H„ &. Bruce - BriggSjB.; Things To Comes (New York: 
t he Macmill an Comp any , 1972) . 
Ref' rence i s bas ica l ly made to diagrams such as t ha t on 
pagp 119• Though the diagram - on thp prob;^bil i ty of a 
NA.TO d5 sactpr in thp ri^xt d^^cadp - contains an pst imation 
designed with a scholarly s k i l l of dangerous p o s t u r e s , 
the word ' sub j ec t i ve ' does c rea te an atmosphere of 
i n c r e d i b i l i t y ) . 
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Tf Svstomp A.ri'qlvcia ir^-c t o bo^n c^ri impqct on pol icv-mqlcine 
and dec i s ion - raake r s , wLat d^p^ree of c r e d i b i l i t y can a decl i-: 
maker a t t a c h to diagrams as such even when t e c h n i q u e s a re 
complea: ? An a c c u r a t e ansiver i s t h a t i t i s not u n l i k e l y tb.-c 
the dec i s ion -maker , whether i n t h e f i e l d of s t r a t e g y and 
n o t i o n a l o r i n po l i cy -mak ing , i s to p r e f e r a l e s s s o p h i s -
t i c a t e d approach, How'^ver, i f t h e s e t e c h n i q u e s a re view-
ed i n t hemse lves , they might look he lp fu l e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e 
case of defence a l l o c a t i o n s and budget-making. 
Quade d i v i d e s the mathemat ica l t e c h n i q u e s r e s o r t e d t o 
i n Systems Analys i s i n to ba s i c and n o n - b a s i c t p c h n i a u p s . Tba 
b a s i c t e c h n i q u e s inc lude* 
a) L i n e a r Programming, 
b) Monte Car lo , 
c) Game Theory, and 
d) Computation. 
The non-bas i c t e chn iques inc ludes 
a) Dynamic Programming, 
b) Queuing Theory, 
c) I n fo rma t ion Theory.^-^ ^ 
L i n e a r Programming i s borrowed from Ope ra t i ons Sesearc> 
and i s , i n f a c t , the c u r r e n t techniqui=^ i n O p e r a t i o n s Res-^^rc, 
The term ' l i n e ' ^ r ' ' ' r e f e r s to t hp r e l a t i o n s t h a t must hold 
(58 Quade, E . ; ( f n . 5 6 ) , p . 2 4 6 . 
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among t h e v--^rious a c t i v i t i e s f o r t h e p l ^ n t o be conpisteTnt 
with a v a i l a b l e s o u r c e s " . A 'programrae' i s "a schedule of 
t! (60") t h e q u a n t i t y and t iming of t h e v a r i o u s a c t i o n s m a p i a n . 
Quade ' s assessment of l i n e a r programming i s t h a t ' ' i t e n s u r e s 
t h a t "no p r o f i t a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e has been over looked" but only 
(59) i n problems of l o g i s ' c i c s and d e l i v e r y sys tems. -^ ^^  The w r i t e r 
i s of t h e op in ion that; t h e sa id t e c h n i q u e can be use fu l only 
i f app l i ed t o s p e c i f i c problems i n t h e f i e l d s p o i n t e d a t by 
Quade. Any a t tempt t o emeliorafce t h e adopt ion of l i n e a r p r o -
gramming bo h i g h e r - l e v e l problems might be f u t i l e s i n c e h i g h e r -
l e v e l problem.? do con t a in assum.ptions, some of which are based 
on what t h e ' v r i t e r termed ' v e r t i c a l ' u n c e r t a i n t i e s and, accord-
i n g l y , can a i f e c t the dec i s ion-maker opt fo r an a l t e r n a t i v e 
t h a t i s imiprobabl o i'n th^ futur^^o 
Monte Carlo i s even much more dangerous because i t 
depends on random numbeJ?s. Monte C a r l o , which i s i n t h e words 
of Quade ' ' e s t imq t ing +-he answer by means of an experiment 
wi th random numbers' i s d i f f e r e n t from random sampling 
i n t h a t i t d e a l s with "an a b s t r a c t r a t h e r t han with a r e a l 
p o s t u l a t i o n " . ^ Quade ' s argument i n favour of t h e s e a n a l y s e s 
t h a t r e s o r t e d to Monte Carlo i s t h a t t h e p rob lems t a c k l e d by 
Systems Ana lys i s "in^ve become more and more compl ica ted and 
(59) I b i d . , -po 259. (An example i s p rov ided on pag'^ 258) . 
(60) I b i d . , p . 2 5 8 . 
( 61) I b i d . , p . 240. 
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and thus sometimes become too d i f f i c u l t for c l a s s i c i a l 
ana ly t i c and numerical methodsr^ This argument r a i e e s 
some v i t a l i s s u e s . F i r s t , methods of studj? i n various d i s c i p l i n s 
haTHQ .oLwaye heen facing more and more complicated problems. 
This provide? no Ingitimqc'^'- for a dqsh in to mqthematicp 
j u s t bocaasG i t provides ind i spu tab le methods.Second,the 
f i e ld of p o l i t i c a l act ion, d--q-.it'^ vari-Su? itt'^mptg • 
'.f 'Vflccin'^ticn'-r^^-a-ins a f i - l d i f i t r .'"n logic .Tc cpt for 
an Hydrogen bomb de te r ren t system r a t h e r thgn R nUcl'-ar f i s e ion 
system on grounds of Monte Gqrlo may be a harmful decis ion 
t h a t , sure ly , l eads to an unexpected esca la t ion pso t ion 
against which Monte C^rlo will hpve nothing to do. 
I f compared to l i n e a r programming and Monte Carlo, 
the game theory ?p^'rare or ig ina l and unique, "inhereas the two 
techniques sunmariz^d in provious paragraphs ere borrowed 
from Operations Research, the Game Theory i s purely an off-
spring of Systems Analysis. But i t must be viewed as a 
counter.method JO tbo f i r s t and second techniques.While 
line-^r programming and Monte Carlo give p r i o r i t y in 
fac t the sole one, to ' co ld ' numbers md da ta as defined 
i n numerical terms, tho fx^ mr- tb'-.or^^ f l^-^os p r i o r i t y to 
non-nu.Ti-rical aspects . Moreover, i t provides for new ways 
of looking at problems of con f l i c t . In a more developed 
(62) I b id . , p . 242 
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s t a g e , i t l e f d e t o mathemat ical t r o a t m r n t of p l a n n i n g under 
c o n f l i c t condit; ionp because ' ' tho types of behaviour t h a t 
appear i such s i t u a t i o n s h-^ve l on^ heen observed "^ nd 
r eco rdedo" 
^' SYSTMS AMALYgiS AND OPERATIOKS a^ JSUARCH 
F , l . 1 . IHTRODUGTIuir. 
iicuiarks on thr r e l a t i o n of .Systenie A.nalysie to Op-
e ra t i o j i i^csearch are abundant i n l i t e r a t u r e on t h e subj-^ct. 
Equally5 remarks on d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h e methods are 
f r equen t . I^ ^ v^ry "^^T "rorkF, confucjon i e surf-^c^d 'vbon 
trvin^- t o draw a demarcat ion lin-^ betjveen the two methods o 
when u s i n g t h e two term i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y . 
Except fo r t h o s e who ase the two t e rms i n t p r c h p n g o a b l y , 
two b r c i c themes can be t r a c e d as r e g a r d s t h e r e l a t i o n betwoQn 
Syst-UH' Ana lys i s and Ope ra t i ons Sesea rch . 
a) Systems Analys i s i s t r u c l y an o f f - s p r i n g or -^ 
dovolopm.ent of Opera t ions Research , 
h) bu t Systems Analys i s i s d i f f e r e n t from o p e r a t i o n s 
r e s e a r c h ) a t l e a s t as f a r as ' a i m ' i s concerned. 
F. 2 DISTINCTION ^FD R^TJIL \TIOffl; 
Kahn and Mann conceived i^s toms Ana lys i s as an 
a c t i v i t y , s i m i l a r t o , but b roader than O p e r a t i o n s Research 
which oh y def ined cS " t h e study of o p e r a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r -
l y , but by no mean^- - x c l u s i v o l y , m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s " . ^ 
C63) Kahn, H & M a n n , J , 5 C f n . 4 ) , p . l . 
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Thoj? added t h a t t h - r o l a t i on of Oporpitions Re'scarch to System, 
analyc-i^ i s as t;he r e l a t i o n of t a c t i c s to s t ra tegy . Conspqu'^nt-
l y , '.v: arc to understand tha t the different bptween the two 
methods i s t ha t the l a t t ' ^ r deals with i s sue s brci^der than 
the former and i s more stretched qs far as time i s concerned» 
Y-^t, they conceived a conimon object ive for both methods 
when they s ta ted tha.t both arc ''tu decide how to use 
t n - ' r own equipment in the b~st; pos s ib l e way". To a l a r g e 
extent , t h i s view held by Kahn end Mann does not counterdic t 
H i t ch ' s idea of Systems Analysis as an ' economi.?ation' of 
dofcncc problems. 
Vi/hilo Kahn end Mann saw the d i s t i n c t i o n b^t^reen Operations 
Hesoareb ajid Systems An,3lysis as a question of which one 
devils with broder i ssupp, Scbl'-^sins-pr conceived Systems 
(Pi^^ 
Ina lys is er dealing with mor- quan t i t a t i ve i s s u e s . 
For Hitch, Systems Analysis i s only "more complex" 
analys is than Operations Research "but there i s no l i n e of 
demarcation". '^  By 'more complex' he moans tha t "'7orld 
War I I operat ions analyses were very l imi ted in charqctor" . 
but what i s now cal led Systems Analysis deals with i s sue s 
t h a t affect the Armed Forces in the more d i s t an t future and 
which requi re gn analysis of the fu ture . 
(64) I b i d . , p . 2 . 
(65) Schlesinger , J. 5 ( f n . l 6 ) , p .9^ -
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Ml throu<3;b Scblppina^or'p cont r ibu t ions t ack l ing t h i s 
point. , '^'^ he i n s i s t s on the d i s t i n c t i o n bet^voen Opergtions 
fiescirch and ^s te rns Analysis and expounds the fact t h a t , 
i n l i t e r a t u r e on Systems Analysis, "very jrreat difforences 
are hidden due to the development of the Systems Analysis 
approach to the cboice-of-objec t ives problems out of Op'-
r a r ions Research" and "the pa ra l l e l i sm bet-voen the techn-
iques of the two ana ly t ica l methods". 
For Schlosin^-cr, the procedure of Operations Research 
iss 
a) to define thr^ object ive p r e c i s e l y , 
b) to construct a formal model i nd i ca t i ng the r e l a t i o n -
ship between the object ive and the va r i ab le s and 
constants invclvod in i t s at tainment, and 
c) with suff ic ipnt quan t i t a t ivo information,paramritors 
K n T ^ , ( 6 8 ) 
ceJj be calculated., 
Another version i s provided by Sineh and Jaiswal who 
s ta ted th-^t OporationC ^1) Research inc ludes : 
a) achieving a c lea r and p r e c i s e de f in i t i on of the 
objec t ive , 
b) l i s t i n g of av^i lnble a l t e r n a t i v e systems, 
(66) RefcrcnoG i s made hero to .. Schles inger , J . ; ( f n . l 6 ) , and 
Schlosinger, J . ; Systems Analysis &, The P o l i t i c a l Proc-
^ss (A RAND CORP paper; no d e t a i l s a v a i l a b l e ) . 
(6?) SchlGPing-r, J , ; ( f n . l 6 ) , p . 89 
(68) Ib id . , p .93 
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c) developing the cost model, 
d) developing the effect ivcnese model, 
e) devclopine: th'^ copt-f^ffrctiv^nopp modrl pnd 
f) rccorriueuding.^ "-^  
'iccording to Quade, Sy^^teas Smsly^is is i d e n t i c a l 
'.vith 0]Dorations Hosearch insofar as i t s anplyt ic t o o l s are 
concrri"'od. But no r e l a t i o n i s reportod as far ns th,-= 
reason behind endorsing Systems '''-nqlysis or Operations 
j:"^cscarch i s rcportodo In another t r r - a t i se , Quade br ings 
Systruis Analysis and Operations Research tog'--ther as "success-
ful aids to pol icy d'^termination in areas such qs nat ional 
( 71) 
secur i ty ' ' . ' Hgd they r e a l l y been one and the same,there 
would have been but unknown -i-rounds to ju s t i fy the d i s -
c re t ion from the t-^rm Operations Research and the adoption 
of Systems Analysis. This idea can be supported by Sch les inger ' s 
emphasis on th-^ f ict thTt "Systems .Inalysis provides 
assista"acc to logicpl th inking" , t r u e , ''but i t can never 
solve problems in the same sense t h a t Operations Research 
c a n " / 7 2 ) 
(69) Si'Tgh, K & Jais 'val , N, ; Operational Research in TOTD 
-u- ...ncc Manpgement; (IDSL Journa l , Vol. 2,i^o.^, : ;pr i i , 
10 70) , p . 409. 
( 7O0 •>. de ,E. ; ( in . 5b) , p . 237 
(71) qurde,E.? ( fn. 26) , p . l 5 3 
(72) . Schlesinger, J . ; ( fno l6 ) , p . 9 1 . 
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To sor t t h i s iseue out, 3chit singer suggests a c l ea r -
cut solutions "rocognit ion t h a t t h - r r om r e a l l y t's/o tech-
niqucsj oach with i t s own l i m i t p t i o n s . , . ".'^^'^ V/hat Schles-
inger has suggested i s , in fac t , a push to the course of 
devolox-iment of oyautus AnalysiF r a the r than ^^ attempt to 
spel l out poiiie of tbc techniques on which aiajor systems 
analyses have been b^sed. In no way can Scu les inger ' s way 
out be described as one in favour of Operations Hesearch.One 
m-^ casil" ' wonde" the nocossity for adopting new terms had 
Systoas Analysis -^ nd Operations Research been re levant at 
core ac the terms for them are in terchangeable . 
The qual i ty and c r e d i b i l i t y of a given mfethod are not 
the uufccomc of the techniques borrowed or i n q u i r i e s developed 
as thc7 -^re the producr of a set of r e s u l t s , deductions -nd 
recommend'itiens. .Vn analysis of the kind refer red to by Q,uade 
which saved the U.S. some % 1 b i l l i o n , though we h^ve to 
express o'^r conservation as fa r as the c r i t e r i o n , i s meaning-
ful only i n so far as i t s r e s u l t s are concerned« 
Viewed in terms of problom.s, Sys~ems ' .nalysis - i t i s 
agreed upon as has been shown in e a r l i e r pages - deals with 
h igher - leve l problems or what has been termed broader po l icy 
problems of weapo i performance and analys is of the course of 
mi l i t a ry b a t t l e . I t might also be l a rge ly t rue to assume,;-
(73) Ib id . , p.90 
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Kahti and Mann d id , t h a t Systems Ana lys i s hand les s t r a t p g y -
l i k e proMems whi le Opera t ions Research hand les t a c t i c - l i k e 
p rob lems . The only argument t h a t we can r a i s e a g a i n s t such 
comparison - j u s t fo r t h e sake of l o g i c a l v e r i t i c a t i o n -
i s t h a t i n c e r t a i n c a s e s t a c t i c and s t r a t e g y are melted 
t o g e t h e r i n a given s i t u a t i o n . I f t h a t very s i t u a t i o n need 
be ana lyzed , t he term t h a t we a re supposed to give t o our 
a n a l y s i s w i l l mostly depend on our p e r s o n a l l i k e s a.nd d i s -
l i k e s . 
The w r i t e r b e l i e v e s i n t h e n e c e s s i t y for a b u i l d - i n 
conf idence i n the new method termed Systems A n a l y s i s . To 
speak of i t as i f i t w^re Opera t ion? Research on t h e g iounds 
t h a t i t emerged out of i t would m^ean, e x a c t l y , t o speak of 
p h y s i c s as i f i t were ph i losophy simply because a l l s c i e n c e s 
have ^merged out of p h i l o s o p h y . 
I . I I . 5; RESEARCH M^TrlOD; 
The problem se l ec tpd fo r s tudy , i t s scope and t h e 
l i m i t a t i o n s noted fo r a n a l y s i s and d a t a g a t h e r i n g l i m i t -
a t i o n s i n d i c a t e the fo l lowing methodology needs which, i f 
s a t i s f i e d , would e f f e c t u a t e a b e t t e r search ' p o s t u r e ' s 
a) the need fo r an o r d e r i n g device to impose d i s c i p l i n e 
upon d i f f p r e n t e lements r e l a t e d t o d i f f e r e n t d i s -
c i p l i n e s , 
b) t h e need to d e s c r i b e t h e p r e s e n t p a t t e r n s of t h e 
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i r i t cma t iona l p o l i t i c a l behaviour, as far as tho s t ra tegy 
arid natioTT-il secur i ty of the present nuclear po',vers are 
o. ncornodjlDc c?^u'^;.'the p o l i t i c a l behaviour approach i s , at i t s 
c - i c , an attetnpt to describe how n a t i o n - s t a t e s have, under 
C'^rtqin cd'^'ditionp, t^ ^ pursue t h e i r nqti'^n^l i n t e r e s t s as 
defi'-cd in t-rms --f po'ver, 
c) the need to p r e d i c t what move ivill be embarked upon by 
njn-nuclcar nation s t a t e s v is-^-vi s an in te rna t iona l system 
governed by ce r t a in pc-wor r u l e s 'vhcee r e l a t i o n t^ nuclear 
•:'.,epcns and technclogy i s belived to be of an incessan t increase 
d) the need to ov.Ivo sonic cf the techniques and concepts 
t h a t have proved functional i"^  the case of relati--d d i sc ip l ines^ 
e) I"he need to propound answerable ques t ions , thr es tab-
l i s h d fac to rs which cons t i t u t e the urge for sus ta in ing the 
phenomenon, 
g) the ne:d to r e f r a in from adopting quan t i f i ca t ion as an end 
i t i t s e l f , and 
h) tho •'"'^ od D^  economise the pe rspec t ivos used so as to help 
evolve workin'"^ pssumxpti.ns -^md operat ional deductions. 
To undert'^k3 an academic study, research should, 
r c j a r d l e s s of the d i sc ip l ine or d i s c i p l i n e s - i n the case of 
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common in tord isc ip l in '^ rv -^ppronch-providp for tlir*^p o<=ppn-
ti-^l d^tcrmiHantss 
a) in -assurance of the 'existencG' of tho problem selected 
for study, 
"b) ^ log ic -1 underst^^nding of the problem which, i f requi red , 
c-^ n help effect a credible control over the preblem, •^ nd 
c) a p red ic t ion of future behavioural p-=itterns. 
In the context of the problem selected for study, i t s 
scope -'nd data-g-^thering l i m i t a t i o n s , the wr i t e r be l ieves t ha t 
the stutibling block i s only r e l a t ed to the t h i rd of the 
nbove-mentionnd drtprminants . Wborpos i t i s poss ib lp t r 
provide onuugb evidence for the ' e x i s t e n c e ' of the problem 
as a d i s t ingu ishab le phenomenon in a p a r t i c u l a r environment, 
nnd to presen t tue required log ica l und-rs t^nding, i t i s an 
en t i r e ly d i f f i c u l t tpsk to p-ige an authent ic p r e d i c t i o n 
simply because the whc l^e procedure of the use or non-use 
of nucle-^r weapons i s not t o t a l l y the produce of mechanised 
techniques. I t i s ±ks equally the produce of the human 
i n t e l l e c t through reading the data proper ly or misreading 
them, crdculat ion of the fnctors of a given pos ture or mis-
calcul- ' t ing them, choice of an a l t e r n a t i v e from a l a rge 
set of a l t t r n a t i v e s none of which i s exclusively b e n e f i c i a l , 
adopting the decis ion to launch the f i r s t nuclear s t r i k e or 
re f ra in ing from such decis ion. Moreover, mechanised tech-
niques pre apt si'^  a degree of e r ro r known or unknown.Even 
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i n chc cnse of a control by the human i n t e l l e c t , the poss -
i b i l i t i e s of mental defection are nut to be ruled uut 
e i tbo r by t b - c r i si ° s t n i n or ^ <=uddpn d<"-.fr^ ctinn„ Pomp 
publir ' iod iL.erican scenarios d^ show tne p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
decision token in view of a metit,al defect ion. H d^ i t ovei' 
boon for the most dostructiwQ conventional weapons now 
deployed, the effect would hqv§ s t i l l been poss ib l e to be 
cent pined, '^ //ith nuclear we?{pons, cental nm^nt i s almost a 
mp.v cor of uncer ta in ty . Accordingly, the techniques rpsurted 
to in order to provide for the pr-^diction required irpy not 
bo those exclusively s c i e n t i f i c techniques used in oth^-^r 
d i s c i p l i n e s . In contemporary l i t e r a t u r e on the subject 
scenar ios , for exs^mpl'^, have b com'^  copious as t-^cbniqu'^s 
of p red ic t ion .There i s a notion tha t they have also been 
endorsed by si;atesmen. Kahn and Bruce-Briggs mention tha t 
"during the f i f i : ios analys ts such as those at the RAND Cor-
pora t ion had perhpps a dozen scenarios for accidental or 
de l ibe ra te war, almost a l l of whicn were taicen ser iously by 
the decision-makers. In many qroas o f f i c i a l s or members of 
t h e i r pt-^ffs l o s t sleep un t i l the underlying condit ions t h a t 
made these scenar ios p l aus ib l e w^^ re corrected or noairif^u . 
@ Reference i s made here to Things to Come; ( f n . 5 7 ) , p .118. 
Ace No. '^^->-.. 
3 \ ^X.r 
•76- \?€^:> .^rs^^-
^ * * ' « > » > , • 1 1 1 , ^ - - ^ > - • . - > - ^ - ^ ' 
In the l i g h t of these f ac to r s , the wr i t e r wi l l adopt a 
modified tpdrnique of systems analys is with the incorpora t ion 
of some of the elements of desc r ip t ive analys is and compara-
t i v e ana lys i s , 
4s for the mOdi"fi'pd t'^cbniques ana lys i s , i t wi l l 
comprises 
1,. the use of quan t i t a t i ve ana lys is where poss ib le and the 
s e t t i n g up of a c lear l i n p of demarcation showing where 
quan t i t a t i ve analysis was not found relevant in whole or 
i n p a r t . This i s to he found in Pa r t I , Chapter Ti l 
where the problem i s approached through an examination 
of the :ooergy re leased by a nucl-^-ar reac t ion and the 
energy requirements for the world t i l l the year 2000. 
i'ho e f fec t s of the acqu i s i t ion of nuclear power capable 
of dovol oping into ^ w-^ qpon system i s hinted a t , iDut not 
quan t i t a t i ve ly a'^  such effect can be q u a l i t a t i v e l y 
observed. On the other hand, the e f fec t s of nuclear 
weapoas in ter;ris of cos ts for example, can be 
quanti fi'^d. 
2. looking at the problem as a whole, i . e . conceiving the 
oneness of the phenomenon, bas i ca l ly a social psychology 
technique. Chapter I of F a r t I I i s an attempt to synthesize 
some el'-^merts in to a phenomenon tha t can be i d e n t i f i e d and 
i s o l a t e d from other phenomena for the sake of study. 
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3. the i n s i s t ence on making one of the objec t ives of the 
study to help th'-- doci ?ion-mal<f^r chocs'^ a course of 
ac t ion . This i s apparent in P a r t I , Chapter I I I , i tems 
I & -4- as well as in the conclusion, 
4 . cie gttompt to economize the p-Drispr-ctivss used by 
maintaining the cos t -e f fec t pe rspec t ive during the two 
procedures of problem for^ulafcion and search, P a r t I I , 
Chapter T and IT r '^spectiv^, but witf^out num^^ricp] 
p r e s e n t a t i o n s , 
5» considering the problem as belonging to the realm of 
choice wher-^, assumingly, a numoer of a l t e r n a t i v e s are 
provided. This considerat ion i ? assessf^d in Pa r t I , Chapt 
I I I pnd thr conclusion, 
6. the formulation of the problem af te r an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n -
ary approach. In Par t I I , Chapter I I , the wr i t e r r e s o r t s 
to economics, psychology, p o l i t i c a l science, his tory and 
the mi l i t a ry science, 
7. th'^ search i s 'vorkf^ d out tbrouQ:b s t a r t i n g by p a r t i c l e s , 
examining each separa te ly , then piocing th^m toge ther in 
an operat ional synthes is , 
8. tui^ i n t e r p r e t a t i o n providing for what has been ca l led 
th - l o g i c a l understanding and, equal ly, che moans t o 
p r e d i c t future behavioural p a t t e r n s . An i n t e r d i s c i p l i n -
ary approach i s used for i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as wil l be 
s^own in Pq-rt TT^ Chapter I I I , 
9. desc r ip t ive analysis i s resort.-d to while deal ing with 
- 78 -
current f t r a t eg i c pos tu res and doc t r ines . The approach 
to the problem in the next chapter depends, alongwith 
quan t i f i ca t ion , as desc r ip t ive ana lys i s , 
10) compRrativ^ anplysis i s up^d w;h^ n tr^^lng to dr.^ 'w con-
c lus ions from the nuclear s t r a t e g i e s of Prance and China 
and in the 'search^ cases of Turkey, Taiwan and South 
Korea. The comparative approach in t h i s case i s based on 
the r e l a t i o r bet^veen the acquis i t ion of ;¥eapon-grade 
f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s and nat ional security^ 
?;j iT I : CHiJ-'I'ER I I I ? R:C£EZRCH SUBSTANCE 
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PA.^ T I ; CHAPTtia I I I 
5ESEA.R0H SUBgT.ANCij;; 
THE FuCLEAR pOV/^ R; 
I . I I I . I . INTRODUCTION 
A.t 5.45 pm, Deceaber 2, 19'4-3, t h e Nuclear Age did 
a c t u a l l y commence when a team of Americian s c i e n t i s t s , head-
ed by Enr i ce Fermi a c h i e v e d , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , a d e s c r i p t i o n 
of p e l f - s u s t a i n i t i g n u c l e a r f i s s i o n r e a c t i o n with an atomic 
' p i l e ' b u i l t beneath a stadium i n ChicagOo 
The wor'k of the team v e r i f i e d t h e con ten t of t h e 
famous l e t i F i t h a t Alber t E i n s t e i n sent to the then American 
P r e s i d e n t Roosevel t on August 2, 1939 i n which he p o i n t e d at 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of aT;ilizixjg the phenomenon of uranium 
f i s s i o n " f o r tb« c o n s t r u c t i o n of pxtrpmely powerful (wpight 
for weight) bombs of a new bype - a m i l l i o n t imes more power-
ful than conven t iona l bombs". ^-^ Said E i n s t e i n : "A s i n g l e 
bomb of t h i s t y p e , c a r r i e d by boa t and exploded i n a p o r t , 
might very wel l des t roy t h e whole p o r t t o g e t h e r with some of 
( 7S") t h e su r round ing t e r r i t o r y ' " . ^ Haunted by t h e p o s s i b i l i t y 
of Germany be ing .working on l ike -minded l i n ' ^ s , t h e d e c i s i o n 
Was idopted " to exp lo re t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y s e r i o u s l y " . 
(7^) Govt, of I n d i a ; Nuclear E>cplosions and The i r E f f e c t s ; 
(.New Del his x^'linistry of In fon i i a t ion & Broadcas t i ng , 
195^5), p . 2, For f u l l t e x t , see Appendix IX. 
(75) I b i d . , p . 5. 
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A.±L;31 t h e work of Fermi had been completed, a huge 
p l a n t wpe "built a t Hanfoi?dito p roduce p lu ton ium. A p l a n t 
was then c o n s t r u c t e d a t Oals Ridge t o produce Uranium 235 
from n a t u r a l u r q ^ i u " . A.t tbe^ s^me Oak Hidge, ano ther p l a n t 
ivae b u i l t t o produce uranium 235 gy means of e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c 
s e p a r a t i o n . The famoug Las Alamos Labora tory was asked to 
des ign a workable atomic bomb under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of 
Robert Oppenbelmer. This l a b o r a t o r y could produce t h r e e bombs 
by mid-19'4-5. One bomb made of p lu ton ium (vas t e s t e d on the 
ground a t Alamogordo Sands on Ju ly 19M-3. The o t h e r two were 
( 75) 
dropped a t Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6, 19-^5-. 
1 ,111 ,2 . IDEWTIFICATION 
( A ) = The nuc lea r power, f o r m i l i t a r y u se s or o t h e r w i s e , 
as Simon s t r e s s e s - proved " to be f e a s i b l e from both s c i p n t i f i c ( 76) @ 
and commercial s t a n d p o i n t s and i t i s here to s t a y . 
(75) I b i d , , p , 3 = 
(76) SiuiOiijA; Energy Besources ; (New York: Pcrgaman P r e s s , 1 9 7 5 ) 
© P r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e p o s s i b i l i t i e s a re no more cons ide red as 
rpmote and r e p o r t s from t h e United S t a t e s i n d i c a t e t h a t 
the p r i v a t e s e c t o r , a f t e r showing s i g n s of i n t e r e s t f o r q u i t e 
a l o n g bime, has been g ran ted a go-ahead t o get i n t o t h e 
nucl ^ar- fuel b u s i n e s s . I n a r e p o r t on Energy, Newsw^-ek,June 
30, 197'^, ex-Prt^^idpnt "Pord wpp r^^ported t o hpivp> ppked t h e 
Congrf^ss t o g ive p<=rmispion for p r i v a t e compani'^s t o p roduce 
and s e l l n u c l e a r f u e l . The American P r e s i d e n t ' s move was 
i n t e r p r e t e d as an atl'^uipt to b o l s t e r f o r e i g n newcomers to 
t h e f i e l d of uranium enrichment from d r i v i n g /imerica t o 
l o s e t h e l i o n ' s share of t h e l u c r a t i v e nucli^^ar fue l marke t . 
The new P r e s i d e n t , Jimmy C a r t e r , has suggested a new 
domest ic n u c l e a r en.-^rgy p o l i c y but has not y e t -c ^"'" 
approved by t h e CongresSo 
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One of bJv; r r a l i t i e ? of tbo presen t i n t e rnq t i cnq l pystem i e 
thpit t b - Nuclerr Vge or the Nuclear Revolution hns nctuelly 
coraafnced -nd th p a t t e r n s of ^ill ri^p-^cts of humqn l i f e 'vi l l 
be ciould'd - ' i ter the e i f e c t s of endorsing the nucl-^ar po'vor 
as -^  basic foundacion of nation.-^I po.j^r in the Cv^nt^xt of an 
iPtornatlorj-d syouCJ- wh re ' i n t e r e s t ' i s - s t r a t e g i c a l l y -
defiurd in teims ' ' ^po '^ro \n. cxauQin?ticn of t h i s po'jer ";nich 
his - -.id surely 'sdll r^-^voluti^ uiso ^ n signs of l i f e on ear th 
i s un-.vjideblo. 
(B) ^.U'^i^tit-'tiv'^l^'-, tb'^ nucl^^r pn.mr Qr,n tio qcoppoo/i 
throuji- examining tbr an, rgy released by a nuclear reac-cioU. 
By biuaiing one kilugraiii of ur->uium, the energy released i s 
--^quivl-nt to -bout t^'enty mi l l ion kilon'^itt hours or the r'-^al 
burn! LI 2000 t^ns of high-gradp coal - 2000,000 times mor'-
e f f i c l n t . Tb'^  energy from f i s s i l e m^teri^l ful ly consunod 
i s ib ju t 1.7 X 10 times .^s thqt l a rge as tha t from the s-nne 
mass jt high >.xplL sivo» Mcxr^^ver, th'^ en rgy from fuel bui*n-
ing .;! the ver icus thermonuclorr fuels i s only three to four 
times l a r g e r then tha t ^f the srtdc mass of l i s s i l e ma te r i a l . 
This ' - u - r t i t - t i v e ^ispect b^p contr ibuted to tb^ '^ m^rgencr^ of 
the nucle-^r po'vor -s a dominirt f -c to r in i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
ro l a t i ' - u s ,-? ool l ns i'^ designing secur i ty and development 
i77) V"os>oboini c,D« 5 Nu_cle'^r Po-'er; (Ne'v Delhi: Third Impi'eseioni 
P . ' p l o ' s P j^b] ; ehing House, 1975), p . 5. 
(78) Ix .rk, J; Nucl-ar ^e-pong 'i'cchnolo.^7 in fold,B.& Othorr 
( d s ) , ( fn .90)^ p . 133. 
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strca^cgics o-t both developed and developing coun t r i e s . 
(C) '^^ualitativGlj', to .givp only one ••example, the r e l a t i v e 
s t a b i l i t y tha t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i s claimed to be 
enjoying, according to Kiss inger , i s "through tho t h r e a t 
of mutual des t ruc t ion based on (nuclear) weapons".^"^ I t i s 
due to nuclear supremacy tha t super-powers, i t i s assumed 
owe 'choir freridom of ac t ion . A c l a s s i c a l example i s t ha t without 
the nuclear po";er, as Prof, iron of the University of P a r i s 
af l i rms, American bombers would not have attacked North 
Vietnam by conventional weapons. 
(D) Yi'-npd in t^rms of en^rgv, i t hps been proved t h a t the 
t o t a l cnetgy requirements for the world wil l mult iply by a 
fac tor of about 5 by the year 2000, -^ The current stage 
of energy consumption depends ba s i ca l l y on petroleum which 
i s cicc-cribod as the most access ib le and convenient source 
of energy. ''World petroleum reserves are almost 350 x 10 ® 
coal equiVcilont. Cumulative consumption of petroleum by 
(79) Ki^singer,H;Domestic St ructure and Foreign Policy ; i n 
Hoffman, S.(ed.)s Conditions for v7orld Order (New York 
Simon and Schuster, F i r s t Clarion Pr in t ing ,196b) ,p.167-
(80) /lron,R. ; The Inarchial Order of Power; ins Hoffman, S. 
( ed.) , Ib id . , v.M-7 
(81) S . I . P . R . I . ; :Nuclcar P r o l i f e r a t i o n Problem (Stocholm 
ALmqvist &Wiksel l , 197^) , p . 21. 
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1? the year 2000 i e estimatf-d to be 305 x 10 Kg. coal '-quiv-
( C>?) 
alcnt wbich would lea.vo only about 13% of t o t a l reservoir* ' . 
12 The remaining 45 x 10 Kg co^l equivalent wil l p r a c t i c a l l y 
be of no use becaUsG the e n t i r e set-up of assoc ia tes indus-
t r i e s wil l not have to be sustained only for such short 
suppl ies and then stop sudd'-^nly. On the other hand, whereas 
"about 2.5% of the t o t a l world e l e c t r i c a l generating capac-
i t y i s at Dr^p'^nt produc-d by nuclear power. . . I t i s estimat'^d 
t h a t by the year 2020, t h i s wil l incroasr to about M-0%,Somc 
p r o j e c t i o n s suggest t h a t t h i s would even reach 75^ -^
(15) Viewed in terms of technology, nuclear t-^chnology i s 
expectrd to be the t rade of t h e quar ter of a centuiy to 
come. Whereas the current trend i s t;o speafc of 'technology 
t ra 'nsfer ' in the cont-yt of th= r.-^lation betw^^n tbr^ developed 
(82) Ib id . , p . 22. 
(83) Ib id . , p . 23 
@ The Time Magazine ( Ip r i l 1^, 1975) published an in te r im 
repor t on progress of "SRDfi. ("Energy Research & Development 
Agency operat ing from i/ashington) whose mission i s to find 
out wbich a l t e r n a t i v e ? to o i l ar^ ^ feas ib le and which are not. 
The wr i t e r has not counted so much on the sai d repor t due 
to th^ lack of procedures and d e t a i l s . In the r epo r t , i t i s 
s t a t d tha t despi te the problems,nuclear f i s s ion could account 
for about 15% of nucl-^ar energy production in 1985 and account 
for about 15% of nuclear energy production in 1985 and 30% 
by th-' year 2000, v, 2% now. As for nuclear fusion i t wi l l 
have no rea l impact on the US energy scene t i l l a f t e r the yoj 
2000. I t i s only in combination with solar technology tha t 
nuclear fusion, according to some repor t , holds the grea t -
est promise for th-^ n^xt 100 y^ars . 
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coun t r i e s (DCs) and the l e s s developed (LDQfl), some 
for^cpipt'^ ourro--at e ' techno] oe;y c r i s i r ' to come in the 
e i g h t i e s o± t h i s century„ I'he said c r i s i s wi l l be one 
@ 
of developed r a the r than basic technology, i . e . i n the 
f i e l d s of nuclear po>ver and associat-^d i n d u s t r i e s . The ]o-.ic 
al deducion i s thgt the near-nuclear count r ies can avoid 
such a c r i s i s i f - Oi^ lLY - they embark on a programme of 
t h e i r own to exercise t h e i r nuclear option had they retain-^d 
i t Open. 
I t might be argued tna t the incept ion of the nuclca" 
power was in the form of a mi l i t a ry use, not technologicaj , 
i n 1945 when th^ United S t a t - s pxploded i t s two nucl'-ar bom" -
on Hiroshima and l^agasaki. But nuclear power would have nc vrr 
doveloped into ib s current shape and ef fec t iveness - not to 
spasl^ of the future - hrd i t s subs tan t ia l a-^^ well as 
as^ociat-^d technologies not been stepped up. The w r i t e r . 
(84) Reference i s mad>^  her to : Kgnn,!! & j3ruce~Briggs,B<, 5 
ThincTF to Como, p . 76. 
@ In Ind ia , the term ' ba s i c technology' usually refers: to 
nuclear technology. 
@@ Japan r e p r ' S ^ r t s a unique case for S'tudy, Though a non-
nuc l :a r s t a t e , the incen t ives tha t might lead Jepan to 
(^xercise the nucl-^ar option are not so v i t a l l y r e l a t e d 
to matters of '^norgy.For the apprehensions of the 
Japanese emanate p r i n c i p a l l y from t h e i r ne^ d^ for securil^^ 
Thus, i t bf comes easy to understand how Japan would 
consider i t s option - including the nuclear one had i t 
been l e f t open. The only condit ion declared by Jgpan-ce 
refer ?ncnp was an American subs tan t ia l r e t r e a t from 
Vietnam. (Nevsw: ek, June 23, 1975) . In addi t ion , one wouj.d 
add tha t the Japanese always s t r e s s t h e i r need to go 
nuclear in case of North Korean- forces would th ink of 
taking over South Korea. 
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•fchoraxore, i s of the opinion that 195'^  was equally iapoxtant 
in thf^  history of nuclear power because i t witnessed the. 
commissioning of the world's f irst atomic power plant in 
the Soviet UnioUo 
(F) Vi'-^ w.-d in terms of i t s impact on the strategies and 
international polit ical behaviour of the non-nuclear units 
of the international system, especially those comprised in 
the term 'Third World', i t provided new opportunities for 
independent action". Trjese n-^w opportunities are the 
outcome of the nuclear stalemate et the super-structural 
level of the system; a stalemate which has eventually resulted in 
'det'-nte'. ' Moreover, the international poli t ical 
behaviour of non-nuclear units of the 
C85)„ Van Den BorghjG; Contemporary Nationalism; in Hoff-
mann , S» ( edo ) ; ( fn. 79) , p. 80. 
@ This should not be interpreted in a way which means th?j 
the acc.uisition of nucl-^ar pc vor plants i s a pre-
requisite for tlie acquisition of nuclear weapons. Despite 
the strong relation between the two, there i s a poss-
ibi l i ty of a siven country embarking on a purely weapon-
oriented pro^rau.uie. 
@@ For an elaboration of this thema, see the tf^xt- of the 
lectur-^- ,ff:ivr>n by Dr. Henry Kissii^g'-'r i""": •^ h'-' 1976 
CLastair Buchan ^^ emori al L,-cturo Programme on June 
25, 1976, Survival, Vol.XVIII, i-^ o.5, Sept./Oct. 76. 
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pyrtem has been affected as well by the f r a g i l i t y charac ter -
@ ±7,±rie. the top of tt^e system due to the nuclear s ta lemate , 
a f r a g i l i t y t ha t could be proved in case of an i r r e v e r s i b l e 
escaLscion t h a t , in turn , l eads to a nuclear exchange. 
1,111.3. yTJC[LE4a '.'^ 4F0FS 
(A) Sucl<=ar weapons form tha t pjrea of nuclear power with 
'vhich we are b a s i c - l l y concerned due to t h e i r d i r ec t effect 
on s t ra tegy and nat ional secur i ty of the u n i t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
system, and on t h e i r behaviour. Nuclear weapons are those weapons 
'.'hich deploy e i t h e r nuclear f i s s ion or fusion to c rea te the 
po'^erful y i e ld . The term 'nuc lea r weapons' ref^-rs to a l l 
' - t o m i c ' , 'hydrogen' pnd ' thermonuclear bombs'. 
(B) An 'a tomic ' bomb i s one whose y ie ld f a l l s in the k i lo ton 
lange. A 'hydrogen' bomb i s another whose y ie ld f a l l s 
in the megaton range. 'Vherf^as the ' a tomic ' (3e:vic» 
depends on fusion. "Instead of employing the heaviest 
Q Technical reasons underlying f r a g i l i t y ought also to be 
mentioned. I t i s t echnica l ly caused by'2 a miss i l e sap -
the guidance system, the 4BM, the MIRVs, the MiiSVs. 
©Q Somo recent works on the subject use the two terms 
' atomic'and ' nuc l ea r ' interchangeably. Accordingly , nuclear 
weapons can be divided in to f i s s ion weapons and fusion weapons. 
The rangp of tb^ vield i s ^^ither the k i l o t o n rane:^ or the 
megaton range. The wr i t e r wi l l s t ick to the us'^ of the term 
'nuc lear weapon' since i t i s the nucleus of i tems which i s 
i'i a f i s s ion bomb, f issioned and, in a fusion bomb, fused. 
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clemerit i n n a t u r e , urauiuui, i n t h e case of an ' a t o m i c ' bomb, 
t ' v bydroerpn bomb msi\r>^ UFP of th^ l i ^ b t - ^ s t , hydroerpri, 4t 
very high t e m p e r a t u i a s , c e r t a i n k i n d s of hydrogen (deu t e r ium 
and t r i t i u m ) fuse i n t o heav ie r e lements g iv ing off g r ea t 
q u a n t i t i e s of heat",, The ' hyd rogen ' bomb or 'H-bomb' o r 
' sup ex-bomb' was an i nnova t ion t h a t r e v o l u t i o n i p e d the 
economics of e x p l o s i v e s and allowed fo r t h e f a b r i c a t i o n of 
v;eapons of a power f a r beyond t l ' a t cons ide red f e a s i b l e 
( 87^ 
fo r chain - rp ' ac t ing n u c l e a r a-^semblies' ' . I t i s i n t e r e s t -
i ng as well as impor tan t t o mention the economic a spec t i n 
bho comparison of an ' abomb' to a ' hydrugen' bomb, vifbereas a 
10 k i l o t o n atom bomb would c o s t approximate ly 1^3^0,000, a 
2 megaton hydrogen bomb would c o s t som.e ''1600,000, which means 
a hundred- fo ld p r i c e r e d u c t i o n , 
( C) ts ca^icXds thermonuclear w a p o n s , no u n c l a s s i f i e d 
in fo rma t ion i s a v a i l a b l e on t h e r e s e a r c h and development 
o± such weapons. J^ o^ n a t i o n has y e t develop 3d such d e v i c e s 
'.•i'itbout pxtensi vp t e s t i n g of f i s s i o n weapon-
.n (88) 
(86) Beaton,Lo, Must tne Bomb Spread, (London: Penguin 
Spec ia l Ko.A791, 1966) , p . 26, 
(87) Lapp,R. ; Nucl - ar J^eayons^lm Govt of I n d i a . A.ED; Nuclear 
Weapons, 1970) , p.3« 
(83) Hopkins, J . ; Wucl.-^ar /eapon Technology? i n ; SIP HI ( f n . 
81) , p . 1 1 5 . 
(D) I t has become t r a d i t i o n a l to speak of nuclear 'V'^apons 
interms of ' t a c t i c a l ' versus ' s t r a t e g i c ' weapons, though 
@ 
no c lea r demarcation has yet been made between the two. 
Perhaps, a worth-mentioning attempt to draw a somewhat 
dem.arcation l i n e has been that of Belef and Antell who 
who defined tacticc3l nuclear weapon? as ''atomic bombs r ins ing 
frum f rac t ions of a k i lo ton to hundreds of k i l o tons in 
( 89) explosive force". We can then concludr tha t s t r a t e g i c 
nuclear weapon^, are thopp whose explosive force exceeds the 
k i l o t o r range and reach the megaton. To make t h e i r d i f i e renb-
i a t i o n more comprehensive, they added another c r i t e r i o n to 
tha t of the explosive force; i . e . u t i l i t y . For Belet and 
/Intel l , " t a c t i c a l "^ e^^ pons ar^ ^ meant to be used in -iiroct 
support of f i e ld warfare' ' . /ifithin the realm of t a c t i c a l 
nuclear weapons, ther-^ are ' sma l l ' and ' l a r g e ' weapons. ' Small' 
t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons are those exploded in the atmospherf 
and use the smallest poss ib le amount of f i s s ionab le 
mater ia l to explode. 'Large ' t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons are 
(89) Bolef, D„ & i n t e l l , M5 Tac t ica l Nuclear Weapons; in ; 
Grovernment of Ind ia , AED; J-^uclear Weapons, ( fn . 87) ,p . l3° 
@ This i s sue has not yet been s e t t l e d The Uniced S ta tes 
the Soviet Union have not agreed upon standardised c r i t e r i , ^ 
for d i s t ingu ish ing t a c t i c a l from s tmte '^ ic weapons.The 
example of the Sovipt Mig-2'^ embodies t^^is unse t t l ed i s s u e . 
I t has even added to the complexity of the problem for i t 
has included the dis tance range as a fac tor . 
these depignod to bp delivexod by ICBM systouis ( I n t o r -
contippntpl B q l l i g t i c Miopiloo) or IRBM ilvt^rm.'=dinto Rango 
B a l l i s t i c Miss i l e s ) . The deployment of MIHVs (iviultiple 
Ij-ccrdepondeiitly-Targotable Re-entry Vehicles) and MHVs 
(Manoeuverable Re-entry Vehicles) has, moreover, contrife-
ted to the advancement of del ivery systems for 
s t r a t e g i c nuclear weapons to the extent t h a t thf=y are 
included - in York's p ro jec t ion - as onp of the four f ac to r s 
t h a t i-hreaton to upset the presen t Soviet-American s t r a t e g i c 
Ja la ice. The same idea i s reaffirmed by Feld who inc ludes 
MIRVs and MRVs as one of the reasons why the present 
s i t u a t i o n i s not of s t a b i l i t y in the arms rac= s^nse although, 
in th<^ c r i s i s - s t a b i l i t y sense, the present s t r a t e g i c 
(91) 
s i t u a t i o n i s very s t ab le . 
The doployme'"it of ULMS (Under-water Long-Range Missi le 
Systems) wil l add to the tn rea ten ing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 
d- l ivery systems tor s t r a t e g i c weapons - i f p roduced . l t i s 
due to tbr^ fj^ct tha t the Rupcians a^ d^ thp 4moricans h^v^ both 
most of t h e i r de te r ren t in the form of fixed land-based 
mi s s i l e s tLat MIRVs, because of th-^ concentrat ion of warheads 
at a s ingle aim p o i n t , have become a d e s t a b i l i s i n g 
(90) F~ldj B„ & Other? ( e d s . ) ; Impact of New Technologies in 
the 4rms Racr-° (Mass. , US4.; Massachussetts I n s t i t u t e of 
^ Technology P r - F ' 1971), p . 4 , 
(91) Tbid . , p , 6 . 
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f ac to r . The ins i s t ence by tbe United on deploying MIRVg 
and I'^ nVp conforms to the s t ra tegy of deterrence as conceived 
(92) by American s u r a t e g i s t s . 
This conformity can be deduced from what James 
Schles inrer - "rhe'T he wa-^^ US Secretary of Defence sp le t out 
i n defining options other than suicide or c a p i t u l a t i o n . He 
said his country ' 'will employ nuclear iveapons with the 
capacity for se lec t ive t a r g e t i n g . With t h e i r p in -po in t 
(92 See Fryklund, S, ? 100 Mill ion LiveS' Maximum Surival In 
k Nuclear ^B.T% (I\^ ew Yorks ^ '^'^ cMillan Company, Second Pr int -
ing, 1962). I t expounds the b i r th of what may be cal led 
' r a t i o n a l ' s tratpgy based on n i t t i n g mi l i t a ry t a r g e t s 
in the Soviet Union r a the r than a s t ra tegy of c i ty 
des t ruc t ion . The choice was reached at n economic 
bases and af ter several computation proc^^sses count-
ing populat ion lo s se s in a l l probably nuclpar 
exchanges. 
This s t r a t eg i c doctr ine i s expect-^d to undergo a 
r ad ica l change as the Uniued S ta tes i s reported to 
have moved in October 1976 in to the hardware phase 
of developing a new ICBM system o£ mobile miss i l e 
Culleo k i s s i l e X. ( In tp rna t iona l Herald Tribune,October, 
11,1976). The change of the premise of the de t e r r en t 
fo-'-ce from fixed land-based miss i lo° in to mobile 
mi s s i l e s wil l make reconnaissance methods, row applied, 
almost use le s s . 
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accur-Tcy, thoy wil l h i t rrio-^ningful t^irgcts with q. suff-
i c i e n t -^ccurancy yiclc! co'ibination t^ df^stroy only tho 
intci".'' 'i object ive -^.nd t:, •^v.ii wil.-.-spread ce l l l i teral 
(95) 
dRnir,-,c.." /'JT-orican s t r a t e g i c l i t e r a t u r e does, indeed, 
s t r e s s t he t a U.S. f i r s t response in a probable nuclear 
oxchonc^c wil l not be in t h - fern of nnss r e t e l l q t i o n with 
an indiscriain-^-co s"; read e f f e c t . ^ " ^ And i t i s i n t h i s 
very context t ha t MIRVs and ¥iSVs acquir^^d t h e i r importance 
which i s ro-inf^'rcov by t h e i r so -ca l l rd ' Swiss -p rec i s ion ' , 
(F) ./heroes t;h-^  r r ] - played by del ivery systeia of s t r n t - g i c 
nuclear weapons i s subs tan t ia l i n the Cuntext of a s u p - r - p c r 
nuclear s t r a t egy , t a c t i c a l nuclear weapon del ivery systecis 
hnvc -' len'or r-^nk b-^ceus" such weqpms qre bps i ca l ly designr^d 
for b a t t l e f i e l d opr ra t iuns which ere not l i k e l y to occur stn 
the lands of e i t he r the Soviet Union or the United S ta tes 
of ;i..ierica. 'Iccordingly, I'r-inc^ sustqinod intf-r.'^st i n develop-
(93) Frr Eastern Econo d c Heview, May 6, 197^, p . 29 
(9^) SeoJ Smart ,I . ; P o l i t i c a l l u p l i c a t i ~.ns; i n ( Feld B. & 
Others (ods) ; ( fn .90) .Smart , a f te r s t a t i n g t h a t the re qre 
trjo purposes t h a t decide tne designing of nuclear arms 
"j^rograeiacs ( t ^ f ight a nuclear wnr or to deter) be-
l i e v e s t h a t , for tha l ^ s t twenty f ive yoHrsjthe U.S. 
s t ra tegy hqs been aoul'^el a f t e r deterrence and has 
r e l i ed upon i t for i t s secur i ty . 
Nuiriorous oxauples can bo provided in t t i i s respect .The 
most r. cent hns boon the .American decis ion t^ give the 
new F-16 f i g h t r r ^ nuclear cq^ -^  qbi l i ty .Ono of the reasons 
bohin'-'' t h i s ""'-^cision, qcccrding t •• q repor t by I n t e r -
?J:^ i'ijf^ J~l _HerelC Tribune, Nov„ 2,1976, i s to reassure the 
Eurbp''c'^n a l l i e s ' t e a t "the United Stqtop wi l l have a 
continuing a b i l i t y to w-gc a t a c t i c a l nuclear war in 
Europe. 
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ing ->"vr.nccc! del ivery systems for t- 'cticq.l ni iclnir wos^pons 
i s j u s t i f i a b l e . Sumo t a c t i c a l nuclear wo^ npoms can be rocket 
p r tpo l lod fron p b-^ zook-^  oc charge-propol lc i from a mortar. 
Star^'larcl b a t t l e f i e l d support p i e c e s , such qs the solf-
propollod 155 millc-ntor HO'//ibzor, i r e capable of f i r i n g 
e i the r cunventiunal or nucl ar s h e l l s . A guided g l ide r bocib 
can (a l so) be used tu destroy mi l i t a ry and tr-^nsi^ort fac-
i l i t i e s such as br idges . Fr^m th" ground, t a c t i c a l nuclopr 
weapons can bo prujoctod un t a rge t by ungui-'^^d ruCKots or by 
(qs") 
guided short ran^c or intcrair d ia tc range b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s ' . " ^ 
Frccf a i l i n g i s al s^ a delivery system fc r t a c t i c a l nuclear 
wei ons. F ree fa i l ing bouibs are spec i f i ca l ly designed to bury 
theiisclves •'deep" in the ear th , S-J t h a t exploding ( a f ree-
f a l l i n g bTib) i n i t i q t ^ ^ pbock~wpv^=' c^^cibl^ of col laps ing 
(95) 
und' . r.>und enemy bunkers and tunne l s" . On the whole, 
(95) B Icf , D.8e Ante l l , M; (fn . 89), p , 1 5 . 
@ Alter the Imericans tnd succ'^eded in manuf-ictLring a, 
^ne k i lo ton i iuclrar d'-^vice in 1951 ^nd n-f'^'v-too bomb 
i n 1958, a be l i e f emanated tha t the pa th to the prod-
uction of -5 nuclear h-^nd-gr-^nad- was s t a r t ed and t h a t 
future bat t l -^f ie lds wil l b domin-^t-^d by nucloaf 
n-'chine-guns» This beli^'^f 's/^s I '^tpr dismissed clu to 
the f^ct t ha t the c r i t i c a l mnss cf n uranium 235 bomb 
of 20 k i l o ton y ie ld or l e s s n e c e s s i t a t e s the same amount 
vjf f i s s i l e mnteripl . L de ta i led exi^ose of t h i s po in t 
i s found in the f i r s t Chapter of:Brown,N; Nuclear //ar; 
The I:::ipending S t ra teg ic Deadlock; (London:Pall Mall 
P ress L t d . , 196^). 
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del ivory systems of t a c t i c a l nuclear 'weapons d i f f e r accord-
ing to si2.e and purpose: 
- The;' can be dropped from an a i rp lane e i t he r as f ree-
fq l l inS homhs or a? guided or unguid-'" glid-^ps, 
- They can be planted l i k e land mines , (possibly emplaced 
on the border between unfriendly countr ies or p l a n t e d , i f 
stnaLler - by p a t r o l s . 
(G) Another difference between t a c t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c 
nucl rar weapons i s the range- targpt spec i f i ca t ion . The former 
can, in case of a 20 k i lo ton device, destroy about 5 square 
mil3S as compared to 200 square miles destroyed hy a 
s t r a t e g i c weapon of 10 megatons, i/'hereas ' a s t r a t e g i c i n t e r -
change between two major nuclear powers would r e s u l t i n pop-
ulabion l o s se s mpssur-^d in terms of m i l l i o n s . . . a t a c t i c a l 
exchan-'O of nuclear >'seapons in a ba t t l - f ipld s i t u a t i o n might 
amount to 20,000 l o s s e s , 100 to 500 times l o s s than t h a t for 
, (96) 
an ant ic ipated gtrpxegic exchange . 
( H) .i/hilc s t r a t e g i c nuclear weapons "can e f fec t ive ly 
destroy the mi l i ta ry and i n d u s t r i a l capab i l i ty of a nat ion 
or agro^jp of na t ions" , t a c t i c q l nuclf^pr woaponc can d-^stroy 
bat tK-f ie ld t a r g e t s , impede the advance of t roops and t h e i r 
deployment can be extended to include non-ba t t l e f i e ld p o s t s 
such OS " a i r f i e l d s , communication c^->ntros, p o r t s , supply 
(96) Ib id . , p .16 
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de-pots, armaments f a c t o r i e e . , . "^  I n m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s 
i n liSi and Surope, t h e s e 'vere among t h e pr ime t a r g e t s of 
t a c t i c a l nuclc-ar W'^apons though though they a re out si d'^  t h e 
b a t t l e zone. 
( 0 "^"''^ above-mentioned resume ol t a c t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c 
weapons i n t h e now a v a i l a b l e nucl^^ar a r s e n a l s i n d i c a t e s t h a t , 
except fo r super-powers and medium-si zed n u c l e a r w e ^ o n 
powers , s t r a t e g i c nuc l ea r weapons a i s of a minor i m p o r t -
ance. I n t h e c-^sc of r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s , t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s 
of t a c t i c a l nuc l ea r s t r l k o s .' a r e v i t a l fo r t h e c o n f l i c t i n g 
p e j ' t i e s on c o n d i t i o n t h a t n e i t h e r i s exposed to u n i l a t e r a l 
nuc lpa r t h r p a t on b e h a l f of on^ super power or one of the 
u'.edium-sized powers p o s s e s s i n g a c r e d i b l e IGBM system. 
I . I I I . ^ : gUCLEAR '/"SAPOMS AND TgCMOLOGY 
(A.) The term 'nuclr^ar t e chno logy ' i s l a r g e l y conf-
i n r d to the " r e s e a r c h , development and p r o d u c t i o n a s s o c i a t e d 
(97") 
' / i t h nuc l ea r warheads" . I n t h i s s ense , i t i m p l i e s 
' ' r e s e a r c h , dev<=lopment and p r o d u c t i o n for n o n - m i l i t a i y p u r p o s e s . 
The r eason unde r ly ing framking the concept as such i s 
t h e assumption common among t h e new g e n e r a t i o n of 
s t r a t e g i s t s - t h a t once a given country a c q u i r e s a 
c e r t a i n degree of n u c l e a r knowledge, i t pnjoys no r'^al 
c a p a c i t y t o d i s t i n g u i s h between m i l i t a r y u se s and non- , 
m i l i t a r y uses of the newly acquired t echno logy . T h e r e f o r e , 
(95) I b i d . , p . 1 6 
(97) Hopkins, J ; ( f n , 8 G ) , p , 1 1 3 . 
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thp announcement of a nuclear prograramp would f i n a l l y I'^ad 
to the establishment of tf--^chnological grounds for i--^ :' .a'ch, 
development and production associated with nuclear <Vc-'hoads 
and explosives. 
(B) Moieover, rbe raw ciajer ia ls and technology' .- -dcd 
for the production of f i s s ionab le mater ia ls t h a t could be 
used tor either nuclear #eapo2Dp or to generatr-- e l ec t ic power 
from nuclear p lanes are cbe f-ame. I t i s f i s s ion , fusion ^nd 
the burning of -charmonuclear fu'-ls, D, D-1 mixture :.nd Lid 
( 98) 
which cons t i t u t e the basic processes involved. ^ 
(G) A subs tan t i a l p ro jec t ion t h i s respec t i s "c'^.t 
of Hopkins who i d e n t i f i e s a lew general requirem:^wt<^ t i - i t , 
i f m.et, tbo tb^or '^ticnl d'-'sign of simple f i s s i on "• :0'sr 
can be aGcomplisb-^-d. These -^^ xe; 
1. The assuraiicc-' t ha t thP' basic concept ^vill worI:.T/ij was 
proved by the US'^ . in 19-4-5 -^ nd has subsequently b n 
confirmf^d by th^ UK, USSR, France and China-
2. The possession of che appropriate data such a© 
c r i t i c a l masses, the number of neutrons, per f i r s l o i 
and so on. 
3. The possession of the appropriate data r e l a t i n g t^i jbo 
prep'=urP5 temperature and volume of f i s s i l e mat-i i ul. 
These data ai e e i t h e r well known or can be approxi.-"^> -6 
with r-asonable accuracy. 
4. A. means of est imating efficiency so tha t the y ie ld can 
(8) Mark, J„ 5 (fn. ) , p ,133 . 
- 96 -
bo cptimptcd. In t h i s case, the phys ics i s a t band and 
avai l bio to a l l . 
5. Tb : thcorct ic- i l doscr ip t ion of the chain reac t ion and the 
nmacrical means to ca l cu la t e the nautrons d i s t r i b u t i o n s , 
c r i t i c a l i t i c s and multiplications.Much of the pt-^ndnrd 
r eac to r technology i s su i t ab le for this.Usi^^g the standard 
r eac to r technology for these t heo re t i c a l desc r ip t ions shows 
i t i s incor rec t to a s se r t tha t there i s no carry-over from 
reac to r to weapou technology. 
5. Th. theorc^ticnl pnd numerical means to ca l cu l a t e the bydro-
dyn-^mics i nvo lved . l t turns out t h a t , at l e a s t for the 
p r imi t ive f i s s ion ^veapons, such ca l cu l a t i ons are almost 
b^xt-book examples. 
7. Ihe possession of computing equipment which i s now comm-
c r c i ^ l y avail ablco Today, one couLd eas i ly find the 
roq_Lirod niumbcr of f i r s t - r a t e p b y i c i s t s necessary for the 
t heo re t i c a l design of simple f i s s ion weapons. 
8, s ta f f to accom.plisb the task which in the ear ly days, 
when the f i r s t devices 'ffcrc being contemplated^ vvas almost 
(99) the only one which could be f i l l e d . -^ ^ 
(D) In almost a l l rec nt pro<joctions, there i s consensus 
tha t i f these requirements are met, the so-cal led near-
nuclear countr ies c-^ n achi-^vr ? design for a simpl'" f i s s i on 
(99) Hopkins, J; C fn, 88) , pp.113-114. 
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dovic-^ ''with a high degrr-^ of confidence t h a t i t would give 
. ( QQ~) 
a y ie ld in the k i lo ton range » 
(S) Hopkias pronect ion i s meant for thos<= s t a t e s t ha t 
tav? alrp'a'^^' reached a developed stage of industry and 
s ince. In the case of a developing country, the set of 
requirements designed by Hopkins need be modified. The wri ter 
sug.^-'^ts thr^ follo'^n'.ng set of requirements, provided th^ 
option for the acqu is i t ion of weapon-grade f i s s i l e mater-
i a l s i s exercised in the conte/tt of nat ional powers 
1. A s taff to accomplish the task ranging from s t ra tegy and 
nat ional S'=curity experts ( t he ca l ib re refer red to in 
Chapter l,^• of Pa r t I ) to nuclear p h y s i c i s t s , geo log is t s 
and computation.programmers. I t i s noteworthy t h a t Hopkins 
speaks of t h i s requiremrnt as the l a e t . ?or a non-nuclear 
or near-nuclear country, i t i s the human element t ha t 
makes the programme implem^entatiou, whicu i s not the case 
of e developed country wber'^ s ta f f recruitm.ent i s qu i te an 
easy task to accomplish due to the comparatively high 
GJ I^P, standard of l i v i n g and low percentage of i l l i t e r a c y . 
I t i s saxQ tha t without some 12,000 nuclear p h y s i c i s t s , 
I nd ia would have n ^ver been able to pursue i t s nuclear 
programme. 
?. In case of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the human "lonipnt, resources 
Tnd tunds come next. The decision to go nuclear has been 
(99) I b i d . , p.l33« 
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described as an economic decision r a t h e r tnan s t r a t -
egic or p o l i t i c a l or even technologica l . The capable 
s taff , devoid of su i t ab le funds, are he lp less even 
a burden because, in case nuclear p h y s i c i s t s ai''e not 
piroperly p laced , they would form a covert so r t of 
unemployments They might even be absorbed in bra in-
drain designs. 
The cost of PI nuclp^ptr device for a dpvplopins: countr^r 
would amount to some $400,000, to take the Indian example. 
But the said amount does not . inc lude expenditure on heavy water 
plaints , research and development of e l e c t r i c , e l ec t ron ic and 
mechanical i tems, po'ver p l a n t s , e t c . The est imate of $400,000 
iaight have been reached at by considering the fac t tha t the 
p r i c e of plutonium 239 (3% plutonium 240) i s near ly $60,000 
kg. and tha t 8 kg. of plutonium are required to produce a 20 
k l lo ton bomb. The outcome would amount to some ^480,000. 
(100) Kaul, R. ; I n d i a ' s Nuclear Spin-Off;( Allahabad: Chanky a 
Publ ishing House, 1974), p . I S . 
(101) Hopkin,J.^, gaolear fgapQDg Technology; in : S.I .P.B. .I . ; 
Nuclear P r o l i f e r a t i o n Problems; C Stockholm;Almqvist 
and vViksell, 1974). 
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Although i t i s cheaper t o use uranium 235 - t h e same 20 
k i l o t o n simple f i s s i o n device would r e q u i r e 25 k g , t h e 
p r i c e of which would be $500,000 ( t h e p r i c e of uranium 
10? 255 i s S l l , 8 0 0 ^s), " the e a s i e s t way of going n u c l e a r 
i s through p lu ton ium 259"» I t i s t h i s a s p e c t t h a t forms ah 
CD ST OF PU-259 PBODUCTIOH 
(The P r o d u c t i o n Costs of 10 kgo homb-grade Pu p e r yea r ) 
C a p i t a l Annual Oper-
Cost a t i n g Cost 
Ref ine ry , metal i n g o t p l a n t 
Fue l , fuel f a b r i c a t i o n 
Reactor 
Plutonium e x t r a c t i o n 
Plu tonium f a b r i c a t i o n 
Servic^^ f p c i l i t i p p 
20 
1 2 
80 
15 
5 
55 
183 
16 
7 
10 
2 
2 
5 
42 
(102) Hopkins, J ; ( f n . 8 8 ) , p . 115. 
(103) S e s h a g i r i , N; The Bomb;Fallout, of I n d i a ' s ^ u c l e a r 
Explos ion; (New DelhiJ Vikas P u b l i s h i n g House,1975)» 
p.68„ 
(104) I b i d , , p . 6 9 
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fas ic problcn of the tGchnology of nuclear-explosivesJ "to 
acquire a qu-entity of f i s s i l e material of pufficie-nt p u r i t y 
to sus ta in o chain reac t ion long enough to produce l a rge 
q u a n t i t i e s of hoat".^ ^^ In t i s r e spec t , i t ought always 
bo re icc ra ted t h a t the r^w mqter ia l s and technology needed 
for the productio-n cf f i s s ionable ma te r i a l s t h a t could be 
used fur c i t h e r nuclear ".e-^ons or tc g - n - n t ^ •^l^ctric p ' .: 
from nuclear rn ^rgy qre the same. 
In c-^ ^e urpnium 23^ i ? used inst'^sd of plutonium 239 
i t should be enriched to 90 to 95 p e r cent . But uraniaii enr ich-
ment p l a n t s "on an i n d u s t r i a l sca le" are s t i l l l imi ted to "the 
tcr r i fcor ics of the nuclear ^Jeapon s t a t e s " . This i s the 
roa?>-^ ii why i t i s said t h a t the ea s i e s t way to go nuclear i s to 
use plutonium 239 not uranium 235. On the other hand, 
uraniu.li enrichment technology i s subs tan t i a l as far as advanced 
nuclcer nea^ons are concerned; h^nce Boskma's theory tha t "the 
access to uranium enrichment i s important fur count r ies t h a t 
meant to k-cn an option for nuclear weapons, espec ia l ly thermo-
nuclear A'capons". At p r e sen t , i t i s tho Unit-^d Sta tes 
uraniuir. enrichment technology ^hich i s in a leading p o s i t i o n 
(105) Boatorn, L. , ( f n. 86) , p . 25 
(106) Boskni-, P . ; Uranium J^nrichment & The P r o l i f e r a t i o n 
of Nuclear .'capons-, in gIPRI; ( fn . 81) , r . 9 9 . 
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i n the world to the extent tha t "only 5 poi* cent of the 
•vorlcl output of uranium enrichment i s out of JJSi" 
iUncricpn expenditure on uranium enrichment giA^oe an i n d i c -
ation of i t s importance. In 1972, th--. US.i spent !^270 mi l l ion 
on uraniuiTi cnrichmicntj in 1976» the expenditure went up to 
•it340 milli0-^1. Ureniuui enrichment to design a f i s s ion 
bomb i s usu-^lly done by separat ion through gnsrous d i f fus -
ion p l a n t s or gaseous p l a n t s or separat ion nozz l f s ,qu i t e 
cos t ly to run. I t can be recal led here, s ign i f i can t ly enough; 
t h a t the USA. nuclcpr progranmie s t a r t ed with two gaseous 
diffusion p l a n t s ( a t Oak -Ridge and Tennyson) and thr.-^e 
(10 7) Simon, A; i)fn.76), p . 113. 
(*?) R-cent r epo r t s showed ^m '^^ icJm^ snd SnviP't sc inint is ts 
crowinL over a new L ,qs^r process for separa t ing out uranium 
isotopes at low cost .Yet , South Africa i s reported (Kaivs.wcek 
Magazine, M,By 5» 1975) "bo h^vc revealed i t s own advanced 
process for doing the same thing mor^ ^ than a year before 
t i . e . i n 197-^). The South African systeni for uranium enr ich-
ment i s said to ijp ready now. 1 S150 mil l iun -pi ant,which 
uses pn aerodynamic technique, opened in ear ly Ipr i l 1975 
near P r e t o r i a and the South African Atomic Energy Commission 
alre-^dy planned a second %1.M- miillion p l an t t h a t could 
produce 5 mi l l ion u n i t s of enriched uranium by 1986.This 
i s oiiLy half the amount projected for a p l a n t to be b u i l t 
by th- French-led Eurodif consortium.But the m-arket for 
nuclear fuels i s expected to grow so rapidly t h a t the 
uranium enrichment business could yi.-'ld South I f r ica SI 
b i l l i o n a year in export revenues. 
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r c - i c t o r s (one «t Hansford and two a t Washington) . Ava i l ab l e 
d p t a ehuw t h a t the c o s t u f ' t h r e e d i f f u s i o n p l a n t s i n t h e 
USA '''r<^ qrout^d R F . 1 ' 7 J 2 ' ^ 0 railH O'" wit'n qn pnnu^l o p e r a t i n g 
ous t of Rs .3 ,750 m i l l i o n , i . e . Rs .90,000 p e r k i logram of 
urc.nium. The outcome i s a d i f f u s i o n c o s t of some 
Rs .2 ,250 ,000 ( a 20 k i l o t o n dev ice needs 25 Kg.of en r i ched 
uranium 255) . 
COST OP THE PLUTONIUM BOMB 
Sstima .cd p r o d u c t i o n cost of 20~kt boribs for r_ t on -ycn r 
progrra-ii-io ( i n Rs r i i l l i o n e ) i n d u c i n g cos t of a d e d i c a t e d 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e (tli^ rdcLd va lue ; c r bomb i s r^ssuned to be 
Rs 280,000) . _ „ _ _ _ . „ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ 
10 bens 100 boms 150 bombs 1,000 bombs 
- p 
ifl +3 -P += 
O K! ffl +3 CO - p 
o o -i 03 o ra 
0 0 o t> o 
o o 
r-> H , --I , 
•H ^ -H g ••-< 3 
d 3 cJ ri cJ ci 
o '^ o '^ o A 
Plutonium meta l I83 42 5 70 55 620 66 
Design and 
manufacture 50 5 50 5 50 5 
Tes t ing 16 20 20 20 
(tv.'o ( c i r l i t ( e i g h t 
S torage & t e s t s ) t e s t s ) t e s t s ) 
maintenance 2 2 2 
+5 
0 
0 
H 
d 
+= 
•H 
r^i 
d 
0 
4950 
50 
+= CQ 
0 
0 
i - l 
d 
d 
ri 
^ 
•~A 
200 
5 
50 
(twenty 
t c st s) 
5 
'i 
TOTVi 233 65 620 ' 82 93 500 0 260 
T'otal for t e n ycars233 650 620 820 670 930 5000 2600 
Average annual 88 144 160 760 
investi-ient 
Cost per bomb 88 144 107 76 
(108) S o s h a g i r i , N? I b i d . , p .67 
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00 ST OF UNDISfiGROUKD TESTS 
Cost of t e s t i n g 20-k t bombs undergr und r e q u i r i n g 
d r i l l e d h ( l o ab. u t 3OO m-tr-^s doop ^nd 1.8 motr^^s 
i n diatnntor ( i n Re. mil l i '^n) 
ono 
t^st 
12 
40 
15 
1 
10 
Four t ' ^ s t s 
i n tho same 
arc-a. 
14 
40 
30 
4 
11 
Exploratory work and feasibility^ etudy  
Establishing the base 
Drilling and s-^aling 
Empl-^ cing the bomb 
Mipccllaneous 
TOT^IL 78 103 
Muro('V-r, diffusion plants are crrc npous and con-
sume as much electricity as a city of New York's size and are 
expensive tu build. Uranium enrichment technology is also 
difficult bccpuso enriching means increasing the proportion 
of i t s uranium 235 isotopes which i s atopes of the same ele-
ment are chemicall.y identical. Accordingly, ' euricnmeut i s 
effected thr^ 'uprh t '^^  E-qseous dif-fusi'^ 'n prf^ icpss which r^H og 
:n the differ nee in '-'eight of the isotopes. 
3. The possession of the appropriate nuclear d-^ ta such as 
critical masses, the number of nrutrons per ffesien and 
so on. 
4. ThQ possession of the appropriate data relating to the 
pressure, temperature and volume of f issi le material.... These 
(110) Gains,!; Itomic Energy (Toronto Bantam Books, 1973) 
pp.45-47. 
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data are e i t h e r well known or can be expropriated with reason-
able accuracy. 
5. Once bppic data are ava i l ab le , the assurance t h a t the 
basic concept wi l l work may be sought for (NOol in Hopkin's 
p r o j e c t i o n ) , id/ithout the said assurance, the economics of the 
nuclenr-pro'^ramme wil l go p'^ay, contrary to the v°rj 
bas i s on which nuclear programmes are now pursued. The 
working concept cannot be proved as i t was in 19^5 by the 
USA and henceforth. In the context of contemporary nuclear 
technology onp can assume tha t a computation t^sfc would be 
suff ic ient to prove how working the concept i s . 
Other requirements can follow, more or l e s s , in the same 
order of Hopkins; 
a) i means of e s tab l i sh ing ef f ic iency , 
b) The t h e o r e t i c a l descr ip t ion of chain reac t ion and the 
numerical mean? to ca lcu la te th" neutron? d i s t r i b u t i o n s , 
c r i t i c a l i t i e s and mu l t i p l i c a t i on , 
c) The t h e o r e t i c a l and numerical means to ca l cu la t e the 
hydrodyrFiidcs involved, 
d) uhe possr^ssiou 01 computing equipment which i s now 
coiimiercially ava i lab le . 
The pbove-mentio'npcl r^xl^ ose shows t ^a t "a npw t^-^chnology 
uL unprecedented power and des t ruc t iveness has placed ' a l l ' 
nat ions of the world in d i re p e r i l " due to two f ac to r s 
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(111) 
na.tioiis of the world in d i re p e r i l " due to two factorss 
- t"ac explosive power of nuclear weapon? and, i n the context 
o£ recent del ivery syetems suck as MRV„ and MIRVs, l a rge 
populat ion vu lne rab i l i ty to fcdlout effect35 cxid 
The t h e o r e t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y of manufacturing a nuclear 
wo.^on of any explosive power with no upper l iruit .Such 
a? t ha t supor-wofpon hinted at by Leonicl Breshnev on 
© June 13, 1975^ "which could be more t e r r i b l e than 
nuclear arms". yHc requirorients included in Hopkins' 
The requirements included in Hopkini^ p ro jec t ion or 
i n the w r i t e r ' s modified pro;ioction, can bo secured in a modest 
prograuaiae of 10 years . I t i s very l i k e l y to have the same 
prograiiime, as hinted at by Seshagi r i , implemented in a period 
of 7 years . Had the option to go nuclear been kept open, the 
7 yc^r programme could be, for tb*^ second time reduced by 4 
year r , i . e . in to a th ree-year programme." I f the energy 
(111) The Rockfoller Brothers Fund, I n c . , Special Studies 
P r o j e c t : In t e rna t iona l Securit.y; The Mi l i t a ry .Ispect; 
in;McClalland,G, (ed) 5 J^uclear .V'eapons Miss i les and 
end Future iq r ; ( Howard Chandler,San Francisco 196O), 
p . 25 . 
(@) The notion t h a t a crash prograone to produce weapon-grade 
f i s s i l e mate r ia l s in the context i f a wc^pon-oriented s t ra tegy 
i s poss ib le to accomplish only in three years i s qui te abundant 
in l i t e r a t u r o o n -^IIQ subject . Mostly, t h i s notion i s furnished 
on the grounds tha t the necessary quant i ty of plutonium can 
bo obtained from the simplest separat ion p l an t over th ree 
yoare. 
(©©) See: Egyptian Gazette, June V,, 1975. 
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fac to r i s inc ludja , tho i n t e rna t i ona l system might bo 
in i t i r i tod to a str-^tcgic enviruniiient for th'^ dealing with 
which wc ought think in t e rus uf soiue 150 nuclear coyxitries. 
In t h i s case, the acquis i t ion jf nucl§ar '.veapons wil l bo 
ro'iucru to the I'-vol of ordinary opti^^ns with minimuni choice 
probloMs. The impl icat ion i s thqt the numb r of n^t i -nal-
owned nuclear forces , whatever token, wil l be littl^-^ l o s s th in 
t h a t of nuclear s t a t e s which r e f r a in from em.bprkong on 
weapon-oriented nuclear programmes. 
x.JllT I I 3 Hill i-T.OBLili. 
PART l i s CliiJPTEIi I ; PSOBLM FOPiIfiUIATION. 
-10 7-
F;i?T I I ; THE PKOBISM; 
CH/Jr^ TEH 1% PH0BL2M FOaMULATION 
1 1 , 1 . 1 . INTBOIUCTION; 
During t h e f i n a l s t age of -v r i t ing t h i s t h e s i s , some 
s i g n i f i c a n t clovolopnents o c c u r c l , though tb ry pasFecl almost 
unncticGc!, wi tn th r r e s u l t t h a t t h e neef fo r t h i s study has 
been i n t e n s i f i e d . These developments , from one p o i n t of vie-Vj 
should have been a n t i c i p a c e d ano cunceived of as i n e v i t a b l e 
i n t'f- ccnti^xt of P pp^rpr spprnach .But t hp Iqc'k' of such 
appr^-^ch hps r e s u l t e d i n an atmusphere of as ton i shment 
@ The tcrui 'p roblem' as used here i s borro7\fod from the 
Phys i cp and Mathematics d i s c r i p l i n e s .vhere ' p rob lem ' means, 
accord ing to the S h o r t - r Oxford D i c t i o n q r y , "a q u e s t i o n or 
inquiry ' which s t a r t i n g from some given c o n d i t i o n s i n v e s t i g a t e s 
some f a c t , r e s u l t or law".The use of the t^ ^^ rm i m p l i e s by no 
mcpJis a conno ta t i on vvith h a r d s h i p s or mishaps as commonly 
t h o u g h t . Problem formuln t ion i s , c e r t a i n l y , " o n e of t h e 
c r u c i - 1 s t o p s i n a n a l y s i n g complex p rob lems" as s t a t e d i n ; 
Jacob,H. 8s ' / o i s s b e r s , R . ; Elementary P o l i t i c a l lnalysis(New York: 
McGra^j-Hill Book Comp any , Second E d i t i o n , 1 9 7 0 ) ,p» 77- To Jacob and 
Te i s sbe rg , t h i s p r o c e s s means"reducing (problems) to more 
mann c b l e p r o p o r t i o n s ' " because "most p rob lems a re d i f f i c u l t t o 
ana lyse c o r r e c t l y when phrased i n broad gene ra l te-i-m".Thoy 
a s s e s s c l e a r l y t h a t " i f you began your a n a l y s i s by ask ing what 
i s r e q u i r e d t o p a s s t h e c o u r s e , you h^ve mq'-'^ p t h e problem a 
l i t t l e more manageable" and t b ^ t i f you f u r t h p r spec i fy your 
r e q u i r e m e n t s , "you hqve re fo rmula ted t h e o r i g i n a l q u e s t i o n 
inbo one much e a s i e r t o ana lyse c o r r e c t l y " . They then 
r e i t e r a t e t h a t "except fo r very simple p r o b l e m s , almost 
every problem must be r e fo rmula ted be fo re i t can be 
c o r r e c t l y ana lysed" . 
- 108 -
encompassing the resp-^nse tu those developments, wiiich, 
unfor tunptc ly , '^i'i ^ot Ippt fnr p lone: t1m«. '^ r'-m qncthpr 
p o i n t of viofl, these development' 'represent a worsening 
s t r - i tec ic cxivironiient absorbed with maximised r i s k s . 
Ihc f i r s t of these developments took p lpce on Oct.9, 
197?" "hen a twenty-one year old student of Pr inceton Univ-
e r s i t y succeoc'ed in l ay ing out the d e t a i l s of a complete 
dcsi3n of a nuclear bomb of a f i s s ion reac t ion . The entir.-
job took him only four months and t h i r t y four pages, /hat i s 
more important i s tha t the young student .'epenJed but on 
pulDlished mate r i a l s which the Government of f ices re leased 
with goc^ in ten t ion whilp giving an pccount of tb'^ 'diff icult-
i e s encountered by the s c i e n t i s t s who f i r s t manufactured 
the early nuclear warheads. John P h i l i p s , the Pr inceton 
s tudent , declarea t l a t the manufacturing of the bomb 
noccssitabed nob I P F S than 6.06 kg of p lu toniua and tha t the 
cost Vs^ uld amount to some USi,100,000. .^ccoraing to P h i l i p ' s 
desi"^:"!, the bomb has got the sizi^ of P v a t ^ r - b a l l , the weight 
of Kg. 72 and an explosive po'ver /hich would amount to one 
t h i r d . r t h a t dropped over Hiroshima and abandoned 70,000 
l i v e s . Cominenting on the work of the young s tudent , one 
renowned nuclear phys ic i s t ,Dr .Frank Shulton,admitted the 
bomb cjuld be used soon a f te r i t i s assembled, though the 
t e d iiiques of the student are qui te old. 
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The second development i s t h a t the United S ta tes was 
reported to hnvo moved quiet ly fiuring October 1976 in to the 
har''\7aro phase ^l producing q mobile ICBM system. Is was 
showri i n j?n o a r l i r r chapter, the s t r a t e g i c nuclear de te r ren t 
of the United S t a t e s , and equally of the Suviet Uniun, 
consisted of fixed land-based ICBMs. Moreov-^r, the qgre^ment 
co.icludoi between the two count r ies on the l i m i t a t i o n of 
s tr-^toj ic arms had i t s conceptual premise in systems of 
fixed land-based missil'-^s. (Sr^e IppendixX'd. The s^id agree-
ment went even to the extent of specifying the s i lo s i t e s 
and t h e i r l oca t ion . Is a cle^ir example of vhat i s usual ly 
cal led v e r t i c a l p r o l i f e r a t i o n , the -'•••m'^ ricRn move has c e r t a i n -
ly got some d e s t a b i l i s i n g bearing on the stratipgic balance 
accepted by both super-po-vers. 
The. th i rd development had occured before the f i r s t two 
but i s no l e s s s ignif icant .By the beginning of February 1976, 
France w=-c. reported to have obtained an operat ional thermon-
uclear force when the French nucle^^r-powered submarine 
Redoubtable was equipped with a thermonuclear warhead of 
an explosive p T'"'er in the ran e of one megaton - 50 times 
as powerful as the f i r s t nuclear bomb dropped over Hiroshima. 
I t i s perhaps in t h i s case tha t the whule theory of nuclear 
proliferatioT^ can bo p^ rC'-^ iAr-^ '^  iwit^ nationp] po'^f^r as i t s 
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frai'^ iG of referonce. Theorising t h i s thermonuclear dpvelop-
ment, the Defence Minister of France s t a t e d : " I f the secur i ty 
of France i s to be guaranteed by i t s nuclear dp-terrent, t h i s 
i s not a once-and-for-a l l undertaking.Our nuclear arraament 
must be constant ly improved. ,1 gr(^at ef for t has been accompl-
@ 
isbod in the pas t 15 years and wi l l be pursued." 
The three '•Vvelopments $i ted above can, sun up the 
course of the nuclear p r o l i x e r a t i o n theory and as t h e i r 
recurrence has got an element of freq.uency, they urge for an 
aGadonic study frnm. "ir^ich 'VP CPH df^ducp th'^ prop^^r 
operat ional conclusions to help the decision-maker solve feic 
choice problems as far as the problem selected for study 
i s concerned, .is has been pointed out in P=irt I , Chapter IT, 
a modifiod procedure of Systems Analysis wi l l be adopted and 
t h i s wil l s t a r t with an attempt to formulate the problem on 
p a r t i c u l a r bases. 
In t h i s respec t , i t i s noteworthy tha t l i t e r a t u r e on 
the subj-^ct cmanqting from nuclear weapon countri'=p i s of 
a preaching character t h a t t r i e s to equate the i n i t i a t i o n 
of ser ious nuclear programmpp in Third •vorl^ countri'=s with 
economic d i s a s t e r s and regional i n s t a b i l i t y despi te the fac t 
tha t nuclear weapon s t a t e s are spending huge amounts of 
Donr^ y on p ro j )Cus whose economic u t i l i t y i s s t i l l a mat ter 
of doubt. To provide one example, the wr i t e r would r e f e r 
See Don Cook's repor t in : Indian Express. Febru^iy 3, 
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to the i s sue ra ised by Nigel Hawkes and his worth-study 
assossmeiit t ha t "the n^-t r e s u l t of a l l inv=>stment i s t h a t 25 
years in to the nuclear age no cEimmercial p l a n t s e x i s t anywhere 
i n the world capahlp of ( reprocess ing uraniuci oxide fue ls -
the kind of fuel used in a l l .Imerican desio^ed r e a c t o r s and 
B r i t a i n ' s Advanced Gas Cooled r e a c t o r s ) " . For Hawkes, the £900 
mil l ion al located by Br i t i sh Nuclear Fuels to build the 
uranium reprocessing reac to r i s no core than a ganj.ble.For the 
p ro j ec t especia l ly in the l i g h t of t h e i r d^-^claration t h a t " th^re 
i s c l ea r ly no background of e i t h e r Br i t i sh or world ex}Dcrience 
i n reprocessing oxide fuel" . In jux tapos i t ion with B r i t a i n ' s 
ac t ive ro l e in the .uieetings o|- the n^.clear fuel escporting 
countr ies ^nd i t s reportf^d supportft'i? th^ Vrapricsn stance 
over t!'e aissue of guarantees and safeguard-s, the nuclear 
policy of Br i t a in poses a question which the wr i t e r be l i eves 
ti".at i t i s ans'verable; why should a nuclear weapon country 
got involved in huge money expenditure of no economic feed-
back in the present time and, in the same t ime, p a r t i c i p a t e 
in moves leading to a ban on the t r a n s f e r of t h i s very 
advanced technology? I s i t the i s sue of ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' i n 
i n t e rna t iona l p o l i t i c a l behaviour on the p a r t of non-nuclear-
weapon count r ies had they obtain.:d such technology with i t s 
immense mi l i t a ry implicat ions? I s i t th^ i ssup of ,^  • _ "• - . 
U'^^e'^-in urge charac te r i s ing the nenbor u n i t s of the presen t 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system to seek for an evor- incr . 'as ing na t ional 
(1) Hawkes,!^.; 'XLO £900 Mill ion I^ucloar Gamble; ThLe__Observer, 
October 3, 1976 
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power -^nalganiatGd with pro 'st ige and d i s t i nc t i on? I s i t the 
i s sue of a rea l fear l e s t a nuclear holocaust should f a l l on 
the '/orld? I s i t qn e n t i r e l y -economic i s sue 'vh^r^ the cos t -
erfecbivo perspec t ive governs the behaviour of non-s t a t e s 
under given conditions? I s i t the i s sue of r ea l r a t h e r 
than ii^aginary nat ional secur i ty ne ds? I s i t a twent ie th-
century model of imperialisni and the_ dependence of one p a r t 
of the world on the other ( t h e d iv is ion of the world in to 
North and South or into LDGs and DCs or in to .Jest and East)? 
The course of Pa r t I i wi l l p a r t l y ans"^'er these qur^stions 
through the foriuulation of the problem on s c i e n t i f i c b^ses , 
a se irch in to the cons t i tuen t f-^ctors and an attempted 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ca&t would help the decision-maker decide his 
opti.jns r e l a t i n g to tjae probldfii' se lected for study. 
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On March 30, 1976, four .tosricqn s c i e n t i s t s who were 
assJ^ciptod one way or another with the development of the f i r s t 
nuclear bomb, asserted in a te levized programme t h a t "a nuclear 
war vjn.p now not only a d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y but also highly 
(2) 
probable^ ' Such an asse r t ion implipd t a c t l y ; 
1. an unstable i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, 
2. the existence of c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s tha t may 
. eas i ly esca la te in to nuclear exchanges, 
3« "the spread, current and forthcoming,of nuclear 
weapons and 
4. tho fear thfit a nuclear war i s 'h ighly r _, 
p robab le ' , 
..@ 
The s t r a t e g i c environment which anerges -out of 
tho dynamic i r t e r n c t i o n of tbp s^id impl ica t ions p r e s s on the 
member u n i t s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system for conferr ing the 
highest p r i o r i t y on mat ters of s t ra tegy and na t ional secur i ty 
( 5) r 
because once s t ruc tua l problems e x i s t , -^  ( t he case of the 
(2) The Statesman, March 31 , 1976. 
(•3) ' Bal l ,G. ; The Discipl ine of Power (Boston; \ t l a n t i c 
Monthly P re s s , 1968), p .26 . -Ball believed t h a t the 
fundamental problem of the nature of t o d a y ' s i n t e r -
nat ional system i s s t r u c t u r a l . 
@ In t h i s chapter, the adject ive - ' s t r a t e g i c ' and the term 
' p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y ' wil l be used interchangeably for 
tho sake of study and for operat ional reasons . 
r-
- 114 -
f i r s t implicat ion) the r e l a t i o n s of the un i t s i n t e r se go 
c r i t i c a l . T h i s development did occur at a time when coun t r i e s , 
deeply involv3d i r post-V/orld ./ar I I tensions "have not 
f i na l l y decided funda^iental quest ions of t h e i r own secur i ty 
i n new condit ions." In the same time, the development of 
the nuclear powpr has srivpn q maernitudp of bopps for a l l 
such countr ies ivbicb face s t r a t e g i c and nat ional secur i ty 
problems, rea l or imaginary. Consequently, nuclear p r o l i f e 
at ion i s expectpd to grow with a r a t e t h a t had never been kn^ 
before. The economic and technological impl ica t ions of the 
nciclcar powerCa shown in Pa r t I , Chapter I I I ) add to the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of — 
1. non-nuclear and near nuclear count r ies opting for 
ser ious nuclear programmes, 
2. nuclear non-nuclear weapon count r ies opting for nuclear 
weapon programmes. 
The above mentioned expose revea l s the ^'^^sis t h a t 
the i n t e r a c t i o n of the economic and technological impl ic-
a t ions of the nuclear power with the s t r a t e g i c environment 
wi l l give b i r th to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l assembly of pos tu re s 
whose s t a b i l i t y , we assurae, wil l depened subs t an t i a l l y on 
nuclear power conceived in the bigger context of the nat ional 
power. 
(4) Ker tesz ,S . C ed); l^uclear I^on-Proliferation in a ^orld 
of Nuclear jJeapons; (London; Notre Dame Univers i ty P r e s s , 
1967), p . 6 2 . 
1 
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1 . BEJLTON'S POBMUL VTIQN; 
I n h i s attoEipt ' t o forii iulate t h e probloni Beaton 
has d iv ided i t i n t o two c q t e g o r i p s . -^ -^  Thp f i r e t c a t ego iy 
i n v o l v e s t h e genera l l ong - t e rm prohlem "which might e v e n t u a l l y 
i n v o l v e a l l but t h e s m a l l e s t c o u n t r i e s " . The second ca tegory 
i s of " the immodiote problem of t hose i n d u s t r i a l powers which 
could i f they chopf become n u c l e a r powers i n the f o r e s e e a b l e 
f u t u r e . " 'Xhat Beaton has desc r ibed i n h i s ' f i r s t c a t e g o r y ' i s , 
i n d e e d , r e l a t e d to t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of the n u c l e a r power i n 
t h e c o r t o x t of tbo common apsumption t h a t t o -^xercicp t h e 
n u c l e a r op t ion needed i s t o enhance t h e n a t i o n a l power f o r 
s u r v i v a l as wel l as fo r t h e we l fa re of t h e s o c i e t y . The 
problem as fo3?mulated by Beaton fo r t h i s ca tegory becomes one 
of a c c e s s i b i l i t y to t h e e s s e n t i a l s of a n u c l e a r power programme, 
bu t ]iot n e c e s s a r i l y t o a s t o c k p i l e of weapon-grade f i s s i l e 
m a t e r i a l s enough for t h e assembly of a number of n u c l e a r war-
heads t h a t a re apt a f o r f o r n i n g a ' c r e d i b l e ' f o r c e . The 
problem as formulated i n terms of t h e second ca tegory i s 
s t r a t e g i c for i t i s simply one of choice and c a r e f u l 
( 5 ) Beaton, !• , Must t h e Bomb Spread^, (London Penguin 
Spec ia l S e r i e s iMo. 1791 > 1966) , p . 1 7 . 
@ The term ' n u c l e a r forc-^' i s used t o mean a m i l i t a r y formr-
a t i o n equipped with n u c l e a r warheads r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r 
n a t u r e C f i s s i o n or fus ion) and r e g a r d l e s s of t h e t ype of 
d e l i v e r y systaiu u t i l i s e d . ,1 n u c l e a r power, on t h e o t h e r 
hand, does n o t , i n t h i s s tudy , Q'^an t h a t a n u c l e a r stat"'^ 
i s having , by n e c e s s i t y , n u c l e a r weapons. 
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cxrn.ii'iatiori of the p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y environment, p resen t 
anci forseeable . By v i r t ue of the compulsions of energy 
nocGssi t ies in the I'^st quar ter of t h i s century, we are in 
no pos i t i on to conceive Beaton's f i r s t category as the 
problem, or p a r t of i t , except in so far as economic and 
technological d i f f i c u l t i e s are concerned. I t might h.qve been 
t h i s ' i s s u e ' to which Seshagiri hinted at when saying t h a t 
some people believe tha t the decision to go nuclear i s 
^ 1. -, . . ( 6 ) t echnologica l . 
The Beaton perspec t ive provides two vers ions of the 
problem; one i s techno-economic, tha other i s strategiCoThe 
techno-economic version i s one of requirements of a nuclear 
programme (see T-Topfcins' p ro jec t ion and the w r i t e r ' s modific-
at ion in Pa r t I , Chapter III^ and of uranium market condi t ions . 
The second version i s ^ ropl problem so long as th'=re i s 
aproblemi of choice and a s e r i e s of alt^^rnati ' /as (Lazer or 
Br^.cteriological weapons can be contemplated as a l t e r n a t i v a s ) . 
1 1 . 1 , 3 . THE NOTRE D l^MS K)MIIL ITIOK; 
According to the f inal repor t of the Notreme Dc,me 
.Imcrican Assembly, the problem i s formulated in terms of how 
to br ing together the nuclear and non-nuclear s t a t e s to agree 
on the dangers involved in any p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuclear wofpons 
and to accept a t rea ty tha t would el iminate the constant 
(6) Seshagi r i , i^ , •, The Bomb! Fal lout of I n d i a ' s Nuclear 
Explosion; (New Delhi: Vikas Publ ishing House,1975) »p-l 
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fear ol dostructinri and enable mankind to enjoy the benef i t s 
of the psacef^ol uses of nuclear energy/^^ Therefore, the 
* Notre Darao' persp-'^ctive dppndp furdpinontally upon the n^^6 
to avoid the e f fec ts of nuclear explosions and, i m p l i c i t l y , 
the p robab i l i t y of the occurence of a nuclear exchange or a 
one-sided nuc lea r -a t t ack . I t i s worth mentioning tha t whereas 
the fear from a nuclear holocaust was imp l i c i t in 1967,(The 
Notre Dame Report) , i t has become apparent in 1976 ( the 
announcement of four U.S. nuclear exper t s ) . But the problem 
remains, i n t h i s perspectiii/e, one of e f f ec t s , or r a t h e r , of 
dangers. Th-ere i s , of course, some sub-problems t a c i t l y 
referred to i n the said repor t such as the need to have an 
i n t e rna t i ona l ordering device to rpgula±?e the behaviour be t -
ween nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers.Such a sub-problem 
ought be excluded from the very outse t because i t i s one-
sided and might l ead , i f implemented, to a nuclearized 
d iv i s ion of the world, b a s i c a l l y , a ' c l a s s ' d iv i s ion . 
I I . 1 . 4 : THB B:iiaT.lBY gOfiMIILATIoi^ i 
Dr. Prank Barnaby, Director of S . I .R .P .R. I . suggests 
tha t the problem i s one of the decrease of economic and 
( &) 
technical r e s t r a i n t s on the production of nuclear weapons. 
(7) Kerotsz? ( f n . 4 ) , p.64-. 
(8) I3arnaby,F.; Prevent ing Nuclear /eanon P r o l i f e r a t i o n ; 
(Stockholm: SIP5I, 1975) , p . 5 . 
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A tono^ 0 / r eg re t could^ be f e l t in Barnaby' s work ovpr the 
poss ib le increase of nuclear weapon countrieso The a l lus ion 
i s to the i ssue of ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p o l i t i c a l behaviour of candidate nuclear weapon coun t r i e s . 
I t i s the same ' d i v i s i o n i s t i c ' look of B<^aton which 
charac te r izes Barnaby's formulation and his t a c i t ca l l t h a t 
unless tne nucl-^ar monopoly i s maintained, at l e a s t twenty 
non-nuclear weapon countr ies wil l go nuclear . 
I I . I . 5 : TEE v.'ILLBICH FUiiU'lULJl'lUi^ ; 
Iccording to Mpsnn 7 i l l r i c h , th^^ problf=n i s tbp 'vid.-^-
sprcad of f i s s ionab le ma te r i a l s due to the increase in the 
(Q" ) 
r i s e of nuclear enf rgy to general e l e c t r i c powers. '' The 
reason underlying the " ' i l l r ich formulation i s the p o s t u l a t e 
tiiat "tho e s sen t i a l ingredient of r^ -very nat ional nuclear 
ccpnb i l i ty , whether for mi l i t a ry or c i v i l purposes , i s 
f i s s ionable ma te r i a l " . He also r e i t e r a t e s t ha t the raw 
mater ia l s for nuclear weapons and to produce e l e c t r i c (9) In power from nuclear energy are subs t an t i a l l y the snrnn, 
/ i l l r i c h ' s f^.rmul a t ion , one can eas i ly see the theme of 
l inking,©r rath^^r the imposs ib i l i ty of de l ink ing , 
nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes from those designed 
for weapon product ion, unless the problem i s formulated on 
now grounds. 
(9) . a l l r i ch ,M; Civil Nuclear Power and I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Security KNew York; Praeger Publ i shers Inc ; 1971) »P' 3" 
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I I . I . 6. THE FISHER FOPJ'IUL ITIQN; 
mother l i n e of thought depends on the nped to qccept 
the rorJLities of the current s i t ua t i on -^ nd proceed to p r e s s 
for uioro s ignp tor ies and more r q t i f i e r s . Pormul qting the 
problcn un such a l i n e , proceeds to pose the problem in a 
question forias "HOTO; can we es^ect 8 nat ion tu sign an p^gree-
ment to give up thp dovf^ l opment of q "reqponp sypte"!, suc^ qp 
a nuclear weapons system, which i t be l ieves to be essen t i a l 
to i t s nat ional security?"^ ^ I t i s noteworthy to observe 
tha t the bulk ol wr i t ings on t h i s and p a r a l l e l l i n o s tends to 
provoke some non -pc l i t i c a l condit ions r a t h e r than expounding 
the compulsions of s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g , I t i s qui te c l ea r tha t 
F i s h e r ' s assumption i s tha t the problem pmanates from the 
proc-ps of horizontal n u c l ' a r p r o l i f e r a t i o n which ought, so 
he imp l i c i t l y t h i n k s , be curbed^ hence the more p ress ing 
problem of how to curb i t by prevent ing o the rs from having 
an -^cccss to a nuclear capabi l i ty though s t r a t e g i c compul-
sio'^s may, in some cases , be badly in need of such capab i l i ty . 
/h i lc Fisher i s opinionated in favour of ac t iva t ing i n t e r -
national moves to ' s e l l ' the Nuclear Non-Prol i fera t ion 
Treaty to non-nuclear countr ies espec ia l ly those t h a t are 
c l a s s i f i ed as ' nea r n u c l ea r ' , Schlesinger suggests the use 
(10) Fisher, ' .} Global Dimensions; inJEoskey ,B.8c "/jll rich,M. 
(ods ) ; Nuclonr F ro l i f e r a t i on :P rospec t s for Control; 
(New Yorks Duncllen Publ ishing Comp.Inc.1970),p.3-
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of persuasion to get the non-nucloar powers nearpr to tho 
bel ioi ' t ha t the aims of nuclear weapon production and 
procurGmont arc so limited/''--'-^ Undoubtedly, the impl ica t ions 
of och les inger ' s suggestion are immense and they can vary from 
t h r e a t s to p r o t e c t i o n , ye t an excuse can be found for 
Schlesinger in the sense tha t he r e f l e c t ? the ' t h ink ing ' 
of a supcr-po/^er. 
I I . I « 7 ; a 'ITHJWS' FORIltUL 'ITIOF; 
The d i f fe ren t ways by which the problem has been 
formulatGd in t h i s survey have depended on an * a p r i o r i ' 
assumption thpt developed countr ies wi l l remain developed, 
tha t l e s s doveloo-^d wil l remain l e s s developed and t h a t under-
developed wil l also remain und, r developed. This notion might 
make i t necesspry for the following quest ion to be asked;-i/hat 
"rould happen in CP'='P thopp po'^ '^prs which ^re not super-
powers, develop weapon systems much more advanced, e labora te 
and sophis t ica ted than those already known? E'er experts such 
as Rathjoans, the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a breakthrough as the 
one posed in the question arc remote. His argument i s based 
on tho observation tha t the new powers are working on l i n e s 
sim.il • r to those of the es tabl ished nucleqr powers p a r t i c u l a r -
l y , those of the es tabl ished nuclear powers, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
(11) Schlos inger ' s theory i s expounded in a chapter e n t i t l e d : 
It-Qcl ' a r S T e n d : TfiP flptti.n^ of the P-robl-m I n : Kerots7., 
S.Ced.)i ( f n . 4 ) . 
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(12) 
tl-iO'-^ of the suporpowers. Yet, no answer i s providod 
by -iatnjeans because the o r ig ina l question r e l a t e s to the 
s :Trtogic ropponpp of th^^ super-powers, though such responsf^ 
i s , c e r t a i n l y , control led by condi t ions of unci^rtainy. The 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s tnight be remote, t r ue ; but what wi l l happen? 
This i s sue bocoiues more complex i f we add to i t what 
R-tt-jj-ns sees no coupling between the probleni of con t ro l l i ng 
uucler.r p r o l l for-^^ti on among the have-nots and control)ling 
tuo sT:rp,togic arms growth of the super-powers. -^  I t 
r':cns q_uito an easy task to refu te those who see no such 
coupling bec'^use th-^ s t r a t e g i c balance between the two super-
powers i s not se l f -explanatory . I t depends on the impl ic-
at ions on the world 's straiiogic s i t u a t i o n qt R given 
ti.^-^ and the i n t e r a c t i o n among the s t r a t e g i c postur-^s of l e ss 
powerful countrioso Moreover, we are not l o g i c a l l y e n t i t l e d 
to exclude the impact of the non-nucle=ir powers on the 
s t r a t c - i c .alancr between t^^ he ' tw. sup^r-pi'vofg en the 
iP t , rnat ional p o l i t i c a l behaviour of non-nuclear powers, 
(14) i f not on t h e i r a l l i e s . 
(12) xlothoens, J . i Constraints on the Nuclear irrasjin: 
Boskey,B & . / i l l r i c h , M.Ceds); ( f n . l O ) , p . 9 . 
(13) Ib id . , p . 21. 
(14) 'ji example of the i n t e r a c t i o n mentioned can be found 
in chapter I I I , s^'ction IV of The Sunday Times;Insight 
on the Middle East i'ar; (Londons Vikas Publ ishing 
House P v t . L t d . , 197^), pp.202-213. 
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on -i-l ^ s s - t h n n - s t r n t ' ^ g i c levi^l, i t can hr HrgU'od, that^ "t^ hf 
devcloped counCi^icF, e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e / e s t , a re now 
i n d u l g i n g i n a technology t r a n s f e r p r o c e s s by v i r t u e of 
'^hicb the;y can m a i n t a i n t t i e i r p r e s e n t r a t e s uf Ts^a f i a t e r i a l 
s u p o l i o s from I -^SP devpl^pr'^ and urdprdeveloped 'cTountri. ;-, 
Du3 to the sa id p r o c e s s , some of the a s p e c t s of the n u c l e a r 
technology i n s i g h t ciay vpry ^Rs i ly f ro l i f^^ r ' ^ tp . Thp cr i t i c i -^ - t 
p o s t u r e on t h e p a r t of t h e dpveloped c o u n t r i e s 'vould "be to 
i n t e n s i f y t h e i r e f f o r t s t o have a t echnology much more 
advanced than tfeat which i s used i n exchange fo r raw mat-
e r i a l s. 
I I . I 0 8 ; GINSBURGH' S EQBMUL \TIQN 
From a Nat iona l s p c u r i t y p o i n t of view t h e problem i s 
complex and manifo ld . To Colonel Ginsburgh, a l e a d i n g . jner ican 
n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y - o r i e n t e d e x p e r t , th-^ problem i s i m p l i c i t l y 
one of h o r i z o n t a l spread of n a c l o a r weapons and t h a t " i t i s 
no l o n g e r a q u e s t i o n of whether or not ( n e a r n u c l e a r n^ition-
s t p t o s ) they couio choose to develop such weapons, but 
whether they w i l l cons ide r i t wor thwhi le to do so i n 
( i s ) t e rms of t h e i r own n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t " . ^^ ;? 
( I S ) Ginsburgh, Col.T?„; Thp I n t p r n c t i o n p l "^nvircnmpnt; 
P o s s i b i l i t i e s , P e r i l s and Prom-ises; i n Jo rdan , Col, \ . 
I s s u e s of Na t iona l S e c u r i t y i n the 1970sKLondon; 
F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r , i n c o , 1967) , p . 2 4 . 
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I t i s obvious; t • at t h e i eo, behind Ginsburgh's no t ion , 
though not kno'.J.j as ^uch during tha t time was tha t of 
dexerrence. The auquis i t ion oi r.a^  l ea r -weapons might 
be i n s t i g a t e d by the compulsions oi t .e Tee< to deter 
adversa r i e s . Acco-^din ly/cYie mere cxie .exi.e of i n t ex - s t cue 
c o n f l i c t s might, ulider cer ta in conditions^ lead several 
s t a t e s to opt for a nucleai 'veapon piogramjne. One can 
s t i . l go furthex in th io c.nalyticai p-'-Ouets to think of 
s t a b i l i t y as an attempt to sus ta in unresolved c o n f l i c t s , 
espec ia l ly tue&e in v/.xicii n a t i o n c l i s n , r e l ig ion or ethnic 
cons idera t ions a '^e involved buco su'"taincd conxl ic t s 
would, i n case p r o l i i er a t ion i s curbed, a-^sorb conventional 
arms production of super-powei^s and nuclear powers. 
Pro 111 t h e point of view of na"cional secur i ty , t i l l 
the balance of mi l i ta ry power has constant ly been a 
dorainani- f ac to r . With p ro jec t ions snapped off r ight and 
l e f t about tnc ini roasc in the nu bcr of nuclear cajndid-
a t e s , almost a l l non-nuclear p a r t i e s of c o n f l - c i s a., o very 
l i ke ly to seek for a nuclear capab i l i t y . In a respected 
pub l i ca t ion , i t i s c lear ly s ta ted t . .a t prol i j -ora t ion T,;ill 
16 bccom.o abundant i n tvjenty or t h i r t y years axid t n a t "at 
(16) Barnaby,P.; ( fn .8 ) , p .20 . 
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t'vonty non-nuclaai'weapon countr ies have through peaceful 
nuclear programmes - already accumulated the technical know-
led'3€ and expe r t i s e , and t h j nuclear mater ia l necessary fur the 
(17") 
product ion of nucl'^pr 's/e^ponp". '^ So lonp a? the ?^cquisition 
of nuclear weapons i s ce r ta in ly an element of change in 
the present mi l i t a ry balance among non-nuclear coun t r i e s , 
i s f a i r enough to understand such prooect ions in the context 
of motivat ion. Mthough the differences between the acquis-
i t i o n of a token nuclear force and a cr-^dible 
(18) 
nuclear fv^rceis subs t an t i a l , a token nuclear force of very 
frw warheads can p lay , in an overa l l s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y , t h e 
ro l e of the credible nuclear c a p a b i l i t y , at le^.st for some-
time. Another face of t h i s very formulation i s the sugges-
t i o n t h a t any country with plutonium on i t s t e r r i t o r y "wil l 
Want to assure i t s e l f t ha t i t can account at a l l t imes 
for almost a l l of the rnqterial. 
(17) I b i d . , p o 5 . 
(18) _1 de ta i led expose of d i f f e r nee i s to found i n : 
Schlcsin^er , Jo 5 ( f n . l l ) . 
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1 1 . 1 . 9 s BLOOMFIELD' S KPSMUL ITION; 
-7hGn, i n an informal p o l l of prominent .Imerican 
n u c l e a r e x p e r t s who met i n March 1975? tho r e s u l t s show 
t h a t f o u r t e e n e x p e r t s out of twenty one have a n t i c i p a t e d 
t h e oxis tenc '^ of one to four af^dit ional n u c l p p r 'vpapor 
c o u n t r i e s i n t h e next decade and t h a t seven e x p e r t s have 
a n t i c i p a t e d the r i ^ e of seven to ten more n u c l e a r weapon 
(19) 
c o u n t r i e s , n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y e x p e r t s i n non -nuc l ea r 
c o u n t r i e s w i l l t h i n k hut s l i g h t l y Ue f ' . r e - i ndu lg ing i n a 
t r a n s f e r of t h e i r peace fu l n u c l e a r program.mes i n t o t h e 
p r o d u c t i o n of necessa ry p lu ton ium and enr iched uranium 
for 'voapon p r o d u c t i o n . The t e m p t a t i o n becomes a r e a l u rge . 
Henco, wo may be j u s t i f i e d i n ag ree ing with Bloomfield upon 
h i s formula t ions of t h e problem i n t h e sense t h a t i t 
"not t h a t any given country w i l l s e c r e t l y chea t i t s 
n u c l e a r bookkeeping but t h a t i t w i l l openly dpc ide t o 
a c q u i r e a n u c l e a r <veapons c a p a b i l i t y , for r e a s o n s which, 
Fincc t ime im-memorial, and today as never b e f o r e , d r i v e 
(19) 
n a t i o n s t o seek p r e s t i g e , i n f l u e n c e and above a l l e q u a l i t y . " 
B l o o m f i e l d ' s fo rmula t ion r e p r e s e n t s a c l e a r con fe s s ion of 
the r o l e p layed by t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of a token n u c l e a r f o r c e , 
no t t o speak of a c r e d i b l e n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y , i n e n r i c h i n g 
(19) Bloomfield , L . ; Nuclear Spread and ^>'orld Orders 
Fore ign - ' • i fa i r s , Ju ly 1975. 
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t h e components of ' n a t i o n a l power' and t h e e f f e c t i t does 
have on the p o l i t i c a l behav iour of such c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y 
through t h e mass- media. This a n a l y s i s can be used to d.-^velop 
Marshyll ^ c l u b a n ' s i d e a of t h e pecul.qr drama of t h e twent i ' ? tb 
c e n t j r y . Though w r i t i n g i n 1954, Mcluhan conceived t h e essenc? 
of such drama i n l i v i n g with both mechanical and e l e c t r i c 
t echno logy . ^ ' / i th B l o o m f i e l d ' s fo rmula t ion i n t hp backgrcLind, 
we can reach a much more developed d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e c r i s i s 
f ac ing our world as emanating from l i v i n g wi th a l l miechanical 
e l e c t r i c and n u c l e a r t e c h n o l o e i e s i n onp and the same t i m e . I t 
i s t h e d i v i s i o n of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i n t o n u c l e a r -
weapon haves and n u c l e a r weapon have-no t s which w i l l be t h e ' r e e l ' 
r ea son unde r ly ing i n s t a b i l i t y of confusion because the v a r i o u s 
u n i t s of t h e system w i l l be i n no p o s i t i o n t o accept enjoyitig 
a ' m e c h a n i c a l ' or even ' e l e c t r i c ' s t a b i l i t y , whereas some u n i t s 
a re enjoying n u c l e a r s t a b i l i t y and t h i s i s n o t h i n g bu t t o r e -
i e r a t e t h e e f f e c t s of t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons. 
I I . 1 . 1 0 : THS VIEV/ FROM TEE UHTTED NATIONS: 
An e n t i r e l y d i f i e r e n t fo rma la t i on i s p r o v i d e d i n a 
r e p o r t by thp Socrf^tary General of t h e Unit'='d Na t ions i n whicli 
t h e problem was formulated as how t o e f f e c t u a t e n u c l e a r 
(10) McLuhan,M. ? Understanding: Media? The "Extensions of Man° 
(London: Abacus e d i t i o n ) , 1975, p . 3 6 5 . 
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disarn-iment rather th^n nuclear Don-proli£.emtiGn. \s such, the 
problem was considered in th i s very report as "the most 
(21) ^ 
important p-^oblem f-^cing the world". The ^o^ia^''Tbi<Ji?j 1"^  .could 
he assumed, may h^ A^ e been established on a t a c i t assumption ofs 
- the dangers of the -present s i t ua t i on , and 
- the p o s s i b i l i t y of nuclear disarmaments 
Despite the fact that the dangers of the present s i tua t ion 
cannot be looked at ^«)ith scepticism, the p o s s i b i l i t y of nucl<§ar 
disarmament i s , at l e a s t , a matter of doubt, i f not* base-
l e s s . Strategic s tudies should always be guarded against any 
such spect""um ^ihich belongs fundam n t a l l y to the f ie ld of 
speculations r'^ther than to the f ie ld of r e a l i s t i c examination 
of po l i t i co -mi l i t a ry factors as phenomenologically perceived 
and as ' r e a l ' e n t i t i e s . But i t should be isjlear that to refute 
t l i i s p o s s i b i l i t y means in no way to refute nuclear disarmament 
though, in the context of a stud'? l i ke t h i s , disarmament cannot be 
C pondcdupon. I t i s worth-mentioning here tha t the kinship bet -
ween nuclear technology for raiHt^ry purnoses ^nd that for 
non-mili tary purposes i s not questionable and, consequently, 
nuclear disarmament would mean '-denuclearizing' our technology 
now and in the future . And th i s i s against the very logic of 
of the evolut ion of Man's- c i v i l i z a t i o n . Fr.om the ... 
(£15 United Nations' Secretary-General Report on Economic & 
Social Consenuences of the Armaments Race and i t s Extremely 
Harmful Effects on '-Jorid Peace and Securi ty, IDSA Stra tegic 
Digests November, 1971. 
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r a i l i t a r y - t e c h n i c a l spcctrura, nuc lear dis'^Tmment ap^^ears to 
be an mtopean idea« From the p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y spectrum, the 
compulsions of pover d i s t r i b u t i o n and balance do riot nii.CiS.for 
ripition p t a t o . 
disarmament a t l e a s t t i l l the end ofp'f>^'g;od't-,?ypten and t h e / 
I IoI»1^s BERTEAiro RUSSEL'S FOE^HLATIOig; 
te/horoas t h e un i t ed N-^tions r e p o r t d\ /el t UDon disarmament 
as "the most imoor tant problem" fac ing our vo r ld to dny, 
• ' ag ^p h i l o sophor l i k e Ber t rand Russel formul-^ted the 
problem i n the fr^me of the l-^cl^ of r ab ion ' ^ l i t y i n the 
(22) 
d e c i s i o n s of s ta tesmen ^nd the unbalanced spread of povjer. 
We can i n t e r p r e t what Russel deecr ib-d the I'^ck of r ^ t ion -^ l i t v i n 
te"ms of a choice problci^T ^^gainst '-/hich minimising the r i s k s and 
maximising the b e n e f i t s o-*^oniQ rnuch mo'"e complicated under 
cond i t ions of u n c e r t a i n t y , es'-^eci-^lly i f brink^i^^ship games 
continue» '^or Ber t rand Russel the ph i lo soohe r , the need i s now 
(23) 
one of an "apjoa l to -^Qtives oT r a t i o n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t " ^ I t 
can be assumed t h a t R u s s e l ' s formul'^tion was based on the e f f e c t s 
of nucle?"'" cx^.lcsion on human l i v e s ind bhe r e l a t i o n of such 
f ac to r on the gene ra l s ' ' ruggle of Man a g a i n s t Nature , S e -
ex'nmined, R u s s e l ' s formul-ition could apneaf as a p h i l o s o n h i c a l 
rel 'ay of Brodc -^ nd Newman's descT^iotion of nuc lea r weapons ^s ' ' the 
(22) Russel , Bo ; Coramon Sense and Nuclear Warfare; (New Yorks 
Simon & Sch'^stc '^ 2nd paner -back p r i n t i n g , 1960), po20. 
(23) . I b i d ^ Po13 
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most s e r ious poteiit i '^I t h r c r t to the c i - i l i ^ n popu l a t i on of 
(2'+) 
the United S u i t e s " , a l though the l a t t e r c o n t r i b u t o r e argura-
ent i s , u n l i k e th^ li of Russcl , bTsed on t e c h n i c r l dn en, 
II»I»12° THE BUSSIAK FpT^MUL^TION; 
Sinil^r, bu' not idcnticnl, to the l^st two views, 
rsl-ted to wh'-'t m^y be caned ' th'- cf^ c^ct persDCctive', is the 
Russian for'iulntion which s-^ ys th-^ t wa'-" has became "more ^ nd 
more destructive and (has) been continuously i iproved to claim 
a bigger and biggei" toll of hunan lives, „ (si ace) nan has 
(S5) . 
learned hov7 to use the imensc no^ 'or of nucle-v energy". 
The background o'^  the Russian formulation is to be sought in 
the continuous insistence of Soviet Ic'^d-rs on mentioning that 
their country did lose some twenty million lives during 
the Second '.Jorld ""^^r which was fought by conventional weapons. 
(2^ -) Brodo, H & Newman, J,; 0_ffcnsive ^^eanons -'nd Their 
Effectiveness, in; vriancr,. E. (ed) -, Survive 1 a nd th e 
Bomb; Methods of__C.iyil Defence; Indiana University 
Press, ^^UTT, ppo107-"l09. 
(25) Trifenov,V„» A Soviet '""iew of Nuclear Proliferation^ 
in*Keretes7,, S. (.^ ^ ): (fn.4), p.4. 
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This pe-'-^spectivG cin be Gnl^rged and stretched but i t w i l l 
lead to poetry n t h c r t h q n no^'er, n-^tioml secur i ty %ncl 
strategy^ SITH-TIV because the bnsic function of any of the 
uni t s of the present in'-ern^-tional system Is to pursue i t s 
(26) 
i n t e r e s t s - a s defined in ter-ns of po^'er. And po^ i^er, esp-
ec ia l ly the po-'er to hur t , is nccess-ry for bargaining. And 
bargaining i s ncccss-ry for the system uni t s to maint-in bhe 
?iovemcnt of l i f e cycle since no country, in the h i s to ry of Man 
has rv- r been -blc to l ive inde lendcntly inside s-^  ^ e borders. 
For soc ie t i e s to -.^aintpia the movement of l i f e cycle in today's 
world, i t sn.auld ra ther be suggested, the horror inherent in 
any nuclo-r caoabi l i ty , v;hatcver taken i t may be, will be 
\7lll bo utilizf^d to ensure a more forcefu? bargaining p o s i t i o n . 
In th3 world of the early seven t i e s , the o i l ' t h r e a t ' acquired 
i t s bargaining pc^ver through i t s e f fec t on the cycl«^ of l i f e 
s t a r t i n g from house warming, pass ing through t r anspo r t a t i on and 
i n d u s t r i a l production and ending by fuel ing var machinns.In 
the jorld of th-^ oighti-^p of t h i s country the nuclear ' t h r e a t ' 
wi l l ceas"' to be a mer^ . energy throa t and ^vill become an 
r oorgy-'veapcn tfcrorato 
(26) .1 de ta i led and systematic ana lys i s of t h i s point i s to 
to be found ±ni ^^orgenthau H. •, P o l i t i c s -'Jnong i-^  at ions ; 
(Calcutta* S c i o n t i l i c Book .'igonc^ y ,-Bifth i idit ion,Irjdian 
Reprint , 197?) » pp.5-tt« 
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'"bat has be^n c a l l e d tho e f f e c t s p e r s p e c t i v e i s , t h e r e -
for^. 5 mis l ead ing and d i r e c t s t aought i n t o some semi-numanist 
p o r t u l - i t o F . Ii^ f*^ct, i t i a t h i s vory •ppr^ri '^ctivp, 'vbich l i ^ p 
b- 'hi id tho overvhelming t rend t h a t fo rmula t e s t h e p r o . l e m as 
i f i t 'vcre '-vhether t o s ign the - '• '^on-Proliferation Trea ty or 
no fc. 
I t i s n o t , t h ^ r e f o r p , stran=2:e to f ind c f f e c t s - ' v i s e l i t -
oracuro on the s u b j r c t obviously fax from b i n g ' s t r a t e g i c ' 
foi t he moment i n t e r n a t i o n a l law or e t h i c s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s or 
t h o u g h t s are invoked, a n a l y s e s would l oad t o c o n c l u s i o n s f a r 
from be ing r e l a t e d t o t h e e x e r c i s e and und '^rs tanding 
I I « 1 , 1 5 : ^ SCI3LE&I 1^bSxi' S m?uVlUL:.TIUa; 
Schlosin^-j'^r hn? sugges ted , i n a substanti-^il c o n t r i b u t i o n 
t o thesubj-^ct , what he c a l l e d t h e spectrum of t e c h n i c a l and 
economic c a p a b i l i t i e s . For him, onp of t h e advantages of t h i s 
sp.corum i s t i n t " i t c a s t s l i g h t on ano the r problem; the 
pot ; , -nt ia l s p i l l - o v r r of n u c l e a r technology from p e a c e f u l 
( 0 9 ) 
procrammcs i n t o weapons programmes. ' The S c h l o s i n g e r 
spectrum i s c e r t a i n l y aware of the dynamics of t h e p r o c e s s of 
nucl ' -nr p r o l i f e r a t i o n in t-^rns of qc t ion and r ^ ^ c t i o n . Iccord ing 
t o t h i s spectrum we are d i r e c t e d to t n i n k of the; problem 
as one of having an acces s to n u c l e a r power by a non- supe r -
po i ' e r . ^h ig i p t h e ac t i on .The r e a c t i o n i s t h a t t h e adversa ry 
(27) S c h l o s i n g e r , J . ; i n K e r t c s z , S.Ced)-, ( f n . 4 ) , p . l 8 . 
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of t h e country t h - t r e q u i r e s t h i s pov/or vvill seek fo r an 
cqucl acquisition. 7r±tir.c in 1967, Sc i i l c s inge r excluded the 
t h e n n u c l e a r ^30wers nnd d iv ided t h e cnnd idn tc c o u n t r i e s 
i n t o four ca t cGor ios accord ing to t h e i r economic and 
t e c h n i c a l l e v e l s althou^^h he def ined no c l e a r c r i t e r i a f o r 
such C a t e g o r i z a t i o n . 
EGOITOMIC & TBCHNIO;jj LSVIILS OF POTENTIAL 
FJCLE;JI ^OYT^TT^r ' ^ 
CATEGORY/A CATEGORY/B CATEGOEY/C CATEGORY/D 
' f e s t Gernany Sweden I s r a o l Egypt 
J a p a n A u s t r a l i a South . . f r i c a 2,-Jcistan 
I t a l y Taiv^an I n d o n e s i a 
I n d i a 
This econoDic ajid t e c l i n i c a l s p e c t r u n would have boon 
a u t h e n t i c c,nJ credi lole but f o r two main r e a s o n s : 
a) the d e c i s i o n t o go nucleaj" o r to change a 
nuc l ea r power prograj-Uio i n t o a n u c l e a r 
Weapon progranne i s n o t an econoriic t e c h n i c a l 
d e c i s i o n o n l y . I s y c h o - h i s t o r i c a l conxjulsions 
Ought not bo excludeci. On tht. c o n t r a r y , t h o s e 
clone ( p s y c h o - h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r s ) n i g h t invoke 
such a change o r ni{;ht push fo r the i n i t i a t i o n 
of a nuc 1 car pro g ra i' ic 
(28) I b i d , , p . 17. 
@ Sch lc s inge r d i f f e r e n t i a t o r s between nuclocZ" power a.nd a 
n u c l e a r f o r c e . He a l so d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between a t oken 
n u c l e a r fo rce and a c r e d i b l e uiclerx f o r c e . 
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subs tan t ip l ly of w0-35;one, and 
b) with "/ et G'-^ m^ny pn d Jppnn, th^^ problom ip ir-^ t t b r 
decis ion t ; gu nucl'^ar or not but how to nr^utralizo the 
p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y compulpions iin.]; o-cd by the iTroeont 
li-tcrn-Hticnal pys tea ' s t i p powers.The s ix-year nat ional 
det-^t^ in Japan on the subj-^ct v as uvcr by ear ly June, 
1976 when Japan signed and r a t i f i e d t b . i '^uu-truliforati-^ ^ 
( 29) 
Treaty, ^^  .llthough the paid r a t i f i c a t i o n h^-lrnd and the 
agonizing d^b-te in Jqpan, i t holp'^d no way sclving any 
of J e a n ' s s t r a t e g i c prublems, espec ia l ly those a s soc i a t -
ed with i t s nat ional secur i ty v i s - a - v i s regional and noii-
regional powers. 
I I . 1 . 1 4 ; THB FOmtULATIQ^ OF TH^ GROUP OF EL WEN; 
The most rpcent trend seems to formulate the problem as 
i t were a problem of safeguards against the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
transforming the f i s s i l e mate r ia l s into wegpon-production 
p rocesses . This trend i s spons^jrcd by the advanced nuclear 
s t a t e s - some of them are non-nuclear weapon s t a t e s . Despite 
the character of t h e i r ends, which are obviously centred ar'.und 
the maintenance of the highest poss ib l e degree of t h e i r 
monopoly, the assumptions behind such formulation are 
worth mentioning. 
(29) '^ 'he Statesman, June 8, 1976. 
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Th:.Y arc,: 
a) thv-^  i m b i l i t y to d i f f - r c n t i qto between a nuclear-weapon 
pro-r-^mmo ^nd nnotbor for non-milit?'ry purpopnp, qtid 
b) Liic i n a b i l i t y to exclude nuclear technology from the 
current phase which i s subs t an t i a l l y one of t-^chnology 
t ransfer . 
This trend was floated during a meeting of nucle^ir energy 
s p e c i n l i s t s of eleven coun t r i e s , h-^ld at London on June 2, 
197s to discuss 'now' safeguard mechanisms for curbing the 
spread of nuclear weapons. -^  (The el'-^ven count r ies rep-
resented were* the United S ta tes of .Imerica - the Soviet 
Union, Br i ta in ,France , Japanj.i'ost Gt ramny, Canada, Sweden,East 
Germany, the Netherlands and I t a l y . ) I t i s oi-^vious t ha t the 
technica l problem was one of s-^feguards whereas the ' str^^.tegic' 
w.as one of how to curb the spre-^id of nuclear wc^ipons, qltl-ougb 
Franco and ""'ost Germany, sp'-cific-^lly, "seem to think other-
w i s e ^ ^ 5 l ) 
11 .1 ,15 : THE .jRITliE'S RJHviUL..TlOiN:; 
Hpving di=cuppod thirtnr>n ntt'^mpts to formulntn 
the prqbloEi i s obvious tha t cgch attempt has sought for 
(30) In t e rna t i ona l Herald Tribune, June 3, 1976. 
(31) Dpsgupta,!'. 5 Nuclegr P ro l i f e ra t ion? The Problem f?nd 
Po l i cy , Imrita Baz^r I^atrika.. Juno 15,1976. 
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i t s conci^ptual promise in only onr of th'^ cons t i tuent f ac to r s 
of thn nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n phenoraonon, or t'vo at Dcst„Th(? 
w r i t e r , while t ry ing to study the problem, has f e l t th-^ n'-^ -^ d 
for a ' s t ruc tura l -opcrpi t ional ' formulation which .vould have 
i t s conceptual premise in the very strato:::;ic and nat ional 
secur i ty environment which i s qbl-^ to 'xiv^ ^••irth t o th^ 
phenomenon subjected to ana lys i s . The problem, as selected in 
P a r t I , Chapter I , i s one of the r e l a t i o n between nuclear 
prol i fera t - iun and i n t e r n - t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l behaviour in teJrms 
of strat'^oy and nat ional securi ty for th^ reasons expounded 
the re in , '^he problem, according to tvu wr i t e r , i s assucieced 
with nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n ra the r than with i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p o l i t i c e l >ehpviour "b'^ caupe of two reciporp* 
a,, the newer phenomenon i s nuclear prolifer?ti.on and abundant 
l i t e r a t u r e can be resor ted to on i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l 
behaviour which dates back to the r i S'^  of th^ p resen t 
( 52) 
i n t e rna t i ona l system some thre^ hundred years ago -^  and 
bo there i s s t i l l an element of uncer ta in ty in which the 
phenomenon i s s t r a t e g i c a l l y and na t ic^a l secur i ty-wise 
orbit t '^d. To adopt a decision for the acqu i s i t ion of an 
(32) *- l a rge numb r of references can be c i ted on the r i s e 
of the p r sent i n t e r n a t i o n a l system.Se , for example: 
Sprout, H. 8s Sprout,M. 5 In te^nat iongi P o l i t i c s ; (l^ '^ e^ y 
York: Van ^ostrand, Indian i^eprint ,1963) ,pp . 73-105. 
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^dvinccd conventional weapon system has b'come an ordinary 
business for stptrsmen tha t needs no pxceptional c a l -
cu la t ions or r^xt^nsivr long-ticip s tud ie s . 1 decision to 
acquire tbe basic nuclear know-rhov fur mi l i t a ry or non-
mi l i tp ry purpos^'=^ i s , on t'---^  otJ'^ '^ r b,^ n.'^ 5 P m^'f'ter r<=l pitnd to 
0 H'ivcn count ry ' s understanding of the i s sue s t i ed to i t s 
V p r"y s urvi v a l . 
On tuv. dr ci si on-making s ide , i t cpn eas i ly be observi-d 
t h a t th^ formulqri.on of tl r problem s'cings betvp-n tivo 
oxcremes. Thr f i r s t extreme equates nuclear p r u l i f e i a t i o n 
'viLb the should-bc^-prohibited postures.. This i s thp p o s i t i o n 
oj- r^;c nucl'-^pr "i^ '^ qpoi'' c o u n t r i ' s , thp Group of ^l-^ven pnd some 
i d c e l i s t internai ; ional furumso'- '^hey have become of the habit 
oi Call ing for sT:rictpr measures against nucleer pro] i f e r a t i c n . 
The ^^ucl:ar Non-Prolif '^mtion Treaty Heview Conferpnce held 
(35) ^ 
^t Geneva in ^^ ay 1975 '^ i-<3 the Conference of tb'^ Group of 
El vpn held ^t London on Jur^ 2, 1976 are only two examplps of 
bh f i r s t forri-ulation which r e s i s t s nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n as 
vie'vod in terms of th'^ dang-rs implipd in th.- deploym^^nt of 
nucl ^r jtfeepons as a backbone of the defence, and probably of 
th, offenci,-, system,Tie other extreme conceives of nuclear 
p r o l i l p r q t i o r as providing « boost to nqt ional secur i ty . 
Enough evidence can b'^  drawn from, to giv - j u s t one example. 
(55) iolvUffo ,ToT. ; I s s u - s Before thp 1\1PT/RC5 Foreign If f a i r ; 
fteoux-Ls, Vol,XXIV,^'io.2, Febol975. 
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p. ptatement by the Defence Minister of Turkey -^  in which 
he tplkcd of Turkey's p lans to dpvelop nucl-^ar energy for 
m^'.nuf-^cturing nucl -ar bombs and bui lding r e a c t o r s , 'mother 
> x.Mirol.^  can be drawn from the o:.ficial communique issued at 
Peking on I^ovcmber 18, 1976 announcing China's l a t e s t hydrogen 
( ^5) 
b l a s t . Iccording to t h : communique •; China claimed t h a t t h a t 
t e s t had boost'^d the count ry ' s mi l i t a ry s t rength . 
The need to have a s t ruc tu r a l -ope ra t i ona l formulation 
of the problem stems also from the apparent need to develop a 
'7orking theory oi nucl ^ar p r o l i f e r a t i o n in a proper context . 
One i n i t i a l st'-p in th-- const ruct ion of a working theory i s 
to make r e a l i t y more understandable.'To mak - r e a l i t y more 
understandable-' requir-^p the i n t ^ l l ' - c t u a l labour of oraranizing 
our pe rcep t ions , ideas and symbols in a conceptual frame.This 
css-^'^tial labour i s l a rge ly s t r u c t u r a l . l t i s th- r a t i o n a l e 
behind the w r i t e r ' s notion of developing a s t r u c t u r a l - o p e r a t i o n -
al iormulatior ' . As for the operat ional a,?pect, the wr i t e r 
eliev'-s that t h i s study, in i t s capacity as a study in 
cr-ic?gy and nat ional s'^curity, should help the decision-maker 
axinise his benef i t s and naxiniso h is r i s k s . 
Our idea of nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n i s one of spread, thr^ 
spread of p a r t i c u l a r ma te r i a l s . Our percep t ion i s a 'pOA/er 
perc"'ption.Our symbols are bas ica l ly threr^ : Hiroshima ( t o t a l 
devastat ion) - unlimited s a t i s f a c t i o n of the en--rgy needs 
necessary for both the asp i ra t ions of survival and betterment 
(54) Economic Times.March 5, 1975. 
(35) Hindustan Times. Nov.14, 1976. 
0 
m 
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(development) - the super-po®ers (maximiom poss ib le s e c u r i t y ) . 
"9 i t uae b come a ver i f ied p o s t u l a t e t ha t the eseent ia l 
i^ci-redient <= rf a nuclear programme for pe^c-ful purposes are 
the ssmc of another for mi l i t a ry purposes, i t i s d i f f i c u l t at 
the stage of the acqa i s i t ion of such e s sen t i a l i ng red ien t s to 
sp-^cify our id'^p 0"P =!Dr'^ ad. Tqlcins- i t f'^rth^r up, i t '•^ '^ comop 
l c l ^ t i v e l y simpler to think of the spread in terms of the wegpon-
gradc f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s , by which we mean uranium 235 with 
-•t l e a s t 90% physical p u r i t y , plutonium 239 and uranium 233' 
I t i s in t h i s very sta^e of the development of a given nuclear 
programme tha t a kinship with tb'= int.-^rriptio-nc,i p o l i t i c a l 
th 
behaviour of the N_ country commences on growth and thus 
i n i t i a t e s s t r u c t u r a l changes in i t s s t ratpgy as i t intrcduc s 
rad ica l changes on i t s securi ty requirements and p r i v i l e g e s . 
.'ith the increase in the en^r^y requirements ui modern 
s o c i e t i e s ( S^e Pa r t 1, Chapter ITT) th-^ r e s o r t to nuclear 
Appendix I I 5o 
energy wil l incessant ly multiply and almost a l l proj-^ctions sec.'. 
Ci^pcndix XLY^ on the enr->rgy requirements i nd i ca t e t ha t the 
number of nuclear r eac to r s now usf^ d to generate e l e c t r i c power 
wil l at le^'st quadraple by the end of t h i s centuryo© These 
C 36) For a de ta i led study see i l ' a t t e r son , J .^ i J>Juclear l^o^veri (Hammon-
sworth, UKsir^enguin Books,1976) especia l ly pp.t57-l l^ wuexe the 
whole nuclear fuel cycle i s examined.See also p . 4 1 , p . 8 6 , p . 9 3 
and p.l27» \ppftrirl-i x^yvohows the pr>oHuction cYcl<= of ^ICTMI'S, 
© J.0 'M.Bockris ,Professor of Chemistry at F l inders Universi ty of 
South A u s t r i a l i a has got an ' oppos i t ion ' theory which concludes 
by a so la r r a t b e r than nuclear set t lement of the energy problems 
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now sharpened. He f i r s t admits the folloi/ving stat^monts are 
now con t rove r s i a l : 
1. Oil =tnd natura l gas suppli'^s for the 'T'^stern World (Und'^r-
l i n i n g i s the w i r t e r ' s . j wi l l exhaust around the r^nd of the 
century. Th^ ^ time tak'^n to build a system using in-^xhaus-
t i b l c energy sources would be 25-50 years. ' ' 'e have not 
s ta r ted to build ye t . 
2. Synthetic o i l and gas from coal wi l l not able to replace 
o i l from the ground to a subs tan t ia l extent b-^caus'^ of the 
lack of a v a i l a b i l i t y beyond 2050 (assuming continued expan-
sion of economipp)5 and the a i r p o l l u t i o n which would a r i s e 
from using coal on a scale necessary to replace o i l a f te r 
2000. 
5. 5"igsion energy would not l a s t more than a generation were 
i t to be mad^ a p r inc ipa l sourc- of onerery in 7petern Ind-
u s t r i a l countri '^s. 
4. The- Great, white Hope of the atomic energy a u t h o r i t i e s , the 
breeder, i s increas ingly being regarded by s c i e n t i s t s as 
a Great ./hite f-lephanti at be s t , i t would produce an increase 
in cancer, at worse, i t wil l not work. 
5. The othe'" atomic p o s s i b i l i t y , energy from the fusion of 
hydrroge^i n u c l e i i , i s utopic in p rospec t , but i t could be 
said about i t t ha t the m.ore i t i s researched, the l e s s i t 
s p e a r s to o f i e r p r a c t i c a l energy. 
6. The conversion of so lar energy to e l e c t r i c i t y and hydrogen, 
thoueht upto about 1972 to produc-^ impractical ly ^xponsive 
fuel Tiow looks PS t^oueb i t could b)e '^ con-omic p i l o t p l a n t 
level by the mid-1980s (with some 25 years necessary to 
build i t throughout the technological world). Several 
method^ for converting solar energy to heat , e l e c t r i c i t y 
and hydrogen ( a clean fuel) have been analysed during t h i s 
decade. Professor -t^ockris bel ipv^s ther-^ i s now lit t l<= 
controversy about the p r i ce competi t iveness (and may be 
p r i c e advantage) before the end of the C'^ntury of so lar 
energy over fo s s i l e fuel or atomic energy; and, he s t a t e s ; 
"no doubt whatsoever upon i n e x h a u s t i b i l i t y , s u f f i c i e n c y for 
a l l neeos in abundance and complete absence of p o l l u t i o n 
in funct ioning". He then expresses his astonishment over 
the fac t t h a t the r a t i o of research funding for the atomic 
and coa l -or ien ted research i s ten times t h a t of research 
on the so la r source. See* Bockri s, J. O'M. ; Future of Energy 
Supplies, The Tjmes,(London) , lug.14,1976. 
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Tiri.ro •necpgc'^ rY rpm=ir''-cp should "bp mad'^  bv tbo "fT-li-pr, "'^i'ppt, 
the po t io r -tint nucloar energy wi l l not l a p t inore than a gen-
e ra t ion dops in no wsv b o l i t t l a the importancr of research work 
being cooduct'^d on the subject . On the contrary, rp°earch fund-
ing ought be treniendous as the hazardous implicacioTi? of ^uch 
energy source, and the f ie ld of t h i s study i s no exception, 
compels us uc sopk for b e t t e r understanding lef^ding to the 
devclopm-^nt ci the two pre- r -^quis i tes of s c i a n t i f i c behaviour-
control of -^  given phenomenon pnd the a b i l i t y to p r e d i c t which 
cj.vironmental determinants wi l l be manifested under Ti/nich con-
i t i o n s . Second, whereas the acqu i s i t ion of p a r t i c u l a r nuclear 
mrcer ia l s ijas jOt an ' a d d i t i v e ' factor on tue e s s i n t i a l 
i n s r e d i e n t s of t h e ' a b i l i t y to i n f l i c t harm', quanbit;ativ°ly as 
well pc qupli t i t i v p l y , thp sol pr pnpr^-y hps not yot boon 
iden t i f ipd with weapon-systems, though t h i s should not mean 
L-hat we have to ru l e out SUCQ p o s s i b i l i t y . 
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r e a c t o r s are mostly fuelled by uranium, n.qtural or low-
ciirich^-d. Durine nuclear f i s s ion in th^ r eac to r , plutonium 
i s produced as &' by-product and has ^ot the priYilf^ge of 
functioning as a fuel for the second generation reac to r or 
as a f i s s ion mater ia l su i t ab le for warheads. Plutonium 
separat ion i s mostly effected throush a procpss of chemical 
separa t ion. There i s another technique to produce f i s s ion 
ma te r i a l s tha t can be used as warheads; namely, the uranium 
enrichment technique, which i s admittedly much mor<= complicatpd 
and cos t ly as i t requi res a sophis t ica ted technolosy„ 
There i s ypt another d i f f i cu l t y should we conceive of the 
°:enesis of the problem su^-jected to study only in terms of the 
spread of 'v^^ppon grade f i s s i l e mater ia ls .The Indian model, as 
wi l l be sho'//n in due course, has ce r t a in ly reshaped our t oo l s 
of ana lys i s as the acquis i t ion of a nuclear capab i l i ty to manuf-
acture an explosion d-^vice for orr^iP'-^'^rin'^ purposes f^ nd the l i k e 
cannot be claimed to have i n i t i a t e d Ind ia i n to the category :of 
nuclear weapon countries.The Indian acquis i t ion of weapon-grade 
f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s i s , consequently, no p?^rt of the problem 
selected for study.There are two elem^^^nts which form th^ o r b i t 
within which the Indian nucl'^^ar proorramme i s conducted. One 
clement i s the o f f i c i a l ca tegor ica l denial of the exis tence of 
a weapon-oriented pro'rename.The second i s the s c i e n t i f i c and 
i n d u s t r i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s of Ind ia . I t might be t h i s second 
element which led Jndi.-n offici ' -ao to dccl r ro tha t they should 
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not hpv- prohibit-^d tho count ry ' s pc i^n t i e tp from OT"" j : .^''i' ,_ 
thpp.dvn"it'^gre of modcrr. scionco. 
As the problem selected for study i s associated rritli bho 
impact of th'? acquis i t ion of f i s s i l e mntr-rials on tb-^ ^cr-b~ 
ogic postur'- ard nat ional secur i ty doctr ine of n-^ticn-sb res , 
p o l i t i c o - i r d l i t a r y considera t ions ought be i'ighlight-^d. P..r 
t h i s end, our i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the spread phenomenon " Id, 
as wel l , be associated with the acquis i t ion of wapon-gr d^e 
f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s in the context of a weapon-oriented 
programme; for i t i s only through t h i s foruiulation thab c; lo 
impact on the s t r a t e g i c pos ture and the national secur i ty 
may b-- t raced . This formulation wil] also help to draw 
the l i n e which has been undis t inguishablc between d i f f e i c t 
programmes. I t i s also capable of e f fec tua t ing a c lear 
understanding of the r e l a t i o n bet .een woapon-oriontatiou a"d 
developments in uther areas . 
Hnvii^g sue"s?est>^d t h i s formulation, t^'-' v'^r-ifi cativ.;' 
i s sue wuuld soon pro jec t i t s e l f as no c l ea r - cu t c r i t o r l • 
have been worked out espec ia l ly in the l i g h t of the f-^ct 
t h a t ava i lab le l i t e r a t u r e on thp subject has not oxce ^  c , 9 
in i t s attempts to formulate the problem, the l i m i t t le 
mere acqu i s i t ion of weapon-grad^ f i s s i l e . 
The wr i t e r suggests tha t the f i r s t c r i t e r i o n should bo 
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the dep]oyment of the necep'='ary delivery system, whether fo 
t a c t i c a l or s t r a t e g i c nuclear '(veapons. The reason behind i,, -
choice of the delivery sysfcem as f i r s t c r i t e r i o n i s t h a t no 
nuclear weapon can be of any u t i l i t y , regard less of i t s 
tonnage or even megatomxage, i f i t <annot bo dolivorod on 
su i t ab le t a rge t s . The mere acqu is i t ion of weapon-giade f i s r i l c 
mate r ia l s - even in the contr>xt of a W'='apon-oriented progr-
amme - i s consider(^Q by the wr i te r an act of boosting the 
p r e s t i g e in ivhicb case th^ f inancia l s t r a i n s on economy 
wil l not be endurable. The wr i t e r has observed t h a t the 
nuclear s t a t e s , while proceeding in t h e i r weapon or iented 
nuclear programmes, were t ry ing to arrange for the neces£'r"y 
ciolivery veh ic les . In the case of the presen t nuclear weapon 
s t a t e s , the delivery vehic les were mostly m i s s i l e s , especi-My 
those of the long-range. This observation may account for 
for the t h e s i s t ha t the present nuclear weapon s t a t e s have j~c 
or developpd, since the incept ion of nuclpar weapons, glo rl 
i n t e r e s t s . In a mult inuclear i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i c environ-
ment, the ne<=d for such vehic les becomes e s sen t i a l , hence tba 
spread of ICBM systems which are s t ra^ 'egical ly and nation.vL 
secur i ty-wise agreed upon as the backbone of nuclear deterre'^ce. 
In the case of a p r o l i f e r a t i o n phenomenon in an area where c r i s i s 
s i t u a t i o n s or escala t ion-prone coi^flicts e x i s t , the long-r„ugc 
vehic les may be dropped tvom the delivery inventory i f non-
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regional nuclear th rea s are excluded, qu i te a rjuwtc 
I M l i t y . In rcgiunal c u n f l i c t s , t h e r e f o r e , i t i s expected t -•G 
e regional pov^^r would opt for a t q c t i c a l d e l i / e r y system 
designed to deter the regional adversary. 
The second c r i t e r i o n sugge^t-^d by the w r i t e r i r the 
quantity of plutonium s tock-p i led , and {^ r enriched uranium 
i n the advanced caseso Th-- wr i t e r beli-^ves t h a t any st-^t 
posseseinf a nuclear cppabi ] i t y and has not eot nuclear 'yoa-oons 
but accumulated any more than Kg.6.06 of plutonium (This i s 
the amount needed for the smallest poss ib l e nucl'^ar bomb.) 
fiiust be c 3 nt cup l i l t ing the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of ex'^rcisin? i t s 
nuclear 'voapor, option. I f plutonium s tock-p i l ing goes hand in 
hend with hu^e fundm^ for research and development of del ivery 
systems c-^ D b^lf^  of b^ino- do-oloy^d for nuclepr w=ir ODf^rptlons 
- t l a r g e , the impl icat ion wil l bas ica l ly be one of a decision 
to opt for a ser ious weapon-oriented nuclear weapon. The 
combination of the said two c r i t e r i a wi l l surely help us h-^ v^ 
0 c l ea re r vi^ ^w as to how the d'^cision-making i s ' s u b s t a n t i a l ly 
or iented. The only argument which the wr i t e r be l ieves can 
poss ibly be rais'^d against such c r i t e r i a i s t h a t the f i r s t 
must depend on a r a the r tnchnical approach. Is i t has been 
shown in t h - chapter dealing with the f ie ld s p e c i a l i z a t i o n 
environment, the i n t e i a i s c i p l i n a r y approach feas almost b'^ come 
widely endorsed. Accordino-ly, ther-^ i s no wonder should wp i n c o r t 
the 13SC of any of the t e c h n i c a l i t i e s of del ivery systems. 
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To apjply tkiGSG t?^o c r i t e r i a to "(/est ^^sia cm help 
unfold th-G ac tua l dotornina.rxts of the s i t u a t i o n vjhich. has 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y Tocen ojnfeiguous, e spec i a l l y as fax as 
I s r a e l i s conccrncc'. Such app l ica t ion w i l l , noroovcr, 
provide a r e a l t e s t of hov; uuch revea l ing the s t r u c t u r a l -
opera t ional formulation suggested by the v/r i ter i s . 
To iDegin vi/ith, we should guaJ'd ourselves against the 
adoption of any of the t r a d i t i o n a l standards tha.t have 
cone to be associa.tod v^ith conventiona.l v;eapon systems. 
One of the well-known t r a d i t i o n a l standards has been that 
of t e s t i n g . Theore t ica l ly , the idea of t e s t i n g i s 
associated with tiie two a b i l i t i e s ? the a b i l i t y to afford 
for another expcrixient or t e s t and the a b i l i t y to absorb 
or contain the e f fec t s , whatever they a r e . Nucleajrized, . 
the idea of t e s t i n g should be set aside when adopting 
the delivery systen c r i t e r i o n i n the context of the 
problem fornula,tion suggested by t h e w r i t e r for t he sake 
of study, at l e a s t . Ev-en i f not for t he need to r e f r a i n 
from exorcis ing those a b i l i t i e s , recent developments i n 
the f i e l d of computation, the app l i ca t ion of mathematical 
techniques of systems ana lys i s to assess the va r ious 
aspects of delivery and weapon ^i-stems, the unfolding of 
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eseontial data re lat ing to nuclear physics (37) clo a,ll 
iGsscn corisiclcraioly the need for t e s t i n g . Do-c^^itc these 
developnents, the super-powers seen to think t h a t the "best 
way to stop nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n i s to impose a ban on 
nuclear t e s t s . The wr i te r s t i l l r e c a l l s how a renowned 
Russian nuclear s c i e n t i s t argued pa.ssionatelyj during 
the d iscuss ions of the 25 th Pugwash Conference held 
at Madras i n January 1976 which the wr i t e r at tended, t h a t 
no general would accept to use a,ny weapon which has not 
been t e s t e d . The w r i t e r cannot explain t h e Russian 
s c i e n t i s t ' s judgement in terms of a Russian be l i e f that 
generals are the only people to decide v^hich v^eapon to 
use as Russian na t ional secur i ty doctr ine i s conscious 
of the contemporary technological r e f l e c t i o n s on s t r a t egy . 
Perhaps, the Russian s c i e n t i s t had i n h i s mind the concept 
of an army general i n a nuclear-weapon country which, as 
(37). Sees Hopkins, J . ; Nuclear weapons Technology, in ; 
S . I .P .R . I . J Kuclear P r o l i f e r a t i o n 
Problems-, (stockholnj Almqvist 
and Wick s e l l , 1974-), PP.113-114, 
where he admits tha.t the 
appropr ia te data r e l a t i n g t o t he 
p ressure , temperature and volume 
of f i s s i l e ma te r i a l , to give one 
exaciple, are e i t h e r well-known or 
cah be approximated vi/ith reasonable 
accuracy. Nuclear p h y s i c i s t s now 
confess there i s hardly any 'atom' 
bomb data d i f f i c u l t to ob ta in . The 
case of bhe ^xmorican Student (P, ) 
i s se l f -exp lana tory . 
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i n th-G case of the Soviet union, has got the a 'oi l i ty as 
\vell as the chance, h i s t o r i c c l or o therwise , to conduct 
l a rge - s ca l e t e s t i n g . Then an arixy general ca,n i n s i s t 
on not deploying a wee^pon tha t has not iDecn t e s t e d . This 
i s , t o be sure , not the case of a country which opts 
for a v;eapon-oriented nuclear prograr.me in the context 
of, for exai^iple, r eg iona l cons ide ra t ions . 
In the case of I s r a e l , the weapon-orientod 
nuclear lorograLme has loeen associa ted with the 
acqu i s i t i on of a^^propriate delivery systems. I s r a e l 
has even gone to the extent of se l f -nanufactur ing 
some. The Kfir case revea ls how the a c q u i s i t i o n of a 
p a r t i c u l a r nuclear capabi l i ty i s s t r a t e g i c a l l y interwoven 
with t he acquis i t ion of a na t i ona l - con t ro l l ed del ivery 
system. The Kfir fighter-honlDcr was o r i g i n a l l y 
manufactured to f i l l the gap r e s u l t i n g from the embargo 
imposed by the l a t e French p res iden t Chrr lcs do Gaulle 
on arms sa les including the Mirage-5, hut i s "now 
being modified for (the nuclear warhead) purpose". (38) 
, Kegardloss of the observat ion t h a t the Kfir i s 
(38). Beckot, B . | I s r a e l ' s Nuclear Options? Middle East 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l , Nov. 1976, pp. 12-15. 
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" jus t a^topgap for tlie scTentics not the e i g h t i e s " (39) , 
tile doctr ine fron wMcii i t s nod i f i ca t ion spr ings-off i s 
at core one of e f fec tua t ing na t ional control over a 
deliv ery sy st Q:I , 
An eas ier way to expose the delivery system i s sue 
would have Taeen to adopt a desc r ip t ive axialysis of the 
now deployed systens and those expected to he deployed 
in the near future a.nd then find out ¥>;hethcr any of these 
systens can he adapted l o c a l l y to he equipped with nuclear 
hoEihs or mis s i l e s of a nuclear warhead* I t i s c e r t a in ly 
t r u e t ha t nunerous del ivery systems now deployed by 
conventional poviers are apt to adap tab i l i ty as required 
a f t e r operat ional pa t t e rn s i n d i f fe ren t regions* This 
should not be un. erstood t o nean tha t a l l such conventional 
powers have adopted the decis ion t o i n i t i a t e a weapon-
or ien ted nuclear programme. I t i s only when t h e adap tab i l i t y 
process i s effectmated in a time of s t ock -p i l i ng more 
than kg 6,06 of weapon-grade f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s t ha t the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of developing nuclear weapons does become 
a r e a l a l t e rna t ive i n the 'grand s t r a t e g y ' of a given 
as 
u n i t . As f a r / a n a l y s i s i s concerned, the re i s no guarantee 
(39) Newsweek, April 28, 1975. This r epor t shows how the 
Kfir case s t a r t ed as an attempt to bypass the French 
embargo and, i n t h e sane t i n e confront the Mig-2l, 
I s r a e l ' s mainstay. There i s no mention in the repor t 
of modifying the a i r c r a f t for nuclear bombing. The 
Yjriter f i r s t noted the change i n "'B'<Jck'etc»s r e p o r t , ' 
published in Nov. 1976, 
_ 149 -
wiiatsoevor tha t research and clevclopnent on delivery 
sys teas would cope with research and development on the 
acqu i s i t ion of weapon-grade f i s s i l e n a t e r i a l s i n the 
context of a weapon-orientod nuclear prograiuno. This i s 
where the elenent of unce r t a in ty coun.ences on growth^ 
t h i s t i n e s t r u c t u r a l l y . Equally, t h i s i s the reason why 
the wr i t e r designed the s t r u c t u r a l - o p e r a t i o n a l fo rnu la t ion ; 
for reading of l i t e r a t u r e on the suhjcct shows c lea r ly 
the existence of s t r u c t u r a l gaps. Moreover, such gaps 
have not even been spotted in the appropr ia te franework. 
V/hile t r y ing to work out a foreseeable s t r a t e g i c 
scene out of the recen t developments in t h e del ivery systems 
of the reg iona l conf l i c t ing p a r t i e s , Aric Hashavia ^ e 
i s regarded as an author i ty on I s r a e l i s t r a t e g i c a f f a i r s ) 
stated? "¥ow there i s a t a l k about Mig-23, P-15 and 
P-l6 f ighter -bonbcrs , and the most advanced e l ec t ron ic 
arnaacnts for a i r , sea a.nd ground fo rces , i n t he 
foreseeable fu ture , the major concern w i l l bo nuclear 
c a p a b i l i t y . " (A^) The r e a l s ignif icance of Hashavia 's 
statement i s the k inship he observed, apparently i n a 
naive way, between the advancement being accomplished in 
delivery systems and the nuclear capab i l i ty as conceived 
(4 0) Hashavia, A.5 Arras and Men; The Jerusalem Post 
Magazine; Nov. 19, 1976. 
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i n tile context of a weapon-orientod prograimiG, His 
forecas t coulcl be s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ve r i f i ed as M s 
argument has nc u t i l i t y in t e r n s of mclCG^ s t ra tegy or 
na t iona l secur i ty . No nuclear iza t ion of s t ra tegy and 
na t iona l securi ty i s to cone out ncre ly due t o the 
deploynent of a,dve.nced delivery systems. Nor i s i t 
possible to br ing such nuc lea r i za t ion t h e other v^ ay 
round. I t i s the conbination of a l l such R&D ef fo r t s 
within the orbi t of a 'grand s t r a t egy ' tha t has developed 
a vjorking concCiOt of nuc lea r i za t ion , which i s e n t i t l e d to 
bring forth a s t r a t e g i c a l l y s igni f icant nuclear 
development. 
AS regards inpor ted delivery systems, the : .ance 
miss i l e may be thought of as a possible de l ivery 
system for a poss ib le I s r a e l i nuclear f o r c e . The J a n e ' s 
Miss i l e book provides the follov;ing s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ; (41) 
TTPE: Sur.face-to-surface, b a t t l e f i e l d support mis s i l e 
COM'IGUEATIOIT; Cyl indr ica l body vath pointed nose and 
cruciforn slender del ta t a i l f i n s . Self-
propel led launch veh i c l e . 
(41) . The J a n e ' s l i i s s i l o Book; (londons IJacdonald & J a n e ' s 
1975), p .119. 
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LEITGTHs 20 fee t 
DIAHETEE: 1 f t lOin 
\7EIGHT; 3 35© Vo. Approx. 
iPnOPULSION: Licjuic\ pre-jackGd. 
EANG-Es 68 . l i l c s . ?rovisiona.l 
GUIDAlIGEs SinplifiGG i n c r t i a l . 
'i/AEHEAD; NuclcaJ". Hj_gii-explosive warhead undeir clevelopaent, 
"Jarheacl containing mul t ip le m i s s i l e s under study. 
On Eelo.-l-, 1976, I s r a e l disclosed o f f i c i a l l y t h a t i t 
had in t eg ra t ed a f i r s t shipraent of Lence n i s s i l e s i n to 
then 
i t s a r t i l l e r y corps and tha t Shimon l e r e s , t h e / I s r a e l i 
Defence i l inis ter^ atT;ended a, demonstration of t h e mi s s i l e 
at an e r t i l l e r y corps base. (42) The I s r a e l i Defence 
Ministry o f f i c i a l s specif ied tha t the Lahco mi s s i l e s they 
received could carry a one-ki loton nucloer" device as far 
as -73 miles and up to a hal f ton of conventional explosives 
a.s far as 47 miles hut the United S ta tes s t i p u l a t e d the 
mis s i l e s vould not come with nuclear warheads. (42) As the 
t ex t of t he agreement has not been d i sc losed , the Yjierican 
condit ions and guarantees remain as unce r t a in as t h e ides, 
behind I s r a e l ' s i n t e r e s t i n the deployment of sur face- to -
surface m i s s i l e s tha t could bo equipped \.'ith a nuoleaJ" 
(42) Pal^istan Times, Eeb. 6, 1976. 
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wariiead. Pa r t ly , t h i s uncerta,inty can gain some s t r a t e g i c 
and na t iona l securi ty s igni f icance i f juxtaioosecl to I s r a e l ' s 
acqu is i t ion of Vi/eapon-grade f i s s i l e m a t e r i a l s . Moreover, 
an-y guarantees that t h e United Sta.tes n ight have grabbed 
from the I s r a e l i s cannot extend tc \7eapo_n-grr.de f i s s i l e 
ma te r i a l s stockpiled i n I s r a e l . According to c rsp^sirt i-: 
Newsweek magazine, the I s r a e l i s were reported to be 
involved in manufacturing a nuclear warhead to go with t h e i r 
self-P-ade Jericho sur face- to-sur face m i s s i l e . (39) I f the 
I s r a e l i s can provide a, nuclear warhead for t h e i r J e r i c h o , 
the re i s no point in quest ioning a re levant p o s i t i o n on 
Lam.ce. The Lance miss i l e i s t he same of the F-16 f i g h t e r -
bomber and s t r a t e g i c approximation can bo appl ied very 
ea s i l y . 
As for the s tock-p i l e of Y/capon-grade f i s s i l e 
ma te r i a l s i n I s r a e l , Gilinsky es t imates I s r a e l ' s 
production capacity as 10 kg per year s t a r t i n g from 
1975. (43) 
(43) ' G-ilinsky, V.5 M i l i t a r y P o t e n t i a l of C i v i l i a n 
MrgTe-ar POWgrr~lh; Bo sire77'~BT~& 
\7 i l l r i ch , M. (Gds.)^ Nuclear 
P r o l i f erationg Prospects "'i^ or 
Control; ( fn . lO) ; p . 4 2 . 
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Barnaloy- r e i t c r a t e s t h a t I s r a e l lias accunulatGd a 
s tockpi le of plutoniun fron i t s research r e a c t o r s . (44) 
This weapon-grade plutoniun i s believed to be the produce 
of the Dinona r eac to r which was constructed with French 
help in 1957 and i s e s t ina ted to hp.ve provided I s r a e l 
with a quanti ty of plutoniun enough to ncjiufacture sone 
10 explo.sives of t h e Hiroshina y i e ld . (45) AS regards 
I s r a , e l ' s na tura l resources of ursenium, 3hir: n 
y i f t ah , the nuclear phys i c i s t at the Haifa I n s t i t u t e of 
Technology, i s repor ted to have disclosed tha t I s r a e l 
produces uraniun fron phosphoric acid a t a chemical 
conplex i n the Hegev to^jn of Arad, t ha t the phosphoric 
acid~used for f e r t i l i z e r - i s extracted fron phosphates, 
t ha t between 30,000 and 60,000 tons of uraniun can be 
extracted fron the 300 n i l l i o n tons of phosphate ly ing 
under the Negev and t h a t fron throe to seven ounces 
(100,000 gran) of uraniun ca.n be taken fron ea,ch ton 
of phosphate. (45) According to Mohanned Hassanein 
Heikal , the ex~Editor-in-Chief of the r e l i a b l e Ga.irene 
dai ly /JL-AilRii/I, I s r a e l has assonbled more than s ix but 
l o s s than ten bonbs of weapon-grade f i s s i l e n a t e r i a l s 
(44). Barnaby, F.5 (fn. 8 ) , p .20. 
(45). Business Recorder, ©ct, 13, 1975. 
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and tha t those 'bonbs ' ere stored r„t an a i rhcse sono 
\vhore neoJ Si lGt . (46) ^^ s i a i l a r est m a t e had 'ooen 
provided short ly hof^jre Hoika l ' s d i sc losure vuion senior 
U«b. analys ts \iere reported to have es t i . :a ted I s r a e l ' s 
wea^^on-gradc s tockpi le of f i s s i l e a a t e r i a l s at 10 'oouhs, 
each r a th an eXj.jlosivc cap- c i ty oi t he srcie Hiroohi:.:a 
honbs. (47) 
According to Puad Jehbcr, I s r r e l produces 7.2 
kilogra-i-ies of .^^lutoniun 239 every year whoreas the 
c r i t i c a l nass for nuclear ho'iLs i s 5.79 kilogrpnnos of 
pure plutoniurj, vjhich neans t h a t Isra.el coai produce 
enough plutoniun for approxi lately H- "bo.ihs per ycar.(' 'r8) 
The synthesis of the vrork beinr :''onc with dolivcry 
systens and the p o t e n t i a l plutoniun production per year' 
i s , by our formulation, r evea l ing . I f viewed in r e l a t i o n t'o 
an assuned vjeapon-oricnt ed prograi'-Uic, the out cone \ j i l l bo 
t h a t the nuclear weapon option i s boing en l i s t ed on the 
s t r a t e g i c a l t e r n a t i v e s inventory sinply because no connence-
nent of R&D and huge funding for then ccji be na t iona l i sed 
without the pr ior assunption tha t the object has got c, 
factor of u t i l i t y . I f we i n s e r t novj tha t announconent of 
• \rn/\/'> 6 ( J.JJ ).^._ 
(''^ '^ ) 3:'atriot, Aug.1, 1975. 
(48) Jabber, p . ; I s r a e l and ITuclcar Weapons; (London; 
Chatto & ./Indus, 1971), p.'BB. 
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Bphrain Katzir tiiat "(Israel) has tho iootcn-fcial to 
produce atoniic woaporis", and Ms declared assessnent; 
"If we need tiie ., wc v>/ill do so. If necessary, Israel 
will protect i t s e l f Ijy a l l possible means", (49) tlie 
resu l t can be a verif icat ion of the assumption tha t 
I s r a e l ' s nuclear progranne i s weapon-oriontod. 
As such resu l t i s basically s t ra tegic and has got 
substantial beexing on the security doctrine, the regional 
s trategic environnent must be expected to undergo 
structural ehangos due to the fundaaental s t ra tegic 
premise that the s trategic environment i s charac ter i s t ica l ly 
one of interact ion and action-reaction chain of 
decisions. Consequently, we are led to expect the 
adversary to react to the change. Assuming that the 
adversary's perception wi l l bo of s t ructural changes, 
the react ion wi l l "be Ciiannellcd in s t ruc tura l courses. 
The easiest way to effectue.te s t ructural courses i s to 
bring forth new factors to the interaction taking place| 
for the other al ternative wil l be t o t a l uncertainty v is -a-v is 
the composition of interact ion. In t h i s case, assuming 
(49)- Times of India, Doc.5, 1974. I t isnot©-^worthy that 
I s r ae l has developed the t radi t ion of leaking i t s 
posit ion cjid then denying i t so as to generate an 
atno spher0 of anbiguity. 
— 156 -
that Israel would liavo v. f i r s t acquisition of a nuclear 
capa'bility, Egypt in i t s cax^acity rs the najor regional 
power possessing the biggest conventional force in the 
region, wi l l have to opt for what has been callcc! a 
'crash prograane of three years ' with the prijiary task of 
accomodrting the strcategic gap caused by an I s r ae l i 
nuclear capabil i ty. Though a quantitative lag is neatly 
expected, an Egyptian token nuclear force wi l l give birtA 
to the desired structural effects, in which case the 
I s rae l i strategy will have to bridge the gap so ao 'to 
create a s trategic balance. This stage of nuclear develoj-
jiient in 'West iisia wi l l be chara,cteri2ed by ins tab l i ty . 
The al ternat ives which wil l then be available for Israel 
are either to give up or to escalate. Ls c. fundaraental 
part of the ^ r^ab I s r ae l i conflict i s a conflict of value-
system, we expect Israel will not give up. The patterns 
of I s rae l i po l i t i ca l behaviour - as exai.iplified in 1948, 
1956, 1967 - are aggreaf--ivd and expansionist pa t terns . 
I t i s unlikely, then, that the I s r ae l i :.-_cic;ion - nokier 
will give up rXid accept major t e r r i t o r i a l shrinkages in 
exchange for survival. The other a l ternat ive i s to 
escalate the conflict . Escalation would have two 
directions. The f i r s t direction i s to develop the 
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nuclear f ission ca^n-bility into fusion - to apply the 
nodel of the present nuclcr.r v.'oapon s t a t e s . However, t h i s 
(direction i s conditioned by hajor uncer ta int ies such as 
the t ine needed to develop the fusion cap-ability, the 
expenditure required and the s t rategic objectives of the 
progroffitie. On the other hand, any such devolopaent, if 
i t ever occurs, wil l have to be coupled with para l l e l 
developnent in delivery systeus, quite a costly step. 
T i l l the fusion v^oapons altern^>tive i s exercised, 
I s r a e l ' s token nuclear force vjill be no ipuar^mtee for 
the satisfaction of i t s alleged security needs because 
the role such a force i s envisaged to play i s a deter a 
niassive conventional thriaqt. Viewed in terus of the 
potential nuclear ciipability, an I s r a e l i nuclear force 
vail be exhausted before a massive conventional thrust 
i s blocked, in which case the t rad i t iona l regional elcnents 
of power wi l l prevai l . 
PART I I I CH.;jTEr{ l i s S J : : .RCH. 
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P;jlT I I ; OHjgTER l i s SEARCH; 
II . I I . Is IliTRODUCTIOI-Js 
Having discussed the formulation of the prololeni, 
which i s a pre-recjuis i te of any nethodological work 
and suggested a s t r u c t u r a l - o p e r a t i o n a l forriulation summed 
up ins the acqu i s i t ion of weapon-grade f i s s i l e mater ia l 
i n the context of a weapon-oriented way t h a t can have 
some p r a c t i c a l ends, the wr i t e r w i l l prograjiii-iie and having 
suggested two v e r i f i c a t i o n c r i t e r i a ? we can proceed to 
develop ' search' in to the phenomenon. 
As the problem selec ted for study i s not self-
genera t ing , the reasons behind i t must be understood in 
t h e i r d ivers i ty and i n t e r a c t i o n . In fac t , t he se are not 
mere reasons. Rather, they are ' r e a s o n s - c c n s t i t u a n t s ' 
through which the phenomenon can be perceived in the same 
¥/ay i t can be concretly observed as one of a set of phnomena 
charac te r i s ing the present i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. 
In the process of t h i s search, no ana lys i s ce.n escape 
an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y approach due to the very fact t h a t 
an understanding of a p a r t i c u l a r s t r a t e g i c environment 
and the compulsions brought for th on na t iona l s e c i r i t y , 
cannot be va l id except i f i t i s as comprehensive .fs the 
phenomenon i t s e l f . The problem selected for study i s no 
exception. I t might even be considered an exaggerated 
case of such p r o - r e q u i s i t i s . 
To make the ' search ' step clear for th^ sake of 
study, the wr i te r w i l l divide t h i s step into t h r ee 
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departuionts relat ing to thrco perSx^cctivess a prestige 
perspective, an ccononic perspective and a national 
security perspective. The clioice of these perspectives 
has iDcon governed "by the e.ssunption that a conbination 
of two or a l l of these perspectives "was loelicvcd to be 
the reason underlying the acquisition of v/oapon-grade 
f i s s i l e materials in the context of a weapon-oriented 
pro granule by the present nuclear weapon powers; thus the 
associated assumption that in the foreseeable future the 
search wi l l nainta,in i t s va l id i ty . This idea i s enforced 
by the fact that the major factor in the present 
in ternr t ional s trategic environment i s nuclear deterrence. 
The dominance of deterrence implies the theme of balanced 
strategic moves ?;hich allow us to use the assui'-iption that 
the model i s l iable to be repeated in -^  foreseeable future. 
Yet, variations on the said theme ought, by no means, be 
excluded. No two s t r a t eg i s t s are of the same mentality, 
no two associated technologies are of the same stmdard 
and no two national security doctrines are of the same 
nc e d s. 
To s tar t with, the writer wi l l discuss the prestige 
perspective which i s claimed, by the present nuclear 
weapon countries, to be endorsed by the so-called near 
nuclear countries" There CXQ two d i f f icu l t i es associated 
with the assumption that .nuclear prol i fera t ion has got 
th 8, re la t ion with boosting the prestige of the N—country. 
The f i r s t difficulty i s of the concept manipulated. 
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p r o s t i g c , as a concept, i s d i f f i c u l t to def ine . Second, 
with power as a fr-'iae of rofciencc i t appears for ejiy 
ana,lysis tha t aji a^jproacli Toy or to p ros t i gc leads "but to 
ajiibiguity. There might be sono signs here and there of an 
un iden t i f i ab l e r e l a t i o n such as thr.t deduced frou the 
permanent monbers of the United Nations Secur i ty Council 
being nuclear weapon countr ies . , 
The econumic perspect ive v>;ill he lp , i n the ' soerch ' 
process and as i t cones .after a discussion of p r e s t i g e , 
c la r i fy our understanding of the rea.sons underlying nuclear 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n . Authentic s t a t i s t i c s show ccrta.in economic 
compulsionsj current and forthcoming, which mcjie the 
acqu i s i t ion of weapon-grade f i s s i l e Tia ter ia ls a ser ious 
a l t e r n r t i v e . I n V/est Asia, Egypt i s badly i n need of 
an amount of e l e c t r i c povi/er and plowshare programmes tha t 
ca.nnot be s a t i s f i e d except through nuc l c rx i za t i on . On the 
other hand, I s r a e l i s in no need of nuc l ea r i za t i on , to leave 
aside the r e a l i t i e s of h i s to ry and reg iona l cons ide ra t ions . 
The na t iona l securi ty perspec t ive i s much more 
enl ightening as i t i s r e l a t e d t o survival cha.llenges. 
Nuclear weapon count r ies and t h e i r s t r a t e g i s t s assume 
tha t except for therxsolvos, the secur i ty needs claimed by 
near nuclear count r ies as i n s t i g a t i n g them to go nuclea.r, 
arc no more than ' imaginary' needs. *7ith the present 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system as one of n a t i o n - s t a t e s , such an 
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assuLiption gains conceri; duo to tlio woll-known models 
of in tc rna t ionn, ! p o l i t i c a l beliaviour of n a t i o n - s t a t e s . 
Moreover, t h r e a t s to na t iona l secur i ty now and in the 
foreseeable fu ture , conventional or nuclear^ have hecouie 
so much ahsorhed with unce r t a in ty . Several puhlished 
scenarios i nd i ca t e so c lear ly a vajricty of p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
that ml^ht soon In the present tino imposslloilitlos^ 
^Another s ign i f i can t factor r e l a t i n g to the issue of 
nat ional secur i ty i s the psoudo-aythological atnosphero 
encompassing the a,dvantages of nuc lea r iz ing the veh ic les 
of a given natiorii^l secur i ty doct r ine , not to speak of 
the economic aspect of such nuclerj*ization. 
Before discussing those perspect ives and present ing 
the w r i t e r ' s suggested scrrch, i t i s necessary to note 
the following e s sen t i a l rcncirkss 
F i r s t , tht^ decis ion to acquire v^/oa-pon-grade f i s s i l e 
mate r ia l s docs not assume, by a must, the a.vauilability 
of an advanced technologica l base in the f i e l d of nuclear 
power. On the contrary, the technological advancement 
promised by opting for such a proCuctlon might in 
i t s e l f play the ro l e of an urge. 
Second, the existence of ' o p e r a t i o n a l ' ba.rrier such 
as f i nanc i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s does not moan the i n a b i l i t y 
to adopt a decis ion for the acqu i s i t ion of weapon-grade 
f i s s i l e m a t e r i a l s . I f a country i s pressed for 
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nuclearization, Gspocirlly in tlac CP.SG rcforrcc!" to in 
the w r i t e r ' s suGgcsteel fornulation no:!el (See p. ) 
whore a 'crash ' progrp/i-ic i s cnlDarkocl upon, no financial 
be 
d i f f icu l t ies ca,iy expect eel to hinder the process of 
nuclearization sinply 'because, i t wi l l loo related to the 
N— country's theory of survival. 
Third, ethice.l and related issues ou^ht to be 
excluded, at least in a study l ike ours, on the grounds 
that the intcrnationa.l systeu now existing i s one of 
nation-stntOS, that nat ion-s ta tes pursue the i r in t e res t s 
a.s defined in terns of power and that the prinary function 
of the nr t ion-s ta te i s to survive. I t i s in th i s context 
thr.t the writer has p.bstained fron expounding, for 
cxar.iple, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, though i t would 
have been quite an easy task. 
- 163 -
@ 
^^' I I* 2. THE PI^ EbTIGE VILRS'^ECTIVEt 
In Icrgc aopsurc, Shle singer cloclarGSj ''tlic drive 
for acqu i s i t ion tu rns out to loe a qu.^st for p r e s t i g e , 
nasquoracling as a quest for a i l i t a r y , s e c u r i t y . " (50) 
The j , r e s t ige of a given un i t i n the in tornat icna . l 
systen i s iiarJly dcf incat le i n l i t e r a t u r e C3p. t he 
suhject though the word i s frequently used, iiorgenthou 
in h i s hp^sic cont r ibu t ion P o l i t i c s iUnong i'^ _c'j_^ iojas 
(fn, 26) expoun:.s the loolicy of _L-'rGstige r a t h e r than 
p r e s t i g e i t s e l f (sec JJ.J. 74-100) . In h i s very fcv\; 
remarks on p r e s t i ge e.s a concept, he conceived i t 
"in c o n t r a a t ' t o the a&intenance, and acqu i s i t i on 
of power", as "hut loarely an end in i t s e l f " , (p .74) . 
Another attempt i s tha t of Arnold Brecht who spoke 
of p r e s t i g e as one of the dif ferent f ac t s fron 
which power naj a.ccrue . See: Brcchts.^. 5 P o l i t i c a l 
Theory; The Poundations of Twentieth Cen tu ry 'Tb l i t i c a l 
Thought";~""(B onToay j The Tin c"s 0 f I ndia„ Pr c s s, S e co nd 
Indian Eepr in t , 1970), p .54 . B rech t ' s use i s vague 
iDccause he equated p r e s t i ge with au thor i ty when he 
nentioncd in one i t e n "pres t ige or au tho r i t y " , l e g a l 
or o therwise" . The wr i t e r suggests a funct ional 
de f in i t i on as " r, psycho-h i s to r ica l dimension of 
ina.ge of power and tha„t i t i s derived from past 
success . I n fac t , i t i s a dinension hetween ' rea . l ' 
power, with a. well-known past and public opinion. 
(50) Schlcsingei , J.^ ins Kortesz, S. (ed^^ ( fn .4 ) , 
p . 1 2 . 
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Not even rJi orCdnrjL'y ^jrestigc, "but •'ati-iosphoric". (51) 
But the quest for prosti{;,c i s not solf--c2:^jlanatcry 
especia l ly in tlio l i g h t of -bhc difforences ccluittecl 
"between jjowcr cjiC. j.jresti£;o. Moreover, i t would lic.ve "been 
en,'eier to cndorco t h i s p r e s t i g e ijorspeotive had the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l systeu "been governed l)y x'^rostige po l i cy . 
Kissinger spck^ of "ta,ngi"blcs of p o l i b i c p l and 
psychological inf luence" as the chief ii-vetus for the 
European nuclear prograr^xios. (52) I t can loo understood 
tha t such tcanei"lDlcs are t h e equivalent of Schles inger ' s 
p re s t ige 5 an understanding that stei-is fron the adject ive 
' p sycho log ica l ' . Dr. Kiss inger had, ofccursc, i n the "back 
of h i s nind those Luro_ j^can a t t e a p t s , especia l ly those of 
Prance, to challenge the ;j:ierican 'psychologica l ' inf luence 
i n Europe through c la iu ing the su"bstantial responsi"bi l i ty 
for defeneing the Vest Europe against any possi"ble nuclear 
(51) I b i d . , ^..13. 
(52) Kiss inger , H. ; Ni/JG ' s ITuclear Dileaua; in 
i^L_shir_e_,_g.fc .tillon, R "(e c" s. ); 
I-Trtional Secm"ity'"; "("low York; 
Freder ick jx. Praoger, 1963), 
p.297. 
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at tack "by tho Soviot-Union. @ Against t h i s background, 
Dr. Kissinger nust have 'believed in the au then t i c i t y of 
h i s doctr ine as the p r e s t i ge of B r i t a i n was sharply 
shrinking in a t i n e of nuclear growth. In f a c t , i t was 
Schlesinger who found i t ' d i f f i c u l t ' t o detect any close 
associa t ion between nuclear force and p o l i t i c a l success. (53) 
On p a r a l l e l l i n e s , George Ba l l used the t e r n 
"nuclear s t a t u s " (5 3) which i s , for h in , d i f f e ren t fron 
@ An enlightening, work on the a t t i t u d e s of Prance 
towards the United S ta tes i s ; bervan Schreihor , 
Jean Jrequesj The ijaerican Challenge? (London; l e l i c a n 
Books, 1969), though the hock was con t rovers i a l 
when i t f i r s t approach in Prance in 1967. 'Ihe 
author confessod the French saw "a fore ign 
challenges (to then Europe - the USA) broalcing 
down the p o l i t i c a l and psychological frauovjork 
of our (iiluropean) Soc i e t i e s " , (p.13) The author 
has get i n uind a leading reo le for Pra.nce in 
ISurope. 
(53) B a l l . , G. 5 ( f n . 3 ) , p . 21 7. 
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na t iona l nuclear syston on secur i ty grounJ.s. Tlio 
exrxiplo citocl lay Ball was t ha t of B r i t a i n v l^ien lie 
a skec l s" . . . . thoro i s no ser ious arguiucnt 103." a 
B r i t i s h na t iona l nuclear systen on secur i ty /^rounds, 
"but i s i t not s t i l l neeuef. for nuclear s t a t u s ? " 
DeSjpite the fact t ha t the growth of B r i t i s h na t iona l 
nuclear forces coincided with the shrinkage of 
B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e , v^est Gcruany and JajPan would represent 
d i f ferent as ^vell as d i f f i c u l t cases though B r i t a i n , 
Geruany and Japan had enbarked on World '.far I I as "big 
powers, ./est Gcmany and Japan have no loss claim for 
p re s t i ge than B r i t a i n , Liorcovcr, the r a t e of ccononic 
ancl technological dovclopncnt of ",/est &eruany and Japan 
far exceeds that of B r i t a i n , (54) To e labora te the 
discussion, y^ e crn. r e fe r to Japan ' s r ecen t pos i t i on of 
signing exid r a t i f y i n g the l lon-prc l i fe ra t ion Treaty , 
Japan ' s r a t i f i c - t i o n , which ended .an awesoue s ix year 
(54-) Por norc discussion on the case of Japan, sees 
Kahn, H. °, The Lnerging Japanese Supor-Stat cg 
JYQ^J er Sey S Engl ewo 0 d <-!li f f s, 'l"'9 70) and 
Chapter X of Kahn, H.a.Bruce-Briggs,B .5 
T_hings ^o_ _Q'^'-":Vo.° Thinking -j'ojat jujae 
Sev^nties 'md_ ^^lighties"' "\Woy York5 
The IJacnillan Gonpany, 1972). 
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nationcO.! dobp.to, rGijrosonts a count or-argument for the 
p re s t i ge perspec t ive , and any exaciination of the motive 
"behind Japan ' s move would ce r t a in ly challenge t h i s 
prcstit^e pe r spec t ive . Most proba-bly, the Japanese 
argument must have been one l i k e tha t presented by 
Tokuyama, the Managing Direc tor of Nomura Research 
I n s t i t u t e , Japan, who stpted tha t "the fos te r ing of 
interdependent r e l a t i o n s h i p s through economdc exchanges 
may appear to be a long and highly i n d i r e c t rou te 
toward i n t e r n a t i o n a l secur i ty and tha t "the longest way 
round i s the shor tes t way home." (55) Given the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Japanese economy as i d e n t i f i e d by 
KcJcin (56) , i t can be argued t h a t the Japanese decis ion-
maker might have enjoyed a p r e s t i g e wiiich i s not f e l t 
by the i ioericans, economic but ne i the r nuclear nor 
m i l i t a r y , -t^lthough Dr. Tokuyaa^a's theory of t h e 
interdepcncence of r e l a t i o n s through economic exchanges 
(55) Tokuyaxia, Dr. J . | Ref lec t ions on a Fiasco, Newsweek, 
May, 19, 1975. 
(56) Kahn , H.K., & Bruce-Brigt,s, B. ? Thin_g_s ...^_o_.p_ono: 
Thinking about the Seventies and 
Eighties; (Now York; The McMillan 
Company, 1973), P.233. 
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as subs t i t u t e for securing vite,l rou tes to Japan imposes 
cohesion on Japan ' s pos i t ion v i s - a - v i s the Non-prol i fera t ion 
Treaty, v7o can s t i l l seo a poss i lo i l i ty of cliango because 
tile pursuance of i n t e r e s t s i s one of power, not of 
agrceuents and a t r ea ty which, i s d i s c r i a ina to ry and 
p ro jec t s only a current cnvironriant. Therefore, the 
question t h a t Bal l r a i s e s for B r i t a i n of t h e quest 
for a nuclear s t a t u s , ciight be ra i sed by t h i s study 
for Japan. In t h i s respec t , the ' o t h e r ' theory nust bo 
cxajained as we l l , 
After the 'Zixodus' of . American t roops from 
Vietnam, the Japanese debate on natione.l secur i ty got 
heated and Hider i i Kase declared t h a t the Japanese 
need to consider t h e i r op t ions , including the nuclear 
one. (57) The aJ-guments presented by Ivase wore purely 
s t r a t e g i c and, hence, the re was no place for th t , Had 
the Kasc theory dominated the Tokuyama, J a p a n ' s 
decision would be a quest for p r e s t i ge n. cquer-^ding 
as a quest for mi l i t a ry secur i ty , as t h e f i n a l anj^lysis 
of Schlesinger i s . Cer ta inly , i t would have projected 
r ea l needs, a t l e a s t in the l i g h t of t he fact tha t 
Japan hardly possesses raw m a t e r i a l s . 
(57) Japans Paradise Lost? IJcwsweeli, June 23, 1975. 
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A clifferent tliougiit on the y res t igo pcrsjJectivc i s 
proviuGcl Toy Bexnaloy who poin-us at the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
botwoen pemanont noLiloorship in the United Nations Security 
Council and niCEiLership in the so-cal led nuclccj" clulo. (58) 
I t ws,s Barnaby \/ho observed that " a l l the porLiancnt noaloers 
of the Securi ty Council are nuclccj vjeapon pov^ers'S 
tha t t h i s point should not be l o s t , "nor i s the point tha t 
nenbersliip i n the nuclear Glub/t ends to be the qua l i f i ca t ion 
for an i n v i t a t i o n to Summit and other major diplomatic 
conf eronceso" (58) But such obscrvo.tion, despi te the 
fact t ha t i t has not been p rac t i s ed , i s b a s i c a l l y 
vulnerable to the assessment of the re la , t ion bot\jeen the 
acqu i s i t i on of vvoapon-<;;radc f i s s i l e na,tGrials i n the 
context of a. weapon-oriented programme and having an 
access to a permanent seat in the Security Council and 
sa.tisfying the requirements of na t iona l s ecu r i ty for a 
given u n i t of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system within the 
o rb i t of i ts ' s t rand s t r a t e g y ' , ^ipplying the pov/cr api-roach 
no r e l a t i o n con be t raced between the f i r s t tv/o elements, 
on one s ide , and the t h i r d , on the o ther s i de . Taiwan 
(58) Barnaby, P . | ( fn .8 ) , pp .7 -8 . 
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was r ncnbcr of the Securi ty Council "but coulC. not 
prevent i t s oustin-'^,. @ The United Sta tes of Aaerics, 
has had to face sono trouloles due to some of i t s stands 
i n the Securi ty Council, The nuclear force and perraanent 
scat i n the Security Council for B r i t a i n did not inpede 
the process of /giving up the "East of the Suez" or economic 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n . 
Though the r e l a t i o n betvveen the acqu i s i t i on of weapon-
grade f i s s i l e mater ia l s and p r e s t i g e , as has been shovm 
i n the above mentioned discussion, i s highly t r a c e a b l e , 
J o l l i n i k Vi/ent to the extreme of admitt ing t h a t even 
c i v i l i a n nuclear power " i s s t i l l a matter of p r e s t i g e i n 
There has been a steady flow of r e p o r t s on Taiwan 
t ry ing to acquire weapon-grade f i s s i l e m.a,terials 
despi te i t s declrred pos i t ion i n signing the KPT 
on the f i r s t day i t was offered rjid a,n easy-going 
r a t i f i c c t i o n i n J a n . , 1971. For a discussion of the 
Taiwan case sees Remachfmdran, Dr. K.^ Taiwan Going 
Nuclear?! j.-^a / I\TOWS Review on Science & Teclinology^ 
Oct. 1976, y^j, 5''r4-547. The reported change "in 
Taiwan's pol icy, to the w r i t e r , cannot be i n s t i g p t e d 
by the l o s s of a. Security Council seat but , r a t h e r , 
by power considerat ions* 
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some cases" . (59) /igain, t h i s view would hcYc "been t rue 
liacl iiiternationE^l r e l e t i o n s 1)8011 governed by p res t ige 
pol ic ies? "but i t i s no t . 
In West Asia, there i s adni t tedly an element of 
p res t ige i n the s i t ua t i on though i t can loe r e l a t e d to 
h i s tory and geography. Professor Ra"bi'of Cairo Universi ty 
has h in ted a,t "the ro lo played i n I s r a e l i prOjjaganda hy 
the Zionis t propaganda logic t h a t I s r a e l i s an extension 
of \ /cstern c i v i l i s a t i o n , (60) He also s t ressed tha t 
I s r a e l s e l l s i t s e l f to the vjorld under the guise of a 
highly developed technologica l s t a t e (61) I t can, 
the re fore , bo assuned tha t nuc lea r i sa t ion nig^t be 
believed by the I s r a e l i s who contr ibute to the plo,nning 
and implcncntai:;ionzf p o l i t i c a l propaganda to be 
on 
providing for a p o t e n t i a l b o o s t / t h i s image of I s r a e l . 
This suggestion i s based on the assumption tha t 
nuc lea r i sa t ion i s sO commonly believed to be a gauge to 
advancement af ter contemporary models. On the other hand, 
(59) Wilbrich, M. ( e d . ) | ( f n .9 ) , p .13 . 
(60) R a b i ' , Dr. H. ; The Philosophy of I s r a e l i Propaganda; 
(Be i ru t ' P.L.O. Research Centre, 
Pa les t ine Monograph Scr ies No,72, 
t970) pp. 176-178, 
(61) I b i d . , p , l 8 1 
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one ro;^:ort Toy tiic in f lucnt ie . l Cciro dai ly , Al-;Jirar-i, 
insinur. tos at the prcsti{],e ^.orspectiVG iup l i cd i n 
Ecyi-'t's jjcssiiole exercise of "builvVixig nuclear .^ower 
s t a t i o n for the generat ion of e l e c t r i c i t y , exiC. sayss" 
Egypt, as a pioneer of technologicr.l clevelopnciifc in tlie 
JiXcJo 1/orld rncl aiiong th., rlevelOj_ving coun t r i es , hps got 
highly aclvancocl engineering ezpe r t i s e caj.able of 
es tah l i sh ing sua l l r eac to r i n d u s t r i e s to sa t i s fy the needs 
of the Arr>h 8-nd developing countr ies for e l e c t r i c energy 
and desalia-'.tcd water" , (62) "^- I t i s , however, notev^/orthy 
th?.t such a l lus ions to p re s t ige are hardly ava i lab le in 
l i t e r a t u r e on the subject dealing v/ith '-/"est As ia . Their 
s l i gh t frequency suggests , consequently, t h e i r quan t i t a t ive 
significEvnce in r e l ' t i o n to the o r i e n t a t i o n of any 
prograi-'aiie pursued for t h e a.cquisit ion of weapon-grade 
( 6 2 ) 0 \<',\()/\<'/V) 6 ( :yA". i ) 
** Prance v^as rever ted to hr.vc sug^^ested the 
Gstahlish.iient'in Egypt of reac tor industry of 
120 .,j.egG>watt each as Stance believed such 
r e a c t o r s are cost becoming for such coun t r i e s . 
t ^ . -
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fis^s-le m a t e r i a l s . 
I I . I I I . ..[.eONOMlO tEIlb^iSCTlVEt® 
PcrhcjPs, th.G priu'^.ry ocoTaonic incontiiYO for a countrjr 
to opt f^r a sorious progra':j-ie to produce wur-pon-gr.-dc 
f i s s i l e n c t e r i a l s i s tho not ion t h a t / . l i l i t ary exponclituro 
on oonventional weapons w i l l bo sharply rcclucccl. (63) 
This not ion i g challenged by PorshergG who s ta ted t h a t 
"even thourh the nuclear weapons stocks of t he United 
S ta t e s and the Soviet Union already incorporate a l a rge 
measure of ' o v e r k i l l ' the technolOj^ical a rns race goes 
on. There i s no evidonee of any reduc t i cn of the enorrous 
n i l i t a r y research and developracnt e f f o r t s in these two 
coun t r i e s . " ( 6/r) al though For she rgc did not nention ' a l l ' 
expenditure on conventional weapons? n i l i t a r y H a; D 
(Research & Levolopucnt) r e f l e c t s the e n t i r e scene. 
I «f I f .^ 1 .HI II JtJTli • » •" •'\ ' 
© The energy issue i s oxoludod fron the following 
discussion a.s i t has already boon t ack led . See. 
s p e c i f i c a l l y , l a r t 1, Chapter I I I . 
(63) Baxnaby, P. 5 ( f n . 8 ) , p»8. 
(6^) lo r sbcrgo , R. j n i l i x a r y P.csearch & Dovolopncnt 
(Stcckholns xHnqvist "S \ / i k so l l , 
1373), p . 7* 
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Moreover, there has not been, t i l l tlie time of writijog 
t h i s chapter , any i nd i ca t i on t h a t the hig^^or nuclear 
arsenal a country possesses , the l e s s conventiona.1 forces 
i t keeps. For those v\/ho c l a i n t h a t the intro-Auction of 
nuclear weaxjons to the American erued forces hy the end 
of V/orld V/ar I I reduced the United S ta tes conventional 
m i l i t a ry ex^yonditure, Porshor£,e says t ha t "almost a l l 
of the decline irx the f i r s t t?aree post-v^ar I I year vms 
accounted for by a, decrease i n nuclear weapon development 
expenditure, from ^100 mi l l i on" . (65) Yet, we should 
consider the fact t h a t the United S ta tes of jimerica, has , 
since tha t t i r ie , had some of i t s v i t a l i n t e r e s t s in far 
regions and that U.S. na t iona l secur i ty requirements are 
not a "qual i ty" i'-'entica.l to t h a t of a non-superpower. 
I t can, the re fore , be assumed tha t if , for a given 
na t iona l power, a token nuclear force can effect a 
regional de te r ren t , decline i n m i l i t a r y expenditure 
on conventional v/eapons could be expected. The case of a 
65. I b i d . , p.37. 
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sUxJer-power i s necesso^rily d i f ferent clue to txro major 
deternirxants. F i r s t , a present super-pov^er i s a nuclear 
weapon power. Second, i t has e i ther got or developed 
global i n t e r e s t s . In t h i s context cones the i n s i s t e n c e 
on maintaining a c red ib le conventional force to dotor -ny 
poss ib le at tack on any flank or any threa.t to the 
pursuance of nation.al i n t e r e s t s . Hence the o f f i c i a l 
iim cr ic a n d e clar a t io n t hat i 
" . . . . a s the l a s t two decades have demonstrated, 
r e l i ance on a nuclear capab i l i ty alone iB by no 
means suff ic ient to i n h i b i t or deter 'ag{, ress ion ' . 
ui suff ic ient nuclear capabi l i ty must be coupled 
vjith a suff ic ient conventional ca^pability in both (iuaerican) forces and i n those of (^u-ierica's) 
a l l i e s . This conventional capabi l i ty must be 
adequa„te to iieet aggression in the soph i s t i ca ted 
environixient... . . " (66) 
A different aspect of the economic perspec t ive 
i s the economics of nuclear explos ives . 
The force formation policy as such i n d i c a t e s the 
presence of two d i f ferent c r i s i s situations*, one tha t 
can be handled in a pre-nuclear esca la t ion envrioniaent, 
the other being, l o g i c a l l y , conducted under t he th rea t 
of a possible nuclear exchange. In the case of a medium-
sized pov;er, the wr i te r be l i eves such d i s t i n c t i o n i s not 
l i a b l e to exis t as there ex is t no such global i n t e r e s t s . 
(66) Government of US..^ Statement on the Five-Tear (1973)-1976) 
Defence Prograi-n-e Delivered by jielvin La.ird, the then 
US Secretary of Defence on March, 9, 1971; IDS' 
S t ra t eg ic Digest, May 1971, p . 3 . 
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iVioreover, txie ^JsycholO;^ of a nediurxi-sizec'. jpovi/er, i n i t s 
nc tu ra l cajjacity as aspirint^ to acquire the saue degree 
of na t iona l security ejijoyecl "by a loig^er power, would 
soon be insti^.ated to esca la te the c r i s i s s i t ua t i on in to 
a nuclear environ..!ent. , / i th the s t r a t e g i c r dv ntag^s of 
a, nuclear force, whatever token, "before "uhe c'ccision-rxiakor 
of a oediuu-sisec' power, the perception of such force w i l l , 
accordingly, seer, econonic in t he sense th? t i t has got 
"che uncontrovcrs ia l aJoility to de te r . This i s one of the 
su 'bs tant i r l reasons w'hy the not ion t h r t a nuclear force 
could be a r e a l s u b s t i t u t e for a consiC ci rb le por t ion 
of t he conventional force i s connon in l i t e r a t u r e emanating 
fr on tho se .^ ow er s. 
In the case of I s r a e l , i t i s r e l a t i v e l y ensy to t r ace 
a trend equating the acqu i s i t i on oi weaj...on-c_,rade f i s s i l e 
mate r ia l s in the context of a weapon-oriented prograi-inie 
with a considerable decrease in i J i l i t a ry expenditure on 
conventional wea^.-ons. Ho she Dayan s ta ted ex^jl ici t ly tha t 
i n t h i s respec t " I s rae l has no choice" but -jo develop 
nuclear wea^^ons and exLjlamed t h a t "with ( I s r a e l ' s ) 
manpower, the ( i s i a e l i s ) cannot phys ica l ly , f i nanc ia l ly 
or economically go on acquiring more and noro tanks and 
more and UIOTQ p lanes . Before long you wi l l have a l l of us 
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faaintainiiit^ and o i l i n ^ the to j iks" . (67) In slicrp c o n t r a s t , 
no s i m i l a r n o t i o n lias been t r a c e d i n an Egy^ptirji p o s i t i o n 
on t h e s u b j e c t , no t even i r a i r l i c i t l y . I t vwuld hpve been 
q u i t e l0i i , ical t o reckon . s i m i l a r L£,yjptian s t i - t e ^ i c 
a rgumenta t ion simjjly because Egyjjt i s t h e l a r g e s t spender 
on conven t iona l weapon systems among t h e group of c o u n t r i e s 
of more or l e s s "Egypt 's n a t i o n a l power. I n 1976/1977, 
Bgypt r e c o r d e d a m i l i t a r y expend i tu re of US ^'r,859m. though 
i t s GNP was e s t ima ted for 1975 to be US ^ m 7 b n on ly . (68) 
Turkey, which i s of clmost t h e srxie n r t i o n . a l power of 
Sgypt , spent i n t h e same y e r r US ^2-, 79-1-m though i t s GMl' 
was e s t i m r t e d for 1975 t o be US ^53 .1bn . (69) A second 
exnmple i s Pol; nd which spent US ^2 ,252n a : , r i n s t an 
e s t ima ted GNS of US ^65 .6bn . (70) These two exrxiples 
would have prov ided Egypt Y^ith the u r g e t o c o n s i d e r t h e 
o p t i o n of manufac tur ing n u c l e a r weapons so a s to su rpas s 
(67) Tim^, ^ v r i l 12, 1976. 
(68) 1 . 1 . S.S.I i i i l i t a r y Survey | 76/77, p . 32. 
(69) I b i d . , p .26 
(70) I Did. , p . l"3. 
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tha t extraordinary f inanc ia l burden ^^liicli no s imilar 
Xjovi/er suffers froci. 
In t h i s stuuy where power i s the frame of re fe rence , 
Mo she -Uayan's announcement, when analysed, i n d i c a t e s a 
substancia l s t ra te t , ic defect . For the nucleoJ weapons 
Dayan r e f e r r ed to :^re but t a c t i c a l weapons. I t has become 
almost a s t r a t e g i c a^ i^om that t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons 
cxe no s u b s t i t u t e for a credible conventioncl force. 
With the acquis i t ion of nuclear weapons the tas l ts of t he 
conventional force become aggravated and more investment 
on R&D for conventional weapons appears to bo a ser ious 
a , l te rna t ive . Economically, t a c t i c a l nucleoj:' vjcapons for 
I s r a e l w i l l by no means effect a consi der-'ble reduction 
of current mi l i t a ry ex^jenditures. I f we assume the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a conventional weapon a t tack against I s r a e l 
in t he case of which the l a t t e r may opt for a nuclccj' 
response, no sustainmcnt of the conventional counterforce 
can be s t r a t e g i c a l l y foreseen due to the well-known 
i n a b i l i t y of I s r a e l to deploy maximum forc&e for a 
r e l a t i v e l y long mi l i t a ry operation.® The acyu i s i t i on of a 
© A lajrgc number of wr i t i ngs on the subject indicr-tes 
consensus on I s r , . e l ' s i n a b i l i t y to launch any mca.ningful 
mi l i t a ry exercise '-fter th ree \i;eeks of conventional 
fiii^ht on two f ron t s , A vivid i l l u s t r a t i o n i s provided 
by a repor t in V "^:;Sh-in_ijt,on.Jie;^ -v_s_J;'_tar, Oct. 19, 1973, and 
a s imi lar repor t published by Le_jlonde, Oct. 18, 1973. 
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token nuclcr r force Toy I s r a e l should not, t l ioreforc, be 
expected to 'brinG a"bout consi derable reduct ion of 
n i l i t c j y expcndiiiurG on conventional fo rces . Nuclear 
explosives , i t i s suggested, can be used i n p ro jec t s with, 
economic ob jec t ives , in vyliat has corx to be knovm as 
plowshrre pro^rr iues.<y These prOoraQi-xOs are now subject 
to mves t ie ia t iou and the United St^^tes i s s"'id to have 
Sir-ent some ^115 n i l l i o n on i t s progratiiae. (71 ) Considerable 
c r i t i c i s n has been voiced on the grounds t h r t "the 
g rea te s t potenti?,l i s in resource ex t rac t ion ,and gas 
stora^,c and t h a t , the re fore , these app l i ca t i ons should 
rece ive a g rea te r f r r c t i on of t h e research and development 
e f f o r t s " . (7l) The Soviet Union i s reported to have 
reached a p r a c t i c a l stage i n such programmes. Accordingly, 
we exo e n t i t l e d to unc'erstand t h a t Plowshare has been 
found economic. (There i s , i n f a c t , no point i n speaking 
of any assoc ia t ion between plowshare progrpj-iines and 
p r e s t i g e , nuclear s t a tus and the l i k e as such programmes 
do not have bearing on s t r a t e g i c pos tu res . L Soviet 
Science Jou rna l i s t disclosed on January 20, 1976 tha t the 
Soviet Union xolanncd to explode 250 nuclear explosives 
(71) -Brooks, D. 6; Myers,H. , Plowsho^ro Evo,lu_ation; in 
Boskey, B.cl v / i l l r ich , 21. (eds ) ; ( fn .1v) ,p . 87. 
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to "blast a, canal tliroush so l id rock, ^^ccordiiis to tiio 
r epo r t by Radio Lioscov>/, tiic b l a s t ¥/ould cut const ruct ion 
cos ts by tvjo t h i r d s . The canal i s needed to save the 
Caapain Sea which has been slowly drying up bocauso i t s 
aa in supj.jlier r i v e r , the .Volgc, h-s been frainod of water 
for i r r i g e t i o n , (72) The Soviets had e r r l i o r u t i l i z e d 
nuclear explosives to boost unforground r e s e r v o i r s for 
s to r ing gas. Those inc iden t s , and, noro i npo r t an t , the 
cut t ing of construct ion cos t s by tvjo t h i r d s , enforce 
the idea t h a t , econony-wise, r lowshare pro^rai.ir..cs can be 
va luable . 
A counter-argument i s provided by Brooks and Ilycrs 
vvlxi be l ieve tha t estii'xiates of the econonic u t i l i t y of 
nuclear technology depend upon "ca lcu la t ions drawn fron 
usual ly aj.ibiguous analyses" . (-r8) They even declare i t i s 
not poss ib le to reach "de f in i t i ve conclusions concjrning 
econonic u t i l i t y " of nuclear technology. (73) AlthougLi t h e 
j'lraerican x-'lowshare prO(_,rai'Jae was 'che one in t h e i r a ind 
when wr i t i ng such assessaent , the Soviet ei^aujle r e fu te s 
the Brooks-Myers pos tu l a t e , esx-jecially i n t he l i g h t of 
the fact t h r t the Soviets borro\,'ed t h e i r substaai t ial 
(72) P a t r i o t , Januajry 21, 1975. 
(73) Brooks, D & Myers, H. 5 ( f n . 7 l ) , p . 8 8 . 
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Plowshare i^rofTpnae designs from the Anericojis. 
Generr-lly, nuclear explosives are exjected to be 
used i n the recovery of n a t u r a l r esources , to c rea te 
c a v i t i e s for the s tor rge of na tu ra l gas , to dig canals 
end shape harboijxs, chcnge the course of r i v e r s and 
construct dai'-is and to provide the radiocCtive dozes 
needed for s c i e n t i f i c exporinent s. If, accoiding to 
Soviet d i sc losure , the use of nuclear explosives for the 
impleraentation of such p ro j ec t s can effect a r t d u c t i o n 
of two t h i r d s of t o t p l cost , the urge to produce weapon-
grade f i s s i l e mate r ia l s w i l l be p rac t i cao ly augmented. 
The Indian no del i s unique i n t h i s f i e l d as the 
Indian nuclear progrpriie i s , the orPLy one Avhich i s not 
weapon-oriented, ^^ i hi!;.torical--OverviGW would. 
Govornmcnt 
rG l t e r c to t h i s and the Ind ian /" _ ca t egor i ca l ly refuted 
a l l ega t i ons and apprehensions tha t India had bent on 
developing nuclear weapons. (T-r) Indian not ions 
r e i t e r a t i n g the May 18, 1974 nuclear explosion was a 
mere piece of c i v i l engineering are abuni.-.ant and, equally, 
the prograi'^iiie and economic f a c t o r s . The Bconouic i i f fa i r s 
Secretary, Lr. M.G. Keul t o l d the Indian consortium meeting 
i n P a r i s on June 23) 1974 tha t India, 's nuc lear t e s t helped 
(74) The Times (London), Hay 27, 1974. 
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I n d i a ' s econony, (75) The t i ieore t i sga l b a s i s fo r t h e 
exp los ion was i n t o t a l c o n s i s t e n c y wi th t h e Ind ian s t ance 
t h a t has always been s p e l t out by o f f i c i a l s . On May 25,1974, 
Mrs . Gan dhi d e c 1 a r e d i 
" I n d i a ' s n u c l e a r knov-i-hov! ^NC.S not developed suddenly 
or i n s e c r e t ana t h e funds a l l o t e d to i t and t h e work done* 
by i t , t o ga in n u c l e a r know-how for p e a c e f u l u s e s i n 
a g r i c u l t u r e , medicine and above a l l i n pov/or g e n e r a t i o n s 
a re of p u b l i c knowlctige. " Q (76) 
I t i s noteworthy t h a t from t h e Third "Torld, a quick 
endorscLient of t h e peace fu l c h a r a c t e r of t h e I n d i a n n u c l e a r 
exp los ion , was f l o a t e d soon a f t e r t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of t h e 
succes s fu l t e s t of May 18, 1974. P r e s i d e n t Leopold Songhor 
'4. (75) Times of I n d i a , June 26, 197^ 
(76) Dho Daily S t a r ( B e i r u t ) , I/lay 26, 1974. 
@ .'xS for p u b l i c knowledge, t h e sources c l o s e to t h e 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Lgoncy for Atonic Lnergy a t Vienna 
confe r red on Hay 26, 1974 t h a t " Ind ia has alv;ays 
been a b s o l u t e l y c o r r e c t w i th Atiency i n s p e c t o r s 
v i s i t i n g the p a r t s of i t s n u c l e a r o p e r a t i o n s t h a t 
a r e sub jec t to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s p e c t i o n . Sees Th 
Hindu (Madras), May 27, 197''r and The MojlhorlgncT" 
May 27, 1974.. 
e 
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of Senegal ex^jrosfcecl in Hev-; Delhi on Aiay 26, 1974 h i s 
s a t i s f a c t i o n at I n d i a ' s decision to use nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes i n the service of the people of 
India and humanity as a whole. (77) Pres iden t Tito of 
Yugoslavia described tlie explosion as "a sirsnificant 
contr ihut ion" to the e f fo r t s of peace-loving countr ies 
for the applic-^tion anc". use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes. (78) 
These impl ica t ions of the Indian no del can \v€lX 
j u s t i fy and explain the dec la ra t ion of t h e Indirji p r ine 
min i s t e r tha t Ind ia i s v^/illing to shpre know-how on 
nuclear energy.(79) The Indian s t -nee \';a,s, t he re fo re , 
self-explanatory and cons is tent when the then Foreign 
Secretary, Kewal Singh, held out the j . j o s s ib i l i t i e s of 
co-operat ion hctween Ind ia and pal t is tan i n the peaceful 
explo i ta t ion of nuclear energy. (80) -.xgain, India provided 
another exanple vv'hcn I,'Ir. Surendra l a l Singh, the Indian 
Minister of Sta te for Foreign ^-.ffairs flew to Buenos -i-ires 
'^''^ ^ Z£i?.H££ (Chandigarh), i.ay 27, 1974. 
^^Q) Indian Express, llay 25, 1974. 
('''5) Indian Express,. May 26, 1974. 
(80) The Hindu (Mr-^ras), May 25, 1974. 
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short ly af te r tlic Indian t e s t to sign a t r e a t y v/ith 
ixrgentina for tlae peaceful u t i l i z a t i o n of a/bonic energy. (81 ) 
As far as \fest Asia i s concerned, Egypt does face acute 
e l e c t r i c energy requi reaents and the re i s a growing need 
forPlowoharo prograiTacs. According to Eng. '^:Jined Sultan, 
the Deputy premier for povv^ er aiid ProJ.uctionj Egypt 's 
e l e c t r i c energy requirenents have incrcaused frora 3.2 in 
1962 to 9.7 m i l l i a r d k i lowat tes i n 1975. 3y t h e a.'.vent 
of the year 2O00, i t i s estimated tha t Egypt ' s requirements 
v>;ill go up to some 84 mi l l i a rd k i l o w a t t / hour. (82) 
These requirements can, Toy no means be sa. t isfiod by 
conventional energy production u n i t s such a^ s thermal power 
s t a t i ons which are no?i/ the riajor e l e c t r i c power suppl ier 
though i t i s fuel led by o i l whose p r i ce i s skyrocketing 
frequent ly. Those energy compulsions w i l l malce the 
nuclear opt ion an 'energy saviour ' for Egypt. The 
Egyptian Deputy Pre;iier i s also repor ted to have declared 
that a l l p o t e n t i a l e l e c t r i c power generated from the 
Aswan High Dam has already been exhausted. 
The Plowshare programm.es, for Egypt, • 
cha , rac te r i s t i ca l ly interwinod with i t s en;-;rgy coripulsions. 
(Si) P a t r i o t , may 26, 1974. 
(82) 
• ) r ; v v v A 6 ( "j {•• ! ) :;...._,>.^-::^i I 
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In view of tiie energy shortage^ even v^itli f u l l High 
Al-Qatara Depression Project lias loecoine a v i t a l need, as 
the immense e l e c t r i c power due to be generated from the 
project \^i l l depend on a hydraulic un i t v^hich, i n t u rn , 
w i l l save an amount of o i l vjorth some £E400 m.illion. The 
digging of a canal for the Depression i s now subjected 
to ser ious contejiiplation and has even he come a matter of 
public discussion. To dig the canal, Sgypt has thought 
of the poss ib le use of nuclear explosives . I t i s r e l i a b l y 
known thc„t the use of nuclear explosives w i l l save some 
US ^250 mi l l ion a t l e a s t , qui te a good urge , i loreover, 
nuclear explosives \^i l l abandon the need to employ 
thousands of w/orkers!, t echnic ians and energies for a 
long ijeriod of t ime. The combination of t he e l e c t r i c 
power generat ing capacity promised by the Depression, 
the amount of money saved by nuclear explosions and, 
equally, the huinan effort and managerxent machineries 
saved i s , by a cos t -ef fec t approach, a va l id oaid working 
incent ive for the acqu i s i t i on of wea.pon-gra.de f i s s i l e 
m a t e r i a l s . In cpse Al-Qatara Depression nuc lear operat ion 
succeeds, Egypt w i l l be i n a b e t t e r pos i t ion to resolve a 
consi- 'crable par t of i t s inr .or tal problem:: the concentrat ion 
of a l l i t s population only i n s-v of i t s t o t a l a^-ea. 
y.ccording to ..1-Ahram repor t , the United St-^tes set 
a p r i o r condit ion to provide Egypt with the required 
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ex;,olosiVGs (213 'CIGPJI ' fusion 'bonbs) , wliicla i s to ko op 
the iDonti boxGs closed and jus t to loc-.to tlieii i n n, 
p r j t i c u l c r order in the lioloc t h a t are to bo dug for t h i s 
purpose. No Egyptian s e ion t i s t or expert i s thus r l lo ; ; s 
to ident i fy or expxiinc vjhich explosives thcj ' are or v^ /hat 
y ie ld they have. (83) 
The p r io r condition sot loy the United S ta tes /light 
i n i t s e l f J operate ^s rn. incen t ive for 'Lgj\>'^ to vjorh out 
a p rogra - le for the acqu is i t ion of \.'eapon-grade f i s s i l e 
u a t e r i a l s . -^^ s the said condit ion i s s i l f - exp lana to ry , 
tha t .^dvonced nuclecu" powers are "by no AQIIUS ready to share 
nuclear technology oven for excluoively 'peaceful* ^juxjoses, 
Egypt can reconsider i t s piano for e l e c t r i c self-
suff ic iency, i^-ny such re~cons ider" t ion \ / i l l "bring 
Hgypt close to teiapting exercise of the option to 
produce yeapon-grade f i s s i l e aca ter ia ls . l^o\i t ha t the ia"ab~ 
I s r a e l i conf l ic t i s not resolved rnd I s r a e l i s sus ta in ing 
i t s effor t (see the w r i t e r ' s forr .ulation on p. ) i n 
developing a suitr-ble delivery syster. and enliancing i t s 
s tockpi le of \-veapon-grade f i s s i l e r i a t e r i - . l s , Egypt vj i l l 
find i t s e l f obliged to keep i t s nucle'^r' p rograme open, 
'i/hen two open progra/ues meet, i t i s a ' r e a l ' p o s s i b i l i t y 
(S5) . \^r\/\*/\s 6 ( -y H;, ) j,'y„ J 
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that an intoractiou of objectives takes place. The 
interact ion of olojectivos involves, by a uust , an 
element of uncertainty springing from the intentions 
v/hich are not publicly announced to be conceived as 
implici t or covert. Here i s the juncture where the 
string to perception of national security being affected 
or about to be affected appeers to influence the strntegic 
postures of adversaries and, in turn, the i r respective 
national security doctrines. 
Egypt's crucial requirements of e lec t r ic energy need 
al\>/ays be re i te ra ted especially due to the fact that the 
\ihole of i t s population i s centred at the banlcs of the 
r iver Nile in not more than v.5fc of the t o t a l area of 
Egypt. I t has been noted that the Deputy i?renier disclosed 
that the to t a l generating capacity of the High Dajii has 
already been consumied. Abundnjit evidence can be found to 
support the assui'iption that such aggravating requirements 
cannot be satisfied except by the i n i t i a t i o n of nuclear 
power stat ions for the generation of e l e c t r i c i t y . I t was 
on July 1, 1976 that a decision was taicen by Giza 
Governorate, xvhich i s part of Greater Cairo, the capital 
and biggest industr ia l centre of Egypt, to ref ra in from 
establishing any indust r ia l project due to e lec t r ic power 
- 188 -
shortage. (8^ f) Even those factories which wore supposed 
to he erected could not Toe ezempted from this hit ter 
decision. The decision was justified by the considerahle 
shortage of electric pov^ er needed to run the basic public 
services. This incident is however, quite sufficient to 
indicate the futili ty of conventional electric power sources 
in supplying Egypt with the energy necessrry for the 
maintainance of i t s present national povi/er. Some recent 
reports shov; that Egypt has contenplated the s*-lar 
alternative with Erench assistance. (85) But the solar 
energy sources and technology are s t i l l a matter of doubt. 
Dr. Frank Barnaby states clearly that ''no one yet knows 
how extensive a contribution solar energy \/ill make to total 
energy production," (86) 
^ Q ^ ^ ) « y\n/\V\ 0 ( ryll 1 ) , \ . l 
(85) According to a report by iJ--.ihraQ on Fov.2-r5 1976, 
Prance i s supposed to ^resent Egypt with a 10 
kilo\;a,tt solar station for the generrtion of 
electric power. Anothei, of a 500 kilo\;att, i s 
being manufactured in Erance for Egypt. The lat ter 
i s the second of i t s type to be manufactured by 
Erance. 
(86) Barnaby, Dr. E. 5 The "K'ucleex iige; (Stockholm: 
Alnqvist & \fiksell International, 
1974), p. 14. 
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Y/hereas the p res t ige an^ i! econonic perspec t ives are 
r e l a t e d to the pos t - su rv iva l stage of s t r a t e g i c planning, 
the na t i ona l secur i ty perspect ive i s en t i r e ly i n t eg ra t ed 
in the fabric of t h e surv iva l i ssues of any na t iona l power 
and goes on effect ing a never-ending dialogue ^;7ith the 
reg ional and i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i c environments. Even 
vjhen survival enjoys r e l a t i v e security, , the pos t - su rv iva l 
i s s u e s , basicii l ly developmental f.nO. spring iron na t iona l 
a s p i r a t i o n s to promote the 'welfare of the soc ie ty ' "cannot 
be considered conipartnientally", to use the phrase of 
K. Subr ahnany aia. (87) 
i i , i i« ' r i N.:JIO]}:;JJ si^ oJnigY jriiasizcTivag 
II ••!••» •••!. — • * - l l l l « l f l l n . « H i,<l——>.,—« . ^ I w .••. — ..•• 1—-I > .1.1.11. I - • • •—. . • • . • * . • • — . — • M - - . . . I IV— • 
ITo consensus i n l i t e r a t u r e on the subject i s so 
obvious as tha,t on the r e l a t i o n between the acqu i s i t i on 
of 'vveapon-grade f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s and na t iona l s ecu r i t y . 
Even those cont r ibut ions ignore i t . Schlesinger , for exaraple. 
(87) SubraK-^anyan, li. ; I)efence and D^evelopg.ent; (Ca lcu t ta : 
The I-Iinerva"Txssoci'atViV '1 973), p . x i . 
!fo analys is of th-j r e l a t i o n of securi ty to development 
can avoid Subrahraaj yan 's varied con t r ibu t ion 
espec ia l ly because :';.e i s one of the very few 
na t iona l securi ty exper ts who so ably theor ized 
why a n a t i o n ' s economic developaent cjjnnot go 
smoothly forward un less i t s secur i ty i s ensured. 
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concentrated on the p r e s t i ge incent ive s t a t i n g c lear ly 
tha t the drive for t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of such u ia te r ia l s i s 
a quest for p re s t ige but "niasquarding as a quest for 
m i l i t a ry secur i ty" (88) \vhich i s a bas ic eleneiit of 
na t iona l secur i ty . 7e are , t he r e fo re , led by Schlesinger 
to admit the n a t i o n a l security perspect ive but not , 
according t o him, the au then t i c i t y of i t . 
Not only does the need, r e a l or iaaginciry, to 
enrich mi l i ta ry securi ty form a s u b s t a n t i a l pa::t of the 
drive to acquire v.'eapon-grade f i s s i l e m a t e r i a l s , but 
also the need to f ee l secure against massive non-nuclear 
aggressions or against nuclear t h r e a t s . Coffey i s of 
the opinion tha.t the l a t t e r need i s "the most l i k e l y 
to induce fur ther p r o l i f e r a t i o n . " (89) ^^ mong xhe cetses 
he mentioned i n t h i s respec t v/ere I s r a e l and Egypt. 
iilthough we have admitted t h a t Coffey's idea i s par t 
of a grea ter na t i ona l secur i ty design, i t impl ies a 
'defens ive ' stra'cegic pos tu re . The impl ica t ion which 
reduces the v i t a l i t y of the drive to acquire v.'eapon-grade 
(88) Schlesinger , J . : ( fn .11) , p .12. 
(89) Coffey, J . ; S t ra teg ic I'ov/er and n a t i o n a l Securjj_yj 
"('Pittaburghs Univers i ty of Ir i t tsburgh" 
:^ress, 1971), p.128. 
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f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s , Tlie reason i s t ha t sucli acqu i s i t i on 
i s primari ly r e l a t e d to pov^^er, to tlie need to l e t other 
p a r t i e s perceive the a h i l i t y to i n f l i c t much more harm 
than conceived and thus he led to a r^ore f l e x i h l e 
negot ia t ing pos i t io / . . I t should, t he r e fo re , he understood 
tha t the decision t o acquire \veapon-grade f i s s i l e 
ma te r i a l s i s r e l a t e d to what can he ca l led ' p o s i t i v e ' 
na t ional secur i ty pol icy . 
I t i s indeed d i f f i c u l t to find consis tency het\\;een 
Coffey's assumption t h a t ' f e a r ' i s the reason underlying 
the decision to have an acv^ess to vveapon-grade f i s s i l e 
ma te r i a l s amd h i s acceptance of the fact tha t "even a 
token nuclear pov^/er, with a dozen (nuclear) oomhs and 
embryonic delivery c a p a b i l i t i e s , could maXe damaging 
s t r i k e s against se lected c i t i e s " . (90) 
\/hen studying t h i s nat io/ ia l secur i ty pe r spec t ive , 
the wr i t e r has come across a problem hinted at by Gordon 
Turner I nai^iely, whether to begin our thought processes with 
the advent of nuclear energy or to base our s t r a t e g i c 
concepts solely on nuclear power and develop only a 
(90) Coffey, J . ; Threat , Eeassuranc_e_and__Kucj^gar 
iro_li_f er atToji; in ; Bo ske'y,' h T L 
" r l l l r icir;"'M. ' ( eds.) J (f n. 10), 
p.119. 
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nuclear vv'eapons s t ra tegy . (91) The problem i s ce r t a in ly 
aggravpted as the theory of nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n 
aclumberates, i n the same t ime, sorae aspects r e l a t e d to 
past experiences and other assumed aspects of v^ /hat i s 
yet -to cone. (Once, the wr i t e r was inc l ined to think 
tha t the difforcnco i s the same v/hich e x i s t s between the 
two phi losophies of A r i s t o t l e and P la to^ Herman Kahn 
and Bruce-Briggs confessed a more or l e s s the same 
problem though they faced i t ?/hen studying the sources 
of s t a b i l i t y and i n s t a b i l i t y in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system 
r a t h e r than nat ional s ecu r i t y . They confessed tha t one 
of the m.ost d i f f i c u l t problems i s , so they put i t , 
"chart ing how vie get from here to t h e r e " . (92) They even 
climaxed the problem by a c r i t i c a l d i s c l a su re tha t a l l 
too frequtently "we have an extremely poor not ion of v^hat 
i s going on a t the present t ime", but l a t e r unravel led 
(91) Turner, G. 5 Classic and Modern S t ra t eg ic Goncepts; 
ins Turner, G.& GhallenerT"^* (ecis.) V 
Fa t iona l Securi ty i n the Nuclear Agej 
(New York5 Frederick A. 'r'raegor, 196©), 
p . 5 . 
(92) Kahn, H. & Bruce-Briggs,B.; ( fn .56) , p.114. 
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the knot Toy advising that " i t i s almost always useful 
t o look at the world as i t i s - to ' f ix* i t , so 
to speak - "before exariining wha^ t forces of change are 
at work", which means a s t a r t from what they ca l led 
"the immediate past" that i s i d e n t i c a l with the p re sen t . 
This would have been opera t iona l ly correc t should we 
not contemplate "that there i s a general p r inc ip l e 
operat ing here's v\/hatever appears to loe even remotely 
poss ib le tu rns out to be ee^sy", the technology which 
was considered "unachievable only ten years >^,go has i n 
fact been r ea l i s ed" and tha t the advancement in coiij_ut:r 
technology and miss i l e guidance "were nade far more eas i ly 
than coulcl iiavc boon imagined". (95) Revis i t ing t h i s 
problem would r e i t e r a t e the w r i t e r ' s not ion, vdien comnencing 
on problem fornula t ion, tha t t h e r e i s an elem.ent of 
uncer ta in ty vjithin which t h e nuclear prol ifers^t ion i s 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y and nat ional secur i ty-wise o r b i t t e d . 
Another reason can now be added to the reasons underlying 
uncer ta in ty? the advanceuient by leaps and bounds i n the 
computer technology and n i s s i l e guidance and i t s effect 
on n a t i o n a l secur i ty . Nuclearizing the s t r a t e g i c 
environment of the said development would inr l ice te , 
(93) Peld, B.& Others, (eds . )^ Impact of the ITc ew 
T_e_chnologi es on the ./irm_s 
Race; pass7sT.IIT, fSTTj, 
p7T35. 
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among other things, that tho quicker the acquisition 
of weapon-grade f i s s i l e materials i s rea l i sed , the 
shorter the pace a national security doctrine i s to 
skip in order to enjoy the maximum possible insurance. 
I t i s in the very national security base of nuclear 
prol i fera t ion that a •consociation' of fac tors , primarily 
s t ra tegic , grrsps the a t ten t ion of decision-makers as 
i t i s associated with the very survival of a given 
to 
country. Except for Japan jjuo / psycho-historic factors 
and for India, the only nation in tho present internat ional 
system whose nuclear programiie i s not weapon-oriented but 
rather established on calculations re la t ing to economic and 
sc ient i f ic affairs , the national security perspective 
seens to have been the major force of instig?/cion for 
the acquisition of weapon-grade f i s s i l e mater ia ls . This 
resu l t can also be proved in an opposite wa-yj i . e . by 
expanding the influence of modern weapons on the 
s t ra tegic postures of near-nuclear countries and on 
the i r respective national security doctrines in terms 
of railitary instruments. I t i s t h i s very opposite way 
which Aarie Hashavia adopted when insinuating at the 
current shift in ¥i;eapon systems in 'Yest Asia and from 
second-line to f i r s t - l i n e weapon systems and the i r 
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associa ted i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s . (94) In otliGr v/ords, the 
i n i t i a t i o n of nov/e:'" v /^capon systems which have got any 
u t i l i t y i n a poss ib le nuclear exchahge might i n i t s e l f 
i n s t i g a t e the nuclear weapon oiotion. 
Throughout our search in to the phenomenon of nuclear 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n , we come frequently across the m i l i t a r y 
securi ty aspect of na t i ona l securi ty as a subs t an t i a l 
factor underlying the exis tence of the phenomenon. I t has 
been ca l l ed ' s u b s t a n t i a l ' mainly because of i t s frequent 
recurrence5 vJhich s i g n i f i e s the r o l e of a denominator. 
This theme has become so common tha t ojiy current attempt 
to nuc lea r i ze i s viewed i n terms of the need t o enhance 
mi l i t a ry secur i ty . Though no ana lys i s can set as ide the 
m i l i t a r y secur i ty aspect i n the nuc lea r i za t ion process , 
especia l ly i f the option to produce weapon-grade f i s s i l e 
ma te r i a l s in the context of a weapon-oriented programme 
i s l e f t open, no ana lys i s , equally, i s e n t i t l e d to l i m i t 
i t s e l f to the mi l i t a ry secur i ty boundaries, \ihen I r an , 
for example, proceeded to purchase six nuc lear power 
s t a t i o n s , a uranium enrichment p lant and a plan.t for 
nuclear fuel ropoocessing, the move was i n to rp ro t ed i n 
a ser ious repor t in terms of I r a n ' s des i re to enhance 
(94) Hashavia, Ao 5 ( fn ,40) . 
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(95) 
considerably " i t s clout in the region". The combination 
of what I ran proceeded to purchase i s ce r t a in ly a r ich 
sourcG for 'veapon-'^rade f i s s i l e mat-^iials, not only 
plutortium 239 but ?il ^o '^•nricb^d ur??nium. Tbip could be an 
ind ica t ion or an ins inua t ion but not a ru l ing t h a t I ran i s 
proceeding to produce nuclear weapons. To reach the l a t t e r 
conclusion neces s i t a t e s the adoption of the formulation 
suggested by the writ^^r along's/ith the c r i t e r i a set for t ha t 
purpose. I r an , in fac t , does c o n s t i t u t e a case in i t s e l f 
which must needs a complete study. 
Revisi tpd, the theme of the r e l a t i o n "between the mi l i t a ry 
securi ty aspect of nat ional secur i ty and the phenomenon of 
nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n would give tne impression of a r e l a t i o n 
taken for '^ranted. Takine i t for granted has led to the 
cracrgence of another idea , qui te common as wel l , t ha t the 
decision to nuclcar izc i s one degree of r'^sponding to B 
n a r t i c u l a r t h i e a t . Coffey gives a sh^pe to t h i s idea in h is 
(9r) 
discussion and proceeds to advise t ha t "ono must look in 
perspec t ive at the t n r e a t s to various count r ies and at 
(95) N£w_o22f]i» Jui^ '^  ?3 , 1975. 
(96) Coffey, J . i ( f n . 90 ) , p .157. 
© This discussion should not be taken to moan tha t I ran does' 
not examine i t s nuclear 'papon option as the aim of the d i s -
cussion i s far from working out any such ru l ing .For fu r the r 
discussion pe-: Beri ,H.M.L. | I r a n ' s Imbitious Nuclear Progrramme; 
National Press •\'^er\cy J'Feature No.911,March 21,1975, and for 
the same; I r a n ' s Nucl-^ar Porsramme; IDSA News H-viPW on Sc-
ience & T chncdoay, M^rch 19 76,pp .100-102.1'ne "nwo a r t i c l e s 
"ai'e "ftiTFCly~'lfR'e"~s"Tjae ' "j - '^""^ - "-" ^ • 
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mcasuros t h a t may rea?sure them conc^rnins those t h r e a t s . "-^ ^ 
The d i f f i cu l ty connected with Coffey'e t h r e a t c r i t e r i o n i s 
t h a t not every t h r e a t i s rea l and tha t not pvery rea l th rpa t 
material izGs in a c l ea r - cu t form within a nuclear environ-
ment. One more d i f f i c u l t y , and indeed much more important 
than the former, i s thr-t therp a r i s e s a juncture during 
which the difforpnce between the conventional act ion option 
ond the nuclear act ion option i s reduced to a minimum. This 
juncture i s s t i l l a sourc"' of major concern in v/estern 
s t r a t e g i c thought and i s centered upon the case of a major 
conventional th rus t by •nars-d'N Pact forces i n to i e s t Europe. 
Thp n ' r i ter has o"hpervpd thp,t thrpp count"^ips, in 
p a r t i c u l a r , have demonstrated a pa t t e rn ized behaviour as 
regards the problem subjected tu study in i t s r p l a t i o n to nation-
P1 secur i ty in terms of mi l i ta ry secur i ty . They are: 
South Korea, Turkey and Tai'van, The pa t tp rn can be summed 
up in t h e i r dec la ra t ion , overt ly or cover t ly , t h a t the 
nuclear weaeon option depends on the outcome of the lmeri«an 
p o s i t i o n , as the Unifco^ S ta tes i s t h e i r major a l ly .South 
Korea 's was overt as Pres ident Park Chung-hee to ld i n t e r -
vie'vors in .Jgshington tha t his country would develop i t s own 
nuclear weapons i f th'^ Unit'^d Sta tes with-^re'v i t s nuclear 
umbrella. He was reported by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, 
the famous Washington Post columnists, to have said t h a t 
South Kore i. could make nucl - ar weapons, but was no-; honouring 
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t e Nuclear Fon-Prol i fera t ion Treaty and not developing i t s 
pOuential and " i f the Unitod Sta tes nucl ar umbrella wcie 
tu "b-^  removed, we h^ vf^  to s t a r t developing; our nuclear 
(97) 
culpability to STVP ourpplv^s". \ month l a t e r , South Korea 
w^ '^  reported to have worked oat a long-range plan to build 
25 nucl ar poiwer p l a n t s by thr year 2000 with a combined 
(98) 
capacity of 55 mm kw at an estimated cost of US $32,000 mm. 
^'Jmost two months b-^fore the South Korea Pr ' ^s iden t ' s declar -
a t ion , Los Aspin, a member of the House of -t^epresentatives had 
disclosed tha t South Korea could build upto 15O nuclear bombs 
with the 'Tqste products from a nucle-^r r eac to r fuelled by the 
(99) 
United S ta t e s . Turkey was no l e s s overt i n iden t i fy ing i t s 
pos i t ion ns i t s Defence Minister s t a t ed , when the United S ta tes 
was believed to be contemplating a major sh i f t in i t s mi l i t a ry 
r e l a t i o n s with Turkey, t h a t his country had p lans to develop 
nuclear energy for manufacturing nuclear bombs and Turkey's 
deputy Prii-^ I ' i n i s t e r d-^clared tha t "nat ional s - c u r i t j comes 
f i r s t " and tha t ''Turkey wil l find the me^ns to preserve her 
(97) The ^indu (Madrpo) , Jun^ 14, 1975, 
(98) P a t r i o t , July 24, 1975-
(99) o t r a i t Times, April 19, 1975. 
(100)Economic Tim3s, March 5, 1975. 
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(101) 
secur i ty ' ' inginupitirio; nt the Tiucl'^ ?>r srnax)on option =!bould 
tho Unitod Stst-^s not l i f t _ i t e thpn qrms embarffo. \s for 
Taiwan, the United Stauos i n t e l l i g e n c e exper ts express t h e i r 
be l ie f t h i t Taiwan i s on the process of d'-velopinr a nuclear 
iveapon •^ id t ^» t Tai'van's f i i s t veapo'^ ..vuuld be ready by I98O. 
Taiwan wae also reported to b - constructin^: a lung-range 
(103) 
miss i l e as p a r t of i t s programme to have a delivery system, 
(101) Times (London), July 16, 1976. 
(102) Economic Times, July 8, 1975-
(103) Th<^  dp'pendenco of Taiwan's Tiuclopr weapon option on th-^ 
Unitf^d Stp.t-^s in trrms of mi l i t a ry securi ty i s d i scuss -
ed, amonj other aspects , in qn e l ightening cont r ibu t ion 
by Quf^ster, G„ 5 Taiwan qnd Wuclf^ar P ro l i f e ra t ion? He-
p r i n t d from the 197-^ Sprins- i s sue of Orbis insIDSl 
S t r a t eg ic Di^2:est, October 197'^.Quester 's po in t of view 
i s t ha t "because of I 'ashington's changes in pol icy since 
1970, there i s l ^ s s tha t thp Unit-^d S ta tes can do no'A/ 
(be Was wri t ing in 197'^ -) to forc^ thp KMT to stay away 
from nuclear W'^ppons".(po 73) He described the manufqc-
t u r i n i of nuclear weapons by Taiwan as ''a measure of 
insurance" in a c lea r a l lus ion to the mi l i ta ry s.-^curity 
?isprct. In fqc t , Taiwan's c-^se ''''^servos a de ta i led 
study especia l ly i t s intprprr-^-tatiun of the NPT., 
Quest^r quoted <=^OTO.^ Tninqnoor^ dip]om'5ts 0° oq^'inq:, 
imm-diately af ter th'-^  NPT was offered for s igna ture , 
tha t th^y had no object ions to the Treaty since ' ' i t a l l -
ocs th«m to have the bomt " x c " . 
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Barna'by has hinted at another important psppct of thp 
rola t ioD between the acquis i t ion of weapon-gr-->de f i s s i l e 
ma te r i a l s and the cont'-xt of a weapon-oriented programme 
and natioaaL eecurity.He stat-^d t h a t such acqu is i t ion "may 
guarantee a count ry ' s independence by prevent ing more power-
ful counbrics - including tu j great po/^ers - frum i n t e r -
ferinq- in i t s a f fn i r ° . "^^°^-^ ThP impl ica t ion of Bprmbv'c 
•view aie s ign i f ican t becpuse he assumes tha t a kinship 
? r i s e s bet.vcen a nat ional power being nuclear and extending 
i t s inf luence including- the in te r fe rence in the a f f a i r s of 
non~nucl-ar coun t r i - s and tha t the acqu i s i t ion of a nuclear 
force c rea tes a ce r t a in immunity against such i n t e r f e r ence . 
/Jtbough Barnaby did not specify h is understanding of t h i s 
' i n t e r f e r r n c - ' , he s^^ms to have got in h is m-ind a c e r t a i n 
id-^p developing from observing the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l 
behaviour o± the present nuclc-ar-weapon count r ies , ''is the 
p resen t in tprna t ione l system i s admittpdly onp of n p t i o n - s t ^ t p p , 
the way nat ions vould view ' i n t e r f e r e n c e ' does repres^-nt a 
source of pn esca3-at;ion~prcnr environment; for the maximum 
exorcise of sovereignty then b-comes a matter of n a t i o n a l i s t 
s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n . Nuclearizing t h e i r environment would t hus 
mean making i t more sens i t ive to foreign e f f ec t s . 
(104) Barnob7,F.5 ( f i ' . 8 ) , p . 7 . 
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7hcn discuFping tho mi l i t a ry aspect of the na t iona l 
secur i ty pe r spec t ive , wo sboiolcl keep in mind t h a t the most 
developed nuclear pcver to-day had i t s f i r s t programme 
wholly for mi l i t a ry purposes. Though Beaton claims 
tha t for tho Suviot Union, i t was a matter of p r e s t i g e 
since i t uvas the co-winner of tho Second ;«urld ^^ar. 
Tho w r i t e r ' s argument i s tha t i t i s t h i s very fact ("bping 
a co-winner of ' iorld .«'ar I I ) which i n s t i ga t ed the Soviet 
Union te maintain a mi l i t a ry power equivalent to t h a t of 
tho Uaibod S ta t e s . Had i t been a matter of p r e s t i g e for 
the Soviet Union, the acqu is i t ion of a token nuclear force 
(105) The decision of tho then US Pres iden t to i n i t i a t e a 
pr'^grnmm'^ f^T t''^^ pi^oriuction of weqpen-grad° f i s s i l e 
ma te r i a l s w-^ s a d i r ec t r eac t ion to the famous l e t t e r 
of Gilbert Einsten. (For fu l l t ex t of tho l e t t e r , see 
Appendix IZ) . In t h i s l e t t e r , i t was only the 
mi l i t a ry advantage tha t wore refer red to by Einsten, 
On the other hand, i t was Dr.Homi Bhabhq who f i r s t 
envisaged thp us-^ of such power for non-mil i tary 
purposes. Sf^ p a pub l i ca t ion by the I d r e c t o r a t e of 
adver t i s ing and Visual Pub l i c i ty ,Min i s t ry of Inf-
ormation gnd Broadcasting, ^e'7 Delhi: Nuclear 
Programme. The views i^f Dr.Bhabha can be considered 
the reason why India has refrained fr'jmi producing 
weapon-grade f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s in tho context of a 
weap on-ori ontod p rogrqmme. 
(106) Beaton, L. ; ( f n . 5 ) , p . 49. 
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would havp been e ougl. But a l l Soviet programmes in the 
f r>ld of nuclpqr w^qporio hnv^ br^ pri d'^pi^r^d to proc^'^d 
with the p roduc t i c i of wj'apoi.- ,rade f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s and 
a^^ocia'ced requirements (dcli\/.-ry systems - wprhcad 
assembli,o£ ~ guidarce system ~ surveiUqncp - early warn-
ing , e t c . ) t i l l ii: could roach the same of i t s maD<-r 
@ 
adversary. 
Dr.Ki s<=inQrer nxpro<^coc! thp idoq ti^qt moraori'^c of 
defeat of supposedly -adequate conventional f o r e s ought not 
b'^  v.xclud'^d from the inventory of i n c e n t i v e for nuclear 
p ro l i fe" ntion„ This wa'^  -^xpr-psed when discuss ing the 
European nuclear dil'^mm^, though h<-- deni-d any due to the 
United S ta tes s t r a t e g i c doct r ine b^sed on the f e a s i b i l i t y 
of non-nuclear defenc^^^ ^^  D'-spitc t h i s ergument of 
Dr.Kissinger who has bee-T one of tne spok-^sm^n of American 
s t ra t ' -g ic thought, en i r r e l e v a n t theory seems to h^ve been 
devolop-^d in the United S ta tes v i s - a - v i s Eur up Co According to 
(107)0 Kissin er, H, 5 ( fn .52 ) , p . 295 = 
@ The wr i t e r i s of the opinion t h a t t h - r ? - l s t r a t e g i c nuclt 
bal'^nce A/qs not achi-^vrd pxcept in the early 1970s 
when the twu supc>r-power agre^^d upon meaningful S I T 
tal.v.£o .. f^ur-y-^r t im- l^g in the s t - r t too^ th-^ 
cuv i - t Uni n n - i r l y n qu-r t r -f - c-ntury to 
c r p ' np-^te. 
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KissiwjTer, memories of defeat ought be undrrstood as invit-
ing the European states to have an access to nuclear weapons. 
But George Ball expresses his doubt over the capability of aty 
* C 1 d P<^ 
sin^-le Surop-^ an st-=tP(,^j, -^^^^ have. Ball'^ allusion i s tn 
the idea of the nerd to organize the European nation-stptes 
into a military alliance over -which the .Americans can preside 
rnd equally J to the inability of single European state to 
d fend its'=>l.'^  pgainst a possiblr inassive 'arsaw Pact or 
Russian thrust by conventional weapons. 
In this respect, the writer finds i t necessary to 
pt^ tf^  th^t work? ernanatin=? from nuclear ""^ a^pon countries giv^ 
th ' irapr-TFi-n -^ f nn 'advico''^° near-nuclear weapon countries 
notr.tQ; plan for the production of weapon-grade fissile mate^^ials 
in the context of a Wf^ apon-ori'-^ nted programme. Schlesinger 
Has been quoted as saying that the acquisition of nuclear 
woopone i r a qu-st for prr^stige masquranding as a quest for 
military' security. ^-^ i^issinger, on the other hand, hinted 
at the inability of any singl ^ nuclear wn>apon stat'^ (in 
the /est) to cope with i t s national security requirements 
without cho help of the Uni-ccd States. Gilinsky 
beliov.,F that i t i s und'^sirable to h-^ ve a lar^'p number of 
countries rather clos^-^-in a t^chnic^l , not apol i t i ca l 
(108) Ball.u,; (fn. 3), 'pp. 205-206. 
(109) Schl ^F^ro•er,J, ; ( fn.ll) , p . l2 . 
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ff'^nse, to the devolQpni'^nt of nucleat" woapong. -^  Prawitz 
i s of the opinion tha t i t i s in tho i n t e r p s t of any'country 
to provont the spread of nucl'-^ar weapons to any other 
country and t h a t the l^on-Prcliferation Treaty c o n s t i t u t e s 
co~ope^"ative prevent ion of tb-^ sprepd of nucle^ir 's/ppportc., ^  ^ 
Even Vesc-rn non-Jimerican i n d u s t r i a l i s t s are reported to have 
ra ised the following qur-stion which t h i s study i s also to 
r a i s e ; " Is i t not in fact the whol-^ system of safeguards and 
the Non-Prol iferat ion Treety a way to maintain the i n d u s t r i a l 
monopoly of the present c i v i l i a n nuclear suppl ier s t a t e s , 
which are, in fact i den t i ca l with tne nuclear weapon coun-
trip-^-?" "^ '^  mpy, ther^^for'^, look skep t i ca l ly to tboae 
.7-^storn, bas ica l ly American, views t h a t be l i t ; t l e the nat ional 
securi ty requirements of near-nuclear weapon count r ies and 
of non-nucl--ar weapon countri ^s.The .Imr^rican. French dispute 
over French nuclear programmes provides for a self--explanatory 
case. For Gal lo i s , thr reputed French s t r a t e g i s t , " the atom 
neu t r a l i ze s the armed mul t i tudes , equal izes the s ize of 
popula t ion, sh r ive l s g-^ufrapbical d i s t ances , l e v e l s mount-
r i n s , reduces the advantage which the ' g i a n t s ' derived only 
(110) / i l l r i c h , ! . ? ( ed.)( fn.9) , p . 6. 
(111) Sro, for a f u l l e r view of Prawitz idea , h i s p a r t 
of the discussion reported in ^ i l l r i c h , M.C'd)? 
I b i d . , p . 9 . 
(112) l A u . , Po 7. 
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ycstnrdaif' from tbp vast dimeio of t h p i r t e r r i t o r i - s ! . , . ' ^ 
Gror^e Ball comments on Gal lo is ' theory by saying tha t i t i s 
both ''wrong end dangerous". -^^ Thp difference i s not only 
of pfirsonality 5 though i t can bp claimed, but , cor ta in ly jone 
of nat ional secur i ty p e r s p p c t i v p s . l t i s qui te c lea r tha t 
General Gal lo is tends to refute a l l the allOt^atiuns ra ised 
by super-po"i'er stratpgi'=^ts ^igqinjat the nat ional ppcurity 
doct r ines of the npa:* nuclear count r ies such as those 
a l l ega t ions of Schlcsinger who describpd the securi ty incen t -
ive as i.iiacU^jary, alti-^ough, to use the words of Brooks and 
Myers, ''tbp development of nuclear weapons followed a recog-
n i t ion of tne mi l i ta ry value of bein^^ able t'j increase 
cnormouslv the explo°ivp pow^r t'^at could bp "ainod on an 
enem.y",^ ^ This d-velopment belongs, c e r t a i n l y , to the 
phase of quan t i t a t ivp change from conventional to nuclear 
power, but i t =>qually belongs to the '^ssenc^ of tbp l a t t p r ' s 
u t i l i t y . Othcy^wiso, the early nuclear powers would have had 
com.mission d nucl'^ar power s t a t i ons for thp production of 
- l - - c t r i c i t y b'-^for-^ producing nuclear '^xplosiv^s, tha t could 
be us d as warheads. But t h i s should not mean t h a t i t i s 
" a s i - r to d'-^vplop a nuclear c ^ a b i l i t y lik'^ t h a t of the Unitpd 
Sta tes or the Soviet Union tnan tu develop a nuclear tr-chnology 
(113) Bal l ,G. ; ( fn .3) , p , 
(114) Brouks, D. & Mryers, H. ; ( f n . 7 l ) , p .S? 
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capablr^, i f n '^-d -^^ d, of producing woapon-grgde fissil*^ mat-
e r i a l s in t'n-^  coPt"xt of a w^-ipon-oriontpd programm'^. 
Schl'^singor has also stL^ssod a s imi la r id-^a i,vhon he 
said t ha t ' ' i t i s far harder than most p-^opl? recognize-" to 
put tog- thor a ser ious s t r a t e g i c capab i l i ty -vhich could 
t3ek© a useful cuntr ibut ion to gati sfying the securi ty 
a sp i r a t ions of most p o t e n t i a l nuclear powers. -^^ 
I t i s , th(-r'-for'^, log ica l to un-'^rstand the quanti ty 
and qual i ty of thr acquis i t ion of Wf^ aioon grade f i s s i l e 
mate r ia l s by the Uniued i^tates and the Soviet Union in 
terms of t h e i r nat ional securi ty requirements as they 
emcrgjd co-winners of the ^'^cond Vorld '^ar. Such an under-
standing would help our explanation of the change enjoyr>d 
by Doth s t a t e s from quan t i t a t i ve super io r i ty ( b a s i c a l l y of 
firepo'v r) to q u a n t i t a t i v e supe r io r i t y . The said change 
can be traced ,for f^xampl.-,from the ob j - c t i v s endorsed by 
Roosevelt on ..ugust 2, 193^? tu pruduc. the bomb t h a t , i f 
''carri-^d by boat and '^xplod'^d i'n a Dort , ml "jbt very '"ell 
d stroy the whole p a r t , tog t h e r with sume surrounding 
t e r r i t o r y " ^ t i l l the deploym-nt of American MIRVs which 
have been design-^d to f a c i l i t a t e pene t r a t i on of any p o s s i b l e 
Soviet xB'I system^-'-^'^^® The deployment of MIRVs, which 
(115) Schlesin^er , J« ; ( f n . l l ) , p . 8 . 
(116) Govt, of India; ( fn ,105) . 
© ,^fter wr i t ing t h i s chapter , the jnericans were reported 
to have proceeded vith the production of mobil-e ICBM 
s i l o s vhich /vouid in tens i fy t h i s cha^?-. (See p . ) 
(117) Rathjnns, J„; ( f n . l 2 ) , p . U . 
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r ep re sen t s the q u a l i t a t i v e chanr^o has given ber th tc ser ious 
repercuss ions on national secur i ty whether for super-powers 
or other s t a t e s . 
The write! bel ieves t h a t t h - most important effect of the 
deployment of MIHVp on nat ional s ecu r i t y , the theory and the 
p r r ^ c t i c e , ' i s t na t i t has made 'defence ' v i r t u a l l y f u t i l e . 
Accurdingly, the s t ruc tu re cf the p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y environ-
ment, which i s one of our major concerns, has undergone r a t h e r 
' conceptua l ' chana-ps. Mthough TO accept Sch les in^e r ' s view 
tha t i t i s far harder than most people recognize to put 
toge the r a s e r i . u s s t r a t e g i c c a p a b i l i t y , the mere acqu i s i t ion 
of weapon-grade f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s prora.ises the advent of a 
MIRY depli^yment p o s s i b i l i t y because the l a t t e r i s a na tura l 
..utcc-me of ser ious R & D of the former, xlccordingly, the ro l e 
•jhich ' f o r c e ' i s supposed t^ play in nat ional secur i ty i s 
phaped, wp apsump, nft-^r thp follo'-'ing dpterminants: 
1. the actual deployment of MIRV^  by these powers occupying 
the top l aye r ..f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l syrtem, 
2. the emergence of ^ doctr i r ,e , p osc r ip t ive r a t h e r than 
d e s c r i p t i v e , of pursuing the nat ional i n t e r e s t s of a given 
nat ional po-'er without thp physical us^ of force , 
3. the r e a l i z a t i o n , on the p a r t of non-nuclear powers, of 
the impl ica t ions of the a c q u i s i d o n of w'^apon-grade 
f i s s i l e mate r ia l s in terms of nat ional s ecu r i t y , and 
^•. th^ need to enhance secur i ty by a va r i e ty of means r a the r 
than by mi l i t a ry fcrce so le ly . 
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Even during the s i x t i e s wben th^ deployment of MIRVs 
was e p o s s i b i l i t y r a the r than a r e a l i t y , the defence of the 
United S ta tes of .America (populat ioi) , i n d u s t r i a l capac i ty , 
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y ) against a probable Russian m i s s i l e 
attpc^c wp,s b'^liev'^d to b*^  bop'-•less. Morpover, iBB/f 
defences provide no solu t ion . They r a t h e r , "give r i s e to 
ambiguity". -^^ The r-ason underlying t h i s ambiguity i s 
the difference between the defence system d-^signed for 
deployment against any at tack on mi l i t a ry s i t e s , espec ia l ly 
the so-cal led ' s t r a t e g i c ' weapons and the requirements of a 
defence system to p ro t ec t papu la t ions , "^t' ™-ay ^e t h i s explan-
at ion which led Greenwood and J^acht to describe the Treaty 
on the Limitat ion of . \ n t i - B a l l i s t i c Missi le Systems "between 
the United Sta te ' and the Soviet Union as providing " l i t t l e 
more than a codi f ica t ion of the immoral r e l a t i onsh ip in 
which the populat ion of each super-power i s l e f t hostage to 
the s t r a t e g i c forces of th^ o ther" . "'^  
In t h i s context , the Russian view seems e n t i r e l y 
d i f f e r e n t , brcause the Soviet Union has declared t h a t i t s 
nuclear weepons are not meant for deterrence as such but 
•'in order to provide r e l i a b l e defence for i t s e l f and other 
S o c i a l i s t countrif'^c^".^ ^ v'e have to exclude from any 
(118) IbL4.r.9 p . 13. 
(119) Greenwood, T.& liacht, M. ; Th- iv^ ew iMuclear Debate, 
Forei,g:n -Iffairs ,July 1974^ p .761 . 
(120) Trifonov, V» ; ( f n , 25 ) , p . 5 , . 
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discussion of Soviet views on the s u b j ' c t , espec ia l ly those 
disclosed in ser ious meetings, the p o s s i b i l i t y of a represen t -
ot ive "being unaware of the compulsions of the nucle'ar age.To 
speat of ' r e l i ab l ' ^ def'-^ncf-' ^s the basic function of a 
nuclear force i s an easy hypothesis to r e fu t e . But there 
should have been some idea behind a dec la ra t ion l i k e Tr i fenov ' s . 
The search for t '^is v-^ry idep becom^^s mor.'^  complicated i f '•"e 
add Tr i fo rov ' s phrase ' no t meant for deterrence as such ' , 
and much more complicated i f we r e c a l l Tr i fonov 's r a t i o n a l i s -
pbion of tne -t^ussian stand vis~a~vis nucl'^ar prollf.-^ration; 
\poviet Unio^) has embarked on the road of bui ld ing the 
communist socie ty , which dem^ands enormous e f f o r t s for the 
completion of i n d u s t r i a l and a g i i c u l t u r a l programm-^s", and 
h'^nc'", i t s d i s i n t e r e s t i^ pushing t'-^ i^  nucl^^r mc^ forward, 
.^though t h i s Complicated viev i s , cp r t a in ly , in need of a 
roccia l study, we can, for the sake oi d iscuss ing the nat ional 
secur i ty persp-^ctivc, assumie f i r s t t ha t t h ° Russians under-
< t^and ' d ' fonc^ ' in a dis t inguished wajo Thp assumed undnr-
s t m d i n g must be one of a 'cr'-^dible' fore- capable of i n f l i c t -
ing the damage tha t Herman -l^ ahn disclos-^d in a testimony before 
a congressional committee when he ^stimat-d t h a t the United 
StaCGS could recover in fiv^ years i f i t suffered a high 
at tack which k i l l e d only ten mi l l i on , with twenty mi l l ion 
(121) I b i d . , p . 4 . 
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dr-ad, the recovery time would br ten years? and froa a l.iccvy 
prtack (1,000 to j^OOO megatons) whicb k i l l e d eighty mil ' i i jn 
(122) 
,\mericans, i t would take half a century to recover . i t 
i s t h i s fear t h a t provides the Russians with what Trilon^v 
de"='crilD^ri as 'defence ' for th-^ Soviet Union and oth-j-^ ? .c--
i a l i s t countri-^s. But t h i s 'defence ' belongs tu a pre--d •''onte 
phase as wil l be explained l a t e r . 
The i n t e r a c t i o n bebwepn Imerican and Russian nat'-oiial 
secur i ty doct r ines has led to what i s ca l led ' v e r i c a l 
p r c l i f e t a t i o n ' or the development of nuclear wespons in 'ccriiis 
of c r e d i b i l i t y , t a r g e t a b i l i t y , accuracy and m u l t i p l i c i t y . In 
t h i s context , ' h o r i z o n t a l ' prol l f ' - - rat ion, i » e i , the acq^uirition 
of weapon-grade f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s by non-nuclear powers^ iii 
the context of a weapon-oriented programme should be uiidcr-
stojd as i n s t i ga t ed by ' v o r t i c a l p r o l i f e r a t i o n ' becquso of 
the nat ional secur i ty accomplishiaents of the l a t t e r , as 
indicated b / the Russian view. ' V e r t i f i c a l ' p r o l i f e r a t i JI , when 
s t a r t e d , Was, to p l a rge ex tent , a production of the nucl -'or 
monopoly crea"Cod 'iihen the Soviet Union succeeded in 19'^ -9 in 
ending the United S"Cates nuclear Monopoly. 
I f tber» i s a notion t h a t the acquis i t ion of weopo""--
grade f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s and consequently the deployme'la of; 
a t l e a s t , a token nuclear force may, in some cases , r e s u l t 
in coiisiderablc reduction in mi l i t a ry expenditure, an e n t i r e l y 
(122) Lapp, R„ ; K i l l and Overki l l ; The Strat'^gy of InnieJ l -
at ion (]^ ew York: Basic Books I n c . , 1962}, 
p . 101. 
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d i f io ren t notion i s associated with nat ional secur i ty . Accord-
ing to a Unit'-d Nations r^^port, "with the in t roduc t ion of 
-very xaov^ sophis t ica ted and l e s s vulnerable m'^ans for the 
long-range d<^livery of nuclear warheads, nat ions turned t h e i r 
e f fo r t s i n mi l i t a ry R & D to the problrm of de tec t ing and 
in t e r cep t ing b a l l i s t i c missil'-^s". The eco nomic-technical 
rroblems of nat ional s^'-curity under these given circumstances 
wil l in leed b-come a burden t h a t can impede, considerably, 
the process of v e r t i c a l p r o l i f e r a t i o n . Yet, the requirements , 
r-^al or imaginary, t ha t i n s t i q a t e such p r o l i f e r a t i o n are more 
stroj'gly f e l t than the economic-technical consider^-ticns i n ^p. 
much ng i t i s a s s o c i a t - d with the survival i p sue je spec ia l ly 
for present non-nculear weapon s t n t e s . 
The notion tha t a s t a t e opting for a nuclear we^on 
programme does not care much for the technica l and fina'^cial 
d i f f icul t ! -^s 1-as also b-^ en pointed at by Maddox who be l i eves 
t h a t " ther r are circuxiistances in which a r e l a t i v e l y suphi-^-
uicaocd nucl .ar d-vic and conventional a i r c r a f t may be 
t^ufficii^nt to provl d'" soinri ppcurnncr^ f^at rmrrow str-^ti^sn c 
ob j -c t ives may be assured". '^  ;J.thougu the w r i t e r does 
."grec with Maddox upon t h i s not ion, he do'^ -s not be l ieve in the 
oxamplo providf^d by Mpddox as "a vivid i l l u s t r a t i o n " , to use 
(123) UN Socrntary G-nor^l 's Report? ( f n , 2 l ) . 
(124) . Maddox, J,,; Prospects for Nuclear P r o l i f ^ r e t i o r ; 
(London: I . I . S . S Idelphi Papers , No . I I3 , Spring 
1975) , P»8. 
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the phrase t h a t Maddox wrote in t roducing the example of 
I s r a e l . I t was explained in the chapter on problem fo rm-
ulptioiT th-^t t h i I s r a e l i nuclear programme hq<= been weapon-
oriented from the very beginning. Moreover, I s r a e l has not 
faced l i t r a L l y the issue of technical d i f f i c a l t i e s or f in-
'^ncipl s t r a i n s "^ ^ c^pucn it b^o cjoppnd^d on th?^ <=xperti ?-= of 
J-^wish s c i s n t i s t s , even those who do not l i v e in I s r a e l 
•:nd has benef i t ted from the huge f inanc ia l help of the 
Unitrd S t a t e s / ^ 2 5 ^ 
(125) As for the f a c i l i t i e s offered to I s r a e l in the t^^chnical 
know-how, i t h?^ s been r e l i ab ly known tha t the l a t e 
nucl ' ar s c i e n t i s t , Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, v i s i t e d 
I s r a e l in October 1965 and supervised, himself, some 
experiments on nuclear f i s s ion and i s believed to have 
corrected some mistakes in the ca lcu lp t ions of the 
two I s r a e l i s c i e n t i s t s Talmi, I and Ben David in t h e i r 
attempt to specify the c r i t i c a l masses of plutonium 
235 and plutonium 239. 
The ;jiiericri.j RlKD Corporation was reported to have 
suppli-^-d I s r a e l with technical ki^ CA'-how r e l a t i n g to 
nuclear weaponry, according to Mr.Mohammed Mahgoub, 
the Commissioner-General of the Arab League Boycott 
Office in Dampscuso Mahguub was.rep . r t ed by the-.i}kily 
S'tar ( B e i r u t ) , November 12, 197'^ 'co h^ve cbarged ttiat 
tLje aid was concnrned with ways of using nuclear 
we.ijyouF e f i ec t ive ly in /.-^st Asia, ^he Guardian (London) 
ad'aiulcd I s r a e l 'VB.^ s t i l l to know how to d'^'liver 
a b'lTT'l' ( November 14, 1.7^). 
.Is for the f inanc ia l help, the famous Kes Report 
d i sc loses that jiimerican ass i s tance between 1948 and 
1968 was oqu.aL to lJtvl,400 for each I s r a e l i . According 
to T'-p, who spent morp than quar ter of a Cf^nturv in 
ti-p US 'R'orei sr^n Sorvic- , t'n^ 1m'=rican governmpnt'<= 
'Economic --id to I s r a e l t o t a l l e d US $11,000m, , and 
Dollar t r ans f e r s froui p r i v a t e sources amounted tu 
US >25,OOOmo , a t o t a l of US 11^36,000 m„ in twenty 
years . Beet Nes David; <lmerica's Very Special Rela t ion-
ship witi'i I s r a e l , The lim'^s (London), Feb. 5, 1971. 
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Moreover, i t i s bcli^^ved tha t I s r a e l ' s maoor 
nuclear r e a c t o r , the Dimona r e a c t o r , which i s of the jiij~3) type (according tu French d'^-signs) or FTa.-3 
(TCcGiding to 'iiaerican c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ) was b u i l t by 
Chqntiers de 1' \ t l an t ique by v i r t u e of a secre t 
agre-'^ment between France and I s r a e l which gave the 
l a t t e i the opportunity to e rec t ti2e Dimona reac to r 
with French ass is tance in excuani^e for souie c l a s s -
i f i ed calcul-^tions on nuclear fusion tha t Jewish 
s c i e n t i s t s i"^  the Hnitr^d St^it^c pc^iev^d o^ h^d 
pn access t o . Spe» 
Ii; was r e l i a b l y known that France offered a team of 
I s r a e l i nuclear s c i e n t i s t s the chance to inv^^stige the 
e f fec ts of th'- f i r s t Fren6h nucl'^ar e^^jlosion. 
Iccording to an estpbl ished r epo r t , Dp^  
Oppenheimer used bis influ'^nce to g^t a permission for 
11 I s r a e l i nucl^gr engineers to be t ra ined qt Los 'ilamos 
in Plowshare programmes. 
I s r a e l , accordingly, has received subs tan t i a l 
help in the nuclear f i^ld tha t none of th^ present 
nuclear powers has over receiv-^d, with the exception 
of some components of the Br i t i sh nuclear programme. 
- 214 -
In West Asia, i t i s only I s r a e l which i n s i s t s on a 
kinship ratb'^r than a r e l a t i o n "b'^ fs/'^ pn the acquis i t ion of 
weapon-grade f i s s i l e mater ia l s in the context of a weapon-
oriented programme and nat ional secur i ty in terms of su rv iva l . 
No such t h e s i s has been traced by the wr i t e r i n Egyptian 
pos i t i on on the subject . In the case of I s r a e l , i t i s " 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c to present the survival i s sue as urgent and 
crucialo Abundant l i t e r a t u r e i s ava i lab le on t h i s very po in t 
and, accordingly, there i s ample room for e lec t ic i sm. 
Though not expounding the r e l a t i o n subjected to study, 
Mrs»G-olda Meir, I s r a e l ' s Prime Minis ter during the October War, 
1973? stat-^d in her account of the war t h a t against the massive 
conventional t h rus t of the ..'xTab forces during the f i r s t tw[iO 
or threo days of the war "only a th in l i n e of . „. men stood 
between I s r a e l and d i s a s t e r " . Voicing again. the 
survival is-^ue, she sa ids" I have npver doubted for an 
i n s t a n t t ha t the t rue aim of the -:irab s t a t e s has always been, 
(127) 
and s t i l l i s , thp to ta l des t ruc t ion of the s t a t e of I s r a e l " . 
An i l l u s t r a t i v e example of tae I s r a e l i a t t i t u d e towards 
conceiving t h i s i s sue i s the famous sentence u t te red by 
iVioshe I^ayan, the then Defence Minis ter of I s r a e l on October 
8, 1973 when he warned MrsoGolda M-irs"Tbis i s the end 
(126) Meir, G; " My Life; (London; J idenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1975) , p ,360. 
(127) I b i d . , p.364i 
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of tho Third Tcnple". (128) (The end of the F i r s t Tonplo 
caliic at tho hands of the Bahylonians aroUhd 586 B»C. a.nd 
the Romans destroyed the Second Teuple i n the year 70 A ,D«) 
According to the sane r epor t , the I s r a e l i Erine Min i s t e r , 
thereupon, gave her DefencL Minister the permission to 
"ac t iva te I s r b e l ' s Doonsday weapons". 
The survival i s sue , as I s r a c l i s e ^ ^ i s an of f -spr ing 
o f an inacinary ra ther than r e a l n a t e r i a l s i tua t ion 
"because of two fundancntal r easons . F i r s t , I s r a e l i alle^ja-
t i o n s th^ ' t ' the Aralos are dcteriiincd to wipe out the Jews 
have proved nul and void, li-vcn the very o^lle^ied announcement 
tha t the I s r a e l i ' s c lained tha t on a'^ rati o f f i c i a l had u t t e r e d 
a few weeks heforc the 1967 \JeX i s now accepted as a forged 
itoi:i, Scccnd, the atniosphGro surrcounding tho issue of su rv iva l , 
I s r a c l i s e d , has got an obvious el orient of propaganda r e l a t e d 
to t he c l a s s i ca l propaganda technique of nagnifying 
ex terna l t h r e a t s to avoid i n t e r n a l d is turhanccs or d iver t 
(128) @ The use of the t e r n con t rad ic t s the content of the 
saii-l re^jort v;hich os t ina ted I s r a e l ' s stock of 
nuclear warheads as containing "13 bonhs". .Iccording 
to the repor t of Brirn. Beckett , Middle East 
I n to rna t i ona l , Novenber 1976, quoTing p ro jec t ions 
based'^on a no del developed by R;JJD Gorpor ration, 
a c i ty l i ke Cairo would n e c e s s i t a t e sone 4Cbonbs 
of the ki lotonnage now av-iilablc with I s r a e l . 
The Tine repor t speaks of 13 bonbs. I t i s 
neaninglcss , t h e r e f o r e , t o use such a t e r n . 
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the a t t en t ion of the masses.. I t has been found d i f f i c u l t to 
provide any evidence tha t th^ -^ nat ional secur i ty of I s r a e l in 
terms of survival can bp enhanced by the acqu is i t ion of a token 
nucl'^ar force. Ev^n i f i t were deployed for b g t t l e f i e l d 
purpo^'-^.q, to use the p ro j ec t ions referred to by Beckett , 
such force wi l l be exhausted before any subs tan t i a l r e s i s -
ta.nce of a massive conventional t h r u s t by .irab forces can 
be p-Pfnct^d. Tho log-fc-^ T d^ductiori, thprt^forp, i s f^pt a 
token nuclear fore- deployed by I s r a e l i s of no subs tant ia l 
help to i t s survival as far as mi l i ta ry secur i ty i s concern-
ed. Another deduction follo^vs t ha t an I s r a e l i token nuclear 
force could be of a p o t e n t i a l u t i l i t y other than surv iva l . 
Theore t i ca l ly , Professor Hammond of If i rginia Universi tyjUSl, 
sums up the uses of atomic diplomacy in throt^ popturess as an 
e x p l i c i t t h r e a t , as an implied t h r e a t and as a bargaining 
(129) 
chip. -^ ^ Is for the f i r s t uee, as shown above, i t i s not a 
(129) . Hammond, T. ; i tonic I^iplompcy •Revisitf^d; Orbis,Vol. 
XEX, ; i n t e r 1976, Hc,^. 
This point i s far. from the focus of the p resen t study. 
Nevertheless , the wr i t e r provides t he following referen-
ces which scrut inis '^ such I s r a e l i a l legat ions? Rabi' , 
•Dx.H. 5 The Philosophy of I s r a e l i Propaganda. (Beiruts 
P . I . O . H r s i a r c l C e n t r e , P a l e s t i n e Monograph Ser ies 
No. 72, 1970), Sayegh,DroF. ? Zionist Diplomac.y; 
(Bei ru t ; P.L.O. Resrarch Centre, P a l e s t i n e Monogr^h 
Ser ies N0.I3, 1969) and Hatem,Dr.A. 5 Information and 
Ihe -.irab Causes (Jjondon; Lunynans, 1975X1 
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s t r^ . tcgical iy va i ' d alternativf=. In fac t , Pi-oFidr^nt S-^dat 
of Egypt expressed his awarenoog of these s t r a t e g i c consider-
a t ions when he declared tha t the i s sue of I s r a e l going 
nuclcsr i s "e play which does not f r ighten u s . ' ^ 
'^3 gc impli-d th rea t , a token nuclear f^rco for I s r a e l can 
L. of some ef fec t but su long as tne acqu is i t ion i s not pub-
l i c l y df'Cl-^r'^d or,:;f d'-clpr-d, no qupn t i t ^ t ive qccount i s 
the effect wi l l mortly be 
picvided by I s r a e l . In chis case, i t v i l l h-^ vo an r j f c t but / 
jn C'JS masses re thor than on the decision-maker who wi l l be 
faced by c lea r ly shaped a l t e r n a t i v e s . Is a bargaining chip', 
i t i s qu i te common in I s r a e l i p o s i t i o n on the i s sue . Onp typ ica l 
^xampl ^ i s Moshe Dayan's dec lara t ion tha t I s r a e l was maintain-
ing t'.'c s c i e n t i f i c and technological capacity to build an atom-
i c bom-b j u s t in case ^rqb tbr-atoned to use one. "^ Thc 
rationalr> behind the us^ ^ of I s r a e l ' s nuclear c-^pability 
(130) orn/'/vvft , "j I'".. O* ^>J^^,..^K•^'' 
@ In an in to rv i v vith T rencvned author i ty on the - i'"-j c t , he be-
l ieved t n a t in case of an I s r a e l i dec la ra t ion of the acq-
u i s i t i o n of a nuclear force,Egypt ought bo rrady to exe r t i se 
a d^tcxroiat, not nec3ss?ri ly nucl^^ar in the early stag^.He 
su^-gcsbid £ cthcmical or b io logica l detei'-r-nt in t h a t s tage . 
I s r a e l h'^ c' oho-j-.T a considerable degree of foar from a po t en t -
i a l Egyptian deployment of nerve gas weapons. According to a 
repor t by The Tribune (Chandigarh),June 8,1976,quo t ing t he 
Boston Sunday Glob, I s r a e l i a u t h o r i t i e s have been rushing 
secre t ly to produce more than throe mil l ion gas masks . . . 
Tho snid r^^port s"^ " 'o tha t I s r a e l i offici-^ls dr^cided not 
to t -11 th'- publ ic or d i s t r i b u t e the mq=ks. 
(131) Tribune (Chandigarh), July 29,1976. 
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a s a bargFiiniRs; c h i p , i ? t o p r o b i M t qny I r a b p^^ivaricpmont i n 
t h e f i e l d . The s t r a t e g i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n which Dayan mus t havs 
h-^d i n mind when m a n i p u l a t i n g t h e / I d e a i s an I s r a e l i s u p e r -
i o r i t y i n huxs f i e l d . The Ej;,yptian p r o p o s a l t h a t qny pe^aco 
t r e a t y t o "b^ c o n c l u d e d be tween Egyp t and I s r a e l shou ld 
i n c l u d e an I s r a e l i pled^-,e n o t to d e p l o y o r t r s t n u c l e a r 
wcaponc^ ^ c o u l d b-^ u n p r s t o o d a s a c o u n t e r - c h i p aimed a t 
n e g a t i n g t h e I s r a e l i c h i p , 
A SUGGESTED SBlRGH 
Hav ing discuss-'^d an p d e q u a t o numbr^r of v i e w s pxempl i fy -
i n g d i f f e r e n t ' s e a r c h ' a t t e m p t s , t h e w r i t p r w i l l no\, p r o c e e d 
"CO p r e s e n t b i s . 
I n o r c e r t o impos~ d i s c i p l i n ' ^ on t h e n u c l e a r p r o l i f -
e r a t i o n phenomenon, e s p e c i a l l y a s f a r a s t h e u n d e r l y i n g 
r e a s o n s a r e c o n c e r n e d , t h e w r i t e r s u g g e s t s t h e f o l l o w i n g 
' s e a r c h ' ; 
( l ) Tfap e i s a d i a l e c t i c i n t ^ r p c t i nn brtwe^-o t^^a n-"-d to 
enhance n-^itional s e c u r i t y and t h o a c q u i s i t i o n of 
w e a p o n - g r a d e f i s s i l e m a t e r i a l s i n t n e a n t e x t of a 
7 3ai, o r - o r i e n t o d n u c l e a r p rogramme, Eor t h o s e c o u n t r i e s 
who have go t a c u t e c a s e s of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , t h e 
( 1 3 2 ) . * n-n/iA'^ c { Zj [L'\ ) ^ i ^ ' V i 
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mcdo-1 provided up t i l now i s b^sod on npitional sec-
u r i ty considerat ions as the present nuclear we^on 
countrir^s arc assumed to be enjoying the maximum 
poss ib le secur i ty . 
(2) Th: new synthesis r e s u l t i n g from such dialogue i s to 
be embodied in the acquis i t ion of a nucl'^ar force , mogitly 
tok'>a>'^''^couse those powers which dev-lopod, since 
"/orld vA/'ar I I , global i n t e r e s t s , have a l rea iy got an 
acce'-s to s t r a t e g i c nuclear forces . 
(3) The Tcquisit ion o'' 'vop.r>on-p:rnd'^  f i s s i l e matf^rials i^ ^ 
t JC context of a v-apon-oriented programme i s an option 
exercised to ef fec tuate an assumed ' c r e d i b l e ' i n t e r -
action between p o l i t i c a l succes'= and mi l i t a ry power 
on the one hand and beti'een the po l i t i co -mi l i t a r^ / 
( s t r a t e g i c ) pos ture of a given nat ional pover and the 
i n t cnat ional system, on th^^ other hand. 
(4) The p r e s t i g e fac tor , though by no m^ans important in 
in a study li'ice t h i s wher^- 'power' i s the frame of 
r-^ferei-ce, has become in tegra ted in the nuclear 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n phenome'ncn. Yot, i t s r o l " remains on-^  
of acce le ra t ing the spread proc ss . The image of a 
nucle-ir weapon country i s not only t h a t of a permanent 
lu'-nbe- o± th-^ United Nations but also of a developed and 
promislT^g socie ty . 
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(5) Except for land reformation, d r i l l i n g and engineering 
the econoriiic u t i l i t y of nuclear explosives i s s t i l l 
highly con-^rov'->reipl and no d'-^cipiV'^ theory hpip y^t 
been reached a t . 
PIET I I 
CH/I'TER I I I 
I I'; T E R P R E T 1 T I 0 K 
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I I I . BIJlEBPKETi^ION 
IT .TTI , t: II^ ITRODUGTIOW 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r o c e s s , which i s t he t h i r d s tep 
i n t h i s me thodo log ica l .vjorlc_ i s r a t h e r complex i n the 
sense t h a t i t i n c l u d e s , i n one and the same t i m e , 
s y n t h e s i s and the e r e c t i o n of p r e d i c t e d p a t t e r n s of 
b e h a v i o u r . As for s y n t h e s i s , i t v^/ill be e f f e c t e d by 
means of a sub-j-process of d e s c r i p t i v e approach to t h e 
environment w i t h i n which the phenomenon s e l e c t e d for 
study e x i s t § . On t h e o t h e r hand, the e r e c t i o n of 
p r e d i c t e d p a t t e r n s o f behaviour v^/ill be worked out by 
means of a compara t ive approach t o t h e two c a s e s o f 
China and p r a n c e . The cho ice of China and P r a n c e h a s 
been governed by some r e s e a r c h concep tua l r e q u i r e m e n t s * 
P i r s t , they a r e no t i d e n t i f i e d as oapcrs-powers though 
they c e r t a i n l y a s p i r e t o . This r e s e a r c h , i n i t s c a p a c i t y 
as an a t tempt i n t h e f i e l d of s t r a t e g y and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , 
should seek to a s s i s t i n b e t t e r dec i s ion - , k i n c in_:2hird 
World c o u n t r i e s ? hence t h e e x c l u s i o n of t h e p r e s e n t s u p e r -
powers where p o s s i b l e . Second, t h e y r e p r e s e n t two 
d i f f e r e n t s o t s of r e a s o n s u n d e r l y i n g t h e i r e x o r c i s e of t h e 
n u c l e a r o p t i o n . Whereas the d i a l e c t i c i n t e r a c t i o n between 
the p r e - r e qui s i t e s of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y r„C'i-nst-^c 
p o t e n t i a l n u c l e a r adver sa ry and a n u c l e a r a l l y unprepared 
t o extend e f f e c t i v e n u c l e a r s h i e l d i n g o r p repa red to 
withdraw i t s p o l i t i c a l suppor t any t i m e , was t h e major 
u rge for t h e Prench o p t i o n , t h e d i a l e c t i c i n t e r a c t i o n 
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between national pov^cr and the xnternational system was 
believed to bo the major urge for China to have an 
access to a national nuclear power. 
As the frame of reference i s basically one of power, 
the entire process of interpretat ion wil l be carried out 
in terms of the impact, current and predicted, of nuclear 
proliferat ion - as identif ied in Part I I , Chapter I -
on strategy and national security, the two principal 
guages of power. , -
The central ascumption underlying the interpreta t ion 
process i s that the acquisition of weapon-grade f i s s i l e 
materials does add, quantitatively as well as qual i ta t ively, 
to the po\^er of a given unit of the internat ional system, 
to affect, harm or even destroy, the national i n t e re s t s 
of another unit or group of un i t s . I t , therefore, adds 
th ' 
to the strategic power of the N unit to exercise one 
degree or anothei of control over the behaviour of an 
adversary. Such control, v^ e assume, may not necessarily 
bo bridling or coercive. I t may equally be provocative, 
especially in the case of an escalation-prone confl ict . 
The wr i t e r ' s commatmont to the dialect ic theme has 
been the produce of h is reading of l i t e r a tu r e on he subject, 
part icular ly those writings emanating from the sO*-called 
near nuclear countries, whei'e i t is vaguely, i f ever, 
conceived that quantitative change a l t e r s qual i ty, Ilr, 
K'. Subrahmanyam hinted at t h i s observation v^ /hen he wrote 
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t h a t : "frosh fron the nonioriGs of tho s t r a t e g i c bonbiiig 
and tliG f i ro r a i d s on Ger..i.an;y and a feX eas ie r uotiiod of 
carrying out ccxjQt bon"bing and f l a t t e r i r i ^ out c i t i e s " . (133) 
I t i s a f i rn be l i e f of the wr i te r t h a t ner j nuclear pov;ers 
w i l l cer ta in ly design be t t e r s t r a t e g i c s r.nd na t iona l securi ty 
doct r ines should they doveloio cii ' a p r i o r i ' understanding 
of the q u a l i t a t i v e change soon to apperj a f te r the 
acqu i s i t ion of weapon-grade f i s s i l e n a t e r i a l s in the context 
of a weapon-oriented prograLH-ie.. 
The i n a b i l i t y to- conceive such changes n ight very 
ensi ly give way to s e l f -des t ruc t ive a t t i t u d e s such as 
those t h a t Hans Wiorgenthau nepjnt v^ /hen he spoke of "the 
very forces that nu l l i f y (the nuclear) advantage and tu rn 
i t against (the / jner icans) . . . . . . " (134) I t i s noteworthy 
tha t the Chinese, i n the w r i t e r ' s ana ly s i s , developed the 
idea tha-t nuclear weapons were no nore than a. paper t i g e r 
in order to prevent the growth of any such a t t i t u d e s in 
China. The l a t e Chinese leader Mao kept on hannering 
on tha t harp t i l l China's nuclear development reached 
a stage where the people becaxie prepared to accept a l l 
consequences of t h e i r nuclear prograa-iae. 
(133) Subrahnejiya!",K. 5 The Role of Huclccj V/ecapons i n 
In t e rna t i ona l Rela t ions ; IPSA j--\xrnr,l, July 19.7. >' p . 1. 
(134) Morgenthau,H.5 P o l i t i c s i n the Twentieth Century; 
(Chicago!University of Chicago Press, ' 
I97l,),p.l9.* 
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;.rL unfiorstn.ncUno, o l 'ulie in jp .c t o l t h e r x q u i s i t i c n 
of nacle- . r \1ec.jon3 on s t r c t o g y pjiC n - t ion^- l s e c u r i t y voulC 
n e c e s s i t a t e t h e choice of devclopuent of r, c r i t e r i o n by 
t h e helj) of \Jhich ^/e can a s sec s the course of a n a l y s i s 
rn-cl, as r v/hole, a s s e s s the e n t i r e r e l a t i o n suhjcctec ' 
t o study* 
/Jlid our i n t e r j ^ r e t r t i o n of the i i i j a c t of t h e 
a c q u i s i t i o n of v/eai^on-yraJe f i s s i l e n a t e r i a l s in the 
con tex t of a ; ;eapon-orientecl jpro2,ra.i]ie on the grmcl s t r a t e g y 
and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y d o c t r i n e oi a [:,x^eii u n i t of the 
p r e s e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e i , ^ie ..lust f i n d soae e f f i c i ency 
c r i t e r i o n a,6Pinst vjhich -vje c-n - s s e s s t b e u t i l i t y of any 
such strate2,y or n a t i o n a l s ecu r i t y d o c t r i n e . JIS j.-'0\Jer i s xhe 
frcJie of r e f e r e n c e for t h i s study -jic. a s t h e p r o c e s s of t h e 
a c q u i s i t i o n of such i i a t e r i a l s has got a r ^ - l a t i o n to tne 
n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y of a. given country,, i t i s suggested 
t h a t the degree of e f f e c t i n g the hehaviour of t h e 
advers '^ry, r e a l or ^ . o t c n t i a l , can he enploycd as cji 
e f f i c i e n c y c r i t e r i o n . Such c r i t e r i o n has got one e s s e n t i a l 
advantage i t v/ould h e l p c o r r e c t t he cho ice of a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
I f t h e hchaviour of a g iven adver sa ry i s not n o d i f i e d in 
t h e \^ay expected to appear as a r e s u l t of t h e choice of an 
a l t e r n a t i v e s ^ t h e dc- 'uc t ion i s t h a t t h e choice was f a u l t y . 
I t n i g h t even i n - . i c a t e sone 1 sunder s t a n d i n g of t h e 
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p a t t e r n s and motives of the bohaviour of the adversary. 
This suggested c r i t e r i o n i s the most becoming to an 
environment of nuclear de te r rence . Roy Jones admitted 
that such en environment "involves a necessary concern 
with the psychological outlook of t h e adversary, or 
p o t e n t i a l adversary". (135) because, "in a deterrence 
s i t u a t i o n each party sees the other as a p o t e n t i a l 
i n f l i c t e r of harm", as Jones summed i t up in h i s ana lys i s 
of de te r rence . The wr i t e r has s t ressed the need for a 
d i a l e c t i c outlook to any such s i t ua t i on simply because 
the power r e l a t i o n s in the i n t e rna t i ona l s t r a t e g i c 
environment are governed by act ion and r eac t ion , in the 
same v^ ay tha t Arnold Toynbce suggested in his challenge 
and response h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r i s e and 
f a l l of c i v i l i z c t i o n s . 
The suggested c r i t e r i o n can also help decide which 
vehicle a s t ra tegy should u s e . / r i t i n g on s imilar l i n e s , 
Wolfers saids "A naval blockade, a nuclear t h r e a t , a 
grant of a id , a summit meeting are or are not v-ehicles 
of policy depending on v;hether they offer a reasonable 
chance of af fec t ing the behaviour of o the rs in l i n o with 
o n e ' s ov;n goals" . (136) 
(135) Jones , R. ; Wu_clear Deterrence^ (London iic:ufXo4:;_:e, 
L KcganTYaul, 3968)", p . 3 . 
(136) Y/olfors, A. ^Vehicles of P o l i t i c a l S t ra tegy; i n : 
Abshire, D. & Allen, R. (eds"'..), 
N at io nal S o curit3^ »(??cw Yorks Frederick 
A. Praeger , 1963), p.272. 
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I f the p o s s i b i l i t y of u t i l i z i n g the acqu i s i t ion of 
nucloar weapons, or - a t l e a s t the weapon-grade f i s s i l e 
ma te r i a l s i n the context of a weapon-orientod programme -
as a source of t h r e a t , inc luding the wi l l ingness to use 
them and, i n a more developed s tage, to work for q u a l i t a t i v e 
supe r io r i ty , i s expected to affect the na t iona l secur i ty 
of the adversary, the decision to go nuclear should not bo 
delayed as any such delay might very eas i ly r e s u l t i n oji 
e lusive na t iona l securi ty doctr ine or in imaginary 
secur i ty needs, which v^ill have but a zero effect on the 
adversary, IJX the l a t t e r case the given country w i l l i n 
no way be able to design a token nuclear force and, 
l a t e r , a second s t r ike c a p a b i l i t y . Moreover, the r e l a t i o n s 
of conventional force to nuclear force within a na t iona l 
secur i ty doc t r ine , in case t h i s i s sue i s not s e t t l e d , can 
br ing about a s t r r t o g i c posture of bui l t -- in f a t a l mis takes . 
This was, for exrjnple, the case of UATO which did not decide 
c lear ly such r e l a t i o n , o-^ . l e a s t quan':;itatiVGly. ..s the NATO 
opted for becominii more and more dependent on a nuclear 
s t r i k e capab i l i ty for defence agains t any larcaw Pact 
a t t ack , the re came a tirae vjhon i t s conventioni-'l forces 
^eca i^ l o s s caiablc of c^^ntonting-a -:ajorjiic6(nventicnrl' '•>' 1 
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a t t ack . (137) Tiicreforo, the need to r e so r t to nuclear 
weapons has fund am oixt a l l y increased, a fact which, might 
i n s t i g a t e the \/arsav^ Pact to launch a nuclear f i r s t - s t r i k e 
( ' '57). I n t e r n a t i o n a l Herald Trihune. j^ugust 2v, 1976. Gen. 
Alexander Kaig, S u p r cm o~'C o mm an d e r of jr^ TO forces 
declared thct NATO's grovi^ing r e l i ance on the 
nuclear deterrent i s undos i r a t l e hecause atomic 
capohil i ty crnnet counter the growing f l e x i b i l i t y 
of i/arsav forces and cal led for immediate cn.d 
urgent improvements of I\fATO conventionol. forces . 
I t i s indeed astonishing tha.t such viev^s 
were not viewed by K.'.TO o f f i c i a l s except as l a t e 
as 1976, though George Ba l l , according to 
Kissinger ( fn .35) , p.296,argued during a t a l k 
with !\T',T0 par l iamentar ians - tha t the Cuba,n 
c r i s i s proved the importance of super io r i ty i n 
conventiona,! weapons (K i s s inge r ' s V'jorlc v;as 
published i n 1963). 
On the o ther hand, Fischer pointed at a 
problem which Haig seems to have neglected when 
urging for immediate improvements of NATO 
conventional fo rces . Accoramg to F i sche r , 
"further '/arsaw Pact increases in force s ize 
or improvements in force qual i ty could to some 
extent offset l\ii,TO improvements". See for a 
f u l l e r discussions F ischer , R. 5 Def'endinij, the 
Central Front, The Balance of Forces] XEo^^^bn; 
I lSb , Adelphi Papers, No.l27, 1976), p . 3^  9^ 
The p o s s i b i l i t y re fe r red to by Fischer 
could be enhanced by the f indings of a procedural 
study conducted by Williojn Jones . One of the 
f indings i s t ha t the Soviet doctr ine d i r e c t s 
careful a t t en t ion always he paid to "±ho 
cor re lo t ion of f o r ce s " . Sees Jones, Vf,; 
i lodell ing Soviet Behaviour and Deterrenco; _A 
Procedure fo r Evaluating"MiTitary Forces; (Sant 
Monica, OA., USA; RAND Corporation, H-1065-PR, 
June 1974), pp.77-78. 
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en t i r e ly against tlio iDUblislicd ca lcu la t ions and scenarios 
of 'EjtSO, (This n i s t akc night not "be the caso of the 
United S ta tes which maintains a nunor ica l ly la rgo 
conventional fo rce . ) Had tha t very r e l a t i o n been cleao* 
fron the "beginning, i t would ha.vo created a. favourable 
s t r a t e g i c posture for the NATO v i s - a - v i s the vjarsa^ w Pact , 
I t seens t ha t the ^jrerdso fomula ted by NATO s t ra tegy 
designers vjas one of a l7ar sav^ j Pact najor conventional 
t h rus t into West Europe tha t could be encountered t i l l 
the so-ca.lled 'pause ' s t r a t e g i c doctr ine could be effected* 
But the Warsaw Pact s t r a t e g i s t s seera to have been aware 
of the NATO's s t ra tegy p rec i ses and hence developed an 
easy way to help then avoid a posture i n Vi/hich t h e i r 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l beha^viour r e a c t s r a the r than a c t s . 
That easy vi/ay was to acquire conventional s u p e r i o r i t y . 
An explanation of the reason underlying such d i f f i c u l t 
s t r a t e g i c posture for NATO nay be found in the s t ruc tu re 
of Western technology in general ohd Anerican technology 
in spec i f i c , which nust have encouraged i t s s t r a t e g i c 
planners to perceive securi ty in t e r n s of an a m s race 
r a the r than of an arns control ,(138) Although the 
wr i t e r , p r inax i ly does not prefer the percept ion of secur i ty 
i n t e r n s of e i the r an arns race or arns con t ro l , the 'way' 
N7xT0 s t r a t e g i s t s i n t e rp r e t ed securi ty in t e r n s of an 
arns race was r a the r native because i n the context 
(1 38) J a i n , J . ; India and Pisarnanent ; (New Delhi : Ra.dia,nt 
Pub l i she r s , T97 r^) ,Vol.1 , p . 65»(l^o'tcs a l e t t e r 
fron Eisenhower to Nehru wherein the forner 
c a l l s for a cessat ion of t e s t s r a the r than 
for disoxnanent. 
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of nuclear weapons, WG aro not e n t i t l e d to analyse 
in tcrvas of t r a d i t i o n a l off enco-def enco environment, (139) 
I t i s qui te obvious from the previous survey ~ tha t 
American s t r a t e g i s t s wore labouring mentally on the 
premise of a possible iLussian and "or Warsaw Pact 
'of fence ' against ?jhich they had to 'defend' Western 
Europe, Moreover, i^merican na t i ona l secur i ty exper ts 
suggest t ha t what they conceived as success i n solving 
nuclear s t ra tegy problems was due to viewing thorn as 
opera t iona l problems; i . e . , looking a t them i n the eyes 
of the empir ic i s t — and with the eyes of the r e a l i s t , 
(140) But the re i s no r a t i o n a l e behind excluding a l l 
premises except that of a Russian cnd/or \/arsav; Pact 
th ru? t 03^  -r j'isoi* conventionol a t t a ck . Despite the 
fact t h a t no Soviet version has been ava i lab le to t he 
wr i t e r on t h i s i s t u e , a like-minded idea v.'as voiced by 
Marshal -^ndrei Grcchko, the then Soviet Defence I l i n i s t e r 
who declaimed that the year 1976 "must be a year of growth 
for the combat power of (Russian) mi l i t a ry forces" 
(139) Smrrt, I , ; P o l i t i c a l Implications^ ins Pcld,B.& Others, 
Tc'ds.) , (~fn. 93), P. 243. 
(140). s^e L t , Ool. Jieye ' s appra isa l of George Lincoln 
as an a rch i t ec t in nuc lear s t r a t egy , ins Jordan, 
Col, A. (ed^) s issucs of l ia t ional Securi ty i n the 
1970s; (Londons Prederick ^i. Praeger I n c . , 1967), 
pp.TB^19. 
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and tha t the Soviet Union \viii. strengthen i t s mi l i t a ry 
pov/er ( in 1976) and over the next f ive yea r s" . (141) 
I t could "be understood, t he re fo re , tha t the Soviet Union 
has decided to continue, over the five years to come, 
improving i t s conventional forces though they have not 
hecn named as such "by Grechko. The outcome i s , c e r t a i n l y , 
a cont inuat ion of t he present NATO dilemmia. 
The previouis discussion indieat_es t h a t "bhe degree 
of affect ing the behaviour of an adversary i s a working 
c r i t e r i o n to t e s t the v a l i d i t y of a na t iona l securi ty 
doc t r ine . This c r i t e r i o n n e c e s s i t a t e s a sound understanding 
of., the motivos and p a t t e r n s of behaviour of a given 
was 
adversary. The evaluation of the degree/follo\;ed by a 
process of modifying the na t iona l securi ty doctr ine and, 
consequently, the grand s t ra tegy and i t s veh i c l e s . The 
evaluat ion step i s subs t an t i a l in the sense t h a t i t i s 
the juncture where we can detect the p i t f a l l s of the 
doc t r ines . 
Per those non^^nuclcar powers which might exercise 
the nuclear option i n a foreseeable fu ture , the p i t f a l l s 
encountered by the present nuclear prograanmes would become 
se l f -de fea t ing . In t h i s r e s p e c t , the survival i s sue must 
any 
be h ighl ighted as/misunderstanding of i t vjill n a t u r a l l y 
lead to another misunderstanding of t h e requirements 
for su rv iva l , as Dr. Kiss inger h in ted a t . 
(141).. The Hindustan Times, liarch 19, 1976, 
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I I . I I I . 2 . CHAR/,CTEFJSTICS OF fflJ.CLE7\R EKVIilOMEM ; 
No understnjafi'ing of t h e i n p a c t of t h e o .cqu is i t ion 
of woapon-grr.de f i s s i l e n a t c r i a l s i n the c o n t o x f of a, 
vv'Gapon-oriented progrrnflG on t h e grand s t r a t e g y and 
n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y doctrxno of c given u n i t - e.s 
mani fes t a t i ons of t n e power the u n i t r e a l l y i n 
i n t e r a c t i o n - can he nado p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t a p r i o r 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l nuc l ea r s t r a t e g i c 
environment . Th is env i ronnen t has developed i t s own 
assumpt ions which, w i l l e v t n t u a l l y he lp u s develop a 
h o t t e r unde r s t and ing of t h e phenomenon of n u c l e a r 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n , \7o assume t h a t t h o s e c o u n t r i e s which 
w i l l go nuc lea r i n a f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e w i l l draw 
t h e i r p a t t e r n s of behaviour from t h i s envi ronment . 
The c e n t r a l assumption i n t h e p r e s e n t env i ronuont 
i s thub t h e ' a c t o r ' o r ' p l a y e r ' or ' p a r t y ' does develop 
some proper r a t i o n a l i t y which would u n d e r l i e and modify 
h i s pa , t t e rns of behaviour v i s - a - v i s a n u c l e a r a d v e r s a r y . 
Thus we need not be haunted by t h o s e a p o c l y p t i c v i s i o n s 
adumbrated i n l i t e r a t u r e on, n u c l e a r p r o l i f e r a t i o n . This 
assumption has been training v a l i d i t y over s i n c e t h e 
environiaont evolved i n t o unacl^^ar duopoly and s t r a t e g i c 
n u c l e a r p a r i t y between t h e two sapc r -powors . So Labedz, 
i n h i s a n a l y s i s of Sovie t behav iour , could po in t a t 
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Soviet r e s t r a i n t in the case of tlio bombing of Hanoi-, 
for oxanplo. (142) Given the elements of Soviet na t iona l 
po\vor alone - and excluding any Soviet understanding of 
the c l i a r ac t e r i s t i c s cf the i n t e r n a t i o n a l nuclear s t r a t e g i c 
environment, tiie Soviet Union would have been ca:,cJbLo 
cf oGCrlatrnii the c r i s i s to a ft^rtii-er r-unc ,h-erc i t ceuld 
manipulate i t s nuclear power. This r e s t r a i n t , v/hich super-
power s t r a t e g i s t s a re fond of ca l l ing ' sense of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y • i s bel ieved to be an outcone of a 
percept ion t h a t a nuclear s t r i k e against a nuclear 
adversary would not pass without roprisa .1. Consequently, 
a second s t r ike capabi l i ty of the attaolied would be f a t a l 
to the a t t acke r as the l a t t e r ' s f i r s t agains t the former* 
Given the daxiage promised by the use of nuclear weapons, 
the cost would be ca lcula ted by a r a t i o n a l ac tor or player 
(142) labedz, L . ; The Soviet Union & \ /es torh Suropc; ins 
Pactor , li, & Others (,eds,)j Strategy 
for the \ /est ; (Londons IJacdtThaia ahd 
Tanc ' s , 1974), p .123 . 
@ For a de ta i led discussion, sees Turner, G.j The 
Influence of Modern y/capons on Strategy ; in""TTrrnor, 
G»& Challcner, R. (eds^ , Ilationa 1 Securi ty i n the 
Nuclear ^'.gc; (New York: Prederich A* Praegor, 196C), 
p . 6 1 . He t h e r e i n discusses how the only act ion i s to 
construct a strategy "to deter the Soviet Union by 
insur ing i t s defeat along with (.'jiicricc' s) own". 
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as unacccptalolG. HGncG the cvclut ion of the associa ted 
assumption that "nations non' /^icw i n the bu i ld ing of 
v^oapons whoso purpose i s not to bo used, Y;hosc n a m 
function i s seen as the deterr ing of other nuclear weapons 
from using t h e i r s " . (l43) These are the cen t r a l assumptions 
of t h e present i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i c environment, and 
we assume tha t the accordinly cendxtioned p a t t e r n s of 
behaviour have bccomo ' h a b i t u a l ' and w i l l remain so far -
a t l c a s t - a foreseeable f u t u r e . (144) 
However, the assumptions re fer red to c:iro obviously 
r e s t r i c t e d to an uncloarizod environment v\;hcrc t h e p a r t i e s 
to a power s t ruggle are nuclear atid whore nuclear pov^cr 
has already become an i n t eg ra l element of xhe na t i ona l 
power. In t l i i s r e spec t , i t seems thp t for the v^/ould-be 
nuclear u n i t s of t h e present i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, the 
case may represent the se t t ing of new environment, espec ia l ly 
©@ Emphasis i s o r i g i n a l . 
(143) 'FT ank, J . 5 Sanity and Survival : P sychqlo £,ic a l 
.xspccts of War and pcoco;~(lJoi'^don; 
Bar r ie r and lieckliff, 19 67), P.2C'. 
(144) By \a.rtuc of the ;^grecment between the United S t a t e s 
/ t h e end/soviet Union on the prevention of Nuclear \7ar(Soc 
Appendix v ) , both p a r t i e s have declared t h e i r 
i n s i s t ence on t ry ing to prevent tl^e r i s e of 
s i t u a t i o n s which m.ay lead to the outbreak of a 
nuclear war and in case such a s i t u a t i o n mater ia l iz cs , 
they should "immediately enter in to urgent 
consu l ta t ions" 
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as the candidato countries aro involved in regional conflicts 
of nat ional is t tendencies-and they free or, ra ther loolievG to 
face urgent security problems v/hich the fircpovjcr promised 
by nuclearization miny substantially enhance. \/est -^sia i s 
a good case in point. Ihc v;ork being done in I s r ae l on 
delivery systems in accordance with the acquisition of 
vi/eapon-grado f i s s i l e materials cind I s r a e l ' s insis tence 
on a threat being directed to i t s survival suggests that , 
i f manufactured ^nuclear weapons wi l l be meant for use and 
that dotrronce notions arc only subsidiary. On the other 
hand, Egypt vicv»/s I s r c a l ' s declaratory nuclearization as 
posing a question of "to be or not to bo" * \7hat wi l l a 
nuclear Is rae l deter in the behaviour of a non-nuclear 
Egypt? The only answer to the quosticn i s the poss ibi l i ty 
of an Egyptian massive conventional attack, in which case 
Is rae l wil l conceive of i t s nuclear capability in terms of a 
quantitative boost to i t s firepo\:/er, not as a deterrent . 
Iji overview of the present interna,tional s trategic 
environment would indicate that the nuclear powers enjoy 
more security than non-nuclco.r powers and that their grpn.d 
strategies have got b^^tter options. This con. be accounted 
for by the h i s to r ica l observation that nuclcair powers have 
not, since they wen.t nuclear, faced rea l t h r e r t s to their 
national security. The case of Britain i s not relevant as 
@ Egypt's Foreign Minister was reported to have l i t e r a l l y 
borrowed th i s expression in an interview published in 
£ l £ ^ I ^ - ( C a i r o ) , April 30, 1976 . 
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Bri ta in has faced a shrinkage of t r ad i t iona l po l i t i ca l 
influence, not a threat to national security. This 
historically-accountcd-for character is t ic i s apt at 
ocllr?.ncing the process of nuclear prol i fcrat ioi i . In the 
case of regional confl icts , v^ c can now assume, the acquisition 
of vi/capon-grade f ibsi lc ua tc r i a l s in the contczt of 
v7eapon-oriented programme, vjill nuclcarize the sub-
environnent in case the non-nuclear party perceives 
the character is t ics of 3 nuclear environment. I'hc 
f i r s t pprty to go nuclear might not, as has been discussed, 
but the second v\'ill certainly pcrccivc. i t . The v-Titery^in 
th i s respect , does not admit Beaton's thes is that there 
i s considerable difficulty in making assumptions a,bout 
the po l i t i ca l bchoviour of a given country when a 
neighbouring r iva l country acquires a stockpile of 
Plutonium or a delivery system of a higher performance.(145) 
I t should not be adiiitted because while the f i r s t 
acquisition wil l bo instigated by 'cenmon' national 
security considorations, the second will be inst igated 
by the ' speci f ic ' threat inherent in a declared nuclear 
force, assuming that the nat ion-state docs not tend to 
surrender or to give in . 
The present nuclear environment, in -flhich s'cates 
tend to interpret the i r in teres ts in terms of national 
power, there i s marked decline of designing behaviour in 
(l45) Beaton, L.s International Po l i t i c a l Contort; i n ; 
Willrich, M. (ed), (±n.9), p.'7F7 
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t o rn s of v.'hat i s known r.s the po l i t i c? , l l y pos s ib l e , 
v i s - n - v i s the p o l i t i c a l l y inpo.:;sil3lc, In fac t , the so 
ejcc t\/in concepts of the pro-nuclorx stage ¥/hen problans 
of nationcal s e c u r i t y . . . . " v/crc s iupler and events novod 
norc slov^ly and the cor rec t ive e f fec t s of experience 
played a big,.^er r o l e " . (146) J^S the inpact of the 
a c q u i s i t i o n of a nuclear force i s bas ica l ly q u a l i t a t i v o j 
r a d i c a l chrji^es should bo expected to be iiiposed on the 
e n t i r e power-structure of the na t ion s t a t e ; and as the 
f i r s t acquis i t ion of a token force w i l l ^car up such 
r a d i c a l chnnoos, "the process of re-exej-iininc the a ins 
of na t iona l policy should be r continuous one. (14-7) But 
continuous re-exrjnination would r e s u l t i n enforcing 
the uncer ta in ty elenent on two l e v e l s ; the l eve l a t 
which Beaton pointed and the l eve l of the s t r a t e g i c 
th pla.nning of the IT— po'».'cr. The conposi t ion of t h i s 
i n t e r a c t i o n i s the a^jpcarrnce of a sot of ' s t r a t e g i c a l t e r -
na. t ives ' for behaviour , ra ther than a set of p o l i t i c a l l y poss ib le 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ .^  
(14-6) Kahn, E.; On TherDonucleag/«(Princetons P r i n c e t o n 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967) , p . 124. 
(147) Garnet t , J . j ( e d . ) °, Thoor i e s of Peace jb Secu r i t y ; 
"(lj'o~ndbn:Macnillan & "Co'.'" "Ltd., 
1 9 7 0 ) , p . 1 4 . 
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and j jol i t iccl ly inpossiole notions. For the f i r s t t ine 
inMrJi 's rocorclGcl hi story, a nuoloar povjor can con^jlotely 
disarm i t s non-nuclear aclvorsary. \/'e can construct a 
simulation or a scenario o£ a nediun-sized or snail povvor 
having access to nuclear \;Ga,poiis ocfore i t s advers^'ry does 
and thus consif.er t h i s a l ternat ive against v^hich "there 
i s no conceivable def once".(148) On the other hmid, there 
i s a, possibi l i ty of u t i l iz ing the nearly acquired nuclear 
force tc force the adversary to give in, by th rea t s . 
Farthering the sinultion ^^ ;e wil l find i t ' iaaginable ' in 
the context of a.ction-re-action that a. supor-pov^er 
reta.lia,tes in case i t discovers that the prior actions 
t i l l e d the balcince of power in favour of i t s adversary 
and the scenario can s t i l l be farthered to reach a 
nuclear exchange between the two super-powers, called 
a 'nuclear holocaust ' . In a nuclear context, therefore, 
there i s r^ o po l i t i ca l ly possible v i s -a -v is po l i t i ca l ly 
possible. There i s , instead, an inventory of s t ra tegic 
a l ternat ives . 
The inventory of s t ra tegic a l ternat ives referred 
to includes some aspects v/hich, in a non-nuclear context, 
do not ap;_;ear so forcibly. Those are related to the elements 
(148) bchc-lling,T. ? Tho_ Piplomacy of Violence;ins Garnett, 
J .Ted', j \ TKi.~iT?"), P."757" 
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of na t iona l power such as onorgy (149) ond tochnology, (150) 
As for the rojige of those s t r a t e g i c a l t c m n t ivcs , 
i t extends "betyjcen the i n i t i a l options for tlic 
acqu i s i t i on of weapon-grade f i s s i l e naterie„ls i n tho 
context of a weapon-oriented progi^arxie and tl 'o 
su ic ida l nuclear exchange. This a rea i s c e r t a i n l y 
one of poyi/cr and the r e l a t i o n hotv^een any strai^egic 
a l t e r n a t i v e and t h e given s i t u a t i o n can "be ga.ugcd 
accordingly. In tae context of t h i s study, such 
a l t e r n a t i v e s arc to he gauged according to t h e i r 
i n t e r a c t i o n with the grand s t ra tegy and na.tional 
t h securi ty doctrine of the N—- povjer, vjith surviva l 
requ i renents and with t h e i r effect on r eg iona l s t a b i l i t y 
and i n s t a b i l i t y . 
(149) I^or a discussion of the r e l a t i o n hotween energy 
resources as an clenent of nationa-1 powers sees 
i^Iorgentha.u, H. 5 ( fn .26) , pp. 116-117. 
(I5i8^ The technology i s sue i s analysed in ; Vfill ians, R. 5 
p o l i t i c s gjid Techno logy j (London; McMillan 
P're'ss Ltd* l y v i ) . bee p.5o for a discussion 
of EdViiin Layton's . s ta tcnent that technology 
expands the p o l i t i c a l l y poss ib l e . 
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I I . I l l . 4 . GENLCI'' OF im -\^  . 'T.giL;"; SURVIV_...X: 
"In order to act witli c oDurajico in i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
a f i a i r c " , u r . Kicomger c ta ted , ''a country' nuct understanct 
the requirei ients for i t s curvival" though ouch knowledge 
doe& not necessar i ly guarantee a working nat ioi icl 
securi ty doc t r ine . (151) I n a nuclear enviroixient, 
the need to act with aoGurcnco bocones ec£.ential, and co 
does the need to underctand the r equ i rc icn t s for curvival 
ho cause of the c!.esre of da^"gc inherent in any nuclear 
exchange. £erha£)i, i t i e due to t h i s not ion tha t the 
naccive r e t a l i a t i o n doctrine pasied away and the e labora te 
doctrino of f l ex ib le rccponce CjOrang off. I t hc,s becone 
aluoot an axid'. of conteaporrry s t ra tegy t h a t the r e s o r t 
to nuclear weapons ought by no ;.ieans be a su ic ida l ac t i n 
a conteft of fury, ]}Iuclear s t r a t e g i s t s have cone to agree 
upon the thenc tha t " inherently high l e v e l s of 
dect ruct ivcness do not cons t i t u t e an optinuii deterrent 
or even a s a t i s l f c t o r y policy a^;ainst sonc kinds of 
t h r e a t s - at "che t a c t i c a l nuclear \;ca.ponr l e v e l . " (152) 
(151) ICL s s inger , H. 5 The jTec c ss i ty _^ f or _Cho ice 5 (N cw York; 
harbor c-,'"Brothcrs"i'ulDli5'hers, i960) . 
(152) Earnct, R. & Van Clca\.., '/. y S t r a t eg i c Adaptabi l i ty ; 
Orbis , Vol.XVIII, 
Pa l l 1974, p. 661. 
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Tlic current success of -tiic prosont sapor-powers in. 
unci e r s t an din 2 the requi rcuents of t h e i r surv iva l and 
the appreciot ion, impl i c i t or othcrv;ise, of ca.ch 
o t h e r ' s rcqui rcnonts are the two najor f ac to r s behind 
the devclopuent of the L;octr±ne of nuclear deterrence 
and the highest possinle desree of a d a p t a b i l i t y t ha t 
t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s enjoy. 
In r e t r o s p e c t , 'two approaches raaj provide help i n 
our attempt to understpnd the acqu i s i t i on of weapon-grade 
f i s s i l e iTiatcrials i n the context of weapon-oriented 
prograJ-ine as necessary for surv iva l . The f i r s t i s to 
find out such c o r r e l r t i o n a f te r weapon-grade f i s s i l e 
i i iaterials eje ava i lab le in the forii of a„ r ia t iona l ly-
controi led nuclear force , i/hatever token i t nay be. 
This was the ca,se of the United S ta t e s of i^aorica and 
t o ' a l e s se r degree, the Soviet Union and i s no more 
t h ex i s t ing though i t ney bo the c^-so of any N— power 
which nay tave an access t o nuclear v^/capons af ter 
s i n i l a r j j a t to rns . The second i s to have an "a p r i o r i " 
understanding of the necessity of the acqu i s i t i on of 
nucleax \<'er.pons for s u r v i v r l . This was tne ca.se of 
France, whose nuclear pro^p:.a.uie i s in to rp rc tod by 
Schlesinger i n t e r n s of wha'c he ca l led the 'Suez 
Psychology'(153) which he defined as "the fee l ing 
(15 3) Schlcsinger, J.? ( f n . 1 l ) , p .12 . 
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that when a na t ion pursued i t s own ob jec t ives , i t would 
lack the support of i t s r.ajor nuclear p l ly ' ' . The deduction, 
i n t h i s casu, i s s ign i f i can t ; na t iona l powers which resenhlG 
Prance, as far as the eloncnts of na t iona l power oxc 
concerned, sonet iaes ca l led nediun-sized powers (l54) find 
i t eas ier and nore responding to t h e i r surv iva l requi rencnts 
to have an a,ccess to a na t iona l nuclear force then to seek 
for the support of a major nuclear a l l y . 
(154) Prance hrs coupled i t s understanding of the 
roquirixiicnts for survival with a c lea r percept ion 
of i t s locat ion in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l systoii. A 
considerable p a r t . . .o f the success of the 'working ' 
concepts developed by Prance for i t s na t i ona l 
nuclear prograriio must be a t t r i b u t e d to the 
understanding i t developed for the requirements 
of i t s survival as coupled with a c lear percept ion 
of the l i m i t a t i o n s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l systan. 
This percept ion was best presented by the Prench 
Pres iden t Valery Giscard D'Estaing in a t a l k at the 
I n s t i t u t e of Higher National Defence S tudies i n 
June 1976. (Service de Presse et d'informr.tion, 
ijnbassadc de Prance a Londres; I\^ote D' Actual i t e, OTl/ 
DISCOM/36/76, June 21, 1976). TEC PrencTTpresident 
Vi/as reported to have c l a s s i f i e d the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
system i n t o ; 
A. The super-powers: The United S ta tes of /jaorica 
and the Soviet Union, i n 
order of power. Their dimensions 
ojid nature set them apa.rt from 
other powers. 
B. China; A specia l case . "I t may one 
day achieve super-power 
s t a t u s " , but t h i s "will take 
very many y e a r s , par t icu la , r ly 
as far as the handling of 
modern i n d u s t r i a l means i s 
concerned". 
C. Medium-sized "I't i s a more or l e s s homogeneous 
Powers; group in terms of populat ion, 
though with ce r t a in d i f fe rences . 
I t cons i s t s of count r ies of 
comparable s ize such as Japan, 
Pcdcrr.l Germany, Brito^in and Prance / . 
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On tlie other hand, the cccoaplislriiacrits of the n a t i o n a l 
secur i ty doctr ines of tho prcccnt r.^diu.i-sized jjO\/ers OXQ 
expected t o i n s t i g a t e s ' laller pov;ors to hrve an access 
to 'jeapon-gradc f i s s i l e ; i i , t e r ia l s in the context of 
v;eai3on-oriented prograii-ies CXLO SO on, c'o?;n\/a.rds the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l sy s td i . The r e l a t i v e secu?"ity t h a t the 
present nediuii-sized powers enjoy nay be eas i ly i n t e r p r e t e d 
Though the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s ne i ther conprohcnsive nor 
very wel l -def ined, i t i n p l i e s vjhat D'Estaing cal led 
' \ ;orld r e a l i t y ' . By and l a rge , i t i s the very c l a s s i f i c o t i o n 
against which French s t ra tegy and n a t i o n a l secur i ty doct r ine 
are shaped, nodif ied and developed. As seen by S^rance, these 
' r e l a t i v e s ' exclude, p r a c t i c a l l y , non-nuclear powers. The 
inc lus ion of the two cases of Japr.-n end 'Jest Goruany i s 
understood i n the l i g h t of t h e i r econonic and technologica l 
advanceuiCnt vdiich equates theu V'/ith nucleej" powers though 
i t i s no s u b s t i t u t e io r t he o.cquisition of nuclear wea,pons. 
lis we ar J l i a b l e at assuuing tha t such c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
i s a working one, because i t has proved so in the case of 
France, the wr i t e r can proceed to p red ic t t h a t c o n f l i c t s 
to cone i n a foreseorble future v^ill have a ' c l a s s ' 
charac te r . The n a t u r a l course of devolopnent of nat ions , ! 
secur i ty doct r ines w i l l i n sp i r e China to become a super-
power, nediun-sized powers to bo cone super-powers, sna i l 
powers to becone nec'lun-sized powers through the at taannent 
of a nuclear ized subs t i t u t e for the lack of 'popula t ion 
density or other elements of na t iona l power, and tho 
present super-powers w i l l t r y to maintain t h e i r posture 
and global i n t e r e s t s . This p r c c i c t i o n supports can e a r l i e r 
p red ic t ion by the wr i te r t ha t the number of na t iona l 
nuclear, forces v a i l i nc rease . 
I t i s noteworthy tha t the Chinese na t i ona l secur i ty 
doctr ine perceives the present i n t e r n a t i o n a l systems in 
terms of th ree worlds. The f i r s t inc ludes the super-powers. 
The other i n d u s t r i a l i z e d na t ions form the second world. 
The t h i r d cons i s t s of tho developing na t ions of Africa, ^.sia 
and Lat in /jnerica. I t i s understood from, the Chinese 
doctr ine t h a t the i n t e r a c t i o n t akes place between the f i i s t 
and t h i r d worlds. The second world might extend i t s support 
to the t h i r d world on som.o i s s u e s . SoojBarnett A.D. jPokin^, 
and the Asian pjower Balance; Vikrant,Nov, 1 976,p. 13. 
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i n t e r n s of the nr.tionr.l nu.clopj' forces t ha t they pre 
deploying. If i t were not so, s . i r l ler j;o-.vcrs shrill 
ce r t r an ly enquire, the Soviet Union vjoulcl not have 
concluded m agree.::cnt with Prance on the -.voidance of 
nuclccJ" wprs. Yet, p r r t l y t h i s r ,nrlysis docs not nean 
t h a t sone 'nuclc^jr i s l i k e l y to r i s e . I'he very deduction 
tha t the nunTocr of nation^ 1 nucle-r* forces w i l l inc rease 
does not be-'J' any source of s a t i s f r c t i o n for the present 
super-povi/ers, riid. - equally - for nuclear neJiUxi-sized 
powers. The conposition of t n i s chain of ac t ion - r eac t ion 
in the nuclear environi.ient does not leave .any a l t e r n a t i v e 
for the present nuclear powers, super or riediuia except 
for what i s tcruod ' v e r t i c a l ' p r o l i f e r - t i o n . One c ruc i a l 
i s sue that iuposes i t s e l f on t n i s m a l y s i s i s that t h e 
quan t i t a t i ve probleas of na t iona l securi ty doct r ines w i l l 
then he reborn. The reason for t h e i r r e b i r t h i s t ha t the 
nuclear ' c l a s s ' d iv is ion w i l l be s t ruc tured in t e r : i s of 
'vertic-^.l ' deterninant s r r t h e r than the i.iere acqu i s i t i on 
of a token nuclear force . The q u a n t i t a t i v e deterriinen'cs of 
the nev\;ly acquired na t iona l nuclear forces w i l l leave 
the sna i l - s i zed once again lagging far behind. This 
c ruc ia l i s s u e , which has not been t raced in l i t e r a t u r e 
on the subject , w i l l be i n t e n s i f i e d by f inanc ia l s t r a i n s 
as v e r t i c a l advanceaent r equ i r e s huge expenditure on 
R&D and the technologies associa ted , not only those of 
weapon sy stei.is. 
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Sovisited, th'c second ai-Jproach can be seen as having 
secured the uediun-sizcd powers against any olusivu 
understanding of tlic iupact of the acquisition of \ivoG,pon-
grade f i s s i l e aa tc r i a l s in the context of v;capon-
oriented prograi-iiios on their grejid s t rategies eaid 
national security doctrines. 
I t i s certainly a rxiattcr of doubt whether the near-
nuclear countries which are expected to go nuclca.r in a 
foreseeable future wi l l benefit frcn the second approach 
or v/ill s tar t fron the very posture fron v/hich the United 
States of Ancrica did. This 'uncertainty ' factor in nuclear 
prol i fera t ion aggravates the problen of the theoret ical 
franie of roference. The only way out i s to havo the 
grand strategy and the national security doctrine pov^er-
oriented. (The writer discusses in the conclusion sone 
suggested techniques to effectuate the power-orienta,tion,) 
A study of the l i t e r a t u r e on the subject reveals that 
the survival issue, in a nuclear environment, i s rather 
a paradox. Nuclear powers have got that feeling that 
the i r national security can possibly be thros/Gcncd to 
the extent tha t they ncy bo obliged to opt for the use 
of nuclear weapons despite the notion that Lhe acquisition 
of nuclear weapons does lessen the threa ts to national 
security and despite the observation that the present 
nuclear powers are enjoying the naxinun possible security. 
Th.cy OYGH naiiixain tiic Icrficst conventional for:cos. 
Jiimy O-wtr-x, while c^iipcigning f..r ?r csidcn-ljial Hi . . t ions 
on June 28, 1976, cGciarcd he coull fc?:osce having to 
crclor tho use of nuclear v^oapons as P rcs i Jon t " i i tiio 
n o t i o n ' s secin'ity or tlie securi ty oi tho natio^is to •v\/hich 
the Unitcu Stnxcs i s ueunci by t r e a ty were to he threa tened" . 
( l 55 ) . Hovi/evor Incoap le te , G a r t e r ' s sta.teaent er.roodies 
what the v^riter sees as a paradoxicel f-^co of tiie survivs.l 
i s sue in a nuclear envixor-rient. Hot only do t-ie present 
nuclear weapon s t a t e s ^ fee l tha t t h e i r secur i ty can 
possibly be th^r^atcned te the e::tcnt t ha t t h e i r survival 
night bo af fec ted , but also they assuiiic t h a t t l i e i r 
adverscxy c?n launch a kill iLig f i r s t s t r i k e , A';ha,tever 
credible and safe t n e i r second s t r ike c a p a b i l i t i e s u ight 
be . This paradox can fur ther be elaborated r.s \/c r e c a l l 
tha t s t r a t eg i c power " i s the no st inportaji t f.actor i n 
c r i s i s nanagenent, i f not the decisive one". (15 5) and tha t 
s t r a t e g i c postures can bo nade excel lent through the 
psychological assurance conferred by s t r a t e g i c super ior i ty .^ s-* 
(P^) ghe Searchl ight (Patna) , July 29, 1976. 
(156) Coffey, J . ; ( fn .89) , p.66 
(**) Dr. Henry Kisoi 'ger y^ /as reported to have atxacked 
the notion of s t r a t e g i c super io r i ty during' one of 
h i s v i s i t s to Moscow pnd said he knew nothing 
ca l led s t r a t eg i c super io r i ty in nuclear amar 'ent . 
He was then replying t o tho a l l e g a t i o n s r a i s ed 
against the then Pord c d n i n i s t r o t i o n on t h e i r 
pos i t ion on S.vLT. - - - - - -
Although, the present nuclcnr v/oapon s t a t e s espec ia l ly 
the super-powers, do Gnjoy the h loss ings of the so-callccl 
s t r a t e g i c supe r io r i t y , v i s - a - v i s other u n i t s they s t i l l 
show i n t h e i r hehaviour a fear tho.t t h e i r very survival 
i s never the less conditioned by dense u n c e r t a i n i t y . 
The poj*adoxicr^l aspect tha t has hoon presented 
imposes ce r t a in conpulsicns on s t r a t e g i s t s who are asked 
to desi^sn v^eapon-orientod pro^rat^nes for the acqu i s i t i on 
of wecx-ion-i^rade f i s s i l e iu?,terials rnd, in a nore developed 
s tage, to advise on weapon sysbcas. Foreaost ojaong these 
compulsions i s the need to franc a na t iona l securi ty doct r ine 
void of imaginary motives or advers r r i e s j at l e a s t in t h e 
preliminary s tage . The wr i te r be l i eves t h a t i t i s only 
through the power o r i c n t r t i o n tha t such need nay be 
correc t ly s a t i s f i e d because t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n i s e n t i t l e d to 
provide for the ac tual cons t i t uen t s of a given pos ture , 
the power eloncnts v i s - a - v i s the ' o t h e r ' . I f imaginary 
ond rdve r s r r io s are not avoided, i t i s r a t i o n a l to except 
the paradox re fe r red t o . This would mean t h a t the 
necessary lessons have not b en drawn from the experience 
of those powers which coramenced on t h e i r programnes 
without pr ior knowledge and, moreover, could afford t o . 
Dr. Kissinger hinted a t one signif icr .nt idea 
r^ssociated with th^^ survival i s s u e . He expressed some 
astonishment over the obscrVcrti^n tha^t i t i s for the f i r s t 
tir^e in human h i s to ry that jea^ o prospects depend so much 
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on weapons of t o t a l devastation, (157) I t i s certainly 
strange that ^^an's survival does depend on nucloar 
weapons which are the nost destructive in the present 
ax'senal. Again, no interpretat ion of t h i s observation 
oan be made possible except with the helio of a 'power' 
approach. A given unit of the present internat ional systen 
Yjould find i t easier to pro-euipt any threat to i t s 
national security by developing, maintaining and enriching 
i t s national power in a way that i s to be understood by 
i t s potent ial adversary as resul t ing in an anacceptablo 
cost if he t r i e s to str ike f i r s t* This posture necessi ta tes , 
as a pr e-r e qui s i t o, the avai labi l i ty of a second s t r ike 
capa-bility which i s a natural outcone of adopting power 
as a frame of reference in the graiid strategy and the 
national security doctrine, In a conflict s i tuat ion, 
nuclearization i s believed to create the prohibit ion 
factory i . e . , every par ty ' s pov/er prohibi ts the 'o ther ' 
from the use of i t s national nucloar force . This i s the 
core of 'nuclear deterrence ' . The case of the super-powers 
of the present day internat ional system, especially after 
the i r i n i t i a t i o n of detente, maizes valid the notion that 
the s ta te to Y h^ich Kissinger referred to as 'peace' 
springs frora the possession of nuclear weapons. 
(157) Kissinger, H.? Nuclear Weapons and poreign policys 
(New York; Harper & Brothers, 1957),p.3-
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In t h i s respoct , vi/e noed s t r e s s t h a t "detorrcncc hy 
nuclear t h roa t i s not considered t o he a t o t a l l y r e l i a h l e 
guarantor of peace" (158) hocause the present i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
system i s has i ca l ly OTIQ of n a t i o n - s t a t e s , t ha t t he r e s t i l l 
ex i s t some escalat ion-prone c o n f l i c t s , and tha t t he actual 
use of nuclear vjoapons i s one of the rungs of esca la t ion 
i n t h e s t r a t e g i c inventory of t h e present nuclear powers. 
David Tarr of Wiscon»'-n Univers i ty suggests a 'mild ' way of 
conceiving t h i s i s s u e : " In sp i t e of nuclear weapons, t he r e 
s t i l l e x i s t s the p o s s i b i l i t y of any number of m i l i t a r y 
engagements to cXico> of which l a rgo - sca le nuclear wars are 
qui te probably the l ea s t l i k e l y " . ( l S ) This i s another 
reason for the r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y which the present 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system enjoys and at which Dr. Kiss inger 
po in ted . 
I n l i t e r a t u r e on. the subjec t , there i s considerable 
emphasis on t h e difference between the wi l l ingness to use 
nuclear weapons and the wi l l ingness to employ s t r a t e g i c 
power for p o l i t i c a l purposes. I n the case of non?*nuclcar 
powers, we can proceed to deduce tha t t h e s t r a t e g i c p a t t e r n 
with vjhich they are to be pre-occupied with, i s to increase 
t h e i r f i r e power, i n t h i s case conventional , alongwith -
(l58) Tarr , D.5 /jaerican Stra tegy in the Huclear Ago.;.. 
(Now Yo3:*k; The Macmillan Company, 2nd, 
P r in t ing , 1976), p . 7 . 
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supposedly ? a more a g g r e s s i v e f o r e i g n po l i cy so as to 
c r e a t e t h e n e a r e s t possilole pos tu re t o t h a t of t h e 
p o s s e s s i o n of nuc lea r weapons. In t h i s p r o c e s s , t h e 
o h a . r a c t e r i s t i c s - n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y - w i s e , of t h e 
a c q u i s i t i o n of weapon-grade f i s s i l e m a t e r i a l s i n t h e c o n t e x t 
of a weapon-or ien ted programme would appear a s a„n 
i m p r e s s i v e urge for the manuft icturing of such m a t e r i a l s . 
The outcome i s , t h e r e f o r e , Fioro n a t i o n a l n u c l e a r f o r c e s . 
Yet no r e a l be t te rment of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y could be 
expected i n t h i s " v a r y s t a g e as t h e s t r a t e g y of t h e count ry 
o p t i n g for a ?\;eapon-oriGnted programme can be made 
v u l n e r a b l e , a t l e a s t to t h e a l ready n u c l e a r powers . The 
only advan tage , t hen , would be r e g i o n a l . In t h i s c o n t e x t , 
t he w r i t e r a c c e p t s C o f f e y ' s s t a t ement tha t ' : " l a r g e r and 
more powerful s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r f o r c e s do o f f e r numerous 
b e n e f i t s , m i l i t a r i l y a s vJell a s p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y " ( 159) 
but only r e g i o n a l l y . 
QUyjWITATIVE BOOST TO WATIOM/JL SECURITY; 
Except for France and China, the p r e s e n t n u c l e a r weapon 
c o u n t r i e s conceived of t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of weapon-grade 
f i s s i l e m a t e r i a l s i n t h e con tex t of weapon-o r i en ted 
programmes as a q u a n t i t a t i v e boost to nat iona .1 s e c u r i t y . 
The s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y d o c t r i n e and 
the grand s t r a t e g y came l a t e r . I n t h e case o f t h e Un i t ed 
S t a t u s , D^. K i s s i n g e r admi t s , t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e 
a c q u i s i t i o n of a n a t i o n a l n u c l e a r f o r ce remained e l u s i v e 
(159) Coffey, J .^ ( f n . 8 9 ) , p . 2 9 . 
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for f i f t e e n yer-rc a t l e a L t . (16C) Mr. L . Su'orcihnanyar.i 
l±:tji-jxet0 ili±D ''.ela-y in grec.-inr, t he rop.l i m l i c r t i o u c , 
of t h e a c q u i c i t i o n of xier jon-[<.ze,J.c f i L c i l e nate . . i a l o i n 
t c r . : c of -what Ivahn end Bruce-]3ri,,^c5 5 tv;c y e - r c a f t e i ' t h o 
» 
; , juhlxcation j i Subralii'.ianyaa'L x^a^er, Ccallc". " the iDrteCiate 
AJ8,ot". (161) ^U-ierican underLtan>''.ing of each a c q u i r . i t i o n , 
according, tu ouhrrJi^ianyaiz, c'.GVoloped then f roa f reoh aer.iorie& 
of t h e Gtrate^iic bon'bing an\ t . i e f i r e red do on Gexriany and 
Jaj.)an. (162) For t h e , w r i t e r , i t i c t h e i n a . h i l i t y of t h e 
t hen iifierican Ltrate{,ifjtr: t o j e r c ^ i v e t h a t change i n 
q u a n t i t y l e a 'c t o q u o l i t a t i v c change \/hich ^u'-evcnted the 
e r e c t i o n of a beconing n a t i o n a l c e c u r i t y d o c t r i n e and a 
grand s t r a t e g y . Thic aeamo i n no v;ay t h r t t h e r e were no 
a t t e m p t c to oeek for a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n for a n a t i o n a l l y -
c o n t r o l l e d nuc l ea r fo rce o the r t h a n t h e n c r e uf;e of cuch 
¥^ea_,ons ar inctrioiaent c of unaccc^ t a h l c da^'iage a t • 
unaccep t ab l e cootc* Yet ouch at'ce iptc '..'ore on ly TenCoxorl 
when t h e Araericanc had a nono^/oly on nuc l ea r weaponc, 
accord ing to t h e accunp t ion diccueoed "by Hanuond i n h i e 
c r i t i q u e of Gar ; i l p e r o v i t z . ( I63) 2ven t h e n , ijriorican 
o t r a t e g i s t G had no c l e a r perCj .cct ive fo r Ja.paJi'c su r render 
v/hich v;ac n o s t l y i n t e r p r e t e d i n t e r n s of t h e n u c l e a r horror , 
(160) K i s s i n g e r , SJT. H . 5 ( f n . 1 5 1 ) , p . 1 0 ) . 
(161) Kahn, H. & Bruce -Br iggs , B.5 ( f n . 5 6 ) , p . 1 1 5 . 
(162) Subrahx.ianyan, K. ; (fn. 13 5 ) , x-^ . 1 • 
(163) Hanuond, T . j Atonic Diplonacy R c v i s i t e d i Q r h i s , 
Yo l . XIX, Ko.-V, Yfinter 1976 . , p.V'rOv. 
of t h e p.cq'aicitiori of xier^ion-.^ze^lc f i L c i l e r . c . t e - i a l c i n 
t e r n c , of, •..'iaa't Ivaiin rncl Bruc'e-Bri ,;^G, t\;c yer.rc a f t e i t l ia 
p u b l i c a t i o n oi Subr^r.liuejiyau'L ^ a ^ e r , c a l l c " ' '" the i u a e C i a t e 
pa-'fc"» (161) jt'j'-iericr.n underctcjic'.inci of cuch a o q u i L i t i o n j 
a,ccordin5.i to SuhrrJiuanyari, devGlopod then fror.i f r ech a e n o r i e , 
of t h e G t r a t e g i c honhing cm:, t h e f i r e r a i d c on Gernrny e:n.C. 
Jcpan , (162) For t h e , w r i t e r , i t i c t h e i n a b i l i t y of t h e 
t hen ^iTierican e t r a t e g i c t c to p e r c e i v e t h a t change i n 
q u a n t i t y lca' ' 'c t o q u a l i t a t i v e change \jhich prevcnto'"'. the 
e r e c t i o n of a hoconing n a t i o n a l c e c u r i t y cloctr ine an", a 
grand s t r a t e g y . Thic UQPXI'J i n no v;ay t h a t t h e r e v;ere no 
a t t emp tc to seek for a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n for a nr„tio2ial-y-
c o n t r o l l e d nuc l ea r fo rce o t h e r t han t h e n c r e ur:o of cuch 
Vi/ep.^ ons ar inctriji-ient c of una,ccc^ t a b i c da„iai,ge a t 
unaccep tab l e c o c t c . Yet cuch c t c e i p t c -./ere only r e n d e r e d 
when t h e ^I'jiiericane had a nono^oly on nuclca.r vieej.'Ona, 
accord ing to t h e a.ccunption dif-.cuLoed by Hrvri.aond i n h i e 
c r i t i q u e of Ga.r A l p e r o v i t z . (163) Even t h e n , ^jnorican 
G t r a t e g i s t s had no c l e a r p e r c ^ e c t i v e fo r Jappj i 'o su r render 
which v/as noo t ly i n t e r p r e t e d i n t e r u s of the n u c l e a r horroi; 
(160) K i s s i n g e r , j j r . I I . ; ( f n . 1 5 1 ) , p . 1 0 ) . 
(161) KaJin, H. & Bruce -Br iggs , B. 5 ( f n . 5 6 ) , p . 1 1 5 . 
(162) Subrahiianyai-i, K. | (fn, 133) , IJ. 1 • 
(163) HaoLiond, T . | ^^.tonic Diploapcy E e v i r . i t e d ; Or b i s , 
Vol . XIX, Fo.-; , Yfinter 1976. , p . l 4 0 v . 
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i t brought forth. I t can bo easily seon, noroovor, that 
the very text of the let ter which Albert Enstoin addressed 
to Roosevelt had an overwhelningly quantitative character, 
(Goc- ^^ j.)^ )enL.ix IX). 
As for the Soviet Union, i t was in 1956 that the first 
impulses of i t s understanding of ttc strategic inplications 
of th2 acquisition of woapon-gra.dc fissile naterials in 
the context of v^/eapon-oriented progranines V'/ere concretly 
manifested, 'Then the Russian Prime Minister threatened to 
use nuclear weapons against Britain during the Suez crisis , 
i t was to be understood in the context of the iipril 195 6 
negotiations at Dov^ /ning Street betv^een Khrushchev and 
ICden during which the former was ^reported to haye assured 
the lat ter that the Soviet Union understood that \7ost Asia 
was fund amen ta,lly a region of Western intorests in which 
Britain could enjoy the freedom of action but that the 
Soviet Union would not abandon i t s propaganda campaigns 
against British colonialism. (164) This meant that Soviet 
Union decided to moke uso of i t s nuclear weapons but 
througl^  non-use^ i .e , to effect a better negotiating 
posture and to destobilize the intorests of i t s 
adversary. Even if we accept the notion that i t equally 
(164) 0 ( \tioY-6t') ! \j.y^.\ : -^-.tLJI ) c ,j^c^\.^y. <, .^ <. 
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took tiiG Soviet Union quite a long t i n o t i l l i t dovolopod 
a s ign i f i can t understanding of tho acqu i s i t i on of nuclear 
v^eapons? i . o , t i l l 1956, wo can s t i l l prove, for tlio sake 
of ana lys i s ythat such understanding was nevort l ieless 
inconplo tc . Had the Russian t l i reat been a rung in an 
esca la t ion ladder -within the frarae of a grrnd stra,tegy, 
i t vrould have only uccnt tha t the Soviet Union was norely 
u t i l i z i n g i t s qunnt i t a t ivc super io r i ty over B r i t i s h 
s t a r t og i c power and B r i t i s h socond-str iko c a p a h i l i t i e s . 
B.jrr inj the fact tha t the B r i t i s h did not grasp the 
impl ica t ions of the nessage in. terias of t h e t a l k s v /^hich 
had taken place in London soac s ix nonths e a r l i e r , our 
ana lys i s can proceed to assess the Russian nove i n terms 
of a quan t i t a t ive unders tanding. This can he backed by 
t echn ica l probleus vjhich then confronted second-str ike 
c a p a b i l i t i e s such as survivo.bi l i ty , s i lo hardening, 
p rec i s ion guidance, accuracy, s i l o - k i l l i n g r a t i o , o t c . . . 
The tvi/o exceptional cases of China and France should 
not load us to an asscss^-ient tha t fciie American-cum-Russian 
model w i l l no more bo repeated. On the contrcJy , we -jrc apt 
o,t p red ic t ing the frequency of the l a t t e r model with the 
present nuclear candidate count r ies because t he nuclear 
option as exercised by both China and Prance was but a 
d i rec t outcome of the impact thoy perceived of iaaerican 
and Russian acqu is i t ion of nuclear weapons on t h e i r 
r e spec t ive grand s t r r t o g i e s and na t iona l secur i ty d o c t r i n e s . 
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Moreover, Ciiina i s geor^raivnically adjacent to the Soviet 
Union and Prruocc i s c j.icaber of tlio -/ectern VozlC, of the 
Atlej i t ic cour.junity c.iid of tiio ^•.ncrican so-cal led 
Soutliern t y r e . Couf-equently, y/e SJ:Q l i a o l e to p red ic t 
tha t thOGO countrioG wliicli r r c not GO nucli adgrcrnt to 
any of tlie proGent supGr-po\;ers Vi/ill conceive of the 
acqu i s i t i on of weapon-grade f isGilo n a t e r i a l s in the 
context of v^eapon-oriented programme ac a q u a n t i t a t i v e 
hooot/fco t h e i r na t iona l cecur i ty , a t l e a s t in the i n i t i a l 
s tage . 
I I . I I I . 5 ' END OE OEgmiCE-DEPSKOS ENVrR0IHI3HT; 
In the diccuGcion of na t iona l securi ty eJid atrategy 
under condit ions of nuclear p r e l i f e r a t i o n , i t uust be 
euiphasized tha t we ought r e f r a i n from adopting the context 
of of fence-defence which i s the produce of na t iona l pov/er 
deploying convention;-?,! weapon-syotens. The major reason 
why such an environi^ient has phyc ic r l ly diminished i c the 
q u a l i t a t i v e ra ther than qu aJit i t at iv e impl ica t ions of 
nuclear weapons the deployment of which does "not 
autom-D.tically load to e i the r p o l i t i c a l or m.ilitcj'y ga ins" , 
8,s Kiss inger s ta ted , though "for cen tu r i e s i t was 
axiom.atic tha t inc reases in mi l i t a ry power could be t r a n s l a t e d 
in to almost immediate p o l i t i c a l advantages". (165) 
(165) Kissinger , Dr. H. 5 Speech in San I'ransisco^ 
TTaiS Bu l l e t i n , March 3, 1976.' 
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He, l a t e r , equated i n d i r e c t l y t h i s s t a t e with, nuclear 
stalenato« "The destruct ivonoss of s t r a t e g i c v;oapons 
has contr ibuted t o the eacrgency of nuclear s t a l c n a t e " . 
(l66)**- But no nuclear staloraate or end of offenco-defence 
environnent can hold without the p r io r condit ion of the 
exis tence of a credible second s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y , which i s 
l a r g e l y a n a t t e r of technology. 
The end of off enco-defence environnent does, in tu rn , 
reshape the function end n i s s i o n of nuclear weapons without 
re l inqu i sh ing the fo.ct t h a t i t i s the out con o of the 
deployncnt of such weapons. ilccor ding to Kiss inger , 
nuclear weapons w i l l increasingly "find t h e i r function 
only i n de te r r ing and natching ea.ch other" , hence the notion 
tha t "a co'ntinuing build-up of s t r a t e g i c a rns , t he re fo re , 
l eads to fresh balances - but at higher l e v e l s o:^exponditurcs 
.and.iB.ncertain±l.e.s". (l67) 
(166) Kiss inger , Dr. H. ; Trr 1976 Alrpteir/T^M chan Menorial 
Lecturn; Survival , v o l . x v i l l . No.'5, 
'Sept . /Oct. 1976, p . 196. 
** I t has been observed tha t the very quotation used from 
K i s s i n g e r ' s San Pransisco Speech was used by h in , 
l i t e r a l l , i n the London l e c t u r e . ' 
(167) Ib id , p.199 
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Coffoy, on tlio other hanJ, suggests i i i p l i c i t l y a 
d i f fe ren t way of handling tho impact of the end of offence-
defence onvironnent on nuclear t h r e a t s to na t iona l securi ty .*•'<• 
Attacks "by po ten t i a l nuclear aggressors , according to him, 
may be warned off or warded off through m u l t i l a t e r a l or 
h ia la te rc . l securi ty arrangements. (168) in t h i s r e s p e c t , 
the wr i t e r be l ieves txiat Coffey's suggestion does but very 
l i t t l e to any p o t e n t i a l throo.t perceived by any of the 
member u n i t s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, behaving under 
condi t ions of nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n , Tho roa,son i s tha t t h e 
end tha t the acqu is i t ion of nucloex weapons pu t s to the 
s t r a t e g i c environment of of fence-defence does not 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e between a s ingle u n i t or a group of u n i t s 
behaving in cohesion such as the case of post-World War H 
a l l i a n c e s . Tho end of offcnco-dofonce s t r a t e g i c environment 
i s , therefore appl icaolc to UATO and Marsavi Pact as i t i s 
appl icable to the United S ta tes ejnd the Soviet Union. In case 
a po t en t i a l nuclear th roa t i s perceived, i t should be, by a 
^* The wr i t e r has quoted Coffey v^ith good i n t e n t i o n s , 
jilmo st a l l h i s views should be t r e a t e d with care rjid 
considerable scepticism as h i s wr i t ings ssem to be 
t ry ing t o ' l e g a l i z e ' c e r t a i n expects of the i j jorican 
National Security Doct r ine . Some of h i s ano.lyscs 
were .clearly pro-designed t o j u s t i f y the American 
Foreign policy v i s - a - v i s talliancc r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
On page 124, jus t to give one example, ho s t a t e s 
that to b u t t r e s s to nuclear assurance, tho United 
S ta tes hrs s ta t ioned /xiericeji t roops in some area 
over seas/ ,bo cause, he claims i n o ther event of a 
conventional a s sau l t , the regiments along tho 
East Ger:.!on Border, could immediately engage ' t he invader ' 
(168) Coffey, J . ; (fn. ) p .123. 
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must J a non-ionrty to tiie balance effectuated by the weapon 
systeus deployed by tiie o r ig ina l p a r t i e s . Confronting t h i s 
type of t h r e a t s w i l l be the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the thi 'eatened, 
and the threatened alone» Another factor for the end 
of such s t r a t e g i c environtient. i s the technologica l 
factor which has already effected the s h i f t i n ^ of 
pa t t e rns of weapon-systems, njid, in t u rn , the set-up 
of a na t iona l fraud s t r a t egy . This can j u s t i f y v/hy 
"the e f fo r t s to achieve l a rge and d ive r s i f i ed s tockp i les 
of nuclear Afveapons and warheads, highly complex delivery 
systems and sophis t ica ted means of defence a.gainst 
in t ruding a i r c r a f t and m i s s i l e s , have pre-occupied the 
defence establ ishments of both the USSR and USA", 
r egard less whether or not nuclear s t r a t e g i c power w i l l 
be employed i n future c o n f l i c t s . (l69) 
An ins igh t in to the published sect ions of the 
na t iona l secur i ty doct r ines of t he nuclear powers would 
revea l tha t t h e i r doc t r ines , though d i f fe ren t as far 
as the reasons underlying are concerned, shore the 
following nucleus? 
1. Mi l i ta ry opora.tions should be avoided. 
2. If they occur, they should be l im i t ed . 
3. If l imi ted , they should be won. 
(l69) l i n t n e r , '\7.^ The p o l i t i c a l i z a t i o n of S t ra tegy; i n 
Abshire, D. & Allen, R (ods) ; (fn. 136), 
p.389. 
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I t i s "bGlicvccl t ha t in tlao prcsGiit / .ncrican 
na t iona l securi ty doc t r ine , l imi ta , t ion , i f V^QX occurs , 
can "bo achieved only i f the use of nuclear explosions 
i s avoided. ''The f i r s t a tonic bonb dropped i n a v/artino 
operat ion w i l l - so i t i s s t a t ed - necessa r i ly lead to a 
ho locaus t . " (l70) Behind t h i s no t ion , there i s oji axio n tha t 
a s t r a t e g i c nuclear s t r i k e "by o i thcr t h e United S t a t e s 
or the Soviet Union w i l l s t a r t en a l l - o u t conf l i c t or 
a t l e a s t w i l l cone exceedixigly c lose to such a c o n f l i c t . 
(171). This developnent has r e s u l t e d in the theuc that 
" a purely n i l i t a r y strategy i s no longer p o s s i h l e " . 
(172) S t i l l , t h i s nucleus co^ n he in t e rp re t ed eas i ly i n 
terms of t he technology assoc ia ted , one which the v/ri tor 
r e fe r red tc as leading to no nore d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
p o l i t i c a l l y possible and the p o l i t i c a l l y i a p o s s i b l e . 
Ls for the Aneric an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i t i s d i f fe ren t and i s 
obviously "based on the e f fec t s approach which the w r i t e r 
has e a r l i e r r e jec ted on the grounds tha t i t loads to non-
power considerat ions a.nd night very v^ell c rea te inr-ginary 
a l t e r n a t i v e s far fron being r e a l i s t , such as the t o t a l 
(170) To l l e r , L.j l u c l e a r Explosions and the At lan t i c 
Gonnunity; j ibshire, D & ; j . lcn, R (eds) 
(fn. 136), p .395. 
(171) T e l l e r , E,-, Ib id; p .598. 
(172) Kintner , \h i (fn. 169), p .388. 
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disarinaraentwise a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
Only oriQ par t of the Aniorican doctr ine i s void of 
such no t ions , the ' response ' p a r t . Several olosorvations 
liavo "been nade tha t 'much of the American Pol icy i s concerned 
with making bel ievable to the Russians a p a t t e r n of 
Anerican response", (l73) and tha t " there can be l i t t l e 
doubt tha t a massive nuclear s t r i k e on the United S t a t e s 
w i l l br ing about massive r e t a l i a t i o n on ( the US) p a r t . " 
I t i s , i n fac t , copious i n American l i t e r a t u r e on t h e 
subject that the question for US policy i s "whether i t 
might be possible and worthwhile to attempt to make 
c l ea r to the Sovie t s t h a t any effor t to achieve 
s t r a t e g i c super ior i ty over the United S t a t e s - or even 
any subs tan t i a l par i ty i s too un l ike ly of success to be 
worth the cos t " . (l74) This very pa r t of "the ijrierican 
na t iona l securi ty doctrine ma,tches Ginsburgh's 
a s se r t ion t h a t National securi ty policy and programmes 
must "be prepared t o cope with the secur i ty problems 
t h a t would confront (the USA) wi th in an in torna t iomal 
environment of e i t h e r arms cont ro l or nuclear 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n (or even elements of both, as at p r e s e n t , ) " 
(175) 
(173) Schcl l ing, T , | Managing the ij-ms Race; i n ; Abshiro, 
D,& Allen, R. (eds .>(fn . 136). 
(174) I b i d . , p.61 2. 
(175) Ginsburgh, Col. R.i ( fn .15) , p .24. 
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I I . I I I » 6 « B^ ID OF BOR]}:H SECURITY CIlITaRION; 
i t i s i n fooCt, duo to nuclGar p r o l i f o r c t i o n 
tha t na t iona l secur i ty has iDoconc " a conplox not ion, 
the consequence of a subject ive evaluation that a 
nunber of v i t a l i n t e r e s t s - the phys ica l survival 
of tho s t a t e and i t s people, together v^ith t h e i r 
independence of econonic wel l -being-not l ike ly to be 
thwarted in the forsoeable f u t u r e . " (176) I t i s worth 
mentioning here thot there i s no nore i n s i s t ence on the 
secur i ty of tho borders of a given country as an 
equivalent to na t iona l s e c u r i t y . The decadence of the 
concept of na t iona l securi ty as one of t e r r i t o r i a l 
securi ty under conditions of nuclear pro l i fc ra . t ion can 
be j u s t i f i e d on the grounds of the nature of the 
delivery and weapon systens which are developed in 
assoc ia t ion vjith opting for the acqu i s i t ion of weapon-
grade f i s s i l e n r t e r i a l s as a najor cons t i tuont of 
na t iona l secur i ty . 
I I . I I I . 7 . THi: I-.'IJSi: Sin .^TEGIG JXJQTHIEI!; _. TEST CASE; 
An exanination of t h e 'Pause ' s t r a t e g i c doctr ine 
developed by General ITorstad and adopted by IL'^ -TO fron 
i960 ( t i l l 1964- a t l e a s t ) and i t s evolut ion would help 
tho e labora t ion of the d iscuss ion on tho inpact of t h e 
(176) Garnett , J . | ( f n . U 7 ) , p .33 . 
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acqu i s i t i on of WGapoii-grado f i s s i l o n a t c r i c l s on 
nat i 0 nal s e c ur i t y , T hi s so - o a 1 lo cl ' P au s G ' s t :c at c gi c 
doctrine noant tha t ' i f a Russian a t tack crJi^, breaking 
i t s continui ty sliould 'beconc tlio f i r s t object - rjnd so 
create a breaking space i n vihich the Russians could decide 
whether or not to continue v io l en t ac t ion . The force 
which would be used for t h i s purposo night be en t i r e ly 
non nuclear . Sut the nuclear capab i l i ty orgrjnic to the 
najor f o r n a t i o n s . . . . could, i f the s i t u a t i o n deaands, 
be Joined promptly raid e f fec t ive ly i.r^.-th t he conventional 
effort to f^rce a pause. (177) Though the s t r a t e g i c power 
of tne United Sta tes provides i t v^ith wh^t Kis t inger ca l led 
the assurance with which to p.ct in i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , 
the 'Pause ' doctrine ' ' s t ipule. tcs the r e s i s t r n c c w i l l corarience 
on a non-nuclear bas i s ' ' and, t he re fo re , ' ' i t uight involve 
exposing one 's own for-waxd t roops to a pre-eraptivc nuclear 
s t r i k e " . (178) Apparontly t h i s doctr ine involves, " . . . 
a dc l ibcrc te ly r e s t r a ined use of nuclear \>;ea.pons in the 
(177) Brown, lU; Ifaclear 7/ar; (London^ P a l l Hal l P r e s s , 1964) 
p. ' ig^. I t i s obvious tha t such Aaerican 
assunption springs fron r a t h e r enot ional 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s about the degree of Russian 
incen t ives to s t r i k e f i r s t . Alnost a l l the 
Aneric'^n scenrr ios ai'o based on a t a c i t 
inage of an aggressive i iussia without even 
a discussion of why they should, i n such 
'power pe r spec t ive ' scenar ios give roon for 
no n-cxaninat i on of assunpt ion s, 
(178) I b i d . , p . 21 6. 
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f i r s t instance" vdtli a view t o l i m i t i n g tlie con f l i c t 
and promoting construct ivo c r i s i s bargaining" and t h a t 
"at tairment of those ends would he host achiovcd i f nuclear 
detonations are ^jroccded by warnings" (179) though warningSs 
in thG franc of the wi l l ingness to r e so r t to s t r a t e g i c 
power iLiplicd in rny p a r t i c u l a r t h r o a t , might i n s t i g a t e the 
Warsaw Pact to s t r i k e f i r s t , i lccently, tho U^iitcd S ta t e s 
scons to have plained a s t r a t e g i c posture t h a t g ives 
ne i the r s ide , on the Europe n front a t l e a s t , a f i r s t - s t r i k o 
capab i l i t y . (180) Alnost t en months a f t e r t h i s d i sc losure , 
the United Sta tes Sccrotrry of Defence declared thr.t the 
V/arsaw Pact doctrine s ta ted t h a t i t s members would launch 
a prc-onptive nuclear s t r i k e against mi l i t a ry t a r g e t s i f 
they bolicvod that the UATO was about to launch a major 
nuclear a t tack of i t s own" (181) which w i l l not be 
launched t i l l the 'Wp.rsaw Pact conventional t h r u s t i n 
Europe becomes d i f f i cu l t to check. Donald Sumsfeld, t he 
then U.S. Defence becrctcxy, nentioned th..t bhc Russians 
"appear to have cnoji^od t h e i r exercise and t r a i n i n g 
p r a c t i c e s to omphasizo longer per iods of conventional 
(179) Ibi_d.,p.217. 
(18-;) For a more eloboratc discussion, sec Schlcs ingor ' s 
views i n an interview publishjc' ins ITcwswcok, 
March, 17, 1975. 
(181) The Statesman (Gale i t ta ) , janupry 29, 1976. 
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conf l ic t TDcforc oscc lc t ing to e, nuclorx onvironjiGnt". 
I t i s noteworthy tlict tlic bovict Union anc" oijliL other 
\/arsaw Tact countr ies voiced, on the ssuiC d?.y, a 
determination h i t "back ha rde r . (182). Those stctoixionts, 
in t h e i r capa.city as pro jec t ing the n a t e r i a l i a c t i o n of 
nationo.1 secur i ty doct r ines , represent a ' r a t i c n a l ' 
developncnt ' pause ' doc t r ine , a t l e a s t frora the Anericpja 
angel, i^ ny attempt to understand the impact of t h e 
acqu i s i t i on of nuclear weapons on na t iona l secur i ty i s 
not , l o g i c a l l y , supposed to neglect such not ions as they 
night very well help design a be t t e r na t iona l securi ty 
doctrines from the t h e o r e t i c a l premise t i l l the 
s t ruc tu r ing of forces end t h e psychological t r a i n i n g of 
the s o l d i e r . The above nentioned cpse i s the p/nt i thesis 
development of the Pause s t r a t e g i c doctrine^ for i t i s 
not uneasy to t r a c e the r e l a t i o n between, the present 
s t ruc tur ing of forces on both s ides and the need, imp l i c i t 
in the pause doc t r ine , to have a negot ia t ing environment 
emerging out of ear ly e sca la t ion rungs on condi t ion tha t 
the wi l l ingness to deploy s t r a t e g i c power i s made c l ea r 
to the advcrsa-Ty, possibly through var ious chaimels. If 
the foreseeable en", i s to have a nego t ia t ing aivrionment, 
the va l i d i t y as well as u t i l i t y of nuclear weapons should 
(182) The Times of India . January 29, 1976, 
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\>Q qucstionocl so long as the Ca.icrging cliallcngc to tho 
na t iona l securi ty of both s ides rcmaius tho saiio and tha t 
negot ia t ions w i l l , in tho f i n a l pj ialysis , doninate the 
conf l i c t resolu t ion a l t e r n a t i v e s . OXIQ answer to t h i s 
question could be frailed a f t e r quan t i t a t ive moulds as 
the range of devastat ion expected (tho v;illin^'ncss to use 
tho weapons i s f i l ed as a constant) would has ten the 
XDrocess of convening n e g o t i a t i o n s , /^nother answer could 
be framed on the jjrcnise t ha t the m i l i t a r y a l t e r n a t i v e s 
can p reva i l the decision making machinery @ rn-d, thus , 
a decis ion to accept nego t i a t ions w i l l be o/doyted« A t h i r d 
ejisvi/or can be sought for in the pseudo-sc ien t i f i c 
assumptions concerning tho so-ca l led 'sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' 
a l legedly a t t r i b u t e d tc the i n t e rn r ' t i ona l p o l i t i c a l 
behaviour of the super-powers so l e ly . A fourth answer i s 
tha t a l l such condi t ions of uncertainy are adumbarated i n 
the n a t i o n a l security doct r ines of nuclear powers? and 
the re fo re , they knew ' the r u l e s of t he game' which 
should be accepted. 
In a h i s t o r i c a l perspec t ive , "armed force more than 
any other elemiont (of na t iona l pov/er) has proved tho 
f i n a l a r b i t e r of c o n f l i c t " . Sec, for a, condensed 
expose of t h i s common themes Dopuy, Col. T,1T, & 
Blanchard, Col, ¥.5 The ^ilnanac of V/orld Mi l i t a ry 
power^ (Londons j^rthur Barker L in i t ed , 2nd Edi t ion , 
39731, P . i x , 
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The aPi)roprir/bo answer, tho wr i t e r beliovess i s not 
any of tlic four sii^^lo rnc\:crs proviclocl in tiie xorovious 
aji-alysis. Rather, i t i s a composition of PXL such, answers 
becausos 
(a) though, nego t ia t ions night be foreseeable , 
the esca la t ion rung where they can be 
i n i t i a t e d rcnains one of the s u b s t a n t i a l 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s . 
(b) therc l ' . t icn between na t iona l secur i ty rncl 
the ?i,Gquisition of nuclear warheads i s not 
en t i r e ly one of u t i l i t y but, equally of the 
v;i l l ingnoss to use then, 
(c) the use of nuclear warheads in the frane of 
a general s t r a t e g i c power does not noces s r r i l y 
guoxantec a m i l i t a r y victory ejnd, oven i f i t 
does, i-t cannot guarantee the p o l i t i c a l 
c hann e l l i ng o f' su ch vi ct ory . 
(d')jt the s t r a t e g i c a l t e r n a t i v e s can only servo 
in the context of a s t rategy designed in the 
l i g h t of ' r e a l ' r a t h e r than inagirip.ry needs, and 
(o) though the notion of super-power r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
seems va l id , to a c e r t a in degree, under 
condi t ions of de ten t s , between the two super-
powers, quan t i t a t i ve super io r i ty of 
s t r a t e g i c power cannot bo said to have 
en t i r e ly los t i t s r o l e . 
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Sonc wr i t e r s JICVC pointod at the pocsi loi l i ty of 
rcsortixi^ to ' p c l i t i c r . l \(;a,rfarG' ns ' a prcl iuinr . ry 
uovc to sGCuro fr^'ourable p o l i t i c a l pos i t i ons which 
could onhD„nc e tix- success of cffciisivc n i l i t a r y opera t ions 
i f they should ta.kc p l c c c . " (183) The i u p l i c a t i o n s a re 
tha t not ional security uay f i r s t he t r i c e by p o l i t i c a l 
Y^arfarc rnd tha t iiiilitary success should depend on an 
'a p r i o r i ' be t to r pol i t ica , l pos i t i on . This l i n e of 
thought i s par t cf l i t e r a t u r e on the subject v\/hich i s 
nainly concerned wit h f inding out sone pre-nuclear 
a l t e r n a t i v e s before the ac tua l use of nuclear \jeapons. 
At core, i t i s the saae idea behind the Pause doc t r ine . 
Two theraes pene t ra te the discussion of the r e l a t i o n 
of no.tional securi ty to the acquisi-tion of v/co.pon-grade 
f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s i n the context of a, weapon-oriented 
prograiine. The f i r s t thenc i s t he s t m t c g i c pos ture of 
the adversary. Ji.ny misunderstanding of such pos ture 
night lead very easi ly to t h e r i s e of compulsions to 
ro -des ign the natio-^al secur i ty doc t r ine . This was t h e 
case of the United S ta tes soon cf te r the Second world V/ar 
( l83)- Kintner, W ; (fn. 169)? p.39'-. Kintner conceives 
p o l i t i c a l warf-^re as containing 
i d o o l o . i c a l s t ruggle r t co re . He, 
t he re fo re , Ci.iphasizes t h e power and 
persuasiveness of fund?,aenxal ideas 
and values which shape a n a t i o n ' s 
objec t ives in r e l a t i o n to other 
na t ions . 
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when i t thought i t s naclcar monopoly vyould be sustained 
for a long t i n e . Ins tead , American s t r a t e g i s t s should have 
contemplated the idea tha t once thoy "had shown t h e i r 
hand so dramatically in 1945" as Beaton says, the 
immediate question which should have haunted then viasi 
"when the Soviet Union would follow suit?-" (184) To 
handle t h i s issue ^inerican s t ra . t eg i s t s should ho.vo 
developed a r e a l i s t understanding of Russia^n s t r a t e g i c 
pos ture . The second theme i s t ha t geography continues 
to remain the most important underpinning of s t ra tegy , 
even though technology may modify i t s importc?.nco. (185). 
Unfortunately, the present generation of s t r a t e g i s t s 
has not "been able to s t e a l out of these two themes vvhich 
to the w r i t e r , seem, r e l a t ed to ' h o r i z o n t a l ' views which 
usual ly do not exceed a quan t i t a t i ve understanding of the 
(184) Beaton, 1.5 ( f n . 5 ) , p . 1 2 . 
(185) Kintnor, V/. ; (fn. 169), p.399. 
@ One s ign i f ican t contr ibut ion to the e r e c t i o n of 
Geo s t ra tegy i s t h a t of Prof. Ganal Hemdan of the 
Department of Geography at Cairo Un ive r s i ty , One 
of h i s recent works i s qui te a r evea l ing case 
st u dy s The October Ifar i n Global Strategy^ (C a i re ; 
Book world Pub l i she r s , 1974). He has also attempted 
a ser ious incorpora t ion of a h i s t o r i c a l f ac to r into 
h i s gcos t ra teg ic p ro jec t ion to t he effect t h a t has 
i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y gains much more formidable 
premises. 
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acqu i s i t ion of woapon-grado f i s s i l e n a t o r i a l s , an 
under s tanding tliat a o c onp ani c d tlie early nuclear dcvolopncnt 
This nay explain wliy the lessons for tlio ere si031 of 
mi l i t a ry power as the opcrationaJL ins t runcnt ox pol icy 
wore not voiced except as l a t e as I963j soue oi^litoen 
years af ter the f i r s t use of f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s i n the 
form of a, mi l i t a ry weapon. I t i s due to Ivintncr, i n fact 5 
tha t these lessons wore suggested as followss 
1» "Eastern r e l i ance on pol i t ico , l wa,rfare i n -d ro i t 
conhination with other xype of Soviet lov;er"»r 
3 . ijiaericon policy of c o l l e c t i v e securi ty which 
has pl'^ced several p o l i t i c a l r e s t r i e t i c n s on 
"both the development rnd p o t e n t i a l euployuent 
of Ancrican arned forces . 
3 . The intervjining of n i l i t a r y ; p o l i t i c a l , cconoraic 
decis ions at the seat of ( the U.S.) Govcrnnait 
due to the influence of ilnerican n i l i t a r y 
ass i s tance progrannc on the force s t ruc tu re 
of nany of US a l l i e s . 
4 . The developncnt of nodern e l ec t ron ic 
comnunication systens wirLch led to the con t ro l 
of forces deployed i n coniloa.t fron the Pentagon 
coaaa.nd pos t . (186) 
(186) I h i d . , p.389. 
- 268 -
I_I; I I \ ^ iF^'EBPRSI'..TIOi; THROUGH .ANTITHESIS s 
ILSSGURITY OF .HON??FJ.GLE/Jl POVERS IN L MJGLEiJl 
EWIROMIBIvTTg, 
Having analysGd t h e phoiionGnon sub jec t eel to s tudy 
i n t e rms of i t s r e l a t i o n t o n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n t h e 
l i g h t of t l io t h e s i s t h a t t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of weapon-grade 
f i s s i l e n a t e r i a l s i n t h e c o n t e x t of a weapon-or ion ted 
programme enhances t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e H--~ po\ver end 
adds, q u a n t i t a t i v e l y as w e l l as q u a l i t a t i v e l y , to 
n a t i o n a l power, our pn.o„lysis ccn he enforced by 
enharking upon an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n th rough the o j n t i t h e s i s , 
i n s e c u r i t y . 
There a re d i f f e r e n t Yvays t o p re sen t t h e e ^ n t i t h e s i s . 
The f i r s t i s to p i ck up t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a n u c l e a r 
exchange between the two super -powers , assuming t h a t 
d e t e r r e n c e has e^ot, a t l o a s t t h e o r e t i c a l l y , an e r r o r 
p r o b a b i l i t y . In t h i s case , t h e s e c u r i t y of non -nuc l ea r 
powers Wi l l c e r t a i n l y be endrj igered. (187) N e i t h e r a 
nuc loa r - fTee zone nor a c r e d i b l e conventione. l f o r ce 
co.n p r o h i b i t a n i r s i l e war betv/een t h e super -powers , 
no t even f l y o v e r s by t h e s t r a t e g i c bombers new a v a i l a b l e 
(187) The Indican Prime M i n i s t e r , : r s . I n d i r a Ganc'hi, 
observed t h a t b i g power f i g h t s a r e fought on 
t h e t e r r i t o r i e s of t h i r d c o u n t r i e s . Sec t e x t 
of her speech a t t h e 25th Pugwash Conference, 
Madras, JaJi. 13, 1976. 
in iDotli a reenals wldcli can pene-Lrate any present a i r 
defence systec-. The point t h a t the w r i t e r wants to 
r a i s e i s that n i l i t p x i l y t he r e i s no such gurrantee for 
securi ty in case a nuclear exchange takes place htstween 
the two super-powers. Thus the p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y posture 
of a non-nuclear power i s in pos i t ion to e s t ab l i sh any 
secur i ty guarantee . ,/"ith the conclusion of an agreement 
•between France anC, the Soviet Union to reduce t he r i s k s of 
accidenta l nuclear Y/arj " p . . . . power prevenir tout r i sque 
d' un declenchnent rcoidei i te l des armies nuc lea i ros"( 188) 
Consenting on the agreement, Hutzinger conceived i t in 
the contest of ' ' les nonveaux p e r i l s r a i l i t a i r e s sur l e 
continent european et r ' sos a"bords,"j and r.dded tha t 
'•en revajache, d l est vcraj/^ue 1 ' UPLSS a decide i l y a. 
deja une dizaine d' annees de conhler des gra'iJcs 
f a ih l e s se s dans t r c i s doaaines: l e s arraes u n c l e a i r e s 
s t r a t cg ique , l a f l o t t e de sur face et sons-uarinc et 
l e s arnemcnts convontionnels pe r ioc t ioncs en Lurope."(189) • 
(^88) Le vionde, July 2, 1976. 
(189) Hutzinger, J . 5 ji'uissence et ' equ i l ih re des Forces 
bovietxque, Le j'loncle; July 2, 1976. 
^ There i s emphasis i n l i t e r a t u r e on the subject tha t big 
power f igh t s tojxd to occur i n p a r t i c u l a r a i e a s . 
Spec i f i ca l ly , the liuro^jean por t ion of the rmphibious 
r in l and i s iDrovi'^cd as a case. See; Carlson, L. ; 
?'^^'^.§??9'9^^^S^^-.'J9'^'^^: .•^ '^ A^ ."^ .^ .Q..sj. (Dekra Luni t a l i t & Dutt , 
i rubl ishers , Indian Preprint, 1971), p. 30^5. H i s t o r i c a l l y , 
the said Cuiphasis i s accounted for by the fact t h a t the 
tY>fo world wars tha t the world has hr.d to face were 
f n i t i a t e d in Ilurope. Some onalysos i n t e r p r e t t h i s 
h i e t o r i c a l phenomenon on t h e grounds of the \iar 
i n s t i t u t i o n in ^^cstern c i v i l i z a t i o n . Sees Tcynbee, -''^ . sA 
Study of History; (iTcj York; Dell Publisiiing Co., I n c . , 
Fou'fth"'pFiliting7 ..E, 1974), Vo 1 .1 , pp. 346-347. 
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The w r i t e r ' s reading of l i t e r a t u r e on the subject 
has revc::lGd tha t the present nuclear po?\/ersj especia l ly 
the supor-povierSj are respons ih le , to a consic'erahle 
extent , for the diffusion of the 'broad feeliriii t h a t non-
nuclear pollers pre insecure in a nuclear environncnt, 
In t h e i r attempts to extend t h e i r pov-/er domains rnd 
naintair . t h e i r nucloar ' c l a s s ' pr ivi la .ges , the super-
poYjers sponsored l a rge - sca l e canpaigns to 'cool do?m' 
non-nuclear powers i n t h e i r search for the nuclear 
pov^er. (190) These campaigns "backfire and r e s u l t in a 
c lear conviction tha t no credib le al terna. t ive e x i s t s 
other than a na t iona l independent nuclear force . Per any 
Third Y/orld s t r a t e g i s t v a i l ce r t a in ly look -v/ith scepticism 
to those measures suggested for ixnerican s t ra tegy to 
el iminate the feeling of i n secu r i t y aiiiong non-nuclear 
powers. (191) 
Coffey bel ieves t h a t , from the point of view of 
a non-nuclear pov;er, "the ideal secur i ty guarantee would 
proba bly be a promise by one or more nuclear powers to 
come to i t s ass is tance should i t be at tacked by, or 
threatened by, s t i l l another nuclear power". (l92) 
(190) The Atom I'or Peace prograrame i s a good example in 
poin t . Seej Skolnikoff, ± .^5 Scienge , TechnoIpgy and 
^dheriCan For eign Po 1 icyj 11 ^  ss.,'TTHiTs 'Tli'c'"l!7T7TT 
rf"ess, 1st Paperl)ack~Edition, 1969), PP.45-45. 
(191)-. Coffey, J . ; ( fn,90) , p .12t t 
(192) I b i d . , p.122. 
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Our aaialysis poses two fundauental questions 'beiore 
Coffej^'s l og i c , and they a r e , app-ront ly, unanswerable 
by such l o g i c . F i r s t , v/hy did Franco not shoA,; any 
acceptance of any such guarantee aii<-. why did i t proceed 
ahead with i t s na t iona l prograiTine? Second, what u t i l i t y 
w i l l any such guarantee have in case of a r i f t between 
the non-nuclear guaranteed and i t s guarantor? I^ven i n the 
case of an a l l i a n c e system, we can expe 't a n o n - s a t e l l i t e 
move. Though Coffey's ideas may be claimed to be in 
defence of non-p ro l i f e ra t ion through br idging the i n se ruc i ty 
gap, they represent an attempt to revive the t a c t i c s of 
American forcdgn policy under Dulles ?Jho i s hnoT/;n for 
the 'containment* doc t r ine . Ij^ the context of the present 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, the chcjrr .cterist ics of t he i n t e r -
na t iona l nuclear s t r a t e g i c environraent and tho d i a l e c t i c s 
of the r e l a t i o n between na t iona l secur i ty end the acqu is i t ion 
of weapon-grade f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s i n the context of a 
\>/eapon-oriented pro.jpramme, the re i s no 'power' reason tha t 
Yi/ould make a non-nuclear country fee l secure the momient 
i t ge t s a promise from a nuclear power that i t \.;ould rush 
to a s s i s t i n case i t i s threatened by any nuclear power. 
Nor there i s a reason for any non-nuclear country to 
bel ieve in the c r e d i b i l i t y of such promises or a s s e r t i o n s . 
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yiiiotlier case of insecur i ty i s provided also by 
Coffey tliousii tlae e^csxiiple lie provides i s not t r u e as 
v d l l be siiovm. He t r a c e s as "the most d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n 
to handle but perhaps the iiiost ID-ely to inCuco fur ther 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n " , the feel ing of i n secu r i ty vis-p,-vis 
a possible nass ive conventional a t t ack . The ezauple he 
provides i s I s r a e l . He suggests thot I s r a e l i n s i s t s 
on securi ty against an iixab non-nuclsa.r a t tach and t h i s 
may lead I s r a e l " to bui ld a nuclear de te r ren t r a t h e r than 
re ly on outs ide he lp" , i n which case Egypt "worried about 
the I s r a e l i developnent of a token nuclear force , nay 
i t s e l f seek to acquire atomic bombs". (193). 
^hat Coffey suggests i s a s t r a t e g i c posture 
cons is t ing of the follo\;inj3 element ss 
1 . L non-nuclear a t tack against I s r a e l , (Coffey, 
though v^riting a s t rc teg ' ic study, used the 
emotional word ' agg re s s ion ' . ) 
2. An I s r a e l i i n s i s t ence on securi ty against such 
a t t ack . 
3. An I s r a e l i exercxse of the nuclear Y-zea^ jon option 
due to the d i f f i cu l ty of the s i t u a t i o n . A token 
nuclear force i s formed up. 
4« The r i s e of 'a resurgent Arab League ' . 
5 . Egypt develops apprehensions aga ins t the I s r a e l i 
token nuclear force, the r e s u l t of which i s an 
Egyptian acqu i s i t ion of nuclear weapons* 
(193) Coffey, J .5 ( fn .89) , p.128. 
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Coffey's assessment does e.ppcrently deioend upon 
p a r t i c u l a r assumptions tha t Coffey did not subject to 
the l ea s t ana lys is needed. The commencement i s of an 
assumed ' aggress ion ' on I s r a e l , The impl ica t ion i s thr,-t~ 
the zlrnh regional p o l i t i c a l behaviour i s the urge for 
the I s r a e l i s to acquire nuclerz weapons. The question 
tha t the wr i ter poses i s why should we exclude t h e 
' o t he r ' p o s s i b i l i t y ? In fac t , the pat'cerns of I s r a e l i 
politiEi),l behaviour does, by any standard, i n s t i g r t e 
the yj-abs, Egypt i s f i r s t included, to i n s i s t on 
efl6 i^"i^ ity against such bihaviourvwif we add the not ions 
provided by the wr i t e r during p'roblem formulation (the 
development of a nuclear capf-ble delivery systems and 
the Plutonium s tock-pi le enough to produce a number of 
nuclear \;ea.pons), the outcome would be Arab apprehensions 
l e s t the I s r a e l i s should develop nuclear weapons the„t 
could be used to impose an I s r ae l i - de s igned set'clement 
of the conf l i c t tha t has not been resolved even by the 
development of the i.tost advanced conventional \v'eapons. 
Another quest ion i s v/hy should Coffey exclude the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of an iirab in s i s t ence on secur i ty aga,inst 
the frequent non-nuclear I s r a e l i a t t acks? I t i s oji 
es tabl i shed h i s t o r i c a l fact tha t I s r a e l sparked the mi l i t a ry 
operat ions in 1948, 1956 and 1967. The Arabs r a t h e r than 
the I s r a e l i s should then th ink of i n i t i a t i n g a new factor 
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to the strategy of the conflict that has heerL going 
on for almost thr i ty years. Apprehensions should, 
accordingly, be the i r s not the I s r a e l i s ' . A th i rd 
question, in fact raore important than the f i r s t and 
second, stems from vyhat Coffoy meant by an I s rae l i 
insistence on security and v/hich security he v>/p.s 
referring t o . To the wri ter , insistence on security, 
in the Coffey context, i s a s t rategic posture not so 
much different from v/hat the I s r a e l i s ca l l pre-empive 
s t r ike . A^.n I s rae l i insistence on security would then Eea,n 
a pre-emptive nuclear str ike ra ther than the mere 
acquisition of a token nuclooJ force whose deployment, 
in view of the previous discussion, i s basi.cally 
intended to effectuate a better negotiating posit ion. 
If, just for the sake of analy.sis, we agreo with Coffey 
upon the assumption that there exis ts an I s r a e l i fear 
les t e. resurgent 'Arab League' should launch a massive 
non-nuclear aggression that I s rae l cannot within stand 
or contain, can Coffey present an explanation for the 
r ise of LvoJo resurgency vis -a-vis Is rae l unless the 
resort to armed forces i s a necessity for survival, which 
means that if there i s a national security urge for the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons in the region, i t l i e s 
with the Arabs, not with the I s r a e l i s . 
Even with the question of major a l l i e s , the Arabs, 
especially the Egyptians, have got a point, Egypt has been 
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facing d i f f i c u l t i e s in guaranteeing i t s arms sources 
since 1955. I s r a e l , on the o ther hand, has faced no 
such problems, wlion the E'rcnch ?rcsidGnt Charles _dG 
Gaulles ordered an embargo on rjLTns sa les to V/est Asia, 
the I s r a e l i s \70re already i n the process of g e t t i n g 
a l l t ha t they wanted from the United S t a t e s . 
No ana lys i s can ever neglect the r e l a t i o n between 
the i n i t i a t i o n of weapon-oriented nuclocj' prograumes 
in West Asia and the behaviour of the super-pov/ers. 
The United S ta tes i s repor ted to have exempted I s r a e l 
alone from i t s world-?i/ide campaign using whr.tever 
diplomatic, economic and militpj 'y leverage to p r e s s u r i s e 
over 1 i,C nat ions to adhere to the'UuclecJ' Non-pro l i fe ra t ion 
Trea ty . A former yjnerican diplomat declared! "In fact 
Y^e (the un i t ed States) may have encouraged I s r a e l to 
r e f r a i n from assuming t h e ob l iga t i ons set fo r th in t h i s 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l undertaking ( the ICPT) . Through a study 
prepared at White House request by the RjJ.-ID Corporation 
of Cal i forn ia , we (the United Sta tes) provided I s r a e l 
with t he most advanced t echn ica l and p o l i t i c a l data on 
the e f fec t ive use of nuclear weapons in the Middle Eo,st". 
(194) The samxc r epor t , whose au then t i c i t y has la rge ly 
(194) Nos,D.5 I.ii--rica*s Y©ry Sy^o-Glri EQl't),tioffiishi3 witM 
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beon GdaittGcl "by •,/c'^ t ^laiau QXjcrtc, '^lovldcr. nucii 
nore iajoortrait inforiur.tion on xho ro l e of the United 
Btftec in ace i s t ing I c r r c l in the nuclerj" f i e l d . 
I I , I I I » S . THS jjIILIT/j^Y ;JJLI/J^CE ALTERF..IIVg; 
The nction-r^tatoi; of the procent intern-^t ional 
sycten rXQ ej^cj:e, \^xt'n varyin;_^ uecrecs, tha t ' 'nuclcnr 
v^e."iJonc r e f l e c t r.trenj^th and increoBe the fOB-co ava i l ab le 
to the (nation) s t c t e " (195) and thus have r^ ot rn or;'-,anic 
r e l r t i o n to na t iona l power through t h e i r d i a l e c t i c 
inxerac t ion -vvith the na t iona l secur i ty end i t has been 
indicated how the r e l a t i v e security/ tha t the present 
nuclcrT poners enjoy night in ' j t iga tc the non-nuclear 
powers to exercise t h e i r nuclear op t ion . 
Assuning tha t any of the non-nuclcor' pov«crs i s not 
able , r egard less of the reasons unde r ly ing , . t c exerc ise 
an independent nuclear opt ion, one se r ious a l t e r n a t i v e 
would be to enter in to a n i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e which would, 
assuLiingly, be a s u b s t i t u t e for independent act ion t o 
f i t in the int erri.-tional'^naclGcr s t r a t e g i c cnvironaent . 
In axinerican l i t e r c t u r e on t h e subjec t , ^/jhich i s 
cer ta in ly copious, the re i s considerable euphasis on the 
a l l i ance systcn as a neans of uu^intaining the neccssexy 
secui i ty agr ins t e i ther a nassivc conventional 
a t tack or a p o t e n t i a l nuclccx s t r i k e . Anerican 
(195) Jones , R.? (fn.135), p .v9. 
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s t r a t e g i s t s a r c of tlic h a b i t of j u s t i f y i n g t h e a l l i a n c e 
system and p roceed ing to emphasize: 
a) t h a t p r e s e n t a l l i a n c e meuToers had hcon 
m i l i t a r i l y v u l n e r a b l e be fo re e n t e r i n g 
i n t o allinXLCc, and 
b) t h a t p r e s e n t a l l i r j i c c members need no t develop 
the i r na t i on cal in d ep c nd e nt nuc 1 e a r c ap a b i l i t y 
as i t 'Hvould not enhance t h e i r s e c u r i t y " . (196) 
T a r r , fo r example, s t a t e s t h a t "by 1948, t h e 
n a t i o n s of Western Europe wore s o l e l y aware of t h e i r 
m i l i t a r y v u l n e r a b i l i t y " and t h r t iunerican " n i l i t r j r y 
a s s i s t a n c e t o Europe was, i n the f ace of t h e Sov ie t 
t h r e a t , a n e c e s s i t y " , though he d e c l a r e s t h a t t h e IwlTO 
"was a ; cy.Gholo.:;i.cri measure des igned to r e a s s u r e Europe 
and warn t h e Sovie t Union" . (197) In o t h e r words , t he 
'pov;er* promised by the a l l i a n c e i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l r a t h e r 
then, c o n c r e t e . Dr. K i s s i n g e r , u n l i k e T'arr, could f i t t h i s 
o H i a n c e i n a power p e r s p e c t i v e v^ jhcn he -wrote t h a t 
"V/estorn Europe c o n t a i n s t h e second l a r g e s t c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
of i n d u s t r y -nd s k i l l s o u t s i d e t h e Un i t ed S t a t e s " and 
tha,t t h e wor.ld ba lance of power depends on denying t h e 
(196) F i s h e r , i.. ; ( fn . 10) , p . 5 . 
(197) T a r r , D,-, ( fn . 158), p . 4 3 . 
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resourcGS and nanpovver of Western Buro'po to an a t tpckor , 
(198)* 
The question of socking for securi ty •* under 
condit ions of a nucloax cnvironnont - tlirougla 
incorpora t ion into a mi l i t a ry a l l i a n c e s i s t l icrcforo 
brought in to scept ic focus. F i r s t , i f t he devclopnont 
of an independent na t iona l nucloa.r force were not to 
ehha^nce the securi ty of a present nenbcr of the 
a l l i a n c e , as I ' ishcr t r i e d t o persuade Prance would 
have the French case follows on pp. ) Second, i f i t 
wore only a n a t t e r of psychological ncasurcs , as Ta.rr 
put i t , the question of v>;hy a, n a t i o n - s t a t e should give 
up par t of i t s sovereignty to an a l ly Vi/ho would not ailovi/ 
a s ign i f i can t share in decisive c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s . Third, 
there i s no accepta.hle power r e t u r n for a given nat ion 
i n underlying in a bigger secur i ty schcne when i t can 
develop i t s na t ional securi ty c a p a b i l i t y . Fourth, as wo 
are now e n t i t l e d to s t r e s s the technologica l fac tor i n 
198 Kiss inger , H.5 ( fn . i57 ) , p .269. 
* The sane thpno was repeated by McITaJ-iara who s ta ted 
thats"a.f ter the United S t a t e s , ue s t e rn Europe today 
roprcBGnts the grea tes t a,ggrogation of econonic, 
p o l i t i c a l and ideo log ica l s t rength i n the w o r l d . . . . 
There can be no question that Soviet donination of t h i s 
area would be a grave t h r ea t to ( / i t ierica 's) Secur i ty" . 
See McNanara, R. ? The Essence of S e c u r i t y . ; (London; 
Hodder and Stoaghton, 1968), p,.35. 
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the s t r a t e g i c enviromient of the super-power adversary. (199) 
Eicliard Burt discussed a sinilar* not ion and concluded t h a t 
jj'aorican mi l i t a ry exp lo i t a t ion of new technology w i l l widen 
ex is t ing gaps in allifinco ca^jahi l i t ios , un le s s Europe 
inc reases co l labora t ion on ijrocluclng and procur ing these 
systeus (200), which i s a re:-iote p o s s i h i l i t y at p r e sen t . 
The impact which Burt foresees i s t ha t " i t i s probably 
inev i t ab l e t ha t sone Europeans w i l l survey the wide range 
of weapons now unJor devclopnent and the arguuents 
supporting t h e i r doploynent cxicl sudpcct that t h e United 
S ta tes i s only a t t cnp t ing to s u b s t i t u t e nuclear technology 
for manpower i n Europe - - asking Europooais to function 
as 'foot s o l d i o r s ' " (^-'l) 
(199) Thero i s now a ta lk underway i n the United S ta tes 
of a ' t echnologica l s u r p r i s e ' or a ' t echno log ica l 
Pear l Harbour' which would exact a very higher 
p r i c e . An achieveucnt of such tocl inological surpr i se 
by the Soviet Union i s bel ieved by Anicrico,n 
s t r a t e g i s t s to have the a b i l i t y of cos t ing the 
United States ojid i t s a l l i e s the l i v e s of t h e i r 
people. See the e d i t o r i a l of United S t a t e s 
S t r a t eg i c I n s t i t u t e ? ' StratogJLc P_e_vioWy_ Yol.IV, 
10 .2 , Spring 1976, p . 4 . 
( 2^  t ) B ur t , R, 5 IT ew^  7oapons Techno logy; Debate & Biroctionsy 
Tlondcn; IISS> Adelphi P aper s No s 1 Z^Yf p . 21 . 
(201: I b i d . , p . 20,; 
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R o v i s i t o d , t he u i l i t c r y a l l i a n c e a l t e r n a t i v e as a 
s u b s i t u t c f c r a n a t i o n a l n u c l e a r f o r ce i n t h e face of 
e i t h e r a n a s s i v c convoiitioxial t h r u s t or a n u c l e a r s t r i k e , 
can "be viewccl a s v u l n e r a b l e . This i s ohvious f ron Gen. 
H n i g ' s oTosorvation (137) njil o t h e r ' d o c t r i n a l ' i s s u e s . 
To t ake up one exaiJ^^le while p r e s e n t i n g the ^lUerican 
Goii-,ross v'jitliin 1977 Defence Budget , l l r . Ransfclc", t h e 
then American S e c r e t a r y of Defence, s t a t e d t h a t t h e 
s t r a t e g i e s of NATO and i/arsaw P a c t , a res 
STHATEGIC DOCTRINES (202) 
NATO, 
To execu t ive e f f e c t i v e 
n u c l e a r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t 
Warsaw f o r c e s i n response 
t o a liiajor c o n v e n t i o n a l 
a t t a c k o r a 1 i n i t e d nuc l ea r 
a t t a c k . 
W;>RSAV 
To execute longer per iods 
of conventional conf l ic t 
hefore e sca la t ing to a 
nuclear environi-icnt. 
To launch a pre-eupt ivo 
nuclear s t r i k e e.gainst 
m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s i f they 
believed NATO ^vas about 
to launch a major nuclear 
a t t a ck . 
(202) For e laborat ion sees Heisenberg, Vf, 5 "The i ^ l i a n c e 
and Europe; Part Is C r i s i s S t a b i l i t y i n Europe 
end Theatre Nuclear Y/eapons"; (Londons IISS, 
Adelphi, Paper No.96, 1973) espec ia l ly PP. 15-28. 
An important overview i s provided by Nunn, S.5 
Address on NAT0_Stratc/2V , Su rv iva l , , Vol.XIX, 
No. 1, Jan. /," P~eb'. 1977., PP. 30-32. 
- 281 -
The sc.icl viilncrability i s iaj)licit in the fact 
tlint JLiTO ' s doctrine i s basGcl on tiio assun;,jtion that 
Y/a.rsaw forces will bc„';Ln with launcJiing a uajor conventional 
attack or a limitocl nuclear" at tack. Equally, the Vaxsaw 
doctrine i s vulnerable as i t dcioends on of looting longer 
periods of conventional conflict "before escalating to a 
nuclear cnvironricnt. i^ s both cif:uv'ajl. cventua^lly seek 
for a bcttornent of their s t ra tegic postures to bo 
projected in 'neaningful' negotiaticns? no roon vdll 
be available for stra,togic sa t is fact ion to be displayed. 
The alternotive i s fast ascen'-'cncy of the esclat icn 
la.der.. .where negotiations wil l be replficed, a.s an 
objcctive, by the need to survive rather thr,n recover. 
I t has been pointed out that the najor nuclorj' 
a l ly, in a military all iance syston, night v^ithdraw h i s 
nuclear cover as vjas the case between Prance and the 
United States , though I'rance, at that t i n e , wa,s no target 
of e. serious and direct nuclear throat . There i s yet 
another possibi l i ty in which the najor a l ly can withdraw 
his nuclear coverj in negotiations with i t s adversary, 
in which case, the ' foot-soldier ' as described cajrlier 
would ronain subservient wp„tching the withdrawal of the 
nuclear cover without proper rcr.ction. "In the event 
of an East-\/est n i l i taxy conflict", as admitted in 
study by the Londoij^nternat ional In s t i t u t e for Strategic 
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S tud ies , the s taloi l i ty of the alliancG night ho 
threatened hy the cxoossive European hy the uncer ta- int ies 
of e sca la t ion" . (203) The sane s"tudy r e fe r r ed a lso ' to 
Soviet i n s i s t e n c e , -/ery early i n the s t r a t e g i c Arris 
Limita t ion T^lks (SiJLT) that PBS (Forvnard-Based Systens; 
i . e . , Anerican nuclear s t r i k e forces based i n Hurope 
and '^^ sia with a cai^acity t o s t r i k e the Soviet honoland. 
ought he accepted as an eleraont i n any negot iah le S/JJT 
loroposal. Assuring tha t the United Sta tes i s pushed to 
a s t r a t e g i c posture where i t has to accept to a Soviet 
negot ia t ing chip on PBS, any country v/hich i s claimed 
to he noT^  enjoying the Anerican nuclear cover, w i l l he 
suddenly l e f t vulnerable to any nuclear t h r e a t . 
There i s also the p o s s i b i l i t y of a s i t u a t i o n 
p r i s ing vi/here Anericon and a l l i e d i n t e r e s t s d i f f e r , 
such as the case with Y/est Geruany during the October 
War, 1973. The other case was b lunt ly put by the 
Aust ra l ians i n t h e i r negot ia t ions with the Aneric^ns. 
Said an Aust ra l ian delegates "We had to consider the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of s i t u a t i o n s in the future in which US 
and Austra l ian percept ions and i n t e r e s t s may d i f f e r . . . . " 
(205) Nerl ich, U.? The A l i i once and E-uropesPart Vs 
lucl 'oar Weapons ajTcl Eas^\7^"st 
HG_^otiations| (London; I . I . S . S . , 
AdGlphi Papers , No.«120, 1975), p . 1 
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so t h a t j i u s t r a l i a could lioxdLy "bo oxpoctocl t o cxtond 
i t s f a c i l i t i o s (204) to US f o r c o s or PBS. The c r i s i s 
and t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s t h a t A n o r i c a ' s advorsrJiT w i l l not 
r o c o g n i z c such a novo oxcoiot i f doc lorod . 3von i t i s to 
bo a d e c l a r e d , t h e r e i s no g u a r a n t e e t h a t YBSs w i l l no t 
des t royed "by A n e r i c a ' s a d v e r s a r y . In case t hey a r e not 
a t t r c k e d , -'a:ierica.'s adversa ry w i l l c e r t a i n l y f i n d i t 
easy t o t a k e advantage of t h e s i t u a t i o n i n n a n y i x o l i t i c a l 
v\/ays. 
The n i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e a l t e r n a t i v e i s , t h e r e f o r e , 
no s u b s t i t u t e vdiatsoever fo r a n a t i o n a l nucloa.r f o r c e . 
MJCLSARIZATIOI iJlD SgRATSGIC GLASSES; CHIIIA & PHAI^ CEi 
The two no e l s of China, and Prance er*e un ique 
i n aany ?i/ays and t h e i r e x a n i n a t i o n has been found 
r e v e a l i n g . They re^-^rosent two f a c t i o n s of what can bo 
c a l l e d ' t h e n u c l e a r n i d d i e c l r s s ' pov^ers, \7 i th China, 
as an upper n i d d l c c l a s s or a ' supra n e d i r x i - s i z e d 
nuc lea r power' and Prance a s a n i d - n i d d l e c l a s s n u c l e a r 
2_ow_cr_. They have got c e r t a i n ' c l a s s ' a c j p i r a t i c n s and they 
f-iasquarade for ' s u p e r - p c w e r i s a ' as t h e i r c o n p o s i t e 
n a t i o n a l power a l lows t h e n to have a sha re i n t h e 
(204). Toohey, B . ; 'Anor i c r^ s Sec re t Nuclear S t r a t e g y ' . 
V i k r a n t . Deceuber 1976, p . 7 . 
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global environaent , -tliGy projected no i n t e r e s t i n oJiy 
non-i30wer apj^roacli and asked for t h e i r due slirj^o and 
nuclecX independence'. Tims G-n, GhrXles do ^'-^^^ ^S" 
buked, in 1959, the previous I'rench Governnicnts ibecause 
they had not denanded for France her pa r t i n uJ-iorican 
plans and decisions concerning nuclear war. (205) 
China, on the other hrn-d re fu ted ^ny such idea as 
convening a conference on nuclear disamaxient "because 
she was not inv i ted pjid thus believed t h a t the super-
powers are using t h e i r nuclear rj-scnals for inf luencing 
non-nuclear powers. (206) In the Chinese s t r a t egy , 
nuc lea r i za t ion was perceived i n a power t o t a l i t y as "a 
ina;jor achievonent' ' which would load to an " increase in 
the na t iona l defence capabi l i ty and oppose the United S ta t e s 
(205) Kohl, \ / . ; Erench Nuclea,r Diplonacy; (Princetons f r i nce ton 
Universi ty P re s s , 1971), p .62 . 
, (206) Governnent of the Peop le ' s Republic of China; 
People 01 the |.j"orld, Unite and Struggle for the 
Couplete Prohibi t ion of Nuclerr Uor.pons;(Peking-. 
Foreign Lpjiguage P r e s s , 1971), pp.1-4-. 
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inxjer ia l i s t policy of nuclear Tolackmail raid nucleaJ" 
t l i r ea t s" (207) Prance, according to Schlosinger , 
exercised i t s nucloar opt ion af ter what he ca l led 
the 'Suez psychology' . The lesson dJ'awn by France 
soon af ter t h e Suez V/ar of 1956 was t h a t t he re i s no 
• r ea l ' na t iona l securi ty for any na t iona l power in 
case i t s nagor nuclear a l l y withdraws i t s support , 
cover or t he so-cal led nuclear unhre l la* The a l t e r n a t i v e 
tha t o,ppeared as sole was the developnent of v.xi 
independent na t iona l naclear force , token or s t r a t e g i c . 
The suggestion tha t China and Prance hclong to one 
s t r a t e g i c nuclear c lass i s also supported by t h e n a t c r i a l i -
zation of t h e i r nuc 1 ear s t r a t e g i c awareness i n one t i n c ; 
The French decided for acqu i s i t ion of t h e i r independent 
force af ter t h e Suez campaign. The Chinese, equally, VXQ 
believed to have oi.tod for the developnent of a na t iona l 
naclear power sonctine i n 1956 (208) and t h e i r progrrjnno 
was p r a c t i c a l l y i n i t i a t e d i n 1957 (209) although sone 
(207) Governnent of th$ Peop le ' s Republic of Chinas 
Of f i c i a l Text of a Stp/topent on thp F i r s t 
gucloar Test.,CJ:^oK:ings ? , Oct. 1 6,19 64)» 
(208) Hint on, H.j Comnunist China i n V/orld P o l i t i c s s 
(Bostons Houghton Miff l in , 1966), p.36; 
(209) Halperin, M. ? China rnd the Bonb; (LTew York 
Frederick A. praegor , 1965), p-7l i 
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w r i t e r s tond to bpxkdato the option to cis ear ly as the 
Mao take-over in 1949 when the ncv; Chinese govorrxient 
ca l led back a l l Chinese s c i e n t i s t s who ?-;erc sent on 
scholarships to the west, especial ly • the United S t a t e s . 
(210) The energencc of the nuclear s t r a t eg i c a^wareness 
can ^therefore, bo thought of as an an to - thos i s as i t 
was the r eac t ion of these two po?\;crs to the p a t t e r n of 
behaviour associa-ted with super-powcrisri. 
As for super-power aspira^tiop^s, the Chinese 
s trategy wa.s designed a f te r pjiticiprated ' super-powor' 
t h r e a t s i n a power s t rugg le . I t i s a historiccul fact 
tha,t China was no t a r g e t of e i t h e r nuclear blackiaail 
or nuclear th rea t frou any of the super-powers and 
Halperin, i n h i s account of the Chinese acceptance of 
the consequences of a s p l i t with llussia, s ta ted t h r t 
Peking vvas confident tha t no nuclear a.ttack Vi/as to be 
launched by the United S t a t e s aga.inst China.,(211) But 
China "wanted to remind the count r i es of Asia of the 
presence of e, raajor mi l i t a ry power with whom they 
niust come to t e r n s ' . ( 2 1 2 ) Equa„lly, I^rench nuclear 
(210) Ryan, V, & Sunmcrlin, S. s The China Clouds 
ij i ierica's Tragic BTunder "anc["TThxna's 
Risc~to Kuc^le'ar Power; (London^ 
Hutchinson & Co., 1969), p . l 6 l . 
(211) Halper in , II.; China's S t r a t eg i c Outlook; i n 
Buchan, A. (ed) . Gh±j}.e, & The 
Peace of Asia; (London5 Chatto 
& ^ Hindus, 1965) , p . i f o . 
(212) Suyin, H.? China i n t h e Year 200J; (London « 
Penguin Books, 2nd Reprint , 1973),P.195. 
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s t ra tegy was dcsi^^nccl against a siDocific energy, as 
iiondl suggests (213), but r a t h e r against an t i c ipa ted 
super-power p a t t e r n s of behaviour -which would not 
cone to t e r n s with French pursuance of i n t e r e s t s 
outs ide i t s borders , and defined in terrus of power. 
The super-power a sp i r a t ions of both China and Francr 
can fur ther be enforced by t h e work being rendered 
on the devclopuent of a second s t r i k e c?,pability and 
then recount success in achieving the f i r s t inpulses of 
such capab i l i t y . The ITov. 18, 1976 Chinese nuclear t e s t 
wa.s clairied by Peking to hav. "had boosted the count ry ' s 
n i l i t o x y s t rength and deal a heavy blow at the two 
super-powers" (214-) On January 24, 1976, Prance was 
repor ted to have arnod her nuclear subnarinos with 
hydrogdn bonb warheads and new miss i l e s s t rengthening 
her place i n the atomic pov^^er's club", according to 
the French Defence I l i n i s t e r . (215) 
The d i a l e c t i c s of the power s t rugg le , as nuclearijsed, 
between the super-powers on the one hoJid and the middle 
c lass nuclear pov;crs, including both supra-medium sized 
and medium-sized powers may be conceived of i n terms of 
(213) Mendl, \/. ; Deterrence md 1 or suasion; Fr.onch 
Nuclear Armament in the contosct of 
National Policy^, 1945-1969; "(London 
Fabcr & F abc'r , 1 9 7 c ) , T.T8". 
(214) ,Tho Hindustoji Times, November 19, 1976, 
(215) > P a t r i o t , Janucry 25, 1976. 
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what 'power' gains the l a t t e r would grcib ' t a c t i c a l l y ' 
from the former. As the peruanont neubersliip of the 
United Nations Security Council i s idcn t i f iod with the 
deployment of nuclear fo rces , China has headed i n . 
Though t h i s gauge i s no e n t i r e power-oriented, i t can ho 
viewed as a power syuhol au thent ica ted by the h i s t o r i c a l 
connotation, Prance, has hecOno an estaTolished member 
of the Group of Eleven, the 'OPEC of the heav i ly" 
nuclerirized, and has t h e r e f o r e , appiroached^to a 
considerable degree^what share i t aspired for i n the 
context of the present i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i c nuclear 
environment. Prance, neve r the l e s s , i s undergoing a 
process of readjustment, which i s not yet the case of 
China. The said readjustment was e x p l i c i t l y propounded 
by the recent Erench decis ion to h a l t i t s nuclerjr deals 
with Third '-/orld countr ies (216), i n set t lement of 
American denpn.ds nasquarading under t he need to maintain 
the present s t a b i l i t y of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. 
The w r i t e r ' s reading of t h i s readjustment i s t h a t the 
Super-;^owers i n t e rp re t ed the a l l - o u t nuclear sa l e s of 
Prance i n a way but to i n d i c a t e French competi t ive 
f r'oirr— 
a t t i t u d e s v i s - a - v i s the super-powers aJid French 
t i c n s . as the supor-powcrs hav^ monopolitiod the 
nuclear t r a d e . The sai.ie reading Equates conferr ing 
(216) jjiib a s s a d c d o Fr anc o on Ind o °, '^_^.BS Role a so 
10.36^ Dec. 26, 1976. 
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tliG pGrnanont ncubership of the United Nations Security 
Council on rolling to the incorporat ion of Prance i n the 
Group of Eleven. Both wero nastermndecl, nos t l y in an 
e laborate way, by the super-po^^.u'irs hoping t h a t the new 
i n t r u d e r s nay abide by r e s t r a i n t and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the 
two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l bohaviour 
c la ined by _thG two super-powers to be assoc ia ted only 
\>/ith thcm^ soae a r i s t o c r a t i c ciannerisn in a s t r a t e g i c 
nuclear environrient of the society of n a t i o n - s t a t o s . (217) 
\/hercas China and Prance do not nind any widening 
of the nuclear base-they, r a t h e r , applaude i t - the 
super-powers s t i ck to the pos i t ion of hard- l inoEsi 
hence t h e i r over-eiiphasis on the i ssue of safeguards in 
t h e i r nuclear doclings with nediun-sized powers and 
t h e i r apparent worries on the evolution of the publ ic 
discussion of the na t iona l s t r a t e g i c posture on the 
developnont of weapon-grade f i s s i l e ina.terials i n t h e 
context of vi/eapon-orientod prograrmes of, for oxanple, 
Japan and ^Test Gema.ny ,(218)^ Prance was no exception 
(217) Per an exaaple of what a super-power a t t r i b u t e s 
as se l f -generated p a t t e r n s of behaviour 
'mothering' o the r s , sees Taylor, Gen. Ilaxwell; 
Responsibi l i ty and Response; (New York. Harper 
& Row Publ i shers , 1967). 
(218) This can he accounted for by observing t h e volune 
of news-nedia coverage on these two c a s e s . 
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during the early stage of i t s nuclear devolopnent, (219) 
Tliis can be understoocl i n view of the assumption t h a t the 
l a rge r the nunloer of nediuia-sized powers which China and 
France would drag with then, ce r t a in ly lagging hohind, 
in to the nuclear environment, the s t ronger t h e i r foothold 
wi l l hecone i n t h e i r negot iat idnc - v/ith the super-powers. 
For those u n i t s of the present i n t e r n a t i o n a l system which 
are awsxe of t h i s posture and pxe, in the same t ime, i n 
need of nucleariza, t ion, no s t r a t e g i c a l l y re lavant asse t 
can natch an e labora te u t i l i z a t i o n of the d i a l e c t i c s of 
the power s t ruggle on the upper echelons of the systen. 
The previous expose suggests tha t o ther n a t i o n - s t a t e s 
of the present i n t e r n a t i o n a l system are funct ioning, i n a 
system spec t r e , d-^. ^''-^cntly ^^ bas i ca l ly 'employed' i n no 
'power-action-power'work, U p t i l the wr i t ing of t h i s 
t h e s i s , the uranium-rich countr ies have shown but l i t t l e 
preoccupation with p o l i t icali-sing t h e i r source of nat ional 
power, . / i th the exception of the super-powers and t h e 
medium-sized powers, a l l u n i t s of t h e present i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
system, tha,t a re on the th resho ld , are nuclear impor ters , 
Ko indigenous nuclear industry has been repor ted i n any 
case at %:.. c r i id id - t ' o - l i r t . The case of Egypt, i f 
unfolded, would r e i t e r a t e the v\;r i tcr 's no t ion . On July 1,1976, 
(219) Sec t e x t of correspondences between the then Pres ident 
Eisenhower and the l a t e de Gaulles as ex t rac ted 
inMendl , \7.; (fn, 210), pp.91-94, 
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the in f luont ia - l Caircno daily Al-iJaroxi reported tha t the 
Fronch side i n the t a l k s underway loetween Egypt and Prance 
advised on Egypt 's nuclear requirements by suggesting a 
systera of t h e 120 megawatt rer .ctors to he used for 
desa l ina t ion purposes. (220) These r e a c t o r s , knovm i n 
l i t e r a t u r e on the subject as n i n i - r e a c t o r s , w i l l help i n no 
vjay the e rec t ion of an indigenous nuclear indus t ry i n 
Egypt, i n which case t he conm.oncenent should be with the 
deployment of more than 600 megawatt r e a c t o r s which have 
got the capacity of generat ing e l e c t r i c power and may 
serve as well i n the seperat ion weapon-grade f i s s i l e 
ma te r i a l s for which Egypt w i l l be badly in need of for 
i t s plowshare prograrxies t o evolve i t s geos t ra t eg ic 
determinants. I f the I'ronch offer m a t e r i a l i z e s , ¥/hich 
i s no reE.ote p o s s i b i l i t y as ind ica ted by an o f f i c i a l 
Egyptian organ on Jan, 28, 1977 (221) Egypt w i l l maintain 
i t s nuclear capacity s t r i c t l y t i e d to what t h e French 
would of fer , \/hat the wr i t e r suggests i s t ha t Egypt 
should examine and sc ru t in i ze the sajae p o s i t i o n as 
encountered by France v i s - a - v i s the United Sta^tos during 
(220) Al-^iiiram, J u l , 1, 1976. 
(221) Gtovernment of A.R.E5 Minis t ry of Cul ture and 
Information; (Cairo Radio 
News B u l l e t i n , 2.30 pm, 
©.IT, Jan .28 , 1977). 
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the n i c V f i f t i c s . 
I I . I I I . I l l s THE IMPACT OF WGLEIJi 'mOLIFmATIOU OIJ 
mTERNATIOCT/Jj SYSTais ( S t a b i l i t y oM 
I n s t a b i l i t y ) . 
Conflict ing themes charac te r i ze many wr i t i ngs 
on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n i n t e r ' i s 
of the s t a b i l i t y cand i n s t a b i l i t y of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
system or t h e sub-systen. Schlesinger understands tha t 
the United Sta tes objec ts to t he spread of nucloar 
weapons because the spread w i l l undermine t h e s table 
world order "to v^hich the United S t a t e s has dedicated 
i t s e l f " . (22 2) Gon,' ;',n ".re . Beaufre maintained, on 
the other hand, that the world would be more s tab le i f 
some other countr ies had independent nuclear fo rces . (223) 
The importance of any discuss ion on the subject 
springs from the common notion t h a t v/ar ejiA i n s t a b i l i t y 
are used interchangeably and t h a t peace and s t a b i l i t y 
are , equal ly, used interchangeably, AS the a c q u i s i t i o n 
(222). Sch; es inger , J . : (fn. 6 ) , p . l 6 . The question 
why the United S ta tes claims to have dedicated 
i t s e l f to the so-ca l led s table world order 
n e c e s s i t a t e s scinitiny. 
(223) Barnaby, E. 5 ( f n . 8 ) . p . 7 . General Beauf re ' s 
theory can also be understood i n t h e context of 
French i n t e r e s t s to acquire an independent 
nuclear force . 
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of \iveapon gre„clc f i s s i l e materials in the context of a 
wGapon-orienteci/is supposed to u-cacr in new 
quantitative as v/ell as quali tat ive factors to the 
environment in wtiicli the nat ion-s ta tes of today pursue 
the i r i n t e re s t s (international po l i t i c a l behaviour) 
as defined in terns of power, the re la t ions loetween 
such acquisition aaid s tabi l i ty and ins tab i l i ty should 
be both qualitative and quant i ta t ive . The writer 
believes there is need to clarify such a relat ion beca.use 
l i t e r a t u r e of the las t decade revealed much rmbiguity 
on the subject. (224) 
Whereas the impact of nuclear prol iferat ion of 
national security i s a pre-occupation of contemporary 
s t r a t eg i s t s regardless of whether they belong to nuclear 
or non-nuclear countries, the re la t ion between nuclear 
prol i fera t ion and the s tab i l i ty and ins tab i l i ty of the 
internat ional system seems to be preoccupying the in.tcrest 
of nuclear powers especially the super-powers. Li terature 
on such re la t ion can hardly bo found in the contribution 
(224) Singer, D,5 Tensions, P o l i t i c a l Settlement _and 
Disarmament^ Tnt Garnett, J . (cdj °, 
"(Tn. l4Tn P»151, has admitted the 
phenomenon. Kahn & Bruce-Briggs (fn,56) 
have used a dubious phraso when 
including nuclear prol iferat ion as on 
element of the basic po l i t i ca l 
envir0ninent th-at gives b i r th to sources 
of i n s t a b i l i t y . See, p.116. 
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of s t r a t eg i s t s anC national security exports of non-
nucloar powers. Tiio only jus t i f ica t ion for t h i s 
observation might perhaps be that the in te res t in 
studying the s tabi l i ty PJLCI i n s t ab i l i ty of the 
internat ional systen would only cone out vjhen a given 
unit of the international systen develops v i t a l 
i n t e re s t s in various regions, especially those 
vulenerable to the adversary's influence. 
In studying th is re l3t ion, the writer r e i erates 
the need to refrain from any non-power approach as the 
adoption of any standard other than power would soon 
resu l t in identifying s t ab i l i t y with peace and ins t ab i l i ty 
with war. This thene i s connected with another equating 
peace with 'good' and war with 'bad ' . Another rolov-nt 
theme i s tackled by Dr. Kissinger who expressed h i s 
skepticism over the proposition that peace i s the normal 
pa,ttern of re la t ions among s ta tes . (225) A th i rd thene 
r e l a t e s s tab i l i ty to responsibi l i ty and responsible 
behaviour.. -Shi^-^is, -in-cp3citric, tii' porjitioit-of the 
fcuifc'r-pov.'crc".- . Ivoh.n and Bruco-Briggs represent t h i s 
(225) Kissinger, H. 1 (fn. 157), p .4 . 
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tiiQUQ when thoy nontion t h a t "a Nasser or a Castro n ight 
say that only 'h is s o l f - r o s t r a i n t prevented t he world 
from nuclear conf lagrat ion, but the choice r e a l l y was 
not h i s . The choice belonged to the uni ted S ta tes and 
the Soviet Union, rjid they were an:-cious to avoid 
escalat ion-prone confronta t ion ," (226) The a l l u s i o n i s 
to the super-power concept of na t iona l l e ade r s of newly 
indcjjondent countr ies i t ha t they are i r r e spons ib l e a,nd 
had i t not been for t he super-pov>;ers' sense ol 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , a nuclear conflagrat ion vjould have 
f a l l en on the world. 
Jukes Versus Kahn '& Bruce-Briggs; 
Bas ica l ly , the r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y tha t the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system now ongoys - r ega rd l e s s of i t s 
range - i s a t t r i b u t e d to a s t r a t e g i c balance bot\^cen the 
United S ta tes and the Soviet Union, This balance i s 
" inherent ly a s table one (227) The inherent s t a b i l i t y , 
Jukes affiriTis, "ovjcs l i t t l e or nothing t o t h e g rea te r 
sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " . (227) Rather, i t owes "much 
- II ..I _ I M i l l . 1 I I . • . - ^ - • . . . ^ . . . ^ . ^ . . . . • . • • , . — • — - . 
(226) Kahn, H, & B. B ruce -Br iggs . ? ( f n . 5 6 ) , p . 1 1 5 . 
(227) Jukes , G.; The S t r a t e g i c S i tua t ion in the_1980 's ; 
An Exercise i n Forecast ing • ("danberroo 
"(ilust,) i iustraixan i^ationai Univers i ty 
P res s , 1968), p . 2 . 
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to thG nature of t h e weapons with which they cxe equiiDped 
and t h e i r devastat ing force compared with those 
employed in the pas t " . J u k e s , a s s e r t i o n thus c leazly 
f a l l s in cont rad ic t ion with Kahn and Bruce - .Briggs' 
who aoGCDOod t h a t "the world i n tjio S i x t i e s w-.s 
r e l a t i v e l y s tab le than prone to i n t e r n a t i o n a l v io lence . (226) 
The ins inua t ion of lva,hn-and Bruce-Briggs i s of course, 
the world of the early Seventies "because t h e i r hook was 
published i n 1972 and presen ts an attempt t9 think about 
th ings to come i n the Seventies and E i g h t i e s . Now, the 
assessment of Kahn a.2id Bruce-Briggs appears to he 
apparently faul ty because had present-day s t r a t e g i c 
s t a b i l i t y been l e s s than t h a t ?(/hich was known in the 
S i x t i e s , the super-pov^ers would not have concluded t h e i r 
S/iJjT I I agreement. The s t r a t e g i c balance which Jukes 
r e f e r s t o , we are apt to understand, must be based on a 
balance of t h e i nvu lne rab i l i t y of the e n t i r e r e t a l i a t o r y force 
of every nuclear power, (228) V/eapon-wise, the dominant 
factor in t h i s process i s deploymen t of MIPuVs and 
nuclear - fue l led submarines equipped with the (UIRVs). 
(Balance i s , t he re fo re , negated by the deployment of I3M 
(228). See; Kiss inger , H., (fn.151), p .20. where he 
descr ibes how i n f e r i o r i t y in t h e offensive 
miss i l e forces i s not as awesome as the 
vu lne rab i l i t y of the e n t i r e r e t a l i a t i o n 
force . 
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systems). The cleployjcnt of llliiVs and ;:BMS gives a c lear 
ind ica t ion to the act ion reac t ion chain under condi t ions 
of nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n . I t i s thin , very chain v.'hich 
the S;iT t a l k s , according to Rathjcns, nre sup,j0 3Gd to 
loreak. (229) The prevention of ;,Hls would cbol ish the 
need to acquire Mir.Vs to pene t ra te defences. I n "Curn, 
i f the developnent and deployiient of highly accurate 
MISVs could he prevented, t he r e would he l i t t l e need, 
according to Rathjens, to hui ld defences for ICBIIs... 
Consequently, the suggestion i s t ha t the r e l a t i v e 
s t a b i l i t y now enjoyed by the in terna t iona , l syston i s 
due to the balance of s t r a t eg i c power which, i n t u r n , 
i s due to v\/hat the wr i te r c a l l s a quan t i t a t i ve ly reasonable 
as well as equi table number of KIRVs. In other words, 
v_ertiC8,l p r o l i f e r a t i o n of wea-pon-sTade f i s s i l e n a t c r i a l s 
when p a r t i a l l y con t ro l l ed , has led to r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y , 
the evidence of which i s the conclusion of S^JJl I I 
agroement and, of course, de ten te . 
Ins tead of using ' r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y ' , Barnaby 
speaks of 'world secur i ty ' which can be guaranteed, 
according to him, i f the nuclear arms race between the 
United S ta tes and the Soviet Union. (230) I t i s c lear t ha t 
(229) Rathjens, J . 5 (fn. 12), p.. U . 
( 2 30) . B arnaby, F . 5 (f n. 8) , p., ?.. 
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Barna"by neans 'vor t ica l ' prol i ferat ion, i t 'ij3 
clear that he neans ' f u l l ' control over i t . In th i s 
sense, no guarantee can Toe secured for what he ca l l s 
the world security sinply because ' f u l l ' control would 
reduce the super-powers into ordinary nuclear power with 
the iraiaediate effect of an ahrujjt change of the structure 
of the intema.tional system into a juncture of vdiich we 
cannot claiff. to have predicted correctly.. The vffiter, in 
the previous paragraph, has proved that ' p a r t i a l ' ra ther 
than ' f u l l ' control has resulted in certain s t ab i l i t y , 
r e la t ive but working-. (The writer had ear l ier warned 
against such idea l i s t i c leniancies when discussing 
issues re la ted to pov;er.) 
What i s rea l ly importejit in Barnahy's presentation 
is h is idea that ve r t i ca l and horizontal prol i fera t ion 
are in te r re la ted . (230) Per the infra-s t ructure environment 
i s 
of a syst en/governed on the top by action-rea^ction in 
the f ie ld of the a-cquisition of weapon-gra,de f i s s i l e 
mater ials . I t has been pointed out that the deployment 
of MIRVs has created the requirement for /iBMs. Scgarding 
the near nuclear or nuclear countries, lower in na,tional 
power than the super-powers, the suggestion i s tha t 
i f candidate countries produce nuclear weapons, i t w i l l 
set off a 'chain reaction and small nations wi l l i n due 
course be forced to follow sui t . (231).The following 
considerations could be mentioned. 
— ' —••• - -• l l l l f l . I III 1 I B - 1 I I • 1l • • I l l • • - • • ' f !• -11 1 | 1 II !• II I I 1 • - I I i r I ML I I 
(231) Kaul , G-en. Ri ? I n d i a ' s S t ra - teg ic Spqctrum; 
(Allahabad^ Chanakya P u b l i s h i n g 
House, 1969), p . 1 9 1 . 
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a) the general be l ie f tliat the acquis i t ion of \iea-gon-
grade f i s s i l e rxiatcrials enhances na t ional secur i ty 
and defence capa 'o i l i t i es ( t h i s t h e s i s was discussed 
under the previous head ing . ) . 
h) The fact that "the capa,city of s t a t e s to defend 
themselves, and t h e i r evident Yvillingness to do so, 
provides the t a s i c frai:ie-work wi thin which the 
business of i n t e r n a t i o n a l negot ia t ion i s ca r r i ed 
on", (232) 
c) The subs tan t i a l need for power to re ly on when 
conducting nego t i a t ions . 
d) the t a c i t assunption t h a t tho present d i s t r i b u t i o n 
-of nuclear power i s u s t a b l e . 
e) the notion tha.t s t a b i l i t y n e c e s s i t a t e s the.t u n i t s 
of t h e systen must admit tho r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
behaviour, aims of other u n i t s , competit ive or 
otherwise, and the methods for achieving such aims, 
One clear tendency i n l i t e r a t u r e on the subject 
i s to approach the s t a b i l i t y of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system 
through the concept and theory of tho balance of power. 
Such an approach i s an o f f - sp r ing of the view t h a t the 
function of any given uni t i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system 
( the n a t i o n - s t a t e in t h i s case) i s one of " t ry ing to 
(232) Howard, M.5 M i l i t a r y Power & i n t e r n a t i o n a l Order; 
ins Gar-nett s J^ (;,•:..) , ' ( in. 1 -; 7) , p . 46) 
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n a i n t a i n or overtlxrow s t a t u s quo" (233). Morgentliau., 
a leading contr ibut ion t o the suloject, concerns t h e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l balance of povjer as t h e "only p a r t i c u l a r 
laanif e s t a t ion of a general soc ia l p r inc ip le t d ' which 
. a l l s o c i e t i e s composed of a nunber of autonomous u n i t s 
o\^ e the autonomy of t h i r d component p a r t s " . (233) 
Elaboracting Llargenthaju' s ideas , s t a b i l i t y becouos t he 
normal "pat tern" af ter which the objec t ives of t he 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l behaviour of every given unit 
of t h e system ought be moulded. One drawback of such 
th ink ing , i s tha t s t a b i l i t y as such s i g n i f i e s a ' w a r l e s s ' 
s t a t e of s t a t u s quo, vjhich means tha t pceoCe i s t he 
normal p a t t e r n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l behaviour and 
tha t i f war occurs, i t i s an effor t to br ing peace back, 
Whatever Morgenthaii's other ideas a re , t h i s very idea 
r ep re sen t s too s t a t i c and i d e a l i s t thoughts . Ever since 
the f a l l of t h e Roman Empire and t h e r i s e of n a t i o n - s t a t e s , 
no evidence can be t raced for peace as the normal and/or 
(233) Morgenthau, H. ; ( fn .26) , p , l 6 7 . ITorgenthau used, 
as he explained i n a footnote , the terrx of 
'balance of pov'jer' with four d i f ferent mec;ningss ( l ) as a policy aimed at a c e r t a i n s t a t e of 
a f f a i r s , (2) as an ac tua l s t a t e of a f f a i r s , (3) as 8J1 approximately equal d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
power, (4) as any d i s t r i b u t i o n of power. 
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regu la r pa t t e rn . Moreover, \vlien Morgonthau define J 
tile goal of t he systera as na in ta in ing s t a b i l i t y and 
preserving i t s e lcuent , he appears to have accepted 
the idea of change, i n any sysxen, as p o t e n t i a l l y 
progress ive , developmental and even u t i l i t e , r i a n . 
Harman Kahn s t r e s s e s "the world i n t h e a i x t i e s 
was rc la . t ive ly s table r a t h e r than prone to intcrnp„tional 
violence" (234). R.B. Byres, on the otho^ hand, put i t 
in a c lea re r forn vmen discussing an associa ted subject 
and declared tha t none of the nat ions of t i e present 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system has been able to c l ing to the s t a tu s 
quo of the ear ly s i x t i e s " . (235) iilthough i t i s obvious 
t ha t Byres has depended o n , r a t h e r , a s t a t u s quo perspect ive 
( tha t the foreign policy ob jec t ive of a given un i t of 
the system i s to preserve the cons t i t uen t s of t h e balance 
of power, foremost cu'aong which i s the sta,tus que), h i s 
assessment i s nearer to t h e a c t u a l i t i e s of t h e presen t 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system than t h a t of Kahn in the sense tha t 
he was discussing a speci f ic subject (Canadian defence 
and t h e anti-subma,rine warfare) whereas Kahn \^as discuss ing 
(234) Kahn, H. & B r u c e - B r i g g s , B. , ( f n . 5 6 ) , p . 115. 
(235) B y e r s , R . j Canndian Defence:_ The_ASU._I)ilemmaj_ 
S u r v i v a l , Vol . X V I I I ' , ' ' N O .4' , J u l y / 
i iugust 1976, p . 154. 
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an inclGfinitc d i s c s to r . 
The recent aioproach to the issue of s t a b i l i t y and 
i n s t a b i l i t y under condi t ions of nuclear iza t ion i s to deny 
the exis tence of any of thon so le ly . This al^pToefih 
conceives the ' s t a t e ' of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l systeu at 
present and in a foreseable fu ture as "an on^ing, 
i n t e r a c t i v e ^jroccss involving both competit ion and 
accoEiodation" (236) or , as Dr. Kiss inger put i t " a 
twi l igh t area between t r a n q u i l i t y and open confronta t ion" . 
(237) "\/ith the diminishing of the concepts which nake 
i t necessary to analyse the ' s t a t e ' of t he systen i n 
terms of^two juxte.poscd s t a t e s , i t becomes eas ier to 
i n t e r p r e t the nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n phenononon. Nuclear 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n can, t h e r e f o r e , bo described by i t s 
e^ddition or sub t rac t ion , to or from t h e tendency to 
conf l ic t or the tendency to accomodation. 'Jhcreas the 
descr ip t ion of the ' s t a . t e ' of the system i n terms of 
s t a b i l i t y and i n s t a b i l i t y , and oven by conferr ing 
' r e l a t i v i t y ' or e i the r — i s s t a t i c , the doscrixotion 
of the same s t a t e i n terms of a ' tvyil ight o jca ' 
provides ana lys i s \viith considerable dynaiiiism. I t , moreover, 
allows i n t e r a c t i o n to be v i^ /cd ' G i t ra'^llf/- pccuris^ 
(236) Volfe, T.; The S.XT. Experience; I t s Impact on US and 
Soviet Strat'ofeic policy and Dcoision-making (iicnta mo"nica, 07,., Usls HiJIB''Corporation, 
Il-1686-lIl, Sept . 1975), p .224. 
(237) E i s s i n g e r , H.? ( fn . l 66 ) , p.196. 
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If the acqu ic i t ion of '.;ccjon-gr..do f i c c i l c ..ir.toririG 
concG in tlio contoxt of a uoapon-oriontoc' prcgrn, Jiio, i t 
cert . , inly indie ,tc6 c, coii_^j-^titiYG cctituCoB, e i ther 
with the systo.i or r, sub-,oyste.-. The -^/.v-jit-^goG of the 
word does ncgrte the xicv anl for ^JQC.GC con/iotaticns v/liich 
- re out-d-'.ted concojjts of the int crn-,tion, ' i naclc^r 
s t r a t e g i c env i roment . On the o'cher h-nd, the lerc 
acquis i t ion of \;caj.)on-grado f i s s i l e ^ i r to r i a l s i n no 
weapon-oriented context does not my 'v^ 'ay allow for 
t r a n q u i l i t y . 
TART'.III: aOECLUSTOH 
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1 1 1 , 1 ; CDFCI.lTgrOATS QV rpTJ^  QmTTT)V; 
I I I . I ; A FEW Pi?OBLEM K)xgAUL/lTl01'j; 
vaien f i r s t embarking on an academic encounter with 
the pioblem selected for study, i t wes found tha t the 
problem had not been formulated on sound bases . None of 
theiia availabl--- formul rations could serve as a proper form-
u l r c i c ; on which fur ther analyses i^,'^--r^'^. ..,-^. -, , _, _ ^ 
To reach gt a proper formulation, t h i r t e e n formul-
a t ions have been scrutinispd.They belong to a var ie ty of 
a t t i t u d e s and have been sanipled accord iog l j , Having 
examined fchem in the l i g h t of 'po'ver' as a frame of ref-
erence and nat ional securi ty as the top-most p r i o r i t y in 
the behaviour of the n a t i o n - s t a t ^ , tn'=^  wr i t e r proceeded to 
prefont h is forjjulftion which could f i t in the context of 
the i-'resent i n t e rna t iona l system within which n g t i o n - s t a t e s 
pursuf t h e i r i n t e r e s t s as dexined in terms of power.The 
forraulntion of thp wr i t e r w^c; 
"'The problem of nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n i s one of 
the acquis i t ion of weapon—srade f i s s i l e mat-
e r i a l s (see Appendjy. r"^ in the context of a 
weapon-oriented programme as such acou is i t ion 
th 
wi l l affect the na t iona l power of the N u n i t , 
thus affecbing i t s adversary and wi l l eventual ly 
affect the in te i 'na t ional system. 
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The said effect i s not viewed in terras of the 
apocalyptic v is ion? "vhich pp'^^vail on what the w r i t e r has 
cal led ' p r c u d o - s c i e n t i f i c ' l i t e r a t u r e on the subject , 
unjlortunately qui te abundant. -t<atber,it i s viewed in i t s 
xe l . cior to s t ra tegy and nat ional Sf^curity, i n t h e i r cap-
aci ty as d i r ec t manifes ta t ions of the ' r e a l ' nat ional power 
of a siven country. 
The advantages of the nevv formulation i s t h a t i t 
helps the would-be nuclear develop a b e t t e r understanding 
of t' c i r requirements for survival which Dr.Kissineer con-
sidered . e s sen t i a l i f a given n a t i o n - s t a t e de s i r e s to 
act with apsuiance. -t'or those s t a t e s which find i t necessary 
for survival to acquire a nuclear c a p a b i l i t y , they wi l l find 
the formulation 'working' as i t c l ea r ly l eads to an underr t - jd-
- j ing ',f what a nuclear capab i l i ty means. Another advantage 
i e thac uhe adoption of t h i s formulation can help any country 
recognize what exactly i t s adversary i s upto. I f the acquis-
i t io i i of weapon-grade f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s comes i n the context 
of a '"e'-ipor-orianted pr&ffrnmme, !.•=. coupl'-d '^itb (Efforts 
:;o cevolop a convenient del ivery system and necessary expend-
i t u r e on R & D of p a r t i c u l a i weapon systems i t should be taken 
for granted t h a t ' t h i s un i t i s on the process of acqui^^ing 
a nuclear f i r s t s t r i k e capab i l i t y . I f R & D extends to cover 
mobile ayctcnaj ICBIlo, oubnarines and USLlls, then t n i s s t a t e 
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then plar-ijing for a second s t r i k e capabiliu.y, which means* 
t h a t i t des i res to maintain the s t a t u s quo ex i s t ing on the 
momp^t 0-'' ri'^ -cl prlrp- 'hp Record s t r i k e caps^i'bility. In e i the r 
s i t u a t i o n , the adversary ought nuclr-arize his s t ra tegy rnf 
nat ional secur i ty , i . e . acquire '^^^spovi-grade f i s s i l e mat-
e r i a l s in^ the context of a w-^apon-oriented programme. F a i l -
ing to do so 'vould mak.^  the given country vulnerable to 
nuclear t h r o a t s or nuclear blackmail. 
4 focirth advantage of the suggr-sted formulation i s tn c 
i t i s both measurable and recc gnizable. From the adoption O-
nono of the host of formulations avai lable can any analysi,^ 
s t a t e c lear ly tha t un i t A represen t s a case of nuclear pro l l i - -
e ra t ion ^vher'-^gs uni t B done not. In fac^', tbo '•vvitp-r 'va? '''ir en 
on searching for a 'measurable ' formulation as any such study 
should pre eont ans-verable qur^stions. Moreover, thpre i s nothiir 
as l a t a l for s t ra tegy and nat ional securi ty as unmeasurablc 
formulations of problems. For the l e s s measurable a form-
u l a t i o n i s the more ambiguous a s t ra tegy and the 
more confused a nat ional securi ty doctr ine becomes. 
Not only i s t h i s formulation badly needed academical:.:, , 
but i t also docs give s. sound bas i s for reso lv ing choice 
problems associat^^d 'vith the gro'idng nuclear s t r a t e g i c 
environment. 
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I I I . I s 2 ; A SUGGESTED SE.jRCH; 4N INSIGHT IFTO THi: 
REASONS U]MJ"1BBLYIMG W J C L E 4 R I Z / \ T I 0 N 
Having formulated t h e problem s e l e c t e d f o r study on 
p i o p e r "bases, a search was a t tempted to d i s c l o s e t h e r ea sons 
unde r ly ing n u c l e a r i z a t i o n . I'h^ search was t r i e d by means of 
t h r e e p e r s p e c t i v e s ; a p r . e t i g e p e r s p e c t i v e , an economic 
perpp '^c t ive snd a n q t i o n a l s e c u r i t y pe r sp - ac t i ve . For i t w-^s 
i n t h e s e p e r s p e c t i v e s t h a t the ca se s of t h e s e powers which 
have a l ready n u c l e a r i z e d t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s and n a t i o n a l s e c -
u r i t y d o c t r i n e s have been eyp la in^d . I n a study l i k e t h i s , 
t h e r e should hpve been no mention of t h e p r e s t i g e p e r s p e c t i v e 
e g o c c i a l l y as power i s ' t a k e n as a frame of r e f e r e n c e . T h e r e a r e 
two r - a s o n s fo r t h i s i n c l u s i o n . F i r s t , i t en fo rce s t h e 
"wr i t e r ' s view t h a t i t i s only i n terms of i t s r e l a t i o n t o 
p o / c r t h a t n u c l e a r i z a t i o n should be s t u d i e d and viewed.Second, 
t h e r e i s c o n s i d e r a b l e emphasis i n l i t e r a t u r e on t h e sub joc t 
I 
ar to the p r e s t i g e a given power would enjoy iii going nuclear 
This emphais wa'- refuted on thp grounds t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
syslom i s one of n a t i o n - s t a t e s and tha t the ma,1or motive 
for behaviour i s the mainronance of nat ional secur i ty which 
prgsti3;e does by no means enhance. 
As for the economic pe r spec t ive , i t has been shown 
tha t the acqu i s i t ion of a token nuclear force would effect 
a considorable cut in mi l i t a ry expenditure, which i s quite, a bur-
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data OP contemporary r3--:ition-states Involved in resioPal esc-
a la t ion --prone c o p f l i o t s . The economics of plowshare prograniiio,?-
iwhicb are a natural off-spr ing of acqu i s i t ion of wegpon-grade 
f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s in the context of a weapon-oriented prograroiio 
i s s t i l l doubtful thuugh t h e i r r o l e i s ever-growing. Energy 
wise, there i s no readily-known a l t e r n a t i v e for the guarantee 
of ol'^-ctric power by the end of t h i s century '^xcept the nucloca? 
source. .Uthough only 4% of the p resen t world e l e c t r i c gen-
e ra t ing capacity cumes from nuclear r e a c t u r s , 75% of wor ld ' s 
pper.gy requirr>mpr"^p wil l b^ ^ supplied by nucl'^ar r e a c t o r s by 
1990. Those po>'ers which are aware uf the need to guarantee 
such requirements? wil l c e r t a in ly commence immediately on 
the erect ion of such near r e a c t o r s . These r e a c t o r s have 
got the capacity of producing, as a by-product we.gpon-grade 
f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s . They, the re fore , i n s t i g a t e nuc l ea r i za t ion . 
In the case of the nationoL secur i ty pe r spec t ive , i t was 
immensely interwoven with the acquis i t ion of weapon-grade 
f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s in the context of a we.apon-oriented p ro -
gramme. F i r s t , i t i s subs tan t i a l ly r e l a t ed to powers the 
requirements for pnd tbf^  effpct on. Secondly, ^s survnvql 
i s the corner-s tone of nat ional secur i ty and s t r a t egy , the 
acquis i t ion of a nuclear force considerably enhances 
because i t can, in i t s quan t i t a t i ve capacity p ro -
vide? a bigger firepower. Third, 
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witb tho growth of an i n t e rna t i ona l nuclear s t r a t e g i c environ-
ment there are fears of nuclear t h r o a t s among non-nuclpar 
p o r e s against the actual implem^>ntation of which th'^re i s 
no concGivahle secur i ty . Further , the re i s a notion t h a t a 
token nuclear force would provide a guarantee against any mass-
ive conventional a'ctack. On the whole, i t has been found out 
tha t the acquis i t ion of wespon-grade f i s s i l e mate r ia l s has 
got a subs tan t i a l r e l a t i o n to the present t rends on the mi l -
i t a i y aspect oi nat ional s eca r i ty . Not only does i t p resen t 
a p o t e n t i a l •chc3at to an adversary. But i t also off-^rs a 
"b'^rg-^liiiiig., chip '^ith the major a l ly so as to grab much more 
convcnuional armaments. I t has been proved tna t such 
acquis i t ion may guarant°p a coun t ry ' s indP'TP^nd^-ncp and 
help diu'inish any vu lne rab i l i t y to interferance" in i n t e r n a l 
a l l a i r s . 
Memories of pas t defeats h=^ ve not been excluded from 
thr T^Fc-'tional s rcur i ty perspec t ive in understanding the incen-
tive c underlying the phenomenon of nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n . 
A c r i t i c a l readlngL_QiL_literaturo on the sub.^ect hgs 
revcaJ .^-d tha t works emanting from the United S ta tes are 
fund ami-nt a l ly of a preaching charac te r ag they propagate the 
t h e s i s tha t the acquis i t ion, of nuclear weapons does not enhance 
nat ional secur i ty and, i f .acquired, no Fing;lo nuclear weapon 
country would be capable of coping with the requirements for 
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i t r nat ional securit.y without the hg -^p of a ma.jor all.Y-It 
wa'' obvioup durine; th ip rpqdiner t b^ t th r Unit^^d S t a t i c 
str-^tcgic l i t -^ra turo i ? on the look out for promoting the 
mil ibary a l l i ance syetom so as to use America's a l l i e s as 
' f o o t - s o l d i e r s ' , in a tna<jor power scbemoo The wr i t e r there-^ 
fore c a l l s for a scept ic roading; of t h i s l i tGratu.ce and f inds 
i t necessary for Third, World s t r a t e g i s t s and nat ional s-c-
U'L"!b.y ,c3cperts to develop theii'. own reading and, more 
important , to try . s tandardise study c r i t e r i a . 
Although i-fe i s ce r t a in ly a d i f f i c u l t task to acquire a 
s.-rious nuclc^ar s t r a t e g i c c a p a b i l i t y , i t i s almost within the 
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of an.y medium-siz^-'d powpr or nv^ n^ a gm^n 
sized power to develo-p a nat ional token nuclear force by 
devis ing a three-year cra'='h programme. 
I I I . I . 3. INTEx i^uLTATION; 
As a) a •^ '^^ cting the behaviour of a given adversary, in 
the context of t h i s study, i s a working c r i t e r i o n to t e s t the 
eff iciency of th'-' grand s t ra tegy and nat ional s'^curity doc-
t r ine , 
b) the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the i n tp rna t iona l s t r a t -
egic nuclear environment, wi thin which the p resen t na t ion-
st-Les act and r e t p r a c t d i a l ^ c t i c s l l y , i s supposedly one 
of ^ '^tional p layers who would not use nucl^^ar weapons a'^ ' a 
si^i)! . con"cest in fury but r a t h e r to det r , and 
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( 3) the deterrr-ncG not ior i ? not l i ke ly to ex i s t in 
a SGirii-nucloaj-" eLvirorment, i . e . in a region of c o n f l i c t i n g 
pgirbios where only one par ty i s nuclear ized, thus the 
p robab i l i t y of using TM«i/s i n mi l i t a ry operat ions in escalat iori-
prone c o n f l i c t s , espec ia l ly those in whico there i s an 
i t 
olciii-nt of nationqlism involved , /has been found out tbats 
(a) the genesis of i n t e r p r e t i n g the phenomenon subj'--'cted 
to study i s ' s u r v i v a l ' 5 
(b) the i n i t i a l use of a token nuclear force ( i n the 
foriTi of TAT'.vs) in semi-nucl"prized regions ' ' /ill be in t^rms 
of t h e i r quan t i t a t ive boost to the mi l i t a ry aspect of nat -
ional secur i ty , 
'(c) the development of a nuclear force , ho'.vever token, 
ends the t r a d i t i o n a l offence-defence and border-secur i ty 
environment, 
(d) the foreseeable aim of acquiring 7GFMs in the 
context of a '•^OP could be to effectuace a b e t t e r bargaining 
por-ition though t h i s remains of matter of subs tan t i a l 
uncer ta inty in p Femi-nuclear environment, 
(•e) to effectuate such a pos tu r e , the ' w i l l i n g n e s s ' to 
use TM.i/s should be shown, 
(f) qupntitfl t ive puT)priority hns not e n t i r e l y l o s t i t s 
rol c, 
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(g) though non-nuclear povcrc are insecure in t h e i r 
int t^ract ion <vith nucl^^^r TOO ^'OPP, th^ m i l i t a r y a l l i ancp al t p r -
nntive does not bridge t h i s gap, 
(h) there i s no s u b s t i t u t e for 3 nat ional nuclear force , 
';/hich would lessen dependence on the nuclear al ly and 
ab-ndon vu lne rab i l i t y to nuclear t h r e a t s or to interf"-rence 
in intein-^JL a f f a i r s , 
(i) i n i t i a l nuc lea r iza t ion in the form of a token force 
Q- ^^-ja; cic^s not heir) ^ta>^i]isf^ q sub-system '^xc^pt "b^n t h i s 
fo cc i s developed in to a second-st r ike capabi l i ty and the 
sci^i---iiUclccr environment i s changed into nuclear . 
n i l , I I . ON .JEST '\SI/.; 
I I I . I I , I . PROBLEM; 
As forff.ul"ted in Pa r t I I , Chapter I , the phenomenon 
subTrcfced to study e x i s t s in i/est Isi a in th^ case of 
I&i i^ el 'vhose acquis i t ion of 'GJMs in the contf^xt of a TOP 
has been x^roved. The assessments on such Isx'aeli acqu i s i t ion 
a.re abundanr and so d -c i s ive t h a t thp scholar f inds i t no 
essy task to commence upon ana lys is . Bloomfield for example, 
th inks of I s r a e l as the seventh nuclergr power. ( l) / i l l r i c h 
do s d'^cieivel y st:: te tha t " I s rae l has i n t ens ive ly d^-^velop-
(1)- Bloomfi-]d, L. 5 Nuclrar Spread and World Order; IDS I 
S t ra teg ic Digest; i^ ovemb r 1975,p : . 1, 
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ed il-p s c i e n t i f i c ^nd t-^chnical s k i l l s and possossos l a r g e 
( P ) 
expcrirnental nuclear f a c i l i t i e s " . ^ He goes even to the 
extent of p lac ing I s r a e l above those count r i es which "have 
thus far rGfrainr>d from acquiring naclear 'voapons'Mt i s 
notc 'or thy tha t no s t a t e in the present i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
cyE''^c:u, except I s r a e l , has received tha t much emphasis on 
i t s nuclear p o t e n t i a l despi te the fact t ha t I s r a e l i s th§ 
onlj/ Case i'n 'vhich the cons t i tuen t s of the programme are 
always kept secre t and" i t s government does not d i sc lose any 
of i t s p lans to develop or purchase nuclear i tems whatever 
they are . I s r a e l , l o g i c a l l y , ben^^fits from such atmosphere 
;.vhich i s , 've assume, supposed to create an element of 
ambiguity in the process of Egyptian decis ion.Yet , we cr:a 
equally assume t t at such ( lel iberato ambiguity might, i n no 
conceivable t ime, r e s u l t in an Egyptian decis ion to modify 
the nat ional secur i ty doctr ine in terms of t h r unce r t - in ty 
corddtioning I s r a e l ' s o'hj'^ctiv'^p. Is far ^^ s t ra tpgy i s 
co.^ccrbcd, uncer ta inly in the area of objec t ive percept ion 
can simply lead to a nuc lear iza t ion of de l ivery systems and 
maintaining (development i s a p r e - r e q u i s i t e ) enough stock-
p i l e of weapon-grade f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s . 
( 2 ) 'Vi l l r ich , M.(pd.); Civil Nucl ear Power and _ I n t e r -
nat ional Securi ty; (New Yorkt l raeger Publisher 's Inc . 
1 9 7 1 ; , 13.4. 
I t was shown i n , I a r t I I , Chapter I , how Isr-^el i s 
proceeding with devoloping i t s del ivery system so as to form 
up an indepcnd-^nt nuclear force. 
The phpnomenor, as formulotpd i-o t n i s study does not, 
in tb'":; riieantii/ie, ex i s t i^: the case of Egypt, Nevertnel -ss , 
th3 TsrA<^li stratr^gic pos^tur-^ i s c-^rt^iinly to aff-^ct ""Sgypt's 
a l t e r n a t i v e espociRlly as we have indica ted the r e l a t i o n 
of sucn acquis i t ion to pc^ier and tha t th'- genesis of i n t e r -
protin^, the phenomenon i s survivpl . 
I I I . I I o ? . SE\RCH; 
In a p r e s t i g e pe r spec t ive , i t must have been Egypt which 
should have acquired WGBIs in the cont, xt of a /^Ol-. The receno 
Egyptian Tnovo>= to r^stqhli sb nuclear power m q c t o r s have been 
highly f i t t e d in a p r e s t i g e pe r spec t ive on the grounds t h a t 
Egypt i s a p ioneer of technological development among Irab 
and developing countr ips . I s r a e l , on the other hand propagatr^s 
t ha t i t i s an extpnsi on of Western c i v i l i z a t i o n . In view of th ' 
ebrategic and securi ty compulsions in the region, th--^  pres t i - rc 
elomont i s not exp^ctrd to be a maoor incen t ive for the 
acquis i t ion of IGBls in tbe cont-xt of a W I . 
In an economic porspcc t ive , there i s an I s r a e l i 
trend to equate the acquis i t ion of wG-Ms in the context of 
a "'/or with a considerablr cut in mi"" i t a r y exp-^nditure.It 
moreover, considers the physical and manpower shortcomings. 
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This trend has not been traced in Egyptian -writings on the sub-
Ooct,though Egypt i s a case of c-xtremely high mi l i t a ry 
02cpGnditurc. 
Thoreas I s r a e l does not face acute e l e c t r i c energy 
requirements, Egypt does. The Cairone dail^'', '•^l-lh^qm,report-
/Julv 1,1976 
ed on'^that Giza ^jovernor^te, which i s a major organic p a r t 
of Greater Cairo, banned the ©leption of any new factor or 
i n d u s t r i a l establishment due o the lack of e l e c t r i c power, 
which i s certai^'^ly a graVe s i t u a t i o n . Egypt 's e l e c t r i c energy 
rcquircm-ents, as declared by Deputy Premier for Power and 
Production A. Sultan, ccnnot be s^-^tisfied by conventional 
enor^'y product ion. 
Moreover, Egypt i s badly in need of plowshare progra-
mmes and the Qatara Depression i s sue (,'ippendix ) i n d i c a t e s 
hoviT subs tan t ia l such programmes are . I t i s a firm b-^lief 
-^p -h- cr-rit^r t ha t the E^yotian n=iti onal secur i tv doctr ine 
wil l remain in tho c r i s i s domain so long as the popula t ion 
i s centred i- both banks of the River Ni le , which has been 
the Case for the l ^ s t seven thousand years . Is far back as 
we Can see, the mi l i t a ry operat ions t ha t Egypt has had to 
f ight were launched by adversar ies who es tabl i shed t h e i r 
ca l cu la t ions on the assumption Egyptian popula t ion concent-
r a t i on at the banks of the xtiver Nile has been a secur i ty 
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gap. Moro then fivo thousanJ yenj's brclc, Egypt had to defend 
i t s val ley Toy raoans of ba t t l e s - foufjht i n Al-Shan, Por noro 
than fivo thousand yocJs, t n i s x^ o^t>lQO hr s not boon r a d i c a l l y 
solved. ]Io\v t ha t plowshare prograr-inos can Qo the job, 
the re i s no reason vvhatsocver why Et>yp"'^  should not coniaonce 
on devclopin£;, i x s na t iona l independent plowshare cp.pabi 1 i ty . 
Our euphasis on a no„tional inde^jenaont progrojune can also 
be account .,d for by the reported ^aaerican pos i t ion on 
iJ--Qatara Jepressxon, (3) . The Unj "^ ed S ta tes v\/as repor ted 
to have refused any Egyptian handling of the ' c lean bombs' 
or plowshare explosives to be used to dii_, tho canal* 
This s i t u a t i o n i s bel ieved to nave aroused Jjgyptian suspicion 
and, consequently, r e fusa l to deploy bombs of unknown 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 
Dist inguishingly , Et>ypt' s need to develop indigenous 
plov^/shere c a p a b i l i t i e s i s intor'v^/oven with Egypt ' s energy 
requirenent s, as i s the case of Qatar? Depression or , equ3,lly, 
of Simai which should be populated. 
In a na t iona l sccuii t^ pe r spec t ive , the re e x i s t s an 
I s r a e l i habi t to i n s i s t on tho nationa3. securi ty urge 
for producing weapon-grade-f iss i le n a t c r x a l s i n tho context 
of a v;eapon-orrented pro^rr\i le (as was discussed in t h e 
(3) '. -J i " 0 .'>._ U -y... \ _-: :.. •-•U-. ....6 ,-6 ,^-:.v^-.. \ 
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w r i t e r ' s formulation of the problem.) Former I s r a e l i Defence 
Miuioter Mosho DP^/PI declared in Tel \viv tha t I s r a e l should 
sooli cho nuclear option ©d argued t l at i f I s r a e l ' s survival 
i s tnroatened by the Arabs, I s r a e l should oe able to leespond 
'vith c.au?l des t ruc t ive ^pp n"hilitv, (4) For I s r a e l , t ^p re fo ro , 
the p 'Oduction of such ma te r i a l s i s r e l a t ed to the very core 
of £..caritys survival . Numerous like-minded nqt ions are 
copiously avai lable and tbey a l l i n s i s t on such r e l g t i o n . 
On the other hand, the -Egyptian pos i t i on on the prod-
uct ion of weapon-grade f i s s i l e mate r ia l s in the context of 
a 'vecpon-oriented programme i s , t i l l the ^vriting of t h i s 
t h e s i s , en t i r e ly dependent on the p o s i t i o n of I s r a e l . C u r r e n t 
na t ional securi ty determinpnts as conceived by Egypt are 
not beli'"-v d to i n s t i g a t e such production.To give an example, 
Ismail Pahmy, the "^gyptiRn D.-^ puty Premipr for Fon^ign 
\ f f a i r s s ta ted in an interview published by Al-/lhram tha t 
Egji-p o nrould "obtain or manufacture the bomb" i f I s r a e l 
explodes a ruclj,::.! weapon" and tha t t h i s Egyptian decis ion 
i s a p o l i t i c a l p^ '^ d mi l i t a ry axiom.-(5) 
I t IS notLTJortby t h a t I s r a e l i anBouncemexits do not 
rof' r to a popsibl-^ nuclnqr capab i l i ty by E^ypt. They, ra ther , 
rof'.v to a poss ib le massive conventional t h rus t the response 
(4) SJASIl Bu l l e t i n ,Vo l . I l l ,No .12 , March 26, 1976, p . 3 . 
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to which would he -^ n exercise of th- nuclear option. This 
'difference' in strqtegiep poees, in i t se l f , a substantial 
question reger-ding the next chain of action which, as the 
process cl'=>arly shovs, i s subject to Egypt's i n i t i a t i v e . Ismail 
Pahmy speaks of what can be s t rategical ly caJLlcd a nuclear 
countorforce. No I s rae l i preseT^tation of th i s s t ra tes ic .iunctur-^-
has been trac-d by thr^ writer. 
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I I I . I I . 5 
INT i^lBPRET AlioiNl 
By v i r t u e of ttae pr '^vious -^nly.sis i t app^^^rs t h a t 
Jest Asia r e p r c o e n t s a rGVor=Gcl mouel. /vhercas Egypt should 
havo optefl for t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of /GM/Is i n t h^ cont^x-f- of n 
\70P, I s r a e l . V/bil-- t bc p r e s t i g e , economic and n a t i o n a l 
s r c u r i t y coiapuls iors have favoured an c e r l y Eg;;/ptian 
n u c l e j . r i z a t i o n , I s r a e l has fabr ica te ' ? a l l such compulsions 
by c l a i i r ing t h a t i t i s ?n rx tons ion of i / es tc rn c i v i l i z a t i o n , 
a t t r i b u b i n g economic aovantages T:O a n u c l e a r i z c d I s r a e l 
and r e l a t i n g n u c l . a r i z a t i o n to i t s very s u r v i v a l . 
On i r i t ' ^ rpr^ t i "Pff ^hr phonom^no^ i^ thn 7 e s t 4si p sub-
system, i t ought pjivays been r e i t e r a t e d t h a t the c o n f l i c t now 
undrrway i s e s c a l a t i o n - p r o n e . Th i s can be accounted fo r by 
t h e h i s t o r i c a l o b s o r v - t i o n t h a t i t has not be'^n r-v^^olv^d or 
even accomodated fo r almost t h i r t y y e ^ r s du r ing which t h e 
frequency of t h e use of force does consi e r ab ly i n d i c a t e the 
i n h e r r n t rsc'^nl a t i o n p o s s i b i l i fci e s . I t i s not an uneasy t a s k 
to unders tand th so p o s s i b i l i t i e s , as they are r e l a t e d a t core 
- t o r e a l t h r e a t t o bhe r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y of t h e Ar'^bs and 
the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y of Eg^pt , the ma^or power i n the a r e a . 
The P - s l e s t i n i a n s , morrover , have b-^on rVni^d t h ^ i r i n p T i e n a b l -
r i g h t t o t h e i r homeland by a s e t t l o r - c o l o n i a l i s t I s r a e l . I s r - c l ' r-; 
dane^or - as a s e t t l e r - c o l o n i a l i s t movem'->nt has not been r e s t r i c -
ted t j t h r I o n ' of P a l e s t i n e . T h m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s of 1948,1956 
and 1967 p rove tbat; 'fh-t harm I s r a e l i n f l i c t e d on P a l e s t i n e coald 
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equally be inflictecl on other str . tes. ixs I s r a e l i ' s harn 
has always heon in the forn ol t e r r i t o r i a l occu;,7ation 
and security th rea t s , no state in Asia could to le ra te 
such 'behaviour. Consequently, the confl ict , v;e predict, 
will remain escalation-prone, at leas t theore t ica l ly , t i l l 
I s rae l abandons i t s character is t ic pat terns of uohaviour 
and Palestinian nat ional is t ri / ,hts o.rc accomodated 
?jid sat isf ied. 
Having accounted for the oscalc^-tion-prone type of 
the conflict no\j under way in 7est Asia, our analysis can 
proceed tc interpret the phenononon suhjoctod to study in 
terns to i t s re la t ion to national securi ty, l i t e r a t u r e on 
the subject assumes Is rae l v;ill use nucleax viicapons against 
any massive conventional attack of any successful Egyptian 
conventional thrust into the green l ine area or \,'ha.t is 
called "The Heart of I s rae l " . This assumption i s one 
of the reasons why the \v'riter discussed the pause s trategic 
doctrine and or \/arsaw l ac t massive conventional thrust 
into the L'uropoan Ocntrrl front. In that discussion, i t 
wr,s pointed out ±li^± th i s strategy of NATO i s coupled 
with a second-strike caj)ebility. In the case of I s r ae l , 
and in the light of the majority of calculations and 
assessments on I s r a e l ' s stockpile of TGMs, no second-strike 
capability would be available for I s r ae l up t i l the 
rdd-e ight ies . I t i s certainly true 
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tha . a f i r s t - s t r i k e nuclear cgp -b i l i t y can be graded and 
divided with gouic intervalis in botwoon. Th- c^se of I s rae l ,ho / - -
over,does not allocs? for t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y as , according 
to the assumption mentioned above, I s r a e l wil l launch i t s 
nuclrnr s t r i k e against Egyptian popula t ion and i n d u s t r i a l 
c-"'c.L^e in case PP '^gvpt'i an _con=l;oiitionnl 'tbrust succeeds in 
poi ic t ra t ing the gr^-^n l i n o . I f the l a t t e r p o s s i b i l i t y 
moccr ia l ' zos , h i t t i n g the suggested t a r g e t s wil l not p r o h i b i t 
I s x - c l ' s m i l i t a r y defeat , which wi l l th^n bp proO'='Ct'=>d 
p o l i t i c a l l y . One repor t quoted e a r l i e r assuir©d t h a t Cairo 
?lonc would nood some eighteen bombs of the nuclear bomb's 
now avai lab le with I s r a e l , wl-.ich mean,? t ha t almost a l l I s r a e l ' s 
nuclear s t r i k e cap-=bility should be consumed jus t to s t r i k e 
at Cairo. I'he s t r a t e g i c obj c t i ve s of such s t r i k e are doubt-
fu l . One objoct ivo, we assumr, should be to s h a t t e r command 
and control over the attack force which has penet ra ted I s r a e l ' s 
green l i n e . This ob j -c t ivc i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y nul and void as 
any such des t ruc t ion would be •^ffect'-d by carpet bombing 
ra':her than by -^  n i s s i l o at tnck, which means tha t the 
problem oS. a i r -d- fences will be the re , ^he experience 
ol the October -'< Mr was not s a t i s f ac to ry for I s r a e l in t h i s 
rcETO'^ ct. Fo-neovi^r, fiir-d'^f'^'^c-^ penr>trqtion i s odmittedly 
a ni-tt r of immense u n c e r t a i n t i e s . Another objec t ive would 
be to t ry effocc a b e t t e r bargaining pos i t i on .Neve r the l e s s , 
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a /"inclear s t r i k e againpt Cairo, which consumes I s r a e l ' s 
nuclear capabi l i ty wil l leave I s r a e l without a nuclear 
covrr c'.uring a. _ succopsful conventioriRl t h r u s t i n to thp 
green l i n e area. No nuclear t h rea t would then be c red ib le . 
The deduction, -cherefore, i s tha t I s r a e l ' s nuclear 
force , i f deployed,will be a q u a n t i t a t i v e boost to i t s 
conventional ii'l^^-powor. This deduction could be enriched by 
t h - notion discussed in P a r t I I , Chapter I I I , t h a t the 
in i t ipJ . understanding of the acquis i t ion of .^ GiiMs in the 
context of TOP i s 1 pTT'-'ly Q qu^^ t i t q t lV^ u^d^rpt^indino-^ Borne 
I s r - e l i w r i t e r s h-^ ve already observed t h a t weapon systems ncv 
deployed in the area aie so much advanced tha t they resemble, 
i n . f f o c t , nuclear weapons. 
An I s r a e l i , nuclear s t r i k e againpt Egyptian popula t ion 
and i n d u s t r i a l c e n t r - s , in the l i g h t of p resen t I s r a e l i nuclear 
cpp^^bility may not be a d e t e r r e n t . I f i t wpr-^ - conceived as 
such by I s r a e l i nuclear s t r a t e g i s t s , i t i s not the case of 
•S.-z/pt as Prc isdent Sadat has emphasi2;'ed Egypt would not be 
in t imidated by what he cal led 'I'he iMuclear Drama'. S t r a t eg -
i c a l l y , i f t''-^ Tdv-r^arv understand the l i m i t a t i o n s of a token 
.f . .rcc , t h ; o r ig ina l use of a nuclear force as ^^o to r r en t fac-
t o r comes in to doubtful focus. 
On thn OGa..i hand, a declared I s r a e l i nuclear c ^ a b -
i l i t y wi l l not b-^lp s t a b i l i z e the Jest I s i a region as such 
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docl--ration mgy i n v i t e a massiv'-^ conventional a t tack against 
I s aol . I f I s r a e l des i r e s to maintain the s t a t u s quo by the 
deployment of a nuclear force, the move wi l l backf i re as the 
very s t a tus quo now in effect i s rej'^ctcd by the Irab 
s t a t e s because no s t a t e can accept a permanent t h r e a t to i t s 
nat ional securi ty or to ' l i v e ' with an adversary who i s 
always on the look out for overwhelming power. 
I I I . I l l ; 
AN ATTEMPT TO THEORIZE ON THE KTJCLB15IZATI0N 
OF STR: .TBGY IND HlTIOmx SECURITY OF THE 
PRESET N O N - M T J C L E . R P Q . J E R S IK THE EIGHTIES 
\ND NINETIES 
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As cone iV'-d of with 'powpr' as a frame of r^f'^mnc^ 
pnd d'fin^d in t-^rms of thr^ drgr^ of W'-^apoa-orinntation of 
the programraG to acquire weapon-grade f i s s i l e ma te r i a l s , tho 
phonomonon of -nucloar prol i-Por^t ior bas "bo-'^  -Pi ttcr] in tbo 
p resen t int '^rnat ional s t r a t e g i c environni'-nt on th-^ promise 
t h a t i t has got a p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n to nacional s ecu r i ty . 
-^ LL int-^rnational p o l i t i c a l behaviour of the nat ion 
stat-"=' now cons t i t u t ing the i n t e rna t i ona l system i s mainly 
aimed a'c guaranteeing th^ survival of the na t ion-s ta te .The 
s t r a t e g i c moves to^i^ards t h i s object ive are not opted for in 
an absolute way. Th-^ y depend upon a number of constant and 
va r i ab le f ac to r s , the most obvious of which i s th^ constant o" 
r eac t i ng to the decision of p o t e n t i a l pnd/or actual advers-^ry. 
Looked at from t h i s perspective^, nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n , 
the phenomenon, proves to be one of the rungs of e sca la t ion 
in escala t ion-prone con f l i c t s of a r i ng in an ac t ion-
reac t ion chain of s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n between the c o n f l i c t -
ing p a r t i e s , as was the case of the sup er-poArer s or between th 
n a t i o n - s t a t e s and the i n t e i national system as was the case 
of China. 
I t WRF been assumed t h a t every n a t i o n - s t e t e develops 
what war cal led 'grand s t r a t e g y ' ( d e a l i n g with the moans 
which help ma te r i a l i se i t s nat ional securi ty d o c t r i n e ) , which 
hp,s b ^er conceivr-d of as the master-design underlying region-
al or i n t e rna t i ona l p o l i t i c a l behaviour. ^Nuclearization of 
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of the gr-aid st'rategy provides for a l a r g e r set of s t r a t e g i c 
altorn'^tiv'^s in a fores'^eablo future*, thousrb not n^cpsp^ri ly 
char-^cfccriscd by maximum ben f i t s and minimum r i s k s . 
Econoadzing the phenomenon has rosul ted in a proof of 
the p t ra togic assumption tha t tho acqu i s i t ion of a nuclear 
force, whatever token, lends to sharp reduct ion in mi l i t a ry 
oxpc-diturc but on condit ion tna t the 2i uni t i s not involv-
ed i'" current pscala t ion-prone conf l i c t s , p r imar i ly reg iona l , 
'Vh- tbr option to deploy t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons for 
operat ion t h e a t r e purposes i s not ruled out .Otherwise, a 
nuclear forC(^ b-'comes l e s s cos t ly . In the c-^se of those u n i t s 
developing global i n t e r e s t s , the m-r-^  acqu i s i t ion of nuclear 
weapons cannot be of a considerable s t r a t e g i c value unless 
coupled with a c red ib le conventional force.The th-^sis tha t 
a token nuclear force may provide a de te r ren t f a c t o r , r e g a r d l e s s 
of the degrcr of i t s c r e d i b i l i t y and p r a c t i c a l i t y , cannot 
be excluded from the process of economizing, the nuclear 
p ro l i f ' - ca t ion phenomenon, -^or thos-> s t a t e s which are badly 
in i-rd of r f f - c t u a t i n g a credible d e t e r r e n t , t h e nuclear 
option may be assumed to bo of a r e l a t i v e d u r a b i l i t y , i f 
compared t o , fox exa^'^ple, the huge mi l i t a ry force required 
to bring pboub the samr ef fec t . This idea , hovever, i s 
es tabl ished on z\:c t a c i t assumption tha t the adversary 
i s n^ _t involved in a regional esc la t iun-prono c o n f l i c t . 
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Other lse , a s t a t e deploying a token nuclear 
forc^ , 'vbil^ I'^v'-lv-'-"' 1^ ^ -^ r e g i c m l c c r f l i c t "d l l blive to p J \^-
p r o t e c t Rincl develop a second s t r i k e capab i l i ty in case 
i t s ndvcrsrry gars nuclear. The moment the second s t r i k e 
cap abi l i ty cojiss !• , tho economic u t i l i t y of the or ig ina l 
progr-^mme wil l turn into p heavy finfenr'lnl burden duo to 
the requirements of soph i s t i ca t ion and qdvancement for the 
tcch'iology of tb'-" socoiid strik-^ ciirsbilitVo 
The acquis i t ion of we-apon-gr-^de f i s s i l e mate r ia l s i n 
th-> cont xt of a veapon-oriented programme does not spr ing, 
ns si'po -powex' s t r a t e g i s t s t ry to g^av4 from p r e s t i g e 
CO r ido ra t i ons . Regardless of the ambi_:uity associ^tpd ^vith 
such cons idera t ions , th^y cpnnot be rel^t-^d to a 'power' 
p r rccp t ion of a phenomenor which the p resen t nat ion 
s t - t ' . s -^ ro l iabl '^ to consider in i t s pssum-d capacity as a 
m-^jor f-^cnor in enhancing t h e i r n-^tionpl s ecu r i ty , t h e i r 
p r i o r i t y I'^od. Tn - study has sho.i/n t ha t such acquis i t ion 
i s the outcome of p di^^lectic in t^r '^ct ipn bot'wpf^ 'n thp 
n-uional s cur i ty doctr ine of a given nat ional power and 
and i t s -^dvp-rsary in a power-orient-^d i n t e rna t i ona l 
s t r -ucg ic - avix'UiX.ont vherr th' ' re^^l TS well as assumed 
p o r t u r - s of t'^ - rucle-^.r-s/eapon s t n t e s ^re r e l a t i v e l y 
s d r . Th: observation th'^t the presen t nuclear powers 
h-vc scnrcely f-^c^d ser ious att^^cks or t h r e a t s to t h e i r 
sii'vlv-i"' pirc^ th-^v dec"'^r^^d th'-^ir acquis i t ion of nucl^pr 
No-^joar does support thr said outcome of the study. 
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Associatrd with t h i s d i a l e c t i c i n t e r a c t i o n , i s the idea 
t l a t those s t a t e s asp i r ing for the acquis i t ion of nuclear 
'vo-'pc's i n p for^pcvp'^ ''"!!^ futuri^ •^r'^ , in the satn^ tir^e, a sp i r -
ing ±or technological and i n d u s t r i a l advancement,The image 
ox r nuclear weapon s t a t e i s not only tha t of a m i l i t a r i l y 
s t ' jno- nat ional p e e r , but also of ^ highly devr-loped soc-
iety-, economically, i n d u s t r i a l l y , soc ia l ly and p o l i t i c a l l y . 
Th- technological s t a tus of the p resen t nuclear powers with 
i t s promising ends does provide for a l e a i n g ->xanplc e spec ia l ly 
fo.: those Third •^'orld countri '^s which hnvo been mede t h i r d 
due to c o l o n i a l i s t e t f e c t s and the pos t - co lon ia l host of 
developmental burdens, economic s t r a i n s ^nd urgent securi ty 
ne c's. 
Moreover, there does ex i s t among Third v^orld count r ies 
1 s t rong fee l ing t h a t the world i s divided into two technolog-
i c a l c l a s s e s , sometimes but naively cal led North and South. 
The presen t obj'^ctive of the technologica l ly unprivi leged 
i s to acnieve a f a i r t r ans fe r of technology from the North to 
the South, \gninst t h i s formula for readjusting; the i n t ^ r -
n^t io al system, the c-chnologically advanced count r ies have 
r . a.ctcd in two ways. F i r s t , they availed themselves of the 
' occas ion ' to dispose of some of t h e i r technologies which 
th-^y consider unpromising for the future such as the tech-
nolo i c s associated with car i n d u s t r i e s , t r a d i t i o n a l e l e c t r i c 
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po'vor s t a t i o n s , f e r t i l i z e r s ",nd petrochemical complexes, 
aluminium -^ nd s tee l p l a n t s and •"ven conventional a i r c r a f t 
indus t ry whether for c i v i l av ia t ion or eombgt and other 
mi l l tp ry purpoppp, "rith tbf ^Tccp-ptlon of nl»otronlo rtqulp-
mjnt for tbc l a t t e r . S ccnd, the^/' hnve been acce le ra t ing 
t h e i r advancement in the technologj.es they thooris^d as t h e i r s , 
not subj-ct to Gxfnsf'^r. These "re th^ tf-chnologies of 
nuclear po>vor5 spree and com;;utors. Under the imp-act of 
economic problems =ind in excnange for natural resources or 
th i r f in r^c ia l r.-^turiis, som^ of tpchnologicBlly advpnc-'^ d 
cou r i i o s , including th'~ super-powers, espec ia l ly the United 
St- r s , embarked upon a r a the r cautious sale of nuclear 
tccbrology coupled with extraordinary safoguards, though 
almost a l l such sa les do not include components of a mi l i t a ry 
po te ' i u i a l . Other nucl-^ar weapon s t a t ^ rJith a sp i r a t i ons 
for •^  super-power s t a tus and advantages, such as France, 
benef i t ted from t h i s trend to which they incorporated some 
ass i s t -nco in t h - f i e ld s of computerization and research ^nd 
development. By thu end of 1976, t h i s trend was almost given 
up with France declaring; i t s d.-=cision not to au thor ise 
any longer b i l a t e r a l con t rac t s for the sal^ of nuclear 
r e a c t o r s or i n d u s t r i a l i n s t a l l a t i o n s for th- reprocessing of 
i r r a d i a t e d fuels? in a c lea r move to acquiesce to the recomm-
cndationo of t h - Group of tho Elnvon. In vie'w of the incrr^as^ 
in ' norgy d-mands ( s" ? I p p e n d i x j n ) thp growth of depend-
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Giicp on f i s s i l e fuels as the only poss ib le a l t e r n a t i v e for 
f oeg i i - fuols in tnr> renerqt ion of e l e c t r i c power ( t h i s point 
w=is dv'olt upon in P a r t I , Chapter I I I ) , the thes i s t h a t the 
acquisiuion of 'vc-^pon-grqde f i s s i l e mate r ia l s in the context 
of a weapon-orienccd programme enhances nat ional secur i ty 
gaining laor: acceptance and favouratDle appra i sa l , the promised 
sharp r duction in milit '^ry expenditure in c^se the '-veapon 
sysccme are nuclearized though -chis i s a conditioned fac to r , 
the progress ive i n t e r a c t i o n betwo'-^n the nuclear , .space «nd 
couiputor technjlofiies /widening the already ex i s t i ng l ag 
bet'.eon the technologica l ly advanced count r ies and the 
tochro logica l ly unprivi leged, the continuat ion of na t iona l -
ism es th."^  m^ijor sourc^ for <=oci a] enp-ra-y n'^d, l a s t , th-^ 
surviv-:^] of the present i n t e rna t i ona l system as one of 
n a t i o e - s t a t e s which consider t ha t t h e i r top-most p r i o r i t y 
i s oo survive and maintain t h e i r n t i o n q l secur i ty under 
condit ions of poss ib le nuclear pro l i f -^ra t ion , the deduction 
i s t - c , in a foreseeable future - supposedly t i l l the end 
of t h i s century when f o s s i l e fuel resources wil l be 
cxh-asced, v]z- process of nuclear p r o l i L^ration wi l l b^ ^ 
one or an increas ing number of s t a t e s possess ing weapon-
gr-^d.j f i s s i l e m a t o r i i l s . 
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•Liquolly, th^ procoss of R, nuclearized d iv i s ion of the 
VOLIU wi l l be enhanced and enriched. In an i n t ^rnationgl 
syctcni perspec t ive 5 tho c r i s i F to appear wi l l bo centred 
on tu-^t nuclc^^r t'-chnolog,y which has been described i n ' P ^ r t I , 
Ch3:pi-^r I I I as c s s - n t i a l for war qnd pe-ice so long as i t i s 
inc^jipontcd ^s a subs tan t ia l cons t i tuen t of nat ional power. 
Unless e f fo r t s are protrtptly rendered, the vvriter p r e d i c t s 
the r sur rec t ion of l a t e nineteenth crntury imperi,aikism, 
tDis time deadly nuclear ,agRiiist which s t a t e s which wi l l 
shor t ly be in na^d of nucle=iri",'3T:ion mny ffrid but vory f-^ w 
al tcrnai; ivcs to exorcis^ t h e i r w i l l , i f any a l t e r n a t i v e o ther 
than acquisecencL to the c lass d iv i s ion of the world wi l l ever 
ex i s t . P r a c t i c a l l y , there i s no such accomodation of t h i s 
prcdicLcd s i t ua t ion as concerted e f fo r t s or an ' ' in te rna t iona l 
org ii izetion for the .vclfp.ro oi the non-nuclear count r ies" and 
.'lljtu.^nind^d ' i dans , ^t I m o t t i n thr r^id of t h i s ci^nturv. 
Thi 'efforts referred to in th b ginning of t h i s paragraph 
must be indigenous, only ^nd en t i r e ly indigenous.The reason 
un cr ly ing the r e i t e r a t i o n of indigenous e f f o r t s i s the nature 
of cl^c present i n t e rna t i ona l sy^ t^em which i s onn of na t ion-
s teccs and of 'power' r e l a t i o n s and i n t e r a c t i o n s . In t h i s 
resj j -ct , two exceptions ought t e named: I s r a e l and South 
Ifric-^. j i th the f i r s t as e s t ab l i sh :d on r e l i g i o u s consider-
a t ions , cxpansionisru -^ nd oxpnt r ia t ion of indigenous n a t i o n a l s , 
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and the second as es tab l i shed , to put i t b lun t ly , on dhi te 
supremricy, those two pxc^ptions must not be given any 
opportunity t>o d^v^lop nucl'^^r cqp abi l i t iess . In case they 
develop such capo.bil i t iQs, a p r a c t i c a l suggestion would bp 
to halt any p o l i t i c a l S'^ i^ '^  from such acqu i s i t i on . 
There i s a mi state'^n deduction thq t the decision to 
acquirv weapon-gr^^de f i s s i l e niarerials in th-^ context of a 
wcroon-oriented proeramme i s a technological d o c i s i o n . l t has 
born shown t h a t as far as i n i t i a l development i s concerned, i t 
docs not necess i tp to a p r i o r advanced technological base and 
thpt a crash programiiie of three years c^n DC d signed and 
implemented by qui te a la rge numbrr of the present non-nuclear 
coun..rics.The maiti ^tumbling block i s not th'-- tr^chnol ogical 
aspect or degree of development but the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the 
human element capable of t r a n s l a t i n g the e n t i r e proc-^ss extend-
ing bot"'CGn s t ra tegy and const ruct ion 'vork in to a r e a l i t y . Is 
for bh-^  f inanc ia l aspect, there i s no such d i s a s t e r as voiced 
by chc presen t nuclear :';/eapon count r ies in the argumentations 
they employ -lerninst th-^ ^ucl'^'^r qpoiratioi^a of Third ''^orld 
couni-j'i ^s. ; th ree-year crash prograiiHTxe would cost ( see 
page 99 ) l e s s than mi l i t a ry expenditure on R ?c D of a 
£"0 Ir t -^nt ial conventional weapon system, which i s a common 
pbe'^omcnon in a l l moderni s<=d -^rmips of the Third <'orld.The 
a v - i l a b i l i t y of tho human clcr;-^nt can be guaranteed and 
f a c i l i t a t e d throu>',h s c i e n t i f i c agreements ^nd pro tocols of 
-332-
01 un ivers i ty grant exchangee. The d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n and 
! clisp-^rs^L' of Such grants ^nd missions would allow for the 
attainment of, -<t l e a s t , tbo basic theor?>tical exper t i se and, 
in tb-: sgjne time, would present a cover for the nuclear 
option^ As r.-gards the s c i e n t i f i c da ta , the case of the 
Pri^'^coton Univerpitv stud^T^t ( s^° p . ) i s 9plf-<^xplRnqtory. 
I t r.;voals tha t the already published ma te r i a l s are a reason-
able source to enibark upon research and development without 
pascing by tine st<^ge of ver i fy ing the autb^-'nticity of the 
bn.Gic dat3o I t has become a b i t of publ ic data tha t nuclear 
explosives depend upon plutonium 259 or uranium 258 and tha t 
i t i s much eas ie r and cheaper to use plutonium 259 because 
i t n-eds a chemical separat ion p'rocess to accompany the 
generation of e l e c t r i c power from r e a c t o r s fueled by 
natural uranium -vhereas the production of uranium 238 
r e q u i r r s (enrichment t^-cbniques which n'^cessit-^te =in advp^^ced 
technology. 
The weapon t'--sting aspect of th--- programme i s one 
qucstie^-e. t h a t aas not boon r e so lu t e ly answered. There i s a 
common be l i e f among st-itosmen and t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l 
anaiysos, but not among s t r a t e g i s t s , tha t no general would 
accent tb-^ df^ ploymn '^^ t of a wnnpon which h^s not bppn t'^ p"*''^ d. 
In CD- C'-\se of rucle^r weapons, especia l ly when only a token 
force i s requirpd, s t r a t e g i s t s argue t h a t there i s a p o s s i b -
i l i t y t h a t ce r t a in computation techniques can provide a 
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s u b s t i t u t e for t e s t i n g . This no t ion i s common in contemporary 
s t r a t e g i c l i t e r a t u r e on the s u b j e c t , Moreover, the d e c i s i o n 
to e':iploy nuclear vieapons for -.urely m i l i t a r y purposes has 
not yet be^n downed to the l e v e l of the j u r i s d i c t i o n of 
army g e n e r a l s . Even i n the case of -he suner-poTCT'S, t he 
p o l i t i c a l le-^d^-rshi-o s t i l l "•laint'^ins the r i g h t t o give 
i n s t r u c t i o n s on the use of such weapons. There i s no reason 
to assume other^jise exceut vhen a t i 'e would come i n vjhich 
nuc l ea r vjeaoons becom.e ' c o n v e n t i o n a l ' , ciuite a r'^not'^ p o s s i b i l i t y . 
For a given s t - ' t e t h a t has ooted for a c rash programme, the 
d e c i s i o n to use nuclei"r wea^^ons v i l l i -^ tural ly be the respD 
o n s i b i l i t y of the leadership, ^'hich has rjri^^'-'rily opted for the 
progr=immeo 
The c r u c i a l i s sue i.ihich ought be v e r i f i e d in any case 
i s v;hether the nerd to deploy nuclenr ^e^ponc i s an outcome of 
r e a l s e c u r i t y ne-^ds o'" t e produce of i'-^^ginary or ascalculTfe;sd 
needs . The s p e c i a l c^ce t h a t nuc lea r \>/ea ions presen t s .ems from 
t h e i r o u a l i t - i t i v e de te rminents and not from t h e i r Kilotonnage 
or even megatonna'c though he y i e ld hns got a "i^ ol e to p lay 
in tiie s h i f t from q u a n t i t y to q u a l i t y issues„The ' i m i e d i a t e 
p a s t ' , to use the t'^r-o of Herman Kahn ->nd Bruce-Bri'^-gs, t e l l s 
us of i n s t a n c e s vrhere n-i t i o n - s t ^ bes could not d i s t i i g u i s h bet^ieen 
r e a l and i "aginary s o c u r i t v lerds and, accordingly^ 'letiicen r e a l , 
p o c e n t i - l ^nd iiggin-^'^y -^dvcrs r i c s„ F a i l i n g to decide such 
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subs tan t i a l Sir-^tegic d i s t i n c t i o n -would resu l t i i a major mis-
ca lcu la t ion of the survival neoessltieSo In the case of the 
acqu is i t ion of weapon-grade f i s s i l e l a t e r i a l s in the context 
of weapon-orionted prograniaes, the consequences of faul ty 
d i s t i n c t i o n night lead to a l e lay that c rea tes , in turn , the 
genesis of a s t r a t eg ic gap or, equally^ a hu'-^ried nove which 
brings forth unneifessary conclusionso T'le four-year delay 
iu the ^oviQt progranne has resul ted in a gaio tha t was not 
bridged except as l a t e -^ s 1^70 when they were able to enjoy, 
for the f i r s t time, a s table nuclear deter-'-enCe and a credible 
balance of nuclear forces with the A^^ericanSo On the other 
hand, the hu'^^ried nove of the Br i t i sh to acquire t h e i r 
na t ional Corce has resul ted in major cons t ra in ts on t h e i r 
econ-imy ^nd^ in the same Li ie, did not h a l t the erosion oT 
Br t t i sh i n t e r e s t s and c r e i b i l i t y in many regions. 
The =>doption of 'power' as a f^ 'ame of reference and 
s t r a t eg i c crite"'"ia has revealed that in a foreseeable future , 
th-:- nun't^er '^ f ^ati^noi_controll ed nuclear forces w i l l increase. 
This conciliusion has got a r e l a t ion to s t r a t eg i c planning 
to the effe'^t fciipt current rehic l s oP s t ra tegy ought be 
' r evo lu t ion ised ' so as to develoo or acqui"''e the a b i l i t y to 
'^ ope ^dth ''he chaTes yet to co'^e. IT othei" words, A^ie must be 
prepa-"ed to f i t in '^  •f'orthco aing in t e rn^ t io T^I system of a , 
nu ibe^" of nuclear po '^e^ s^ as tha t of the members of the Unifeed 
NacionSo The sug'-ested ' rev l u t i oo i sn t i on ' should be \7orked out 
a f te r po'''/eiworiented concepts without which the s t r a t e g i c 
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planning Q-^ a given unit o^ tae orcsent in te rne t "onal system 
wil l f?^ll short of the real -"equiT'ements. Insiie'^d^ i t night be 
pushed to cost ly "lehavioural p'=it,terns. One cost ly behavioural 
pattei 'n is i;hc be l i e " in any ox the non-power aporoaches against 
which the l a t e DT„ Ho^ 'ai Bhabha had the ins ight to warn thats 
" there i s no form of power i s an expensive as no ooTer^„Yet,'5ihere 
remains the question of hov? to -^elate the ncouis i t ion of 
weapon-gr-'de f i s s i l e nteT-ials to oo®er or hov to effectuate 
the power oT'ientationoThe recourse to historv- alone, in t h i s 
P'^rticul'^r i ssue , light not hring forth s-^tisf^ctory conclus-
ions because power or ien ta t ion requi'-es a sound perception of 
reasons r-Lher than occasiotis, "'Pa^r. h i s to ry orovides us with 
i s an occasion-vjise account > A d i r ec t method to rel-^te the^i 
i s to i n t e rp re t t he i r i a t c r ac t i on in te r^s of n o i i ' i c o -
mii i ta^y postures Such •oi^stures should aot e^ iden t i f i ed 
in i so l - ' t ion but slather, in ^ di'=ilrctic dialogue with nhe 
. corresponding TDostu^es of a '2;iveo adversary" A next s tep 
to fos .er the o c e r o^'-ientation i s to -^ dd rhe tr '='ditional 
ele lents of n-clonal oower to the en\riro".nent of i n t e r a c t i o n 
to the effect of wnich hha area of nat ional incores t s extend-
ing between survival -nd pro,ut ing the ^'elfare oT the soc ie ty 
comes in . I t i s 1n th i s st^ge that concepts of conf l ic t 
begjn to be reshaped «"ter nodcls not o.ily designed for 
present circumstances but also for future n e r d s . I * i s assumed 
in 
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tha t t h i s ijrocess of _^ D\V or or ic i r jc t icn '>;Oulc'. c.ssirt i"!; 
c r ea t ion of \;orkin£, grand strct'es^/. This i n p l i c s the 
o^cioption of souG p red ic t ion tochniquos* 
Despite the fact thc t i .rodiction techniques are s t i l l 
i n the cradle , the orj^tmizcJ a t t c n p t s of the present 
generat ion of s t r a t e g i s t s ho„vc "boon considerably f r u i t f u l . • 
This was the case of ^ for exai-iplo, the scenarios prepai^ed 
hy RAND Corporation and Hudson I n s t i t u t e USA, seen before 
and during the Cuban cri ' - . is . 
what 'ehcald be embarked up'Ui by the secoii-l generat ion of 
s t r a t e g i s t s i s to attempt a noro inagina-tivc appra i sa l of a 
nucler ized i n t e r n a t i o n a l system in which the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
nuclear war, however mini '-al , are not r u l e d , out . So long as 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l systeui remains one of n a t i o n - s t a t e s , t he 
n a t i o n - s t a t e maintaining;, surv iva l ?-s the f i r s t and foremost 
securi ty need, n r t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and secur i ty a '^o defined 
i n terms of power, power-or ienta t ion inev i t ab ly r e q u i r i n g the 
nuc lea r i za t ion of s trategy and na t iona l securi ty - the 
dccuction w i l l bo one of nuclcar ised c o n f l i c t s . In any 
dec e la t ion-prone conf l i c t j t he use of force i s not to be 
excluded as wc have got no poin t , t h e o r e t i c a l or otherv^iso, 
to r e j e c t the idea . The c o n f l i c t s t ha t the present i n t e r -
na t iona l system i s vulnerable to -over t or l a t e n t - vrtiich 
^ ; i l l inevi tably oner-^e in a foreseeable fu tu re , are 
oscalct ion-pronc because of two reasons , U'irst, these 
c o n f l i c t s have got one degree or a,nother of n a t i o n a l i s t 
f e e l i n g s . Socond, contemporary s t r p t c g i c th inking i s 
baqhed by v;ea::.ion systems wiiich proviso for a sot of 
graded credible t h r e a t s . Assuring t h a t the f o r t h -
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coming nrocess of nuclegr pro"! ^ f era .ion i s charge ^ e r i s t i c a l l y 
one of ^rowLh, na tura l ly v i th r ich " l i l i t a rv lootenti^ls, fche 
nuclear iza t ion of conf l ic ts i s ex^ecccd to adcl esca la t ion 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . This viould ra i se the problem of future conf l ic t s 
in terms of the i r ""illt;ary nould„ There i s no c lear agreement 
in 11 '^ratu'^e on the subject as to the militar^^^ mould though 
a considerable sect ion of„ tb is lite^^'^ture soe^ks of ' l l i i t e d 
war' as an acceptable mo''"'d to be r^s^rted to in the sub-systems. 
But t .is t-'-eid decs i^ .^no "e the lucle-^riz^tion p o s s i b i l i t i e s and, 
hence i s no asset for s t r a t eg i c planning. This study shows that 
the mi l i t a ry mould i s expected to be t a c t i c a l nuclear exchange'^^ 
make i t possible to h-ive what can e called 'nuclear in tormizzo ' , 
s imi la r to the concept of 'Pause' in /American strace'^y. Such 
expectation i s >ased on an assuio t ion that in a nuclear s t r a t e g i c 
environment, 1t i s o ily the da^iage infUctec' by t a c t i c a l nuclear 
weapons "hicn lay be accf^ted. I t i s almost an axiom that the 
use of s t r a t eg ic nuclear wea-^ons would not allow •^ ny such accept-
ancGo If accented in a t e s t of s t •'ength by conflicting^ n a r t i e s , i t 
l i l l give then an ' i n t e r l izzo' for negotiat ions before the conf-
l i c t i s escaiai-ed into a degree where the use of s t r a t eg i c 
X'/eapons i s seriously cmsidered . Consequently, =>dversaries w i l l 
nrefer t-^ctical nuclear exchange ^s the nould of s t rength sho^ r^ 
in the future. 
/ii-El^DICES 
-338-
/i-'PMDIX I 
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Tho data of Appendix I , combined with Appendix I I I and with 
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Source S.I.I-.R.1.5 Nuclear P r o l i f e r a t i o n Froblemp; 
C Stockholm;/Jmqvist Se i¥iksell,197^) 
p . 3 2 . 
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APFENDIX I I I 
Per cent 
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REGIONS OF TES .'ORLD. 
Source; S . I . l - . R . I . ; Nuc l - a r P r o l i f e r a t i o n Problpms; 
(Stockholm; Umqvis t & w'iksGll , 
1 9 7 ^ ) , p . 29. 
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.ffPENDIX IV 
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4GJRT5WSNT B^T'i/EEN THE UFETUD STATES OF AJ-IERIG/l 
ATO THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCTAI.IST REPUBI.ICS 
ON THE PKEVENTION OF NUGLEAB '^kR 
The U n i t e d S t a t e s o f Amer ica aad t h e U n i c ' o f S o v i e t 
S o c i a l i p t R e p u b l i c s , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e p a r t i f ^ s 
Guided by t h e o b j e c t i v e s o f s t r e n g t h e n i n g wor ld p e a c e -^ .nd 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , 
C o n s c i o u s t h a t n u c l e a r ^ a r would have d e v a s t f t i n g c o n s e q -
u e n c e s f o r mank ind , 
P r o c e e e d i n g from t h e d e s i r e t o b r i n g a b o u t c o n d i t i o n s i n 
wh ich t h e d a n g e r of an o u t b r e a k of n u c l e a r war anywhere i n t h e 
wor ld would be r e d u c e d and u l t i m a t e l y e l i m i n a t e d . 
P r o c e e d i n g from t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s u n d - r t h e c h a r t e r o f thf= 
U n i t e d l ^ a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of p e a c e , r e f r a i n i n g from 
t h e t h r e a t o r n°° o f f o r c p , pnd t h ^ a ^ o i d a n c p o f wpr , pnd i n 
c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e a g r e e m e n t s t o which e i t h e r p a r t y h a s s u b s -
c r i b e d . 
P r o c e e d i n g from t h e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s of r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f Amer ica and t h e Union o f S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t 
R e p u b l i c s s i g n e d i n Moscow on 29 May 1 9 7 2 , 
R e a f f i r m i n g t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e 
USA and t h e USSR i s n o t d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t o t h e r c o u n t r i e s and t h o i r 
i n t e r e s t s , have a g r e e d as f o l l o w s : 
ARTICLE I 
The Un i tpd S t a t e s ^nd t h e Sovi '^ t Union qsrrop t h ^ t an 
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objec t ive of t h e i r p o l i c i e s i 8 to remove th-^ danger of nucleer 
war iqnd of the uee of nuclear weapons. 
Accordingly, the p a r t i e s agree t h a t they wi l l act i n ^^ uc!} 
a maiiuer as to prevent the development of s i t u a t i o n s capable ol 
caaairg a dangerous exacerbation of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s , as to avoid 
mi l i t a ry confronta t ions , and as to exclude the outbreak of nucloar 
war between them and between e i t h e r of the p a r t i e s and other 
countri'^'P. 
ARTICLE I I 
The p a r t i e s agree, i n accordance with Ar t i c l e I and to 
r e a l i z e the obj'^ctivp' s ta ted in t h a t a r t i c l e , to procr-f^d from bho 
premise t ha t each par ty wil l r e f r a in from the t h r e a t or use of 
. force against the other p a r t y , against the a l l i ' ^s of the other 
pa r ty and against other coun t r i e s , i n circumstances which ma;v' 
endanger i n t e rna t iona l peace and s<=curity. The p a r t i e s agroo jhat 
they wil l be guided by these cons idera t ions in the formulatio-.i of 
t h e i r foreign p o l i c i e s and in t h e i r ac t ions in the f i e ld of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . 
ARTICLE I I I 
The p a r t i e s undertake to develop t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with each 
o ther and with other c o u n t r i r s in a way cons i s ten t with the 
purposes of t h i s agreement. 
AttTIGLE IV 
I f at ar>y timp r p l a t i o n s bptw^pn thp p a r t i p s or b-^twor-n 
e i t h e r par ty and other count r ies appear to involve the r i s k of 
r!ucl<^ar ^NBT b^^t'^ee'" t h e USi end the USSR or loetw^^v e i t h e r p p r t y 
and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , t he United S t a t ? p and t h e Sov ie t Union, 
a c t i n g i n accordance with the p r o v i s i o n s of th ' ^ i r agreouiont, s h a l l 
iuiiuediately e n t e r i n t o u rgen t c o n s u l t a t i o n s ^idth each otht?: and 
mnke every e f f o r t to a v e r t t h i s r i s k . 
AHTICLS V 
•^ach p a r t y pha l l be f r e e t o inform t h e S^^curity Council of 
t he United S t a t e s , t he Sec re t a ry General of the U n i t e d , N a t i o n s and 
the Governments of a l l i e d o r o t h e r c o u n t r i e s of t h e p rog- ' -ps and 
outcome of c o n s u l t a t i o n s i n i t i a t e d i n accordance wi th .Article IV 
of t h i s agreement. 
,iRTIC!LS 71 
Nothing i n t h i s agreement s h a l l a f f e c t o r i m p a i r ; 
( A ) the i n h e r e n t r i g h t of i n d i v i d u a l o r c o l l e c t i w e s e l f -
defence as envisaged by A r t i c l e 51 of the C h a r t e r of the United 
N a t i o n s , 
(B) t h e p r o v i s i o n s of the chart-^r of t h e Uni ted N a t i o n s , 
i n c l u d i n g those r e l a t i n g to the maintenance o r r e s t o r a t i o n of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y , and 
(C) the o b l i g a t i o n s under taken by e i t h e r p a r t y towards i t s 
a l l i e s o r o t h e r c o u n t r i e s i n t r e a t i e s , ag reements , and o t h e r 
a p p r o p r i a t e documents. 
ARTICLE VIT 
This agreement shall be of unlimited duration. 
Ax^ TiaLE VIII 
Tt ie agreement shal l enter in to force upon s igna ture . 
Done at the City of iVashington on June 22, 1975? i ^ ttvo 
copies , each in the English and in the Russian languages, both 
tPpta ^r>ir]a: pquallV PUtbpT^tlC. 
For the United S ta tes of Americas For the Union of Soviet Soc-
i a l i s t fiepublicsJ 
Pres iden t of the Unitpd Stqtps Gen--^ral Secretary of the Gr-nt~ 
of America r a l Committee of the GPSU 
LIMITATION OF UNDm^ GHOUJMD 
NUCLEAR fEAPOi^ T TESTS 
Treaty Bet'.veen the United S t^ tpp of /Unerics and 
the Union of Sovie t S o c i a l i s t Republ ic^ and the 
L i m i t a t i o n of Underground Nuclear 'Weapons Tepts . 
Ju ly 3 9 197^. 
The Unit^^d S ta tue of i m e r i c a and the Union of Sov ie t 
S o c i a l i s t -Republics, h e x e i n a f t e r i ef e r r ed to as the P a x t i e s , 
D e c l a r i n g t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to ach iev - a t toe e a r l i e s t p o s -
s i b l e da te the c^^sp t ion of the n u c l e a r prms r a c e and to t a k e 
e f f e c t i v e m-asure? toward r e d u c t i o n s in s t r a t e g i c arms, ' -uclear 
disarmament; snd genera l and complete d ie armament under s t r i c t 
and e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . 
Reca]" ' ing t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n expressed by t h e P a r t i e s t o 
the 1963 Treaty Banuing Nuclear weapon Tesi-s i n the Atmosphere, 
i n Outer Sppicp pnd Under Water i^ ^ I t ^ Proamblp to sppk to achieve 
the d i s c o n t i n u a n c e of a l l t e s t e x p l o s i o n s of n u c l e a r weapons f o r 
a l l t ime , and to con t inue n e g o t i a t i o n s to t h i s end, 
Noting t h a t t he ?5doption of measures fo r th^ f u r t h e r l i m i t -
a t i o n of underground n u c l e a r weapon t e s t s would c o n t r i b u t e Vo 
t h e achievement of t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s and would meet the i n t e r e s t s 
of s t r e n g t h e n i n g peace and the f u r t h e r r e l a x a t i o n of i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n . 
Rea i f i rming t h e i r adherence to t h e o b o e c t i v e s and p r i n -
c i p l e s of t h e Treaty Banning NuMear weapon Tes t s i n the Atmos-
p h e r e , i n Oute r Space and Under Wat^r and of the Tr°a tv on 
the N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n of Nuclear Weapons, 
UTICLE I I I 
Tdt p r o v i s i o n s ol r b i e Treacy do nob -^xtend to underground 
nucl-^RP ^xplopionc carri'^'d ou+' bv tb-^ PaT"ti'^° fo r pppcf^ful p u r -
p o s e s . Underground n j c l c a r e x p l o s i o n s for peace fu l p u r p o s e s s h r l l 
be governed by an agre '^^ 'Diont wh ic ' i s to be n e g o t i a t e d and conclud-
ed by t h e P a r t i e s a t thp e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e t imp. 
This Treaty s h a l l bf^  s u b j e c t to r a t i f i c a t i o n i n accordance 
with the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c r d u r e s of each P a r t y . Th is T rea ty 
s h a l l e n t e r i n t o fo rce on the day of the exchange of instrumeni-;^ 
of r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
iUtTlCLlL V 
1. This Tr'~ qty sball ppmain in forc^ for Q period of fiv^ 
years. Unlpss replaced ear l ie r by an agreement in implementation 
of the objectives specified in paragraph 3 of Article I of t h i s 
Treaty, i t shaJl be extended for successive five-year periods 
unle"'^' either Party notifips the other of i t s termination 
no l a t e r than six months pr ior to the expiration of the Treaty. 
Before the expiration of th i s period the Par t ies may,as necessary, 
bold consultations to consjd^r tbo si tuation rp] ^varit to the 
substance of th is Treaty and to introduce possible amendments 
to the text of the Treaty. 
2. TCach Party shall , in exercising i t s national sovereignty 
have the r ight to withdraw from th is Treaty i f i t dpcid'^s that 
extraordinary ev-^nts related to th-^  subject matter of t h i s 
Treaty have jeopardized i t s supreme in t e r e s t s . I t shall give 
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Having abr:ed as <. JIIOA/SS 
iRTIGL.^  J 
1. S^ch Party undertakes to p r o h i b i t , to prevent , and -lot 
to carry out any und-^rground nucleqr weapon t = s t having -) yi Id 
exceeding 150 k i lo tons at any p lace under i t ? j u r i p d i c t i o a 
or con t ro l , beginning March 31, 1976, 
Z. Each Party shal l l i m i t the numb'---'r of i t s gnderground nucl rar 
'veapon t^^sts to a minimum. 
3. The P a r t i e s shal l continue t h e i r nego t ia t ions with s. v^ '/ 
to^vard achieving a so lu t ion to th^ problpm of the c^ssa t io ' of 
a l l underground nuclear weapon t e s t s . 
4J?TICL^ I I 
1, For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance wi"jh 
the provis ions of t h i s Treaty, each P---ty shal l use natio_i "' 
cechnical means o± v e r i f i c a t i o n at i t s disposal i n a '^dC\xv: 
c o r s j s t e n t with the generally recognized p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r -
na t ional low. 
2. Each Party undertak'^'S not to i n t e r f e r e ss^ itfj the national* 
tpcbi^ical moqno oP vr^rificatioTi of tb^ oth'^r' Pa r ty op'^rating 
in accordance with paragraph 1 of th i9 i r^ t ic le . 
3« To promote the ob j - c t i ve s and implementation of the 
p rov i s ions of t h i s Treaty th^^ P a r t i - s sha l l , a<= necessary, 
consul t with each o ther , make inquiri(=p and furnish infornnt ion 
in respons'^ to such inquir ies , , 
Dofcic^ 0"^  i t § dec is ior . to th? o t b e r P a r t y s i x months pr io^ ' to 
withdra>val from t h i s T raa ty , SacL n o t i c e s h a l l i n c l u d e a 
s t a t emen t of the e x t r a o r d i n a r y e v e n t s tne n o t i f y i n g i^arty 
r c^q rd^ a'^ ' b ivi^e: ,i'^op^rdizod i t s supr'^m^ int^r'^st'^^. 
3o This T r t a ty s h a l l oo r e g i s t e r e d p u r s a a n t to A r t i c l e 102 
of the Chartt^r of t h e United N a t i o n s . 
Donp a t Moscow on Ju ly 3 , 197^\ i n dup l i ca t ' ^ , i ^ th-^ 
E n g l i s h and .Russian l a n g u a g e s , botn t-^sts be ing '--qually 
a u t h e n t i c . 
FOR TIE EraiTTiID ST4TES OF SI ERICA; 
RIGH4RD MXOn 
The P r e s i d e n t of the United Stat; s of 
America 
FOR TEE UlTIOT\i OF gOVP-BT SOCIALIST R^'UBLI""S3 
L.Io BRlZHlJiSV^ 
General Sec re t a ry of the General 
Gommittep of the GPSU 
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APPEMTX VII 
COST OP UND"5RGR0UPD T^ IISTS 
Copt of t e s t i n g 20-k t bombs und rground r e q u i r i n g 
a d r i l l e d hole about 5OO metr . s deep and 1.8 me t res 
i n diametex ( i n Ks m i l l i o n s ) 
Exp lo ra to ry 'mT\ and f e a s i b i l i t y study 
E s t a b l i s h i n g t h e base 
D r i l l i n g and s c a l i n g 
Emplacing the bomb 
Misce l l aneous 
TOTAL 
One tes t 
12 
40 
15 
1 
10 
78 
M^slfil^^ '^^  
area 
14 
40 
4 
4 
15 
103 
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/JFANEIX VIII 
NUCiLEAE PENETRATION OF THE ELECTRICAL GENERATING MARKET 
P e r i o d Nuclear p e r cen t of t o t a l c a p a c i t y added 
1 9 ^ - 7 5 
1975-80 
1980-85 
1985-90 
Af te r 1990 
20 
W 
60 
70 
ao 
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;j?pTTiTj[^iy.ix 
TEZT OF T Ji] LETTER THAT / iBsHT EIHSTEIN ADDRESSED 
TO THE THEN iUVlEHICAN PHBSIDEWT T, K)0SEVELT D..TED 
I'^^llS'^^ilJi'^^^^'^ ^¥^IIE^^-'^E 2^™^^ 1^ 2 1940_. 
Some recent work by B. -t'^ ermi gnd Lo Sz i la rd , which hoe 
been coriununiGated to me in manuscript, l eads me to expect 
t ha - the element uranium may be turned i n to g now and 
impor-Go^nt source of energy in the immediate future« Certain 
a£poci;e of the s i t u a t i o n which has ar isen seem tu ca l l for 
watchfulness and, i f necessary, quick act ion. I beliov^e, 
thci^cforr, tb-^t i t i s my duty to br ing t^ your a t t e n t i o n 
the following fac t s and recommendabions. 
In the coursG of the l a s t four months i t has been made 
probable - through the work of J o l i o t i n Erance as veil as 
Poruii and Szi lard i n America - t h a t i t may become p o s s i b l e 
to cot u?p a nuclear chain ropct ion in a 1 < r^ge mass of 
uranium, by which vast amounts of power and la rgo quant-
i t i e s 01 nrw radiuri- l iko elements would be generated. Now i t 
appears almost ce r t a in tha t t h i s could be achieved in the 
i rmnodi at c fu-curo. 
This now phenomenon would also lop'^ "' to the cc r s -
t r u c t i o n of bombs, and i t i s conceivable - though much l e s s 
c e r t a in - t h a t extremely powerful bombs of a new type may 
thus be consccuctcoo A single bomb of t h i s type , carric^d by 
boat and exploded in a p o r t , might very well destroy the whole 
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p o r t together witu Sv^ me of the surrounding t e r r i t o r j o However, 
Fuch boinbs might very -i^pll prove to bo too heavy for tr-^np-
p c r t a t i o n by a i r . 
The United S ta tes has only very poor ores of uranium, 
i n moderqte quan t i t i e e . There i s •^ urae good ore in Canada: nnd 
the forcer Czechoslovakia, while th'" e s t i'-rportp.nt source of 
uraniura i s Belgian Congo. 
In vieT of t h i s s i t ua t i on you lany think i t desir-^ble 
to have some permanent contact maintained bet'^eon tnc adm-
i n i s t r a t i o n and the group of p h y s i c i s t s 'forking on chnin 
r eac t i ons in America. One poss ib le way of achieving rQis might 
be for you to en t rus t 'vith t h i s task a person whc h^e your 
confidence and who could perhaps serve in an uncf f ic in l 
Capacity. His task might comprise the followings 
(a) To ^ p r a a c b government departments, keep them inform-
ed of th-! fur ther development, and put forward recommend-
a t ions for governmont ac t ion , giving p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n 
to the problem of securing a supply of uranium ore for the 
United Statos . 
(b) To speed up the experimental work, which i s at 
p resen t being carr ied on 'within the l i m i t s of the budgets of 
un ive r s i ty labor-s tor ies , by providing funds, i f such funds 
be required , through his contac ts with p r i vn t a pcrs(-'ns who 
are w i l l i ng to make con t r ibu t ions for t h i s c-iuso, n/i3 perhaps 
-^54-
also by obtaining the cooperation of i n d u s t r i a l l a b o m t o r -
ice* whicn havo tl'c necossary oquipment. 
I undorsrand tba t Germany has ac tual ly stopped the 
s?iu of uranium irom tbo Gzechuslovakian mines which she 
has taken ovrro Thqt s'^r- should hnvo t-^kc^ such onrly 
act ion might perhaps bo understood un tho ground t h a t the 
son of the Gorman under-secre tary of s t a t e , Von 7/cizsacker, 
i s pfctachod to tbo Kaisor-Wilholm-Inst i tu to on Borl in, 
where sordc of tho Amicrican work on uranium i s noiv being 
ropeo^tod. 
Source: Annals of America, Vol, 15. 
-355-
APPENDIX X GO 
I n t e r n a t i o n a L Atomic Energy Agency G-G(ZX)/INF/165/Add.l 
GEl'IERrJL CONFERENCE • 7 0 c t o b - r I 9 7 6 
GENERAL D i s t r . 
O r i g i n a l ; ENGLISH 
Twent ie th l o g u l a r s e s s i o n 
1DV.'!7ICES IN THE -TPLICATION OP NUCLEAR BN^ R^GY 
FOR PEIGEEJL PURPOSES 
I_nTorJ-ation r e c e i v e d on 28 Sep Goriuer 1976 
EGYPT 
THE qATT.lRA DSPREFSION ffiDROELECTPJC PROJECT AS A POSSIBLE 
isPPLI C.ITION OF N^^ TCIEAR ENERGY FOR PEICEFUL^ USES 
Introdction 
1, The study end ansilysis of thp u t i l i z a t i o n of e l e c t r i c i t y 
in E£;7i^ t has s'-^ own t h a t , during 1975? 6^ % of the t o t a l 
e l e c t r i c i t y consumption was covered by hydro generat ion. 
2, However, p r o j e c t i o n s regarding the future i nd i ca t e tha t 
"by 1985 ''Lie expected share of hydro e l ec t r i c -ene rgy wil l 
diminicb to about only '^Qfo of the toa.l consumptiono Consequent-
l y , chip wil l neces s i t a t e a subs tan t i a l inc rease of the fos s i l 
fuel consumption of thermal p l a n t s , which i s est imat-d at 
over 50 mil l ion Egyptian pounds for t h ' yeer 1985. According-
l y , the pol icy for the i n s t a l l a t i o n of fu ture generai^ing 
capacity i n to the unif ied power grid ?ystem i s bpgod on 
the maximum addit ion of nuclear power genorabion for base 
load req.uirements and gas tu rb ines for peak loads , and the 
exp lo i t a t i on of a l l ava i lab le hydro resources i n the 
country. 
3. 'jf^ ho Qattai a doprepsion, (vtich i s a na tura l depression 
si tuarod at a disbanco of about 75 km- from the Moditerranoan 
So8 in the Western Desert, o f f - r s one of the unique opport-
unioios for a so la r hydro scheme which wii l provide a 
subs tan t ia l hydro-power generation addi t ion to the power 
generation system in Egypb. This b r i r f note i s intended to 
provide information on t h i s scheme, p a r t i c u l a r l y in 
connection with the poss ib le use of pe coful nuclear explo-
sions for digging the cornecting 75-teni long canal between 
the Mediterran^er Sea and the depression. 
GaograiDhic Location 
4. Tlic Qat tara depression i s located in the vilestirn Desert 
of Egypt, about 170 "km 'wnst of '\lpxpndri R, 'frith i t s nor th-
em r i some 75 km south of the Medit' r ranean coas t . This 
depression forme a v?st oval basin 3OO km long and 15Q km 
wide. I t s eas tern borders reach up to a d is tance of 250 km 
from Cairo. The area of the depression measures about 
2 
1S500 km at sea l e v e l , with an average depth of 70 metres 
pnd 0 maximum depth of I34 metres below the l eve l of the 
Mediterranean Seao Another s t r i k i n g fea ture of t h i s scheme 
i s the existence Sf a na tura l r e s e rvo i r at a height of 
220 m^etros above sea leve l next to the depression, thus 
_ 3 5 ^ 
providino: the p o p p i b i l i t y of a pchemo for pumping ptorage 
from the doprcssion to tho ro sc rvo i r during off-poak: pe r iods , 
pjid of i t s use for the vast generat ion of peak en&rg:y e s t -
iinr L-od at up to 10 000 MW. 
Descript ion of the schomo 
5. The basic concept of tho schemo l i e s in the u t i l i z a t i o n 
of difforonco in olG"vation between uhe Mediterranean Sea 
and the depression for gen^-^riting e l e c t r i c i t y by allowing 
Water p l a n t . For t ha t purpose e i t h e r a connecting canaL 
with a width of about 280 metres i s dug or twin underground 
tunnels arc cxc^>vqtedo The natura l so la r evaporation of the 
water froia tho surface oX tho depression would ensure the 
continuous flow of water the re in and maintain a constant 
l eve l of Water when reaching 50 metres below sea l e v e l , 
t h i s being the stage when the st;cady balance between 
watei' flowing from nhe sea and evaporai:ion from the surface 
of the doproqsion i s roachnd. 
Stage s of esoimatcd pow'^r output 
6. Tho development of power output from the scheme i s 
planned to be rea l ized in a s c r i e s of successive stages 
cbrough the combination of base 33d peals hydro s t a t i o n s 
from the depression i t s e l f and pumping storage to the 
ncigbbouring reporvoir . Tho f i r s t stage of implemontntion 
according to tiao preson-o planned schedule of cons t ruc t ion , 
commissioning of a 7D0-MW c.-pncity hydropovver p l a n t , i s 
forosocn for tho year 1986. Subsequently vho hydro ataoion 
wi l l be operated as a base load s t a t i o n generat ing about 
6 m i l l i a r d kWh annually for thc^ follCA/ing ton yea r s , a f t e r 
which the s t a t ion v>;ill be operated rs a poa'^ load s t a t i o n 
provid ing 1200 IW approximately for s ix hours p -r d a y . I t 
i s foreseen tha t the second stage wil l be r complecely 
independent nump storasr- s t a t ion of 5 x 400 M^7 u n i t s and 
6 X 600 MW u n i t s respec t ive ly which wi l l bo 3ble to most 
the pcoJc loads of the unified power grid system in the 
subsequent years , providing an estimated gen.-'rating peak 
ccpaci ty of about 8000 MW to 10 000 MW. 
7. With a head of 270 metres ava i lab le on rhe rim of the 
depression and with the formation of a laKo 23 times the s ize 
of Lake Constance in Europe, morp pump storage s t a t i o n s 
could be i n s t a l l e d during the 21 si: century to meet the 
future peak demands of tho Egyptian unified power system. 
Bonofits of the scheme 
8.The e l e c t r i c i t y generat ing p r o j e c t of Qat tare wi l l have 
numerous d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t benef i t s which may be 
suTTxKipxi^ .od in the following main points? 
a) Ccneration of vast amounts of e l e c t r i c i t y to moot the 
growing requirements of Egypt in the years ahead of up 
to 700 MW of base power and 10 000 MW of peak power 
could bo achieved. 
b) Fishing and canning i n d u s t r i e s could be promoted in 
the newly created lake . In addi t ion the s a l t content 
v/ill gradually increase to the sa tu ra t ion l i m i t of 
33%? thus providing the poss ib le c rea t ion of chemical 
i n d u s t r i e s ; ^ 
c) Increas ing r p i n f a l l as a r e s u l t of evaporat ion, which 
wil] enable the surrounding deser t to bo used for 
agricu].turo and p a s t u r e ; 
d) 'The faci l i t=^t ior of at tempts to explore for o i l i n 
the depression by using off-shore equipment,since the 
vi'eakness in the so i l of the depression in i t s p resen t 
s t e t c cannot withstand the weights and p re s su re s of 
heavy o i l d r i l l i n g equipment; 
o) The c rea t ion of the environmental condi t ions for the 
establishment of t o u r i s t r e s o r t s around the huge 
a r t i f i c i a l Q^ttara laXo. 
ST:OPR. cnkoii by oi-ic Ef^ytptian M i n i s t r y of E l e c t r i c i t y and 
Eiicrpy.. t o I n i t i f i t o t h e study of tbe p r o j e c t 
9 . As a r e s u l t of n e g o t i a t i o n s onterod i n t o wi th tho G-ovcrn-
mcnb of t ho FoderiL Republ ic of Gerraany? an agroetiicnt ^vas 
concluded t o undertpfeo t h o r e q u i t e d Ppq^ i ih i l i t y Study of t h e 
p r o j e c t with t n c j o i n t co-op o r a t i o n aQd f i n a n c i a l suppor t 
of i/nc Gormpn GovernniGnt. 
10 . I n accordance ivith t h i s agreement signed het'?i;cen tho 
Govoxnni'^nt; of Egypt and tho Government of t he Federa l Repub-
l i c of Gcrmnny i n Ju ly 197^5 v a r i o u s s t e p s have been i n i t i a t e d 
fo r t h e r c e l i z a t i o n of tho t a s k s embodied i n tho agreement, 
i n c l u d i n g : 
3.) S o t t i n g up of a s t e e r i n g committee under t be l e a d e r s h i p 
of t h e Egypt ian M i n i s t e r of E lec t r i c i - cy and Energy 
compris ing t 'velvo mcmbors, with "n equal number of 
Egypt ian and German r e o r e s o n t a t i v o s , t o s u p e r v i s e t h e 
v a r i o u s p h a s e s of tbe F e a s i b i l i t y Study; 
b) E s t a b l i s iaiont of e Loord of Advisers compr is ing 
e x p o r t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r qpu to to study t b e v a r i o u s 
a s p e c t s of t h e p r o j e c t and to fol low up tne work 
deno by th-^ corx^ul tants pxeout ing t h e F e a s i b i l i t y 
Study and r e p o r t t h e r e i n t o t h e S t e e r i n g Committee^ 
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c) On t h e 30th September 1975 a coiio aci; ^as r ignod b e t -
\yoen oho M i n i s t r y of B l o c t r i c i t y ^nd Energy and a 
t^roup uT C o n s u l t a n t s named " J o i n t Venture Q a t t a r a ' ' 
comprisin=^ t h e German f i rms Lahmeyor, S<aIzgi t tor , 
Deutsche P r o j e c t Union i n C o - ^ p e r a f un with .li'ab 
c n s u l t i n s ; e n g i n r o r s , Bundesanp t^ l t Fur fi e sonscha f t en 
unr Rohs to f fo , Harz ie TDnc^ino-ring and C. E. Ro 
G.vaiucloar fo r c a r r y i n g out t h e F c ^ p i b i l i t y Study of 
t h e p r o j e c t ; 
d) An independen t a u t h o r i t y ca. l led " Q a t t a r s Depress ion 
A u t h o r i t y " was e s t a b l i s h e d undrir t h e a u s p i c e s cf t h e 
M i n i s t r y of B l ' - c t r i c i t y and Energy, which 'vil 1 under -
t a k e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y fo r s u p e r v i s i n g thr^ p r o j e c t 
and c a r r y i n g out the t e c h n i c a l , f i n - inc ia l and admin is -
t r a t i v e -A/ork n e c e s s a r y . Should t h e f e a s i b i l i t y Study comf 
to a p o s i t i v e c o n c l u s i o n , t ;his Author i ty w i l l bo r e s -
p o n s i b l e a l s o for the execu t i on of the p r o j e c t . 
P a r t i c u l a r a s p e c t s of t he Feasibilit ; .Y Study 
1 1 . Anon^- t h e mam a s p e c t s covered by t h e F e a s i b i l i t y Study 
i s "uhc endeavour tc e s t a b l i s h wh-^ther tihe use of p e a c e f u l 
n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n s and t e c h n i q u e s w i l l p r o v i d e s u b s t a n t i a l 
oconouic s av ings when c a r r y i n g out ttec p r o j e c t as compared 
t o t h e use of c o n v r n t i o n a l m- thods . Should t h e nucl'-^ar 
- •3 f i2 -
vario .nt of t h e Q a t t a r a p r o j e c t bo found o p p l i c a b l o j i t could 
tho' i b-Gonie tho second ma^or p r o j e c t of i t s k ind i n t h e wor ld , 
as a s i m i l a r p r o j e c t i s be ing a t p r e s e n t c a r r i e d out i n t h e 
So v e t Union. 
ProG^rogs of work 
12 . Tho group of c o n s u l t a n t s has begun i t s a c t i v i t i e s on 
v a r i o u s a s p e c t s of t h e p r o j e c t . So f a r t he follo^ving work has 
boon undortalliens 
a) I n v i t a t i o n s fo r t e n d e r s fo r b o r e h o l e s , t e s t l i iafts and 
tUiinels have a l r eady been p repared? 
b) A c o n t r a c t for t h e removal of l and mines r ema in ing i n the 
Western Dese r t s ince vYorld War 11 has been concluded and 
li^ ork i s no'-r i n p r o g r e s s ; 
c) SurvL-ying of tho a rea has n e a r l y been cumplotod? 
d) A hyd ro -geo log i ca l study i s n o a r i n g coiiiplotion? 
e) Addition?il power m.arket survey d a t a have boon c o l l o c t o d 
foi" power market eva lua t ion? 
f) The f i n a l ocoanographic study has been completed; 
g) Ecology s t u d i e s and r e g i o n a l p l a n n i n g a re i n p r o g r d s s . 
Go-Q-p o r a t i o n vvith t h e I^lEA 
1 3 . In r e sponse to an i n v i t a t i o n extended by t h e Egypt ian 
M i n i s t r y of E l e c t r i c i t y and Energy, an liiEA m i s s i o n v i s i t e d 
t h e Q a t t a r a s i t e i n May 1976 i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n f i r s t - h q n d 
inforoiation about technical aspects of tho project and i t s 
present status as '-ell as to Gst^blish close contact bet^veen 
tho /x cncy and zhc competent E35'pti,':n authori t ies for future 
collaboration in the various studies of t h i s scheme.The 
report of the /Iguncy's mission included a number of main 
points pnd oncour^^gins; conclUFi ons, Thp mis^iion concluded 
that tMs project i s being treated as a seri^uis project by 
the Egyptian author i t ies , as indicated by i t s f i r s t pMority 
among the main national projects and the creation of a 
special independent authority for tho project known as the 
i''^,attara Depression /luthorit;^'-". 
Future Progress 
14. I t i s espcctod that the Feasibi l i ty Study referred to 
will be concluded during 1978. Further information on deve-
lopments concerning the Qattara project will be circulated 
to Member States as they emerge. 
iiiforaiation about tochnical aspects of tho project and i t s 
present status as AGH as to ostpblish close contact bet.veen 
the .^  cncy and ubc compotent Egyptian authori t ies for future 
collaboration in the various studios of t h i s scheme.Tho 
report of tho Agency's mission included a number of main 
points pnd encouraging cnnclupions. Thp mission concluded 
that t'eis project i s being treated as a serious project by 
the Egyptian author i t ies , as indicated by i t s f i r s t p r io r i ty 
amxng the main national projects and the creation of a 
special independent authority for the project known as the 
l''^,atta.ra Depression Authority". 
Future Progress 
14-. I t i s e>rpcctod that the Feasibi l i ty Study referred to 
will be concluded during 1978. Further information on deve-
lopments concerning the Qattara project will be circulated 
to Member States as they emerge. 
itt-iBNDIX XI 
TAHLE . ?/OHLD PLUTOinmi PBODUCTION mi) ACGIM.TLAT1D STOCKS -
S'/SE' I F SAFEGU:J2D£ ijm 99 .9 PSR CENT EFFECTIVE IN 1980 ENOUGH 
PLUTOlilUivI COUl.D }3E DIVERTED V/ITFIOUT DETECTION TO PHODUCE 
NUCLE.;^ ./EAPONS ..T THE SATE OF ONE PER WEEK 
Tota l ' worl cl Approx. annual ;lppj. ox. accuraul a ted 
Yoa.r nucloa-f gen- commercial p l u t o n - cummei-cial p l u t -
o r a t i n g capac- iurn p r o d u c t i o n oniuni s t o c k s 
i t y (G'.'.e) ( t o n s ) ( t o n s ) 
1970 2& -. 4 ' 20 
1971 26 5 25 
1972 35 7 30 
1973 ^7 9 W 
1974 72 18 • 60 
1975 100 25 85 
1976 150 35 120 
1977 180 . 45 165 
1973 210 50 215 
1979 260 65 280 
1980 300 80 360 
1981 4-70 125 585 
1982 570 160 545 
1983 670 180 725 
1984 770 210 935 
1985 870 240 1175 
1986 1030 270 1445 
1987 1190 300 1775 
1988 ' 1350 360 2135 
1989 1510 400 2535 
1990 1700 450 5000 
T i b l o . I n r t 
[our-
Gouncry 
l r g 6 m : i n a 
A u s t r i a 
Bolgium 
B r a z i l 
Bulg-^eio 
Can con. 
Gzochoslovn™ 
k i a 
Fi n l and 
F r a n c e 
FS German^?-
G-orman DR 
Hungary-
I n d i a 
I t c l y 
Jap&n 
K o r c o j S o u t h 
Mexico 
Nc thor l -^nde 
Pakie-ca ' i 
Sp a i n 
Sivodcn 
S w i t z e r l a n d 
Tai '^an 
T h a i l a i i d 
USSR 
UK 
USA 
Y u g o s l a v i a 
EotrJLs 
C o u t j ' i c s 
R e a c t o i ' s 
n l l o d N u c l e a r 
- f c ' ' d i n c r o a e 
To ta l n u c l -
e a r c a p a c -
i^ -y 197^ 
(MWe) 
320 
— 
WO 
— 
440 
2500 
iio 
~ 
2900 
4200 
430 
— 
780 
600 
5000 
™ 
-
530 
120 
1070 
2600 
1000 
— 
™ 
3500 
5800 
40500 
— 
1974 
19 
170 
G.-^Dacity (I.rVo) 72800 
' Cppoci 
'0 u v o r 
No. of 
poOTor 
. t y i n 1974 and 
t h i s p e r i o d . 
T o t a l nuc l i 
1980 sbowing a 
9 an 
c a p a c i t y 1980 
r e a c t o r s ( M 7 G ) 
( o v o r 
MWQ) 
1 
— 
1 
— 
1 
7 
1 
— 
10 
10 
2 
~ 
4 
3 
10 
— 
— 
2 
1 
3 
4 
3 
— 
— 
16 
31 
60 
— 
20 
920 
TOO 
1700 
600 
1800 
6100 
1800 
1500 
15000 
22000 
800 
440 
1600 
3400 
19000 
1200 
1300 
530 
120 
8600 
8300 
5700 
3000 
500 
10000 
11000 
I38OOO 
1400 
I98O 
28 
393 
270000 
, 
N o . o f p o w e r 
r e a c t o r s 
( o v e r 20 MWe) 
' 
2 
1 
3 
1 
4 
12 
5 
3 
23 
28 
z 
y 1 
8 
7 
29 
2 
2 
2 
1 
11 
11 
8 
4 
1 
24 
39 
156 
2 
Country 
NUMBER OF POWER REACTORS 
Experimental r e a c t o r s Power r e a c t o r s 
I n ope-
r a t i o n 
Under 
cons-
truc-
tion 
Shut 
down 
In Under 
oper- cons-
ation true-
tion 
PI ann-
ed 
Shut 
down 
A r g e n t i n a 
A u s t r a l i a 
A u s t r i a 
Bangladesh ~ 
Belgium 1 
B r a z i l 
B u l g a r i a 
Canada 
Czec ho S lovak i a 
DR Germany , . . 
FR Germany 5 
F in land 
Franco 
Hungary 
I n d i a 
I s r a e l 
I t a l y 
Japan 1 
Korea?Rep. of -
Mexico -
Netherla .nds ~ 
Norway 
Palmist an 
South Af r i c a -
^ a i n 
Sweden 1 
Swi tze r l and -
Taiwan . <. 
Tha i l and 
USSR 2 
U.K. 1 
USA 3 
Yugos l av i a 
1 2 
10 
6 
1 
1 
12 
11 
1 
6 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
3 
12 
15 
32 
2 
1 
1 
1 
5 
2 
3 
2 
2 
14 
1 
1 
6 
2 
6 
57 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
4 
4 
14 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
26 
1 
1 
1 
8 
5 
8 
2 
1 
10 
102 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
12 
= d a t a not a v a i l a b l e . 
- = no r e a c t o r s ; . 
Source,<=!-Power & Research R e a c t o r s i n Member S t a t e s , I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Atomic Energy Agency,1972. "Pow-r R e a c t o r s ' 7 3 " , N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r m 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l , V o l . l b , N o . 2 0 3 , i p r i l 1973? p p . 327-62. 
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MJMBER OP RESEARCH REACTORS 
rnir-ri-r>v ^^ Opera- Under con-
oouxiory ^^^^ s t r u c t ! on P lanned 
Arab Republ ic of Egypt 1 -
Argen t ina 5 ~ 
A u s t r a l i a 2 -
A u s t r i a 3 -
Belgium 5 -
B r a z i l 3 -
B u l g a r i a 1 -
Canada 8 -
Colombia 1 -
Czoc ho S lovak ia 3 -
Denmark 5 _ 
PR Germany 28 3 
F in land 1 -
Prance 23 
Greece 1 -
Hungary 2 -
I n d i a 3 -
I n d o n e s i a 1 -
I r a n 1 -
I r aq , ' 1 - -
I s r a e l 2 -
I t a l y 16 - -
Japan 21 2 
Korea ,Rep. of 1 -
Mexico 1 -
N e t h e r l a n d s 7 1 
Nor Way Z). _ 
P a k i s t a n 1 -
P h i l i p p i n e s 1 -
Poland 3 1 
P o r t u g a l 1 -
Romania 1 -
South Af r i ca 2 - -
^ a i n 5 - ' 
Sweden 5 - -
Swi tze r l and 6 -
Thai land 1 -
Turkey 1 -
USSR 25 -
U.K. 25 - 1 
USA 121 9 ^ 
Uruguay 1 -
Venezuela 1 -
Vietnam,South 1 -
Yugos l av i a 5 -
Z a i r e 5 Rep o of 1 -
Chi le - 1 
Cuba - 1 
Source: Power & Research R e a c t o r s i n Member S t a t e s , I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l Atomic Energy Agency,1972. 
iJPEKDIX XV 
INTERIM AGRElTIEIil BET/EEK THE UNITED ST..TES OE 
/J1ERICA ANE THE UNION OE SOVEIT SOCIJ i lST REPUBLICS 
ON CERTAIN MEASU-iES \7ITH RESPECT TO THE LILIITiJEION OE 
STRATEGIC OPEENSIVE ;J^,1S 
The UnitGcl S t a t e s of AiT.erxca and t h e U n i o n of S o v i e t 
S o c i a l i s t R e ^ . u h l i c s , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to a s t h e 
P e x t i e s , 
Conv inced t h a t t h e TresAcy on t h e L i r ' ^ i t a t i o n o f 
i i n t i - B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e S y s t e n s r n d t h i s I n t e r i n A g r e e n e n t 
oh. C e r t a i n Aeas i r r c s w i t h ResASct t o t h e L i i r d t a t i o n of 
S t r a t e g i c O f f e n s i v e airns A^all c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e c r e a t i o n 
of n o r e f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c t i v e n e g o t i r t i o n s on 
U n i t i n g s t r a t e g i c a r n s a s w e l l a s t o t h e r e l r u S a t i o n of 
i n t e r n s . t i o n a l t e n s i o n and t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f t r u s t 
"between S t a t e s , 
. T a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i A he tv / een 
s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e a r u s , 
M i n d f u l o f t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r A r t i c l e VI 
of t h e T r e a t y on t h e N o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f HucleaJ* 
Y/ea^'.ons, 
Have a g r e e d a s f o l l o w s s 
A r t i c l e I 
The P a r t i e s u n d e r t a k e n o t t o s t a r t c o n s t r u c t i o n of 
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addi t iona l fixed land-based intercontinen-oal "ba l l i s t ic 
miss i l e (IGBl) launchers a f t e r Ju ly 1, 1972. 
; J " t i d e I I 
Tiae P a r t i e s undertake not to convert land-based 
launchers for lii^ht ICBils, or for ICBMs of older types 
dej.'jloyed p r io r to 1964, in to land-based launclicrs f o r 
heavy ICBMs of types deployed af ter t h a t t i n e . 
Ar t i c l e I I I 
The p p r t i e s undertake to l i n i t subna>.rine-launched 
b a l l i s t i c n i s s i l e (SIBB!) laimchers and no dern b a l l i s t i c 
Liissile submarines to t he numbers opera t iona l and under 
cons t ruc t ion on the date of s ignature of t h i s Inter im 
^^Sreement, and in addi t ion to launchers an^ v submarines 
constructed under procedures e s t sb l i shed by the P a r t i e s 
as replacements for a.n equal number of ICBIu launchers 
of older typos deployed p r io r to 1964- or for launchers on 
01d er submar ine s. 
^ j r t ic le IV 
Subject t o the provis ions of t h i s Inter im Agreement, 
modernization anCi replacerient of s t r a t e g i c offensive 
b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s and launchers covered by t h i s Interim 
Agreement may be undertaken. 
j ' j r t i c l e V 
1. Por the purpose of providing assurrjice of compliance 
with the provis ions of t h i s Inter im ^.greement, each Pejrty 
-570-
sliall use national technical means of ver i f ica t ion at 
i t s disposal in a manner consistent with generr?.lly 
recognized x-^rinciples of international lavj. 
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere '?;ith.-
the national technical means of ver i f ica t ion of the 
other PcJ'ty ope rat ins in accordance with paragraph 1 
of t h i s Ar t i c le . 
3 . Each Party undertakes not to use deliherate 
concealment measures which impede ver if icat ion hy 
national technical means of conplfence with the 
provisions of t h i s Interim agreement. This obligation 
shall not require changes in current construction, 
assembly, conversion, or overhaul pract ices . 
Art ic le VI 
To promote the objectives and implementation of the 
provisions of th is Interim ixgpreemont, the Pc^jrcties shal l 
use the Standing Consultative Commission established 
under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of 
Anti-Ball is t ic Missile Systems in accordance ^i/ith the 
provisions of that /ar t ic le . 
Article VII 
The Par t ies undertake to continue active negotiations 
for l imitat ions on s trategic offensive arms. The obligations 
provided for in th i s Interim Agreement shal l not prejudice 
the scope or terms of the l imita t ions on s t ra tegic offensive 
arns wliich nay be worked out in the course of further 
negotiations. 
Art icle VIII 
1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon 
exchange of v;ritten notices of acceptance by each Party, 
j^vhich exchange shall take place simultaneously v\;ith the 
exchange of instruncnts of r a t i f i ca t ion of the Treaty on 
the l imi ta t ion of ^--nti-Ballistic Missile Systeas. 
2. This Interim ^igreement shall 'remain in force for 
a period of five years unless replaced ear l ier by an 
agreexiient on more complete measures l imiting s t ra tegic 
offensive arms. I t i s the objective of the Par t ies to 
conduct active follo\>/-on negotiations with the aim of 
concluding such an agreement as soon as possible. 
3. Each Pfirty shall , i n exercising i t s national 
sovereignty, have the r igh t to withdraw from, t h i s Interim 
"A"greement""if~it decid'es that^oxtT'aorllinary events related: 
to the subject matter of t h i s Interim iigreoaent have 
jeopardized i t s supreme i n t e r e s t s . I t shall give notice 
of i t s decision to the other Party six months prior to 
withdrawal from th i s Interim ixgreement. Such notice shall 
include a statement of the extraordinary events the 
notifying Party regards as having jeopardized i t s 
supreme i n t e r e s t s . 
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Done a t Moscow on May 26, 1972, i n two corbies, each 
i n t h e E n g l i s h and Russ ian l a n g u a g e s , both t e x t s be ing 
e q u a l l y a u t h e n t i c , 
FOR OHE UNITED ST;JES OF iMERIOAs 
RICiL'^D WIXOK 
p r e s i d e n t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of i j a e r i ca 
FOR THE UMON OP SOVIET S O C I A L I S T REPUBLICS'. 
LEONID I . BREZHNEV 
General S e c r e t a r y of t h e C e n t r a l 
Committee of t h e OPSU 
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